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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE INTERACTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
lhNDADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN THE DEFINING OF MARS
PROJECT VIKING
James Francis McNulty
An engineering %nd administrative systems study is made of the
definition of _[ASA's 1975 Mars landing project. The work performed at
NASA's Langley Research Center in the years 196h-1969 from initial
_ probe studies to lander hardware commitment is described. The focus
:_ is on the technical staff, its contributions and its interactions with
Langley mana@ement, Washington NASA Headquarters, and other NASA Centers.
The workings of the technical-adminlstratlve systems are analyzed by
utilization of formal system concepts. An appendix documenting the
technology base developed in this period is included.
The main body of the work, the barrative, follows the progress
i of toe program through (i) the Voyag_.r years where Langley's roles were
fi:-stthat of consultant to the Jet 2.opulsion Laboratory on entry prob-
lems and then manager of the Voyager entry system and (2) the Viking
years where Langley undertook the total project responsibility. The
Narrative starts by descr4bing Langley's operations in the pre-Mars
years--working environment, management policies, sketches of pertinent
personallties, contributions to Apollo--to furnish the necessary back-
ground for an understanding of the technical-administretive interplay
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during the Mars studies. The Mars years, viewed from the vantage
point of a member of the technical staff, traces the definition of the
mission and the administrative _'esponsibilities as influenced by the
technological challenges, Langley Research Center's and NASA Headquarter's
Interests, and forces external to NASA such as Congress and the scien-
tific community. Two principal contributions of the technical staff--
+he defining of entry and landing mission mode, and the total system
definition of launch vehicle, spacecraft, and lander--are presented in
technical depth to delineate the engineering systems methodology devel-
oped. The Analysis portion examines the workings of the technical
staff, of the technical staff-Langley administration operation, and
the technical staff-Langley-NASA interactions. Formal concepts pro-
posed by physical and behavioral scientists are utilized to analyze
(i) the means by which a researcher makes a major contribution, (2) _he
performance of the technical staff, (3) the opera_ion of Langley's
management system, and (h) the efficacy of NASA project decisions.
_ Similarities are noted in the methods utilized at Langley in contribu-
ting to the Apollo and Viking projects. Conclusions are drawn on the
basis of the Analysis regarding why and how Ls_.gley Research Center's
staff was able to ms2e major contributions to project hardware defini-
tion although the Center's primary fu::ction is research.
V .
_,, _" _'_ ....... _----i .... .__-....................................
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PREFACE
The NASA, starting in the lake 1950's and carrying through the
1960's, faced and mastered many complex challenges of large size
projects such as Mercury, Gemini, Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter and Apollo.
The size and complexity of these challenges necessitated NASA to
utilize its technological capability together with administrative
procedures in _ new way which is now commonly termed "aerospace
technology." Because of the success of the space program, considerable
attention has been given to the "aerospace technology" and transferring
its methodology to attacking problems in the civil sector, i.e. mass
transportation, pollution, urban problems, etc. The success has also
attracted attention in the management area and investigations have
been made to study and document the management techniques used to
allow their exploitation in other fields. These studies were carried
out by Schools or authorities in management and, for the most part,
have concentrated on the management decision making and have treated
! the technical aspects only incidentally. For this reason, it is felt
i that there is a gap in the literature--that of presenting the technical
and managerial problems of a large scale project from the point of
view of the engineering or technical staff level.
In an effort to broaden the _ase of project management studies,
this dissertation (using the NASA Mars lander program as the case in
point) will focus on the technical aspects--both definition and
executlon--wlth the role of m_-Z_,'_t viewed as (a) supportive of the
vi _
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technical staff (b) expansive or constrictive regardlng technical
options and (c) directive toward technical approach. It is conceded
that the work presented herein will tend to be biased in favor of the
importance of the technical staff's contribution; however, it is felt
that a description and analysis of the entire systems operation from
the vantage point of one intimately associated with the technlc_t
details is a singular approach worthy of consideration. The objectives
of this dissertation will be:
1. To present the technical problems and their solutions by the
technical staff in sufficient detail to demonstrate the derivation of
the essential technological base for mission definition.
2. To detail Low the technological base impacts on administrative
decision making and, vice versa, how administrative decisions impacts
on the technological base.
3. To apply basic formal administration and engineering system
concepts to the technical staff's actions and to the technical staff-
administrative interactions so as to form a conceptual framework for
explanation and analysis of the system's operation.
The focus of this study will be the Langley Research Center--its
technical and administrative staffs. The dissertation will detail
Langley Research Center's efforts in support of a scientific investi-
gation of Mars; in particular, how Langley entered into studies of the
problem, how Langley organized and carried out its assig:_ents, and
its participative role in defining a national project. It will concern
itself with such topics ._sconcept formulation and technical
vii
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approach; the definition and solution of critical problem areas; team
organization and cohension; Langley interfaces with other NASA Centers,
Headquarters, s_Idindustry; decision making at all levels ; and the evo-
lution of an acceptable program through the man:/ perturbations in direc-
tion from Headquarters and Congress.
This evolution of the program and Langley's participation will be
tracked through its following phases:
The Saturn iB/Centaur "Voyager" Phase (196h-1965)
During this phase, Langley's responsibility was primarily
that of a consultant on the entry problem and technolo_
development. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory was responsible
for all mission hardware for a 1971 launch. This modest mis-
sion was terminated by NASA and replaced by the large scale...
The Saturn V "Voyager" Phase (1966-1967)
Langley assumed responsibility for the entry system hardware.
The overall mission was to be managed by NASA Headquarters.
The scheduled launch data of 1971 slipped to 1973 because of
Congressional funding priorities and later was cancelled by
Congress in its entirety for _he same reason.
The Titan/Centaur "Viking" Phase (1968-1969) '
Langley assumed responsibility for the enitre mission manage-
[! ment and hardware. Funding problems necessitated a revision
in launch date from 1973 to the presented scheduled 1975.
The writer was continuously involved in Mars studies from their
inception at Langley in 196h until a firm contract was awarded to
vii_
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Martin Marietta in 1969 to carry out the Mars landing. My roles
were such that they afforded me a microscopic view of work and decisions
at the technical level and a macroscopic view of the administrative
decision making at the highest NASA levels. At the time when Mars
studies were initiated at Langley, I was made responsible for systems
integration (a role which continued throughout the entire period)
which required me to understand all technologies and their interfaces.
This role, incidentally, made me a focal point for the effort and
furnished me with an overall view of all the technologies and their
meshing, tecnnically and administratively. In addition to this pro-
Ject responsibility, I, as a fizst-line supervisor in my Division
(Engineering) was directly responsible for supervising the structural
design, subsystem integration, and system analysis portions of the
work. As a result, I became acquainted w_th and worked closely with
technology specialists in various disciplines throughout NASA and
industry.
Other roles assigned to me during this period which increased my
appreciation of the many facets of the problems were:
(i) Secretary of Langley's Planetary Missions Technology Steering
Committee which was responsible for making recommendationm to top
Center management.
(2) Member of NASA intercenter Mariner M_rs i_71 Probe Worki_
Oro_.
(3) Author of technical work statements for industry-wide contract _"
cempetition.
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N(h) Member of NASA evaluation boards for contractor selection.
(5) Technical Representative of the Contracting Officer on Mars
studies - responsible for approving contractor performance.
The dissertation will be divided into three parts: Narrative,
A_lalysis, and Appendix. Part I, the Narrative, will have a straight
expository, historical base relating the key technological advances
and key decision points within the human technical staff-administrative
interactions so that the reader can obtain a broad appreciation of all
aspects of the project's development; the narrative will be divided
into chapters, each describing, normally, a year's effort. Part II,
the Analysis, will analyze how the technical and administrative system
worked by examining the systems and decisions within the framework of
formal concepts and theories. Part III, the Appendix, will contain,
mainly, the documentation of the development of the pervasive
J
technology base.
Thus, in effect, this work will reflect an inside view from the
technical s_aff level of how an approximate billion dollar project
reached fruition through many technological challenges and adminis-
trative course redirections. It is believed that the presented
material represents a significant addition to the literature on
project management in that its approach is fundamentally that of the
influence of the engineerir_ input on administrative decision
making and program definition.
The _!ssertation is the result of a cooperative endeavor e_
Union College and Langley Research Center. _,th institutions have
x
t
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given me full enco,,ragement throughout the four year period for academic
course work, research, and dissertation preparation. In particular,
appreciation is owed to my immediate supervisor at Langley Reseat _"
Center, Mr. Ken Bush, and to my co-advisors at Union College, Dr. Gardner
Ketch_ and Dr. Robert Sharlet ;withcut their un_tinting support and all;
this dissertation could not have been written,..
Finally, this dissertation is dedicated with love to my wife for
her understanding and positive attitude which sustained me throughout.
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THE NARRATIVE
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION--TKE PRE-MABS YEARS
Langley Operation i_i_ - 1964
Before proceeding into the mainstream of the _rs studies, it is
essential to define the "sentiments ''I (ideas, beliefs, or feelings
about the work and others involved in it) of the organization and of
%
the people in it because these sentiments influence the course of
Langley management and its technical staff. To explain these senti-.
ments, it is necessary to look at the orga.nization in its prior NASA
days and to trace its progress and its driving forces until we reach
the initiation of the Mars studies.
:, In 1915, Congress created a Government organization to be known
; as the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) with the
charter "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems
_' of flight, with a view to their practical solution," and also to
"direct and conduct research and experiments in aeronautics." The act
i specified that NACA be governed by a committee appointed by the Presi-
dent and that it report directly to the President. Twenty-elght
years later Dr. Karl T. Compton of MIT, in a 1943 s4dress to British
scientists described the NACA as "... unique among our Federal
scientific agencies, in that its controlling body is a Committee which i
mmm i $
1Lawrence, Paul R. and Seller, John A., Organizational Behavior i
and Administration , (Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
and the Dorsey Press, 1965) pp. 1_-161.
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serves without salary and has been composed of men o£ such high
character and distinction as to render it completely free from
,,2
political influence.
One of the first decisions of the committee was that _ well
equipped laboratory was essential to its work. A tract of land near
Hampton, Virgini_ fronting on Back River, an estuary of Chesapeake
Bay, was purchased in 1916 and the property was named "Langley Field."
An office building and wind tunnel were constructed shortly there-
after and formally opened in ledieation exercises in June 1920. This
was the seed £ron_ which several I'_CA Centers originated in the follow-
ing decades and which, in turn, served as the nucleus for NASA in
1958.
The early years, prior to NACA expansion in preparation for the
oncoming World War II, were a period of slow but steady growth.
Facilities and a competent staff were gradually built up. Key men,
leaders in research, were carefully selected and put in Jobs where
their ability would find its opportunity. By 1930, Langley was the
recognized leader in aeronautical research world-wide. In 1936,
Langley had grown to a staff of 370 with I0 wind tunnels and war
: clouds wer- gatherins. The years between 1939 and 19_6 vere years of
comparatively rapid growth. From 1939 to 19_I, two new laboratories
• ,l • , t • , ,_
2Gray, George W., Frontiers of Flight, (New York, Alfrf_ A. Knopf,
19_8)p. II.
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!(Ames at Moffet Field, California and Lewis at Cleveland, Ohio) ,ere
authorized and Langley was expanded. With the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the United States' aeronautical position was in a crisis condition;
daring proposals for the development of military aircraft were being
made by the Army and Navy. Complez problems were being referred to
NACA for solution. Additional men and facilities were required; a
large construction program and a recruitment program were undertaken.
During this _ericd, :_CA temporarily put aside basic research and
concentrated on studies of military aircraft; at one time, there were
78 different t)_es of aircraft under in%estigation. In addition, NACA
was requested to investi6ate guided missiles and Langley acquired a
tract of land_ Wallops Island, on the Atlantic side of the Virginia
Eastern Shore as a test site. A missii_ xaunch site was constructed
on Wallops Island and a new type of research came under Langloy's
cognizance. A% the war's end, HACA's resources could be tabulated as
follows:
(1) A staff of 6,80h, approximately 50% professional, -- 3,253
at Langley, 8hh at Ames, 2,572 at Lewis, and 135 at the Washington
Office.
(2) Laboratory installations represented an outlay of $85,000,000
in three centers as a6alnst $12,000,000 in one center in 1939.
It is also worth noting that the NACA effort during the war
-_ years vas primarily an "In-house" effort; NACA sponsored research, i
mostly to universities, totalled only $1,500,000 from 19h0 to 19h6.
I
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I returned to Langley from military service in 19h6 after having
previously worked for several months at Langley as a Civil Engineer
during the construction expansion following graduation from Union
College in 19hh. NACA's table of organization at this tine is shown
in Figure I-1. I was reassigned to the Construction Engineering
Section of the Engineering Services Division as a structural engineer
to assist in the design and construction supervision of new facilities.
The section consisted of approximately 50 engineers and designers
divided into three groups--mechanical, structural, and architectural--
and was responsible for a construction budget of five to ten million
dollars per year_ again, all design work was done in-house as were
the contracting and construction inspection.
The management philosophy at that time is worth)" of examination.
The center was, for all practical purposes, an independent operatlng
entity controlled by first generation aeronautical researchers with
the individual researcher furnishing the basic input into the programs
which Langley would carry out. Promotions were slow, salaries were
low, and emphasis was placed on worthwhile research. Facilities
were excellent and constantly upgraded. Status within the profession
was high. Challenges were great--frontlers in transonic and super-
sonic flight were under investigation. As mentioned previously,
NACAwas an independent agency reporting to the executive branch.
Its yearly budget was in the order of $200,000,000 and usually passed
Congress without controversy--presummhly because the budget was not
sufficiently large to attract undue attention and because the
1974020203-023
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reputation of the agency was good. The Washington office was small
and served the centers rat_:cr than vice versa. The funds were funnelled
to the centers and utilized where the centers themselves deemed
appropriate. The younger engineers, recruited into the center during
the war years, were socializea into the system by the senior engineers
and, in the most part, remained loyal to, and did not question, the
system. The engineer who did not fit the system quickly left on his
own accord (turncver was extrem_l_ _all). All in all, At was an
efficient, paternal organization, somewhat remote and "_.vory-towerish,"
manned by t_:cdistinct groups--the few senior engineers from the
1920's and early 1930's and the many young engineers hired in the late
1930's and early 19h0's.
From the end o£ World War to "Sputnik" in 1957, NACA operated in a
near "status quo" mode as outlined above. Promising ongineering
graduates were hired annually to replace engineers leaving the agency
so that by 1957 a few of the engineers hired during the 1939-19h6
expansion period had moved into positions of middle management although
their primary responsibility remained technical rather than adminis-
trative_ administrative work remained minimal and the center operated
more or less on its own policies. There were minor organization
cha_es in this period and the Pilotless Aircraft Research Divisiou,
charged with research responsibility on guided missiles, inc-eased
somevhat in size and importance relative to the rest of the organiza-
tion.
The flight of Sputnik might have chocked the United States but
I
L
I
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its effect on NACA could only h., _ -_edrevolutionary. Funds poured
into NACA to push sF_-.cescience-.-_ ' eld in whic i only a tiny minority
were working. Young engineers ._'_. .ned funds to develop launch
vehicles and spacecraft for L.: '.._esof space study--atmospheric
"h_i_ics, thermal heating-. -....'k.cations, etc The organizational
systF_. _,t_,d we._ _. .. -_F staff remained in control; _t
co-opted the i_ t ,_J.scit[i::e_nd gave the younger engineers the freedom
to investigate 5h_ ne_ t_:chnolcgy including studies of how to put a
man in orbit- On Ju!j, _9, 1958, President Eisenhower signed the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act and on October i,
1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Adm!nA_+ration was formed
with NACA as the nucleus
President Eisenhower approved "Project Mercury" which co_itted
NASA to put a man in earth orbit. The Langley group working on the
project was separated administratively from Langley and given the name
of Space Task Group (ST(;)with Dr. Gilruth as head. Astronauts were
selected and assigned to STG. STG, with mission responsibility,
expanded and Langley took over the Job of developing the technology
to support the mission. Many of the smSitious and adventures_e
aeronautlcal engineers transferred from Langley to ST(]during this
period. As Project Mercury was too large for ST(}to handle by itself,
many elements were "subcontracted" to various _ASA Centers. For
example, the building of the worldwide communications network was
dele6ated to Langley. It was at this time that I was introduced to
the Aerospeae world. I was made project engineer for constructing
k
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sites at Bermuda and In the Canary Islands. Another group oi Langley
facility design engineers were pressed ir_toservice of conducting
?
ground and flight tests of prelimina_'y Mercury hardware. In this
manner, the Engineering Services Division _n which I worked was split
about in half--half suppcrtin_ flight projects and half working on
ground facility 4esign.
This arrangement continued throughout the years 1958 to 1961--
the carrying cut of Project Mercury, the development work on Project
Gemini, and the commitment in 1961 for Project Apollo at which time
ST(;became the Ma:,ned Spacecraft Center (MSC) with permanent facilitiec
in Houston, Texas. As MSC bulit up in I_62 and 1963, there was less
need for "subcontracting" to other Centers so that while Langley was
still heavily involved in de, eloping Apollo technology, personnel
were being "freed-up" to work on research problems in much the same
manner, and under the samt management, a_ in pre-NASA days. A major
change, however, had occurred in the type of research problem to be
_nvestJgated. Space research had become an equal partner with
aeronautical research; this was recognized even at the engineering
level where the Engineering Services Division was reorganized into
tvo divisions--the Flight Vehicles and Syotems Divlsion--FVSD--(for
space projects) and the Research Moa_Is and Facilities Division (for
@_ound-based projects ).
The "sentiments" at Langley iu 196k at the initiation of Mars
studies coa_d then be summarized as:
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(i) Top management was research oriented, conservative, and
protective of their independence from Washington Headquarters.
(2) Middle management had much the same sentiments and was research
task discipline oriented. A sprinkling of middle managers, however,
had enjoyed the challenge and exneriences associated with working with
contractors cn large aerospace projects and were interested in
broader systems problems.
(B) The engineers themselves were a more sophisticated group
than ten years previously, and the availability of funds for space
research furnished the engineers with fluidity to transfer within
Langley, with more freedom in Job selection and execution, and with
more opportunity to display their talents.
A table of organization for LRC at this period of time is given
in Figure I-2. In general, the organization was designed to work in
the following manner:
(1) Ground research carried out within the llne Research Divi-
sions (Groups 1-3) with aid of the Research Models and Facility
Division to design research apparatus and of the shops in the
Mechanical Service Division to build same. Otttputwould be a
Technical Note publishing the research results with wide circulation
in the field of the particular discipline.
(2) Space research usually implied an actual flight test. In
this case, the individual researcher requiring a flight test would,
through his Division, obtain the services of a Research Program
Manqer from the Applied Materials and Pl_sics Division under the
1974020203-028
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Office for Flight Projects. This manager would interface with and
coordinate the researcher, Washington Headquarters (for funding), and
the Office of Engineering and Technical Services (OETS). OETS,
through a technical project engineer (TPE) in FVSD and the line
i
organizations, would be responsible for carrying out the technical
aspects of the project. The duties of a TPE are outlined in a
memorandum from the Deputy Chief (OETS) which is included as Appendix
I-A.
(3) Large flight proJec' , approximately ten million dollars or
more, were managed out of a special project office set up for that
particular purpose. The line organizstions (such a_ FVSD) would
assign men 5o the project for the length of the project. One such
project was the Lunar Orbiter Pro.lect which was assigned the
responsibility of a precursor mission to Project Apollo for photo- J
graphic mapping of the moon and determining the landing sites.
Approximately lO0 engineers were assigned to this project office.
1974020203-030
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Individual Researcher- Langley Management - Headquarters Operation
As indicated previously, the Langle} management philosophy at the
beginning of the Mars studies was primarily one of "bottom up"
generation of research p_'ograms with maximum independence of the
individual researcher. By "bottom up" it is meant that the ideas
or programs are concei',ed at the technical level and are transmitted
to the Langley management for implementing approva_ -- funds,
manpower, etc. An overall systems concept of this procedure is
indicated on figure 1-3, For the vast majority of Langley programs,
the Washington Headquarters loop is not activated. If the researcher's
request is well defined to be within Langley's charter, the llne
organization reviews the request and evaluates its worthiness. If
supported, the researcher performs his work, has it reviewed by the
llne organization and/or special technical committees, and outputs
his product whether it be a technical data report or a piece of
hardware.
The Washington Headquarters loop is activated (by Headquarters
directives to the Center) if (1) the dollar value of a particular
planned contract is over one mill_on dollars or (2) the program is
L
one that would impact overall NASA planning (such as any interplane-
tary study). In these cases, Headquarters must approve the planned
program before the Center can proceed. In isolated cases, Washington
Headquarters could initiate programs by furnishing the original
input to the Cegter. Two such programs were the Lunar Orbiter and
the development of the worldwide communinations network for Project i
i
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Figure l-3.--Normal Langley operating mode.
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Mercury_ in both instances, the original responsible Center was una_]u
to carry out the programs because of a commitment overload. The
systems mode is this instance is illustrated in figure l-h. Briefly,
this mode consists of a negotlating cycle between Headquarters and
LRC management to obsain sgreement or contract as to end item arid
resources. At which t_me,.the responsibility is given to a project
office reporting directly to top LRC management to carry out the
program. Mr. Erasmus H. Kloman, Senior Research Associate, National
Academy of Public Administration who researched the management methods
on Lunar Orbiter says in thi regard "Senior management at NASA
Headquarters debated at length whether an agency center rather than
JPL should be assigned respon_il _ y for management of a lunar pro-
Ject" and the develcp_ent of the specialized competence required. >
Recognizing that some duplication might be necessary and desirable,
Headquarters authorized Langley Mesearch Center to investigate the
feasibility of its undertaking a possible assignment from NASA cf a
major flight project of tile scope of Lunar Orbiter. Langley manage-
ment deliberated carefully and concluded that it would be able to
handle such a mission. The Center was very receptive to the
challenge of its first spaceflight project. The positive attitude
and enthusiasm of top management were contagious and infected the
Lunar Orbiter project staffs. Some of Lar_ley's top talents sought
assignment on the project, considering it a career plus. The Lunar
Orbiter at both La_ley and the Boeing Co. [the contractor] were
tightly knit coheJive units. They [Langley] accepted the assignment
1974020208-088
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with full commitment and a determination to make it succeed. The
Langley management placed great store in its reputation for fulfilling
every mission it set out to accomplish. In reporting to Washington
Headquarters, Langley made no effort to hold back information concern-
ing problems that arose. Washington headquarters reciprocated with
full cooperation and support. For all of these reasons, the
institutional environment surrounding Lunar Orbiter was favorable to
,3
teamwork. Much the same is appropriate relative to the Mercury
network; the quote above is included to demonstrate the operation of
the systems mode of figure 1-h.
To illustrate further the operation of the individual researcher -
Langley management - NASA headquarters system mode in figure 1-3 in
programs of large national impact (simila- to the Mars landing
program), Langley's role in Project Mercury and Project Apollo will
be examined.
Immediately after the Soviet Union orbited Sputnik, a Langley
researcher, Max Faget, Initiated studies in his work unit on the prob-
lem of orbiting a man in space -- this was premature even to the
United States concentrating on orbiting a "ball" in space. Since his
work vas engaged in rocket performance and propulsion, no extra-
ordinary procedural changes were necessary to allow him to research
the problem; no large contractual funds were required as the work
3NASA SP-bgo1, Unmanned Space Project b_Lnagement. Surveyor and
Lunar Orbiter, Kloman, p. 11, 19.
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was carried quietly in-house, Further, this was prior to the
eztablishment of the NASA and the NACA centers operated as nearly
independent entities. _fter the establishment of the NASA and the
national approval of Project Mercury (Faget's Concept), Faget's work
unit formed the nucleus of the Manned Spacecraft Center and Faget's
LRC Division Chief, Dr. Gilruth, was named Director of MSC which
carried out Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo.
After Apollo was approved as a national program, committees
formed from individuals from the various NASA centers debated at
length over the best method to c_rry out the lunar landing. Marshall
Space Flight Center, through Director Van _raun, and Manned
Spacecraft Center, through Director Gilruth and Mr. Facet, took
official positions while Langley took no official position but allowed
an individual researcher, Dr. John Houbolt, to attend the committee
meetings and present his concept as an individual. MSFC favored an
Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR) wherein two Saturn rockets, one carrying
extra fuel and the other carrying the spacecraft would be launched
into Earth orbit where they would rendezvous and, with the extra fuel,
the spacecraft would be launched to the moon. MSC favored a direct
ascent method from Earth which would require the development of a
monster rocket. Houbolt's concept was the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
where the spacecraft would be launched to moon orbit by a Saturn and
a smaller craft (the L_) would ferry between the moon's surface and
o ,
the spacecraft. Houbolt's concept was ridiculed in these committee
meetings but he kept gand pushing his approach. When NASA
administrator James Webb announced that EOR appeared the best method
A
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and dire_t ascent the second best (not even mentioning LOR); Houbolt
despaired of committee action and, bypassing tht _ommittees, appealed
directly to NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans. in his letter
requesting serious consideration of his concept, he stated, "Somewhat
as a voice in the wilderness, I have been appalled at the thinking of
individuals and committees -- Give us the go-ahead and we will put men
on the moon in very short order -- and we don't need any Houston
empire to do it. ''_ Seamans requested a review from his deputies who
reported favorably. In time, both Faget and Von Braun swung behind
the LOR concept which became the mission mode fo_ Project Apollo.
Houbolt wns later awarded NASA's Exceptional Scientific Achievement
Award for "his foresight and perserverance" in advocating the LOR.
In this section, I have shown the persistence of the Langley
management operational mode or systen_ to adapt when acted upon by
either endogenous inputs (normal research, concepts for orbiting a
man in space and for the Apollo mlsslor mode) or exogenous inputs
(Mercury tracking station or Lunar Orbiter).
bLife, "How an Idea NobodM Wanted Grew up to be the L_," Vol.
66, No. i0, March Ik, 1969.
{
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Langley in 1964
Langley Research Center had at this time approximately 4000
•,mpl_yees operating in the following manner. The Director, Associate
Director, Assistant Directors, and their staffs occupled Headquarters
Building, Bldg. 1219, a two story brick office building; the power
center was co_on!y known as the "second floor of 1219." The Center
itself _,as spr,ad over an "East A_'ea"end a "West Area" divided by
Langley Air Force Base r_wayz. Its physical appearance is not unlike
an Ivy League college campus--well kept law,as with various buildings
well separated from each other. In general, each Division would be
housed in its own building(s) and would _onsist of 100-200 empAoyees.
The Division Chief, a respected researcher in his field, would be
responsible for the operation of his Division and was extremely
powerful in determining many aspects of working condltions--type work,
assigm_ents of personnel, promotions, and management philosophy.
The Divisions were further organized into Branches and Sections to
facilitate the division of work. As "1219" generally followed the
recommendations from the Division Chiefs, the Division Chief position
was one of strength representlz_ a respected authority and his staff.
The individual researcher usually looked to his Division Chief
for support of his programs and f_r his own advancement. As the
individual researcher and his Division Chief shared a mutual aim of
the advancement of science and that the work was on the frontiers of
knowledge, the line between ordinary science and extraordinary
I science was not a discernible one. In fact, the emphamis vas on the
t
|
t
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development of new breakthroughb s,_,_has Jolm Stack's (a national
aeronautical authority) concept of slotted throat in a wind tunnel
test section that proved planes could fly "faster than sound." Thus,
the individual researcher was given to pursuing the truth regardless
of past experienc,, or "established" methods.
The engineering portion of the organization operated somewhat
differently although a_ain the Division Chief represente_ the focal
point of its strength The _ _ of the individual engineer was to
support research--in the eyes of some researchers, engineering was a
secondary function. Although nct working urimarily to advance
science, the engineer required innovatlve thinking and ingenuity to
transfer the researcher's advanced concepts into hardware. In
addition, the engineer, through construction and space projects,
represented the Center's cap=bi!_ty in the integration of disciplines
al,dexperience in managing contractors. Thus, the Division Chief had
credentials for advising the Center Director on project policies as
well as on the importance of the engineering functions. By use of
the technical project engineer concept, the Division Chief had the
capability of assigning an experienced chief engineer to any multi-
disciplined progrem to work on a near co-equal basis with the lead
researcher. Wni'_ the engineer lacked some of the freedom of the
researcher to define his own programs, he still could, in some
_egzee, follow his inclinations as to whether to be a specialist in
a specific area (i.e. structurea) or to be a coordinator (technical
project engineer).
i
L
1974020203-039
22
Headquarters Organization in 196h
NASA Headquarters is located in a few multi-tiered, modern
offSce building in Washington, D. C. The complement of about 1500
perso,.nel is organized as shown in fig. I-5. Beporting to the
Administrator's office are t]u'ee main technical offices--the Office of
Manned Space Flight (OMSF), the O; "ice of Space Science and
Applications (¢SSA!, and Office of Advanced Research and Technology
(OART). OMSF i_ responsible for all manned flights (Mercury, Apollo,
Shuttle, etc.) and has t_'ee dedicated Centers supporting it3
prograr_s--thc Marshall Space Fii_hc Center (NSFC) at Huntsville,
Alabama; the Manned Spacecr_['t Center (MSC) at Houston, Texas; and the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at C%pe Canerva], Florida. OSSA is
dedicated to unmanned scientific space flights and has line responsibil-
ity over the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) at Greenbelt, Maryland;
the contractor operated Je. Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) at Pasadena,
California; and the Wallops Station launch site in Virginia. OABT
is responsible for c[_rrying out advanced research programs through its
four supporting Centers--Ames Research Center (ARC) at Moffett Field
California; Flight Research Center (FRC) at Edwards, California;
Langley Research Center (LRC) at Hampton, Virginia; and Lewis
Research Center (LeRC) at Cleveland, Ohio.
While the charter dividing responsibilitie_ appears sufficiently
clear, it must be noted that OABT supports OSSA and OSMF programs by
developing the needed technology and this has funding implications
i
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on each Office's funding and, thus, the Centers' operations. Further,
OART (Langley) has taken over an entire OSSA project (Lunar Orbiter)
which supports Apollo (OSMF). Thus, program responsibility among
offices and Centers are often obtained after lengthy negotiations among
officials occupying powerful positions (Center Directors and Office
Administrators). In addition, there is likely to be competition among
the Centers for "lead" Center responsibility if a proposed program
is compatible with the Center's activities.
The Administrator is, of course, appointed by the President.
The heads of the variou_ offices are drawn by the Administrator
from various sources--NASA, i_dustry, or the academia; they are liable
to be leading scientists, researchers, college presidents, or
industrial man_gers. In brief, the socialization of Headquar:;ers
into a common mold is much less than for a Center like Langley.
1974020203-042
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Hum.an Factors
: The cou_'se of any program is, to a large extent, dependent on the
people involved--their pe1"sonal characteristics, expertise, experience,
and work methods. Sketches of some of the key people in the Ma_s
program are given below to furnish additional insight for understanding
the narrative material (descript:ons given are those existing at
initiation of Langley's Mars studies):
Langley:
Dr. Floyd Thompson - Director
A thin, d_stinguished six footer in his mid sixties. Grey haired
with a trim_,ed mustache. Low key, relaxed. Formerly, Chief of
Research at Langley. Forty years with NACA/NASA. Folklore--runs
Center quietly and efficiently from inputs received informally
at his table in the Cafeteria and in corridor encounters in 1219.
Charles Donlan - Deputy Director
A cigar smoker, short and aggressive, about fifty. A NACA
researcher up through the ranks. A believer that expertise
resides at the Centers and not at Headquarters. Blunt,
ambitious, and responsible.
Dr. Leonard Roberts--Branch Head, Dynamic Loads Division
Born and educated in Englsnd. PhD. in Mathematics. Came to
Langley from M.I.T. Short, early thirties, personable, outgoing.
Interested in applied research. Concise, excellent speaker.
Ambitious, political.
1974020203-043
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Edwin Kilgore--Chief, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Champion tennis player, early forties, wiry. Excellent engineer.
NACA/NASA career. Flair for management and instilling loyalty.
Switched to aerospace at first opportunity. Ambitious, personable,
political.
Roger Anderson--Assistant Chief, Structures Research Division
Tall, ex-athlete, early forties. NACA/NASA csreer. Recognized
as a leader of structures research. Interested in applications
and new concepts. Heads committees, ambitious, political.
James Martin--Assistant Head, Viking Project Office
Large man, mid forties. New hire from Republic. Management
oriented. Aggressive, capable, hard working. Direct and
convincing. Totally dedicated to project success. Interested
in results.
David Stone--Head, Project Fire Office
A career researcher with NACA/NASA. Believer in the "Langley
system." Capable supervisor, considerate of his men.
Independent, technically competent, blunt--not a worrier.
Mid forties.
Washington Headquarters:
Edgar Cortright--Deputy Director, OSSA
Brilliant, distinguished man in early forties interested in the
nation's problems. Co:,vincing speaker for NASA and technology
to the public and Congressional committees. Dedicated to public "-
service. Hard working, ambitious, political. From NACA/Lewis
1
I \ .
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to NASA Headquarters. Technically distinguished.
JPL:
Dr. William Pickering--Director
A distinguished scientlst, authority in space science. In
early fifties, quiet, low key. Good speaker, academically
inclined. Relies on staff for engineering of space projects.
Administrator.
1974020203-045
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Langley's Administrative Mode
As can be deduced from the foregoing, Dr. Thompson's administration
was chazacterized by full support to his staff. Very little direction
was given by 1219 on research matters; Dr. Thompson and Mr. Donlan
concentrated on those problems requiring interfacing with Headquarters.
Primary consideration was given to Langley and not NASA with the firm
conviction that there was no conflict; i.e., what's good for Langley
is good for NASA. i
An example of how Dr. Thompson entered into a space project
(Lunar Orbiter) prcblem is indicative of his philosophy. This story
again may be folklore but it rings true to those familiar with his
management techniques. Apprised that Lunar Orbiter was having a
slight overrun in costs, he telephoned an executive at Boeing and
expressed his concer:. The executive immediately offered to come to
Langley and discuss the matter. Boeing gathered all the cost data
and prepared a presentation. The executive and his staff arrived at
Langley and were greeted by Dr. Thompson who took them on an extended
tour of i/_ngley wh_le Dr. Thompson pointed out the various facilities
and described the on-going research work. At lunch, Dr. Thompson
remarked to the effect that he was an old man try_,_ to run Langley
and that he would appreciate anything Boeing could do to hold down
i costs on _mar Orbiter. Word has it that the Eoeing people left :
immediately after lunch--no presentation or opening of brief cases--
vith the conviction that they had to help "that fine old gentleman."
m _ .....
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CHAPTER II
THE BEGINNING - 1964
Summar_
The first year of Lar_ley's participation in Mars studies was an
active year with emphasis on a small group's efforts to obtain a
technology base. A five man multi-disciplined group undertook, more
or less on its own initiative, to examine the aerodynamic and
structural problems associated with vehicles entering the Mars
atmosphere. In order to define the problems, the group found it
necessary to set up a "straw man" concept. Because this concept
appeared to have mission application, NASA management approved a
contractual effort to study the concept in depth. The same group
then dedicated its efforts to the preparation of the necessary pro-
c_rement documents defining the individual tasks and overall scope
: of the contract.
29 ,
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Initiation of Studies
Early in 196h, Dr. Leonard Roberts, a Branch Head in the Dynamic
Loads Division (DLD), became interested in the technology problems
associated with a vehicle entering the Martian environment. Langley
Research Center, by virtue o_"its extended research in the behavior
of bodies in the Earth's atmosphere, was recognized as the lead NASA
center in entry vehicle design considering both aerodynamic and heat
loads. At Dr. Roberts' request, an informal group of high-level
center scientific personnel was formed; this group consisted of:
Dr. Leonard Roberts - DLD
Mr. William Mace - Flight Instrumentation Division (FID)
Mr. Roger Anderson - Structures Research Division (SRD)
Mr. Edwin Kilgore - OETS
Mr. Kilgore assigned me the engineering task of assisting these
researchers by acting as a systems coordinator and performing the
duties of the technical project engineer. This assignment was% for
practical purposes, my introduction to Aerospace Technology and I
was to be supervised by my Branch Head, Mr. C. T. Brown. It should
be noted at this point that although not a large commitment was made
by Langley management at this time, the action to allow the researchers
: to embark into a new technology was consistent with management's past
actions with respect to Faget and Houbolt.
The first meetings of the group (Roberts, Mace, Anderson,
McNulty and Brown) were directed to the question of how best could
I
t
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Langley contribute it._ talents to the investigation of Mars. It was
felt by all members that the investigation of the planets and Mars,
in particular, would be a major NASA role after Apollo. Thus, it was
necessary for Langley to become cognizant of this area of study in
order to _ide the necessary research in the ensuing years. The
group was starting from near zero in knowledge pertaining to Mars
and interplanetary missions. Since Langley's entree into this field
was its expertise in entry aerodynamics, it was decided to concentrate
on a baseline entry vehicle and payload; the question of how to
deliver it to Mars was considered second order at this time and,
besides, this could well be some other Center's responsibility.
However, by emphasizing a baseline entry system, the Roberts te_ was
taking the first step into mission studies and away from research
investigations in specific disciplines. The memters were asked to
initiate work in their respective divisions "_der the following broad
responsibilities :
Roberts - Science and management
Anderson - Structures and thermal protection
Mace - Electronics
McNult¥ - Systems and mission analysis
As the group was small, the proble_ large, and all members
approximately equals in responsibility, there was no need or time
for formal memoranda and documentation. Telephone calls, bull
sessions, and cryptic notem were the recognized means of coRunicating
and exchanging thoughts and information.
h
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Within a few weeks, the followin_ basic data had been gleaned from
many sources in the technical literature as well as from telephone
! calls to contacts in other centers and in industry:
i. Mars' period around the sun is approximately twice that of
4'
Earth's; thus, launch windows occur every two years which alloy for
feasible communication paths of approximately 160 x 106 KM or less.
_:. Mars' diameter is h210 miles. Mars' gravity if 12.3 feet/sec 2. Mars'
t
pressure at surface is estimated to be very thin (i0 to _0 rob;
t
i000 mb = 1 Earth's atmosphere).
2. Jet propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was the implementing arm for
NASA interplanetary unmanned scientific projects. JPL is a research
and develo_ent laboratory of the California Institute'of Technology
and had been affiliated with _ASA since 1959, unlike NASA field
Centers, JPL was under contract to NASA.
3. JPL had carried out a successful Mariner Mars flyby mission.
JPL had demonstrated capability in electronics and interplanetary
mission analysis.
_ M. Atlas Agena launch vehicle can deliver about 800 pounds
: payload to Mar_, Thnr-Delta about _0 pounds (actual payload weight
dependent upon launch year).
_. J_ we planniug to let a study contract in the near future
! for Advanced Mariner Miss tons involvin6 a landed package on Mars.
Atlas-Centaur _s to be the launch vehicle and could in_ect about
'- 1500 pounds into a Mars tr_eetorT.
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6. Ames and Goddard Centers had study efforts underway concern-
Ing probes in the Martian atmosphere to obtain scientific data
regarding the atmosphere. The probes would be small in nature and
rely on statistically reconstructing the atmosphere from indirect
measurement s.
7. Headquarters was looking to the future beyond Mariner-type
missions to a large interplanetary program for the planets. Study
contracts for Voyager (1969-1975) had been awarded to AVCO Corporation
•and General Electric Company to consider payloads in the range of
6000-7000 pounds (Saturn V Launch Vehicle).
8. Entry velocity into the Martian atmosphere for an entry
vehicle would be in the range of 20,000 feet per second for a
dlrect Mars impact trajectory.
9. There existed a Headquarters Science Directive that
specified that any vehicle entering the Mars atmosphere be sterilized
•o as to prevent contaminating Mars vlth Earth mlcro-organisms.
1974020203-051
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Initial Concept Definition and Approval
Based on the foregoing, the group decided to concentrate its
efforts on (1) an entry vehicle about 8-feet in diameter (to fit
within the Mariner shroud) and about 300 pounds in weight (this
appeared to be a reasonable weight and would be compatible with Atlas-
Centaur launch vehicle using a Mariner spacecraft as a bus to deliver
the probe to the planet,),and (2) a payload consisting of instruments
to make direct measurements of the Martian atmosphere while descendi_:6
on a parachute deployed from the heat shield after the entry heat
pulse. A preliminary design effort was initia_ed to iterate science
instruments and the required _ubs_stems until a re=._onable concept
was identified. It took approximately two months for this effort to
i
converge with about 20 men of various disciplines working on the
problem in scattered locations; my office was the hub _ecause the
actual designs were integrated on the drafting boards as well as the
weights tabulated. There was no problem in obtaining production--
people were motivated by the concept of a Mars probe and realized
that they auw be getting in on the "ground floor" of soBething big.
No sophisticated analyses were made, designs w_- . broad brush, and
Rost work was done on scratch paper. All work was very preliminary
to get a feel of practicability; a lot of work and concepts were
turned out, analyzed, modified, or discarded in that time period.
TWo probless which arose duri_ this period and which required
luch discussion, tradiz_-ofT, and Judpent were (1_ a descent
television exp_riaent and (2) the heat shield design.
I
** [ i ....
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The fundamental instruments necessary to make direct measurements
of ale atmosphere were readily identified. Their welgh_s (as well as
the weights of their supporting subsystems--power and conmlunlcations)
could be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy. These
instrument s were :
Temperature: Platinum Resistance Thermometer
Density: X-ray Backscatter and Accelerometer
Pressu_'e: Pressure Transducer
Composition: Mass Spectrometer
Altitude: Radar Altimeter
Descent T.V. was believed to be a worthwhile erperlmen_ and, in
addition, rather a glamorous one. However, weight allowances could
not tolerate the experiment without deleting some of direct measuring
instruments and, thus, relying on indirect analytical derivations.
After examining many trades and much discussion, it was agreed,
reluctantly, _o omit a descent T.V. experim,.nt. We ezpected, should
the proposed probe become an actual flight program, that the
question would arise qain.
The other problem, that cf the heat shield, was again one of
velEht. Since the entry vehicle would experience •erodynas/c forces
on entering the Martian ataosphare catmins deceleration loads and
heat pulse, it would be necessary to protect the payload with a heat
shield through teas period. While we had but a rough idea of what
these lo6ds would be, it becm obvious that we couldn't build • heat
shield of the required else with state-of-the-art technolo_ within
**he wcitht restraint. Fortunately, there appeared • v_y out of this
I
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problem; resea_-chers under Roger Anderson in the Structures Research
Division were, at that t_me, working on a new configurational concept--
a "tension shell" hat-like configuration designed to take pressure loads
in membrane tension. This configuration had promise of being much more
efficient than a cone or Apollo-shaped heat shield because of the ab-
sence of bending stresses.
In addition, researchers under William Mace in the,,Flight Instru-
mentation Division had become interested in the sterilization problem
and had started a group of several engineers vorking on procedures and
studying the effects of the elevt_ted sterilization tem_ersture (135° for
2_ hours). .
Thus, we had a concept to present to Langley manegement for con-
sideration. The mission outline is shown on Figure II_l_ the rationale •
for its consideration rested on the following main points:
i. The scientific instruments would make direct measurements of _
the atmoshpere.
2. Langley has expertise in parachutes and heat shiel Is,
3. Langley has interest in sterilization.
_. The mission hardware requirements could serve as a focus for
LRC research and tec_olo_ dsvelol_ent for several years.
5. T_.e probe itself corld be considered an experiment to supple-
nent Mariner fliKhts.
6. The probe mission could obtain the necessary data to guide
desi_ of Voyager leaders.
Dr. Roberts decided the next logical otep would be to have an
experienced aerospace contractor stu_ the concept in depth under
j .....
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Langley direction; he talked of a $500,0C0 contract. I felt that he
was optimisitic about obtaining funding of that order. Dr. Robert
: perservered, however, and, by virtue of his aggressive championship
of the concept obtained the support of Langley management and Head-
quarters. This commitment was a key decision with far reaching
consequences for Langley and NASA since $500,000 was sizeable enough
to put L_ngley in the maizstream cf interplanetary studies for th_
f_r=t t_._'e. Further, the ,_rivin_ force had oeer Dr. Roberts and his
te=hnical staff acting on their own initiative.
I was assigned to consult specialists in all disciplines and to
t
write up %n inclusive work statement which would serve as the basis
for the contractor proposals. Headquarters allocated $500,000 for the
contractual study. $250,000 each was supplied the Office of
Advanced Research and Technology (OART) and the Office of Space
Sciences Applications (OSSA) as it was felt that study results would )
be applicable to both research and mission applications. Headquarters'
decision approving Langley's entree into the interplanetary mlss!ons
studies which, heretofore, had been a JPL monopoly was based on the
consideration that missions to Mars (or other planets) appeared to be
the next logical program after Apollo and it was well to consider
broadening NASA_s ba6e beyond JPL which was not a NASACenter, had
been subjected to Congressional criticiam for its management of the _
1
Surveyor program , and was too small to handle a large Apollo-llke
INASA 8P-h901, Unmanned S.naceProject Management, Surveyor .._
and Lunar Orbiter, Kloman, p. 11.
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program by itself.
A model of technical-administrative path leading to Mars probe
7
commitment is given in fig. 11-2.
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Preparing the Request for Proposal
Between July, when the go-ahead was given, and December, when the
Request for Proposal (RFP) was released for bids, most of the Roberts
team effort was centered on defining the tasks that the contractor
would perform. Defining these tasks was a complex undertaking for
two reasons: (I) we were lacking in expertise--it was out first
experience with interplanetary missions and we did not have the grasp
of the technological details, and (2) soon after go-ahead, Washington
Headquarters directed that a lander be included in the mission and we
had not examined a lander in any manner. The addition of a lander
was influenced by a desire to increase the potential mission's appeal
to the public and to Congress and by a possible need to match any
Soviet competition. It is to be noted that the lander was only
included, at this stage, as a study item; thus it could be included
: or not included in any mission as circumstances (technical or
political) warranted at a later date. The adding of the lander
enthused us for the following reasons:
I. The mission was greatly enlarged giving the study prime NASA
importance and national recognition.
2. it gave us an entree in a new technology (lander) that was
previously the domain of JPL.
i_ 3. It Justified changing launch vehicles--going to the Saturn
iB/Centaur with much greater capability; thus, easing any weight bind
we might have had in trying to build the 8 ft. probe for 300 pounds.
!
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In short, it was a new and bigger project--and it was our
r_spons_b_]ity.
Preparation of the work statement entailed problems other than
technical ones. It was necessary to determine overall work statement
objectives as well as defining individual tasks in detail. Leaving
the technical problems aside for the time being, the following work
statement approach was agreed upon after numerous meetings. It was
decided to consider more than one launch opportunity. In fact, we
agreed to think in terms of launches in 197], 1973, and 1975, each
larger in scope insofar as the lan_ed package would be concerned.
1971 was taken as our baseline mission with e_.phasis on the entry
experiments but including a minimum landed package. The landed
package would consist of a crush-up ball with accelerometers to
measure deceleration impact (surface hardness) upon landing together *
with a minimum of instrumentation to determine atmospheric density i
and other parameters which might influence the design of future more
sophisticated landers. The 1973, 1975 missions were to be primarily
lander missions with the landed package increasing in weight and
complexity throu6h 73 to 75 to the maximum payload capability that
could be launched by the Saturn iB/Centaur. A commonality concept
of subsystems was to be utilized to the maximum extent practicable.
! The heat shield would perhaps be common for all three missions and
more heavily loaded in the last two. This would mean that the heat
shield would be over-designed for the 71 and 73 missions in order to
save the development costs associated with three different heat
J
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shields. The second objective to be agreed upon was that the contractor
should consider the development of a complete probe lander system (heat
shield plus all subsystems) rather than concentrating on technology i
items per se. The contractor would be responsible for defining a
complete development plan for the probe lander including the following
items:
I. Manufacturing plan
2, Sterilization plan
n
3. Test program plan
b. Flight qualifization plan
/._ Facilities plan
6. Cost
It should be noted that while Langley was still not involved in
the entire mission planning from launch to landing, it was very
interested in the entire systems phase of probe lander separation from
the spacecraft to landing. There were several reasons for the decision
to use this systems approach. They are:
i. It was felt that a system study of the entire probe lande,"
system would be the only way to determine the interfaces between the
various technologies and to determine exactly what was required _rom
each of the technologieb.
2. The probe lander would be an integral unit which could be
developed by Langley and supplied to any Center responsible for
carrying out a Mars mission.
/
S. Because of Langley's interest in sterilization and in flight
J|
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qualificatioll programs in the Earth's atmosphere, the study would
generate data allowing Langley to proceed with plans in these areas
as well as determining what ground facilities would be necessary to
support a Mars mission.
An output from the contract would be a complete preliminary
design of the 1971 probe lander defining all components and their
weights--for example, a complete design of the heat shield. This
complete system design then could be used as _ basis for further
final fabrication drawings and detailed drawings of all parts if a
decision was made to go forwar4 with this concept.
To serve as a base for discussion of the technical problems
: involved in the work statement, our preliminary concept of the mission
is shown in Figure II-3. This concept assumes that the probe lander
would be separated from the spacecraft several days prior to Mars
encounter by a mechanical spring system which would be designed to give
the necessary velocity increment to put the probe lander on a Mars
encounter trajectory. The probe lander would be aerodynamically
stable so that once it entered the Mars atmosphere it would align
itself to the air stream at zero angle of attack and, thus, take the
; reentry and heat loads in an axial direction. It was further assumed
that the probe lander could be designed so that its drag would furnish
s_ficient braking to decelerate the probe lander to a velocity of
less than Mach 1 at approximately one-half scale height above the
/
Mars surfa@e (a scale height is equal to the altitude necessary to ....
cha_e the density by one order of magnitude). At this altitude,
l i
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a parachute would be deployed which would lower the instrument package
(pulled from the heat shield) to the surface of Mars impacting the
surface of Mars at a velocity of approximately lO0 feet per second.
The spacecraft on its Mar_ flyby path would serve as a relay station
for communications from the probe lander back to earth. Using the
spacecraft in this manner would minimize the amount of power and the
complexity of instrumentation required on the probe lander, r
The work statemen_ was divided into technology areas where the
contractors' tasks were defined. In the first technical area, that
of Mission Profile and Analyses (an area where we had a dearth of
information), the cortractor was made completely responsible for
defining the mission profiles for the spacecraft and for the probe
lander f_om separation to the end of communications. However, we
had the foresight to ask the contractor to look into some additional
items because we had no knowledge of the impact trajectories or of
the associated loads. The items which we asked the contractor to
consider were the influence of (a) t rminal guidance on the probe
lander and (b) prob_ lander separation from the spacecraft after the
: spacecraft-probe lander combination vas in orbit As will be seen
I later, the additional requirement of asking the contractor to look
i into separation after orbit took on major importance.
i The second item, that of Structures (including the desisn of the
probe lander heat shield), was exercised thoroughly as this vas an
area of Langley expertise. Since the Saturn 1B/Centaur removed the "-_
veight problem as a major restraint, the contractor was asked to
4
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study three different configurations for heat shield appiication_
these three configurations were the tension shell, the Apollo-shape,
and a large blunted cone. The contractor was required to make detailed
stress analyses and to trade-off the pros and cons of these tP_ee
shapes based on their aerodynamic drag efficiency, their overall
weight requirements, and their system packaging capability. In doing
this, he was required to define the critical aerodynamic _oads and
heating inputs (both convective and radiative) for all ranges of
proposed trajectories and atmospheres.
The third technology area was Science Instrumentations and
Communications. The _cientific measurements to be made were delineated
in the work statement as well as candidate instruments to make those
measurements for the 1971 probe lander. The contractor was responsible
for specifying the communications equipment aboard the probe lander
to condition the science data and transmit the data to either the bus
for transfer to Earth or to Earth directly. In the case where the
spacecraft was used as a transfer link, the contractor was further
responsible for delineating the equipment on the spacecraft in order
to effect this transfer. The contractor was also required to determive
the power _equire_ents from iaputs from the science and the
cozRunication equillent.
: The fourth technolo_ area was Aerodyn_ics. _ain, as with the
structural design, this area was exercised thoroughly because of
Lang_ey's exl_rience. Although it vas ustmed that the probe lander
_uld be designed to be aerodyu_ically stable, there was considerable
t
T-
!
1974020203-065
_8
uneasiness amongst aerodynamicists concerning the dynamic behavior
o_"the probe prior to achieving stability. One concern was that
before entering Mars' atmosphere the probe lan_.er may tumble and be
in a random mode. Such behavior would possibly negate any communica-
tions link during this period and would require, at a minimum, special
unknown design procedures. For this reason, the contractor was
required to look into the possible need to provide a method for
spinning the probe lander after separatlon from the spacecraft _o
assure that it would not tumble. Should these spinup conditions be
necessary, it might be further necessary to despin the probe lander
after entry to allow it to go to its natural stable attitude. A
second problem which concerned he aerodynamicists was the motions of
the probe lander during entry. Assuming a random angle of attack
entry co,,_ition, the question became one of how soon would the motions
damp out bel'ore obtaining stable flight. Further, would there still
be a large angle of attack on the probe lander when it penetrated
sufficiently far in the atmosphere to have aerodynamic loads or heating
inputs? If so, how did this effect the structural design of the probe
lander shell? It was our hope a _, this time that, even should a
design angle-of-attack at entry be achieved (through spinup or other
mesJns) which would be satisfactory for a nominal case, we could
further obtain at least a partial successful mission for a remd_n
entry condition (if. for example, the spinup mechsnima failed). For
the above reasons, the contractor was asked to define the _otions
of the probe lander "during entry for design and possible off-design
{
J
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conditions." As one can imagine, that simple sentence requires the
contractor to perform innumerable analyses and designs.
The last technology area concerns the parachute. Here again the
problem vas one of dynamics--definlng the motions of the perachute to
assure that it was in stable flight durln6 the science measuring
period. The contractor was required to determine the size of the )
parachute and the weight of the system in order to meet the fin_l
requirements of landir_ the instrument package at i00 it/see and
providing sufficient dwell time in the atmosphere to make the science
measurements. Since the data available on Mars indicated there might
be wind gusts in the atmosphere, the contractor was further asked to
study the system motions while penetrating 50 ft/sec gusts oi"i0 second
duration and to damp these motions, if required, in a manner so that
system operation was compatible with the science requirements. Again,
to cover an unknown exigency, we inserted an additional requirement
that the contractor evaluate the influexlce of adding a supersonic
parachute to the entire probe lander system to be deployed at a maximua '_
Math number of 2.5. The purpose of this supersonic parachute would be
to add to the drag of the probe lander in order to assure that the
subsonic parachute could be deplo_red at ,_ elevation of one-half
|@ale heilht above the surfa@s of Mar|,
For informational purposes, It as_ be noted that 1_ drafts of the
work statement were prepared in the converKln6 process of obtalnln4 a
I
consensus before the final york stateaent was approved by the Source "_
4
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Evaluation Board and was released for bids. With reference to the
aforementioned Source Evaluation Board (SEB), a few wordr on its
makeup and objectives are in order. "In the NASA, formal Source
Eva_uation Board are established for competitively negotiated research
and development procurements when (1) The estimated cost of the
contract will exceed oz_=.,lllion dollars or (2) The ss_Im._ted cost
of the contract itself will not exceed one million but possible
follow-on work for later phases of the same project wlll. "2
Source Evaluation Boards hay, four primary functions: to approve
the RFP, to assess the technical and business qualifications of
prospective sources, to evaluate proposals receiver from these sources, A
and to report their finding to the person who is responsible for
selecting the sour-_."of a_'ard. The members on cur Source Evaluat..,
Board were selected by the Director of the Langley Research Center.
The SEB vas composed of several high-level personnel from the Cen_er
and two representatives from Headquarters; the Chairman n_med vas
Edwin C. Kilgore, Division Chief of Flight Vehicles and Systems
Divumion, Langley Research Center. Because of the size and complexity
of the procurement, it was necessary to supplement the Source
EvLluation Board itself vith subsl_iary technical and business
committees and subcommittees for e4_alysis and research purposes. _ne
Source Evaluation Board is also responsible for approvir_ the
evaluation criteria which the committees servin£ the board will use in
_UkSA Procurement Mana6eme=t 8emirar _s. 31-3_. •
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grading the proFosals. Thus, in this context, the RFP must include,
in addition to the technie%i work statement, a statement as to the
broad _ntidel_nes on which the proposals will be evaluated. Again, the
sue _roup ,,hichprepared the work statenent was involved in develop-
in6 th,,evaluation criteria :_ndsubmitting its recommendations to
the Source Evaluation Board for approval.
To fulfill this require_.ent, we asked that the contractor submit
k
his overall technical approa'h with suh;tantiating data analysis
for the following five technical areas:
i. Overall System Concept and Integration
2. Subsystem Concepts and Associated Analyses
3. _,_allficat! n Program
h. Sterilization
5, Technical Management and Plans
In addition to the Technical Manadement Proposal, the bidders
were requirf:l to submit a Business Mans4_emert Pzoposal which included
the following: (i) past performance and experience (2) the r._]ation
of pro4ected work load capacity, and (3) thel.r_anagement structure.
Wit_. the approval of the Source Evaluation Board, the subsequent
rele&se o£ the RFP represented the completion ¢f Lar_iey'r first
year's efforts on Mars mission s_udtes. The foll,_wing items are
included in the Appemdix for Chapter II: (II-A) Statement of Work,
(II-B) Instructions for Technical and Businest Management Proposals,
(II-C) LRC Announcement designating the Source Evaluation Board,
(II-D) Langley Announcement establishing SEB Committees. The
t
• t
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co_itment by Langley to set up a Source Evaluation Board and its
committees was not a minor one. As can be seen from the Appendix, it
represents breaking about 40 senior staff members away from their _
line responsibilities frr at lea_t a month's effort. A model of the
technical/administrative interr.ctions utilized to request contractor
proposals on a Mars probe lander study is given in fig. II-h.
At the end of"the first year, Langley had a suall technical staff
i
under Dr. Robert's direction, a nucleus for the future el'fort, that
was beginning t,_understand the problems and were well placed for the
next phase. Washington Headquarters was giving Langley more
responsibility. The Langley administration was giving full support
but was not getting directly involved for project participation.
?
-j
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Synopsis
A synopsis of the first 2caMs effort could be tabulated as
indicated below:
i. Formation of a high-level group _o study problems associated
with Mars entry. Action initiated and managed by Dr. Roberts, a
middle-manager ia position responsibility.
2. identification of Langley's role as one of the entry vehicle
technology as applied to obtaining direct science atmospheric
measu.-ements utilizing a parachute descent to assure sufficient dwell
time.
3. The _reliminary definition of a hardware concept which w_s
compatible with :tem 2 above.
h. The approval by management of the concept with the authority
to pursue the concept further through contractual means--allocation of
five hundred thousand dollars.
5. The increased interest of Washington Headquarters in the
procurement by directing inclusion of a lander into the mission and
thus causing the procurement to become one of major significance.
6. The preparation of the request for proposals
a_ The contract approach--systems (rather than research)
i oriented.
:
i b. Delineation of teclmical tasks.
! c. Development of evaluation criteria.
7. Approval by the Source Evaluation Board and the release of the
Request for Proposals.
/
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CHAPTER III
i
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM - 1965
j
<
>
Summary
The second year c(:u]d be divided into two distinct phases. For
the first half of the year, Langley continued on its more or less
independent path with minimum interfacing with NASA Headquarters,
other NASA Centers, and industry. In this period, Langley concentrated
i
on increasing its technology base by means of in-house studies and on
T
selecting a contractor for the probe/lander contract. In contrast,
!
the second half of the year was devoted to initiating a Langley role
)
in Voyager and integrating Langley's effort into a national NASA
: effort. This required both formalizing the effort at Langley so that
[
Center management could keep current and respond as well as defining
• lines of communication with JPL and Headquarters.f
55
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Lan,_ley In-House Studies
With the release of the RFP for bids, a slack time became available
to strengthen Langley's technology base by continuing the in-house
studies which were dropped when l_oberts' technical staff switched its
efforts to the preparation of the contract procurement documents.
In my role as systems integrator and mission analyst, f started two
teams in my division, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division (FVSD),
/
to work--one team on the engineering design of a tension shell heat
shield and another on miss:on analysis (trajectories, launch vehicle
requirements, and Mars entry ]o_s and heating).
Starting the work on heat shield design presented no problem--an
experienced structural design engineer together with a designer was
made available and assigned the task. The mission analysis problem
was another story--I had no one with any expertise to call upon as
well as having none myself. I advised Mr. Kilgore, my line Division
Chief, of this fact and recommended that our Division should build a
technology base in this area. I further requested a team of four
promising young, ambitious engineers (who I had hand picked) to
tackle this problem. Mr. Kilgore concurred and ¢or two months, I
worked closely with these engineers to develop an appreciation and
i understanding of the parameters and their fit in the definition and
: design of the probe/lander and sub-systems.
i In a similar manner, other team members started in-house studies _ _
in their areas of responsibility. In addition, other line research
]974020203-074
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organizations, sensing the future direction of our efforts, began to
orient their long range research objectives toward a Mars mission
objective. Rowever, the main forcing function of our group's in-house
studies was to prepare ourselves for the task of technicalSy monitoring
the probe/lander contract work once it was initiated.
/
L
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Voyager and Probe/Lander Contract Evaluatic_n
In the Spring of' 1965, NASA }{_'adquartersmade the decision to
follow the JPL Marine_ Mars 1969 mission with a "Voyager" Mars
mission in 1971 (launch windows to Mars occur at two year intervals).
"Voyager", at this time, was a nebulous term to denote a lander
mission to the planets (Mars and Venus). A series of Voyager missions
was envisioned similar to the Mariner Flyby missions and would be
precursors to any manned planet mission. JPL was instructed to
proceed with contract definition studies of the spacecraft to ferry a
lander to Mars. The lander definition was not to be included. The
omission of t)e lander from the Voyager Study was significant; ouz
group concluded that Headquarters must be looking to Langley and its
Probe/Lander contract for definition of the Voyager landers. As far
as we knew, however, there had been no commitment from Dr. Thompson,
Langley's director, to Headquarters for Voyager support--in fact,
i Dr. Thompson had stayed very much in the background throughout and
had not displayed any personal interest in Mars studies.
The month of March was spent in evaluating the contractor's
: proposals for the Probe/Lander study. The aforementioned committees
took over a floor of the nearby Ch&mberlln Hotel and graded the
proposals received from AVCO, General Electric, Grumman, Hughes,
I
I Northrup and Space General. While these deliberations are confidential,
it can be reported that the competition was keen with companies_ as
i _.expected, showin8 varied strengths in the technologies required.
While the committees were evaluating the proposals, members of the
k i
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i Source Eval_ating Board (SEB) were visiting the six companies to
inspect their facilities as a guide to their competence to perform
the work. In addition to the committee evaluations and plant visits,
a oral presentation was held at Langley on March 23 by all companies
in secret to the SEB and committee members. The purpose of the
presentation was, of course, to aid in the decicion making process.
The companies _-ere given the opportunity to present their philozophy,
technical epproach, and to expand on their proposal wherever they felt
they might have left loose ends or to emphasize the points they
deemed important. They were also questioned by Langley personnel
on points which were not clear in the proposal.
The committees reported their finding to SEB on March 30. The
J
report consisted of a complete written record of the evaluation
plus an oral s_,_ary from each chairman; I presented the findings of
the Overall Concepts and Integration panel. The e_"_ now had cor_plete
information to start their deliberations with the objective of making
a recommendation to the Center Director regarding award of the
Probe/Lander contract.
L
|
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Results of _qSD In-House Studies
In late spring, the FVSD's in-house studies on the tension shell
and in mission analysis had progressed far enough to have some
preliminary results. In a manner similar to the no,'n_sl m[_hod that
FVSD carries out a hardware assigr_nent, FVSD und, 1 9ok to "engineer"
the Mars probe lander with the variety of disciplines within the
; '_ _ion. _s a -esult, _SD was building a _eam capability wi_i_
the division under my aesignations on Roberts st_ff as integrator,
design chief, and mission analyst. There wss nr_ conflict between the
groups because the groups were working different problems and F%'SD's
dat_ fed directly to _oberts and his staff. Both Kilgore, FVSD
Division Chief, and Roberts were pleased with the arrangement and it
was most effective. The FVSD team at this time consisted of about
eight engineers-four in design and four in mission analysis.
The results of FVSD's findings are puesented in the followin_
sections:
Tension Shell
The problem of the tension shell is shown in Figure III-l. The
concept is that the shell is configured to the shape a membrane would
aasume with symmetrical loading under Newtonian theory. MY structural
engineer reported two problem areas:
(1) The base ring would be heavy as a large moment of inertia
would be required to prevent buckling. " "
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Figure III-1.--Theoretical tension shell loading.
i{
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(2) Engineering design procedures were not available for defining
shell stresses under unsymmetrical loading as would be anticipated with
an angle of .%ttack during entry. Further, texts such as Formulas for
Stress and Strain (Roark) or Theory of Plates and Shel±s (Timoshenko)
were not directly applicable to the problem; the shell would probably
have to be designed to resist some bending, and the development of an
analytical solution would represent advancing the state of the art.
Mission Ana/_ses
Few experiences have been as rewarding or as enjoyable as the
first ccu,/le of months work in this field. Starting from scratch and
working, by and large, without guidance, we defined a simple
methodology--not anywhere near a complete understanding of the
technology but an understanding sufficient to make complex trade-offs
in a short time and to identify critical parameters--a working
knowledge sufficient for all near term purposes. It was a stimulating
:.perience and a surprise to us that a group of five people could
progress to such a depth in a new technology in so short a time. The
secret was, I think, that we were interested in the application and
not the methodology for itself. When mission analyst specialists
_.':iedto explain refinements or optimizations, we turned a deaf ear
and ran; when texts got comp.licated, we skipped pages and looked fo_"
a formula we could use for our purpose. Beyond this was the constant
cross feed among five persons aimed at understanding the problem_
in effects we taught each other.
i
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First, let us look at the final results--what we could do. We
could:
(i) Size a launch vehicle and fuel for a mission to Mars for
any size payload (spacecraft and probe/lander) for the following
pha, _--launch, earth orbit, and to place payload in interplanetary
orbit.
(2) Size spacecraft for interplanetary cruise, course
corrections, and orbit maneuver at planet if desired.
; (3) Size propulsion requirements on pro_-'lander for entry.
(4) Determine entry trajectories--velocities, altitudes, loads,
flight path angles.
Now, let us look at how we got there.
(i) Literature search uncovered data such as given in Figure
III-21; similar data is contained for launch windov_ in 1973 and
1975. Concentrating on the parametric data given for departure
velocity (VD) and approach velocity (VA), we obtained a wealth of data
sufficient to study launch £ayloads and Mars entry loads and tra-
Jectories. i
1Voyager Design Studies, Volume 3: 8yste_s Analysis, AVCO
Corporation, October 1_3, P6. 80.
i '
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The departure velocity sauared is usually ter_ed C3 and is a
measure of laup_h vehiCle energy (E), and payload (P). Rationale:
E (for a given launch vehicle) = constant
2
E ~ mV2 ~ FVD = constant
the smaller the VD, the greater the payload--so minimize VD.
(In layman terms--when the planets are favorably aligned, it
takes less departure velocity to deliver a given payload).
Checking down the _epartures velocity column in Figure 111-2, t
for example, we find that the minimum velocity of 2 8 km/sec occurs
on 5/2h/71 and epresents a CB = 2.82 = 7.85. We can then proceed
2
to a launch cnart, such as given in Figure III-3 , which designates
payload as a zunction of C3. This completes the discussion
regarding the launch phase.
The Mars approach problem was also examined. The approach
velo.-ities designated are the velocities as the spacecraft approaches
Mars when the gravity of Mars becomes the prime factor in determining
the subsequent trajectory. By using simple formulae 3, the velocity _
at eny aim point (entry or orbit maneuver) near Mars can be calculated.
Since we must eventually land on the planet, this approach velocity
must eventually be decelerated to zero. Thus, i is logical that we
keep the approach velocity as low as possible to minimize the work
we must do. In summary, tools were in hand to determine the entry
velocity of the vehicle at atmospheric entry -onditions--assumed to be
2 Launch Vchicle Estimating Factors, NASA, January, 1970.
3 Voyage _esign Studies, Volume 3: Systems AnL1ysis AVCO _
! Corporation, October, 1963, p. 70.
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(a) Conversion chart, C to Vj c
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(b) Conversion chart, VC to payload as function of launch vehicle. -':
Figul-eIll-B,--Launchvehicle performance.
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800,000 feet _bnce Mars. (Fcr simpliclt2 and because the refinements
are not essential to first cut analyses, I have omitted mention of
other parameters such as launch azimuth restraints, communication
links to Earth, landing site on Mars, Sun position relative to the
vehicle, length cf launch window, etc.)
(2) To obtair required data on the entry, a simple particle
ballistic Earth entry program was modified. By working with a
programme:- in Langley's Computer Division, the atmospheric and planet
characteristics reflectin_ the current scientific estimates for
Mars were substituted for the Earth's v61ues. Such niceties as six
degrees of freedom programs and entries relative to the atmosphere's
rotation were ignored. Fro_ this simple program, parametric studies
could be readily carried out; we could call in to the programmer the
values of the parameters-entry velocity, entry angle into the
atmosphere, and ballistic number (a measure of the weight-drag
characteristics)--and gel the print-out in the same day which would
describe everything we wanted to know about velocities and loads.
From this work, we identified the critical parameters and could
understand the trade-off problem--thi_ allowed us to carry out com-
plete mission analyses with confidence. It is interesting to note
how this very _mportant assistanc_ was obtained. Two of my young !
engineers made discreet inquiries to determine who covld help us.
They then made an appointment with the specific programmer (female), -_'_
N_SA TN-D2525, NASA Er_ineerlng Models of the Mars Atmosphere for
Entry Vehicle Design, Levin, G. M.; Evans, D. E.; and Stevens, V.,
November 196b.
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explained they were in trouble with their assignment, wer_ ignorant
of the technology, and requested any help they could get. The
cooperation and assistance obt_ned was invaluable and no formal
interdivislon arrangements were eve" :_ade.
7o
Preliminary Langley - JFL - Head_ua:-ters Activltics
With the increased interest in a Mars mission as indicated by
Langley's Probe/Lander effort, JPL's spacecraf_ effort, and Head-
quarters' desire t<. define a rlission, the Langley management began
to take steps to identify Langley's nission role (if any) and its
internal research and technology direction. Since Voyager was an
OSSA program, the definition of Langley's fit in the program was a
complex problem in'.olvin_; OAPT, ()SSA, and Langley.
At the request of Mr. Kilgore, 5_r. _rown and I were clcsely
associated with Dr. Roberns in the preparation cf two dcc_nents e_r±y
in May. The first dccument was an internal memcranduar, defining, as
best we could, the <)ptions available (together with their Justifi-
cation from a technology viewpoint and the resources required for
each option responsibility) to CART in its participation in the
Voyager Program. This memorandum OART's Role in the Voyager ProgrmT_
is contained in Appendix III-A, and a su,_ar_ chart is included
herewith as Figure IIl-h. Briefly, it outlines three options all
with overall JPL management and responsibilit) for launch vehicle and
spacecraft systems. Under Option I, Langley would be responsible
for the entire entry vehicle ("capsule bu_") development including
science. Option II is the same except the science integration
function would be performed by JPL. Option III gives mission h_rdware
responsibility to JPL with Langley furnishing technology suppor .
The second paper was for a presentation at Washington Headquarters i
by Dr. Roberts on May Ii to OSSA and OART management. This presen-
tation was entitled Voyager Research and Technology Programs and was
k ,
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I II III
TOTAL SYST_I INTEGRATION JPL JPL JPL
S/C Bus JPL JPL JPL
S/C F'periment Integration JPL JPL JPL
S/C Experiments From Experimenters
f
Capsule _as Development LRC LRC JPL
Capsule Bus Definition Program LRC [qC LHC
Earth Atmosphere Flight Program LRC LRC LRC
Capsule Experiment Integration LRC JPL JPL
Atmospheric Measurements Exper. LRC LRC LRC
&
Other Experiments From Experimenters !
LRC MANPOWER 120 80 50
2o
:r i
Figure llI-h.--Alternate Langley roles in Voyager prog_'am.
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"' devoted to c_u_at!ng Headquarters on Langley's capabilities in both
7
general applicable technology areas and in Voyager _±ssion under-
2
_' standing specifically. The objective of this presentation was to
supplement the previous memorandum (Appendix II-A) by illustrating
Langley's expertise ana its relation to Voyager requirements and I
., schedule. An overall technology schedule program plan (Figure iII-5) {
{
:: 7
? was included which illustrated the technology development fit with r
: Voyager scheduling but no recommendation or mention was made concerning :
• _
:, ar_ Langley direct role in the mission hardwa_'e Fro_ram. Langley
mena6ement was obviously sitting tight at this time and awaiting
future developments before committing to a position or setting up any
formal mission o"_ire. All Langley personnel working the "missi n
oriented" problem were still carrying out their line functions; there
7
was no Langley Voyager Office as there was at JtL.
> 9
5 )
<
! '
#
_' t _ '"
i
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Voyager Planning at Headquarters, June i_6_
At this time, NASA Headquarters had initiated project '_d defini-
J
tion of Voyager with plans to fund the start of hardware fabrication,
test, and operations in 1966. The first operational mission was
scheduled for 1971 with a Satarn 1B/uentaur launch vehicle. Ther was
enthusiasm for Voyager within the scientific community; the Space
Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences recommended that
unmanned exolcration of Mars and the search for ex_ra-terrestial life
be the primary objective of post-Apollo space program. There was
clamor among biologists for ambitious missions including the landing
of a large Automated Biological Laboratory (ABL)_ a minority viewpoint
wa_ for a more gradual, evolutionary approach starting with small,
simple payloads. Donald Hearth, OSSA Voyager Program Manager, stated
that Voyager "extends a major challenge and great opportunity to the
scientific community and the aerospace industry. Neither the
technical difficulties nor the potential rewards of the program are
5
underestimated."
For all intents and purposes, Voyager appeared to be an
established program on firm ground with support from NASA and the i
scientific community.
5 Donald P. Hearth, "Voyager", Astronautics and Ae'onautics, May 1965.
L .
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Langley's Response to Voyager _ipetus
Because of the aforementioned events (Voyager's iml,o_tance and
La_,gley's Probe/Landec input), Langley ad_in_ztzation rec_Jgnized the
need tc _;rganize its efforts in a n_anner compatlbl_: with the overall
requirements of NA['A. Its first st_p was the creation of a Planetary
Mission Technology Ste:?ing Committee (PMT:_C) reportin6, T_c the Director
and chaired by Dr. Roberts. The membership c_nzisted c_f"eight senior
Center engineers in the various divisions and inc]uqed the basic
core of personnel who worked the earlier Mars missions studies; I
was appointed Secretary for the conmittee. Throu_,_h this mechanism
(both formal meeting" minutes and discussions with the chuirman),
the Director was kept in['o,_ned of all dev,q<;pments regarding Langley/
Voyager interactions and could participate as he saw fit. Two of the
specified functions o_ the comn,ittee were to (i) guide and review the
progress of contra,,'t studies and (2) evalunte results of studies
and recommend future actions. (The men,cr_ndum establishing the PMSTC
and its functions is included as Appendix III-B. ) Through this
mechanism of a PMTSC, the Langley mana£ement could get the Langley
staff involved to a degree while still not perturbing the research
llne orgsnizations or creating a project office to centralize the
work.
With the award of the Probe/Lander contract to AVCO, Wilmington,
MassachuEetts,the stage,ms set for the accelerationof Langley's
efforts to include directing of Probe/Lander work and cuordinating
\
I
i
L k
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Voyager participation vith JPL and Headquarters. The PMTSC addressed
itself to the problem and undertook three major responsibilities at
the behest of Mr. Charles Donlan, Associate Director, who met with
the committee and gave it broad operating guidelines. Mr. Donlan
stated that "the Voyager Program is mo¢ing fast and LRC should"
participate because it is primarily an exercise in reentry technology.
": The present AVCO study is being used as a focal point--for preliminary
definition. ''6 He asked the PMTSC to (1) guide AVCO's study, (2) york
up an Langley research program tJ support Voyager, and (B) prepare a
draft of working agreement with JPL tc define mutual responsibilities.
The PMTSC set up the organization shown on Figure III-6 to
guide the study; as indicated therein, I was responsible for system
integration, mechanical design, environmental control, qualification
i program, and _ission an_Llysis. Subcommittees in the various research
disciplines were appointed to outlil.e and cost research programs
necessary to support Voyage:*. Thirdly, a draft o£ a "Reconm_ended LRC
Position in "theVoyager Program" was prepared for the Director for
his use in negotiations with JPL. A cop) of the draft is included
as Appendix III-C and is based on LRC's position being one of "strong
technical support in the _rea of entry technology/." In essence, it
committed LBC to carry out the ner_ssary aerodynamic wind tunnel
testing, entry vehicle structural research, and plan and conduct a
supporting flight test program in the Earth's atmosphere--total
Voyager mainline hardware was "assumed" to be the responsibility of JPL. .._
nute| of the fo_,_thm_etlng of Planetary Missions Technology
Steering Committee, _u_ust 9, 1965.
J
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I STEERING
I COMMITTEE
I
STUDY jDIRECTOR
CONTRACTOR
FUNCTIONAL STAFF
Study Director
Leonard Roberts, DLD Technlcal direction of Study
Technical direction of Functional
Staff
/
Functional Staff
i. R. A. Jones, APD Aerodynamic Configuration
Aerodynamic Heating
2. E. M. Sulliva:,, LMPD Propulsion
Decelerators
Flight Test Program
3. P. J. Bobbitt, Dr/) Entry Dynamics
Entry Loads
h. J. F. McNulty, FVSD System Integration
Mechanical Des_ ,,
Environmental _r_+i l
Qualifi_atio: i...._"-_
Mission Anal_'_::_
L
$. S. T. Peterson, IRD Communication Sy:tem
Instrumentat ion •
Tracking
StertlizatJ on
6. L. D. Guy, SRD Structural Analysis
Thermal prot_.tion
Impact Structure
Struct:_al Configuration
Figure III-6.-Organization of _nagelent and direction of LRC Marl
probe/lander study.
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Direction of AVCO's Study
As mentioned previously, the companies bidding on the Probe/Lander
: proposal had strengths in various areas and the comp_i¢ion was stiff.
AVCO's strength was its analytical capability in mission analysis,
parametric studies, structural analysis, etc.; compared to some of its
competitors, it was weaker in the engineer.ng hardware design and
fabrlcatlon--in other words, the company was more research than
engineering oriented. The company, no doubt, was selected because it
was felt that analytical capability was the driving function ir our
study; i.e., the need to optimize entry shell weight, tradeoff
trajectories, etc.
A mutually acceptable working arrangement was quickly worked out
between Langley and AVCO. This arrangement consisted of close
Inters-tion; the work of the contractor was followed in detail so
that the effort was a Joint one rather than having the contractor
work for a period of months, report his findings to a large review
group, and obtain feedback redirection as befits and is normal for
some studies. The I_ISC stayed out of the Otre_t loop (except as
Dr. hoberts reported progress at meetings) and the runnin, of the
contract yes left to Dr. Roberts and his functional staff. AVCO
had a similar function ptaff and tt was the responsibility of the
Langley atatf member to monitor the work in his area. This was an
extremely demanding period fo _ me because a large amount of work
in mission analyLls vas required to furnish input to Che other
4iecloline|. This tnterecti_n, in addition to bet_ responsible
J
L L
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for the actual design integration of subsystems required me to see
the whole picture and know th,_ interfaces. Normal working relation-
ship between me and Mr. Ellis, AVCO's systems en£ineer, consisted of
many phone calls, mailed dat_ exchange, aALd oi-weekly meetings either
at AVCO or at Langley when ,e analyzed and agreed as tc where we were
,n_ where we were going. The LRC-AVCO relationships were excellent
throughout owin_ to mutual respect and the mix of capabilities was ;
J
advantageous for outa.ning sound analytical ant engineering o_jectives.
On the _hnicai'sidr, AVCO's paraa,etrlc studies of the t|mee
c_ndidate shapes (.enzion shell, cone, _nd Apollo _ indicated thpt
from welght-performance considerations they were near equal while
from a packaging point of view the cone was superior. '_e tension
shell's _uperiority in high drag and le'_ ,,_:l_htproved illusione/-y--
tunnel tests of 120 ° blunt cones indicated that they performed nearly
equal in drag to the tension shell and the tension shell's estimated _.
weight increased with buckling and bending problems. Thus, one of
Langley's main selling rmints--its unique knowledge of low weight
tension shell technology--was quietly discarded without notice. The
PMTSC agreed to concentrate t_ study on the cone shape for the
reentry vehicle because of its packaging capability a_%d because its
state-of-the-_rt was in keeping with schedule requirements.
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i;_ Research Program To Support Voyager ,,;
The second action item of the PMTSC was to define a research
_'J '5
:, program. It should be noted that this item is of tremendous importance
t _
to a Center like Langley. It furnishes the researcher with funds and
i o" ",'_.tivesto follow his quest fcr knowledge in his specialty. One
reason why Langley participates in mission projects is because of the
technology (facilities included) fallout ; in general, Langley desires
_' a mix between missions and research, and strives to assure that
projects do not overwholm the research in importance. Projects are
-X
,/ status symbol_, good public relations, a sm_ce of funding, and many _,
engineers prefer the type work. The defining of a research program,
thus, goes to the heart of Langley.
The following program elements were defined and presented to
' PMTSC for approval and forwarding to JPL and Headquarters: :
i. Wind Tunnel Test Program .... $330,000
_ 2. Capsule-Heat Shield Development. . . _00,000 ,
" 865 '
,_ 3. Parachute Development ........... ,000
_, The parachute develoI_ent program warrants a few words at this
point. It was anticipated froa our mission analysis studies _hat - :
i the ulssion vould require a parachute approxiaately 8_ feet in diameter _'
,., to be deployed at about Mach 1.2. Deploy:ents in this transonic ,_
range were beyond the state-of-the-art. Langley proposed a series of ,'_
seven rocket flight deployaent_ of sub-scale parachutes to _elect an !
"i_, Opt_ configuration, and a series of five full-sise parachute :_
,4
._' -)
:
2 j
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deployments in the wake of a blunt cone to prove out the system and to
study wake effects. The full-size tests would consist of a balloon
_ la,mch to approximately i00,000 feet, cone release, firing rockets
for additional altitude (120,000 feet to simulate Mars atmospheric
? density) and for Mach number requirements, and deployment of the
parachute. Figure IIl-7 illustrates the concept and sequence of events.
An important decision was required with regard to this proposed
parachute program. There was considerable controversy within the
PMTSC as to whether this balloon launch, rocket assist concept was
feasible teclmlcally. The alternative was for a standard rocket
launch which would require a Little Joe II launch vehicle. The launch
cost of a Little Joe II was estimated at $2,000,000 while the balloon
launch was estimated to $i00,000. Even the Assistant Director _t
I_C, Mr. Donlan, had grave doubts about the balloon concept. However,
the cognizant Langley engineer, Mr. John McFall of AMPD, stood firm
%
and carried the day--for five launches, the decision involve,, a total
of about $10,000,000. _e PMTSCand Langley mana@_ent approved and
_roposed the l_lloon la_uch method and then stood its ground against
f
JPT,' s _uestioning.
/
f'
? ..
g
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Working Out Arrangements With JPL
In working out arrangements with JPL, Langley had to consider
JPL's unique position in the _ASA organization. Formally, JPL is a
research laboratory under the cognizance of California Institute of
Technology. However, nearly all its contracts are performed for
:_ NASA; JPL is, in reality, an arm of NASA-OSSA. Although a contractor,
'_ JPL acts and considered to be more like a NASA Center. Pre-196_,
JPL provided the initiative (through 0SSA) for early unmanned lunar
and planetary programs. Its early planetary ideas developed into
successful Mariner miqsions to Venus in 1962 and to Mars in 1964.
Its mode of operation is primarily to build in-house with the use of
subcontractors rather than the utilization of prime ccntractor such
as North American on Apollo or Boeing on Lunar Orbiter. JPL had, at
_"_ this time, a near monopoly on NASA unmanned missions to the planets
and, thus. was the only "Center" with proven capabi!_t:;. .There were,
_ however, some previously mentioned difficulties brewing in the NASA-
JPL relationship; (i) NASA was under pressure from industr M to
_ contract work rather than performing the work in-house, (2) Congres-
_ r, ioual inquiries into problems associated with JPL's Ranger and
8urve_ror programs revealed that neither NASAnor Congren was
: satisfied with NASA's direct control over JPL and, thus, the programs,
._ (3) th_ desire by OSSA to obtain overall NASACenter participation in
• unmanned aAssions and, thus, enlarge N_SA's options and capabilities.
i: _ Ret_trnAng to Voyager, it should be noted that Voyager was, at
_ii :_ tMAs t_me, _ ,llshtl_ ler_er and more c@_lex tbaa _PL's previous
]974020203-]0]
Mariner missions. The impor'ant differences were: (i) use of
Saturn iB-Centaur is:stead of Atl_s-Centaur as launch vehicle, (2) an
orbiting spacecraft instead o_ flyby, and (3) a release of an entry
capsule carrying a "hard" (Impact attenuated ball) instrumented
lander on spacecraft approach (see Figure III-8). The estimated cost
i
of the 1971 Voyager mission was of the order of $400,000,000. JPL was
z officially assigned Voyager Project responsibility on July 14, 1965.
The letter from :Ieadquarters stated t,_at "LRC would provi!e support
in the area of entry technology"--this _s precisely the role which
the PMTSC had recommended to the Director in its aforementioned
draft.
With that charter, JPL visited or_ perh, ps, descended on Langley
to work out the details of how "L_C vould provide support." JPL was
represented by a staff of 12 high-level Voyager office personnel with
the aim in mind of getting maximum " _ "pro_,ect help from Langley. The
_ rsonnel were obviously well qualified and well prepared for the
meeting. Langley was represented by members of the PKTSC with Dr.
Roberts as principal spokesman. It yes quickl_ apparent that JPL
and Lan_ey had some diverse views as to Langley'e lx_rticip_tive
role--and I don't b_ileve that this case as a surprise to ar_one
since the dividing of the responsibility and i_IAM is a |erio_m and
iaportant matter. JPL was interested in gettin_ L_ey out of the
"systems" ares vhich JPL _ted to control and into narrow specific
technolo_ tasks (i.e., type Qf holt shield _terlal) vhich _uld
lupl_ its minions oo_oept. L_e_, on the other hand, took the
]974020203-]02
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broad view that "supl_r% in the area of entry technology" included
entry concepts and design methodology. As a me_ber of the JPL group
: stated to me in words to the effect that "JPL knew LRC w_s interested
in Mars missions and was soliciting contract assistance. We expected
_ r.qC "co contract for a research oriented study and were very surprised ,
when we read the work statement and found it systems oriented--we
knew then that JPL had competition in unmanned planetary missions."
JPL asked s_ecifically that Langley's contract "systems effort be
deemphasized %o avoid preferential treatment to AVCO in subsequent
Voyager capsule procurement. "7 The meett_ was adjourned after a
free discussion but few agreements_ it was obvious that the feeling
out period had started and much york or Headquarters direction would
be required to define mutual roles.
TJPL l_tar June 29, 1965, to Dr. Rob,z't, frm D. P. l_relma,
. VoTqer Prol_t Nkna6er.
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_, Voyager Becomes a Multi-Billion Dollar ProKram
_' August and September were months of working the AVCO contract
,_ heavily and continuing the preliminary skirmishes with JPL. Then in
October came a surprise Headquarters decision which changed the entire
picture. Headquarters decreed that the launch vehicle for Voyager
would be the Saturn V_ this changed the program from a Mariner type
to a mini-Apollo This, together with the almost simultar,eous data
from the fly-by Hariner that the atmosphere of Mar8 was now estimated
to much les_,dense than previously (5-I0 millibars rather than
previously defined 10-h0 millibars), required the design of entirely
much larger mission with much more difficult landing parameters.
Neither JPL nor Langley had studied the _aturn V mission and recommended
it to Headquarters. Headquarters' decision was unilateral and based
on scant technical input insofar as the Centers were aware. The new
guidelines dictated by Washington Headquarters were:
a. Saturn 5 vehicle
b. Only on_ vehtcle for etch opportunity
c. l_o "69" test f'iKht8
d. Teo identlctl spacecraft an l capsules on each launch vehicle
for "71" and "7,_".
e. Delivery node "out-of-orbit"
f. Type one tre_ectorie8 only i
., g. 5Mroud 260" dimaeter naxinwa
h. Spleecra_t science pe_load 250t maxtmm
T
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i. No spacecraft zcience mission required in "71" 1
J. Objective of "71" mission
(i) Obtain atmosphere data !
(2) Obtain surface winds
(3) Obtain surfaces topography
(_) Obtain surface .hardness
k. Land a 2001 automated bioLo_ laboratory type l_load lu 1977
1. Spacecraft mission to deliver capsule Luto orbit
m. Design _o a 5 to 10 MB pressure
n. Spacecraft designed for 0-800# capsule weight for 1971
and 1973
o. Capsule entry weight to be 1000-3000# for 1975 and 1977
p. 1971 capsule entry mode to be ballistic with a minimum
M/CDA of .25.
q. Subsonic chute only /or "71"
r. 1971 test capsule to be done on an in-house basil (like
Ranger and Mariner ) system contractor planned for no earlier than
1973.
The important points to note are:
a. Chs_e in launch vehAele pe_load eapability fr_a about
10,00_ to 100,000#
b. 1971 test e&psule (lander) to be • relattvel_ sidle
packqe and to landed by "subsonic chute only."
e. Jo 1969 test flights but • 8radual _x_th in _tlsicm
c_plexAtlee event t_ years - l_rl tbro_h 19TT.
1
i
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The management resl_neibiltty was still in the hands of JPL but it was
obvious that a project as large a_ Voyager vas nov defined vould require
the resources of many Centers_Mareh._l _uld, of course, suppler the
Saturn V--and, thus, the final project _ageBent vould have to be
redefined at a later date. Hean_le JPL, vith LaNL_ey's help, va¢ _o
redesign the mission and make recommendations to He_lquarters. LanCes
issued a change order to its AVCO eontrant to redirect its york on
the Probe/Lander to b_ consistent with the hey 6u£Aelines.
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Headquarters' Rationale fop Saturn V Decision
The two reasons publicly stated for makir_ the launch vehic',
/ switch were:
i. A funds squeeze existed ovin_ to the _emands of the Vietnam
War and the Apollo priority. The switch to the developed Saturn V
would free up funds needed to develop the Saturn 1B/Centaur combina-
tion and transfer launch vehicle costs until later fiscal years when
Vietnam and Apollo wouldn't be so demanding.
2. The lower atmospheric density estimated at Mars could mean
that a more complex and weightier landing syste_ _uld be required
,, which the Saturn 1B/Centaur coundn't ha_._le_a_d the next bigger
launch vehicle in the NASA stable was the Saturn V.
_ Other underlyinK reasons for the switch mentioned by v_riou_
NASA officials which added impetus to the decision were:
1. Marshall _s gearin_ up to produce six Saturn V's per year
for Apollo and it was natural that _ _uld need a market for the
Saturn V'8 after Apollo. The decision was, thus, influenced b_ a
: desire to naintain a national space capebility and to provide
contlnuinK work for the Marshall Center.
_. 2. Scientists in O_A and in the aeademia w_ted the clpability
•" of landing lar6e scientific laboratories on M_rs. The scientific
. c_nity at this tins was almost totally in concurrence with the
deeislon because, as it said by VoyIM_er pLrtlc1_*0, "--- every
biologistin the countrycouldget his ezperi_entaboard."
tL '
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Reactions at Lanf_ley and JPL
The reactions by Langley management, as express _ co the I_TC,
was one of using VoyaKer as a focus of research programs. Mr. Donlan,
Lan_ey's deputy director, stated he had met with Dr. Adams, head of
OART in WashinKton, and t.hat "OART's mission is to develop technology
required to surport Voyager since VoyaKer is the only approved
_zoKram af*.er Apollo". 8 Hr. Dave S¢,one, who had recently served as
prog_.a_ manager _f the highly successful FIRE project, was appointed
Lan_ley's technoloKy m_._la_er and was instructed to survey the Center,
define te,'hno]oKy programs, and work with JPL to obtain approval and
fundinK. Our core of top level technical people vorkinK on the J4ars
mission wore somewhat elated at the turn of e_ent8 because we felt,
in general, the larger and more important the mission, the more the
opportunity to contri_te and to advance in our professions.
Discussion with our project counterparts at JPL revealed that
the reaction at JPL was very much different and reflected concern.
yam concerned about both techrical and man_ement problems. In
the technical area where they had had extensive lnterplanel_sry mission _
eXl_eric_cc whereas L_ey v..s a novicd, JPL felt that the teehnolos_
Jtup f_ )4arinera to 86turn "_alesioum _ _ Kr_t. Beyond this,
tke_ hsd e_nod the feuSb£1i_y o! _ar_ 8cient$_0 R_Jmten8
in-house an_., despite the clamor of scientists for lar6e experiments,
A
°J_nute8 of the ninth neetin6 of the Planetar_ J_testons Teehnolo£y .._
8tnrtn6 Ccm_ttee, (evembe_ 8, 196_. .,
t
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had concluded t'_at the scientific instruments were not available
within reasonable cost oi"schedule limitations. In the management
area_ _hey forsaw that the mission was zoo big for JPI. to manage alone
and feared that a managemen_ structure would become big and unwieldy
_aithJPL cau_ht in the middle her°seen several NASA Centers and
/
Headquarter,'.
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The Other Shoe Drops--Cancellation of '_i Voyag_er
T_o months after the switch to the Saturn V, OSSA Headquarters
cancelled the '71 mission and reschedu!ed the first Voy_er mission
to 1973. Lack of f_ids w_s the reason. The BOB (Bu_e&u of Budget)
cut _{ASA'soveral I request for fuads from $5.6 bl].lion tc $5.1
billion. With Apollo, Surveyor, snd Lunar Orbits- in ha.rdware proc_Lre-
ment, the new start progr,ms bore the brunt of the cut. As a r__sult,
Voys_er w_s approved for only $i0 million out of the requested $150
million. Donald Hearth the Voy_er program manager stated that
"--- work on the spacecraft portion of the $ystem _rlll go on a low
back burner basis for the next year and a half to twD years before
we pick it up again. ''9 In the interim, the plan was for JPL and
Langley to continue work on lander deflnition.
Thus, the yea_- a,nded on a confused basis with an entirely new
problem to start work on in the _,evyet.-. The situation in brief was:
i. Langley's technical staff wa__broadening Jts technology base
and increasing ia expertise. Th,_FVSD team was becoming an
appreciable force vithin the staff.
2. Langley administratinn was taking its first steps to support
a Mars program but had not maO-. anM c,'ganisational ehanles nor
indicated a Aesire for era4hardware :oemitPent.
3. Headquarters had a "tiger by _he tail" with the Saturn V
Voyager program end no clear _ath was evident.
9Aviation Week and Space Te_hnolo_, January 3, 1966
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Synopsis
i
: : A synopsis of the second year's effort could be tabulated as
indicated below:
i i Obtaining in-house capability in Mars mission studies by the :,
}
formulation of Lan61ey working teams in various technology areas.
i 2. Probe/Lander contract evaluation and award to AVCO.
3. Probe/Lander contrac_ _o serve as basis for Voyager entry
capsule. ?
4. Langley becomes a semi-participant in the Voyager program _
with Headquarters and JPL.
' 5. Langley creates a Planetary Missions TechnGl_@y B_eering ?
Committee with Dr. Roberts as chairman
I 6. JPL awarded managership of Voyager.
7. Voyager to utilize cone configuration for entry vehicle rather
i than tension shell. _
8. Langley proposes a parachute development pro6ram for Mars
application--transonic deployment at low dynamic pressure, iC
_ 9. Headquarters decrees Saturn V as Voyager launch vehicle.
i0 Voyager 19_1 mission cancelled.
?
} ;
.J
_ .
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CHAPTER IV
VOYAGER DEFINITION - 1966
Smmm&r_
• On the technical level at Langley, the year was primarily spent
L
• on trying to understand the Saturn V Voyager program -- analyzip_
the technical problems, evaluating the trade-offs, and defining a
rational technical approach. Other technical items of note which took
place durlng the year included the completion of the AVCO contract
and the initiation of research and develol_nent tests for a Mars
parachute system.
At Headquarters the effort consisted of developing guidelines for
the various systems (Spacecraft, Lander, Launch Vehicle, etc. ) in
order to furnish the various Centers and JPL some definition of
their responsibilities and to provide cl'_rter interfaces. In addition,
much effort was expended in atteaptir_ to deterai_, a management
organization to weld together the efforts of the many participating
organizations scattered from coast to coast. Involved in this
problem was the prime importance of defining Center assignments
(management, spacecraft, lander, etc. ) so as to obtain the best mix
of capabilities and ins'are a "workable" management system.
• i
ee
2
•_ 95
I
• 7 ................ :
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I Voyager-AVCO Interface
9 _ At the start of the year AVC0 was engaged in revising its work
i to date to make it directly applicable to the 1973 Voyager mission--
i.e. extrapolating the data they had worked up for the Saturn IB/
I Centaur mission to the Seturn V mission. Since AVCO's work on the
entry vehicle was _o be used for program preliminary definition, it
! was essential that the guidelines AVCO was using reflected the
_ mission as _SA Headquarters visualized it. As delineated in the
_ _ previous chapter, Voyager was now defined as a continuous program
i evolving in complexity through four launch years (every other calendar
_ year) from a first probe mission to a final landed "automated
biological ?aboratory" mission. JPL's management was convinced that
_ !i prime importance had to begiven to definition of the first mission
for costing and scheduling reasons--other items such as logical growth,
future planning, and subsystem commonality were placed on the back
i burner unt_l the first mission was defined. I In this regard,
Edward M. Sullivan, LRC Liaison Coordinator, reports in a trip memo-
randum as follows:
: "Mr. Schurmeler [JPL Voyager Program Manager] expressed the
; thought they would like to get the first mission settled _d i
? defined.
1Author's note: This JPL "obsession" with the current problem
continually reflects itself in technioal and management dealings with
! Headquarter_ and other Centers as the careful reader will note.
t
1974020203-114
97
Then they should proceed ... and see what technology
development schedule makes sense for '73 and '75 to support
,
the '77 mission.
"I asked about a landed payload in the first mission. They
c
_, were adamant in saying they did want to consider it. Mr.
Schimandle offered the comment that the simplest landed
payload, which did nothing but transmit a signal to indice.te
impact survival, would so affect the cost and engineering
complexity as to Jeopa_'dize the entire capsule mission."
4 In accordance with the above, Dangley had AVCO concentrate on a
Probe mission. As AVC0 stated in the final oral report "the purpose
of this study is the design of a non-survivable probe to perform
V
engineering experiments for the determination of Mars atmospheric and
terrain properties. The mission is primarily engineering in nature
in order to obtain Mars properties for the definition and confirmation
of assumptions that are necessary for the design of future large soft-
landers for advanced mlssions. ''2 The sequence of events is illustrated
in figures IV-i and I_-2 and a summary of significant da_a from the
fizal report is included in Appendix IV-A. A synopsis of the final
", conclusions is as follows:
' _4a_s Probe, Final Presentation, Contre_t lq_l-522&, March l, 1966
|
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Experiment s
• 3 camera TV
• 4 penetrometers to measure hardness
• atmospheric composition instruments
Entry Capsule
• 15 foot diameter cone
r
• weight = 20h0 Ibs.
• M/CDA = .22
Only Technology Problem Area
• Development of parachute for low dynamic pr,:ssure
deDloYment
i AVC0's final report was veil received; it was felt that the company
did an exceptional Job under trying circumstances involving guideline
changes of the launch vehicle, mission magnitude and objectives. The
realms of parametric data produced together with actual design weights
for the baseline mission furnished a wealth of d_ta to guide further
" studies and trade-offs for future missions. AVC0's study of the
Saturn V Voyager mode was restrained to study of the capsule being
released from the spacecraft while in orbit about Mars rather _han
_ being rele _sed on the spacecraft's approach to Mars and making a i
direet entrT. The re_onlq will be dlseumHd in _e de,all in
the next section because the controver_ between _ and out-of-
_ entry is of prime importance in mission complexity, cost, and
success; suffice to sa_ at thi, time that with the guidelines of
._ Saturn V with its lsr6e ener_ and with an orbiter specified,
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mission success requirements became the forcing function and the
out-of-orbit mode became an obvious choice. 3 It should be recalled
at this time that the contractor wa_ required to study the out-of-
orbit delivery mode by the original work statement (more or less as
_ an afterthought to be certain we included the total problem). As a
result of this foresight, the changes in AVCO's contract resulted in
_ only a very small change of contract price in lieu of a complete
" rework.
_ mnunuu iii
3Author°snote" We smallmee t_s eo_e_s:r szlmetlaesa4 qaAa
throu6hout the hlstozT.
'i
4
1974020203-119
102
Out of Orbit/Direct Entry Trades
The alternate planetary approach modes are illustrated in
figure IV-3 together with their appropriate entry velocities into
the Martian atmosphere. The entry velocity for the out-of-orbit
mode is considerably less than for the direct mode because the
spacecraft must be slowed (by use of retro-propulsion) to effect its
capture into orbit. This velocity decrement is reflected into a
lower entry velocity.
Figure IV-_ summarizes the trades between the entry modes in
terms of the parameters involved. Targetir_ the entry vehicle for
entry into the Martian atmosphere at a specific point and direction
is the crux of most entry problems. Figure IV-5 represents the
general problem. As one can see, a 7E of 0 ° to skip YE causes the
vehicle to miss the planet entirely. The nominal (s/m) YE is
determined by adding the 30 error tolerance to the skip ankle. Design
must account for entry at nominal 7 E +_ 30 tolerance angle. The
reasons for staying ad close to the skip ankle as possible are:
1. longer path ("stroke") in the atmosphere thus reducing
structural and heatt_ loads.
2. D_re &_ospb,_ie breaking thus less enerEy to be removed by
landing aystm.
3. lower velocities at parachute deplo_ent altitude.
Exa_ the l_lieations for the direct entry node, we find:
J
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i.
Direct Mode Jut cf Orbit Mode
I
Spacecraft
L r .
Spacecraf_
Entr.v Conditions
Direct Mode Out of Crblt Mode ',
7
VE 2h,O00 ft/sec 16,000 ft/see
Figure IV-3.--Planetaryapproach modes.
I
; 4
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t_teepest Design YE
/"
I
+
Figure IV-5.--Entry :ondi_ions.
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i. skip YE is approximately 20c for VE = 2h,OOO'/sc_..
2. 3o eL_or band could be only be estimated since the mission
had never been done befo_'e--iet alone enough t_mes to get
statistical data. The problem is complicated since it is not
known _. wheA'eMars is. Based on an examination of the
first Mariner dat_ (Mariner missed its target on a flyby
by at least a thousand miles which would result in a mission
failure for an entry mission), it was felt by JPL and AVCO
that enou6h was lee/ned so that it should now be possible to
design a mission with a 30 value of 84, This would result
in a nominal entry angle of -'8° with a m_ximum design1 entry
angle of 36°.
For out-of-orbit mode, we find:
i. skip YE is approximately 13° for VE • 16,000'see.
2. the 30 error band is determina_,t since it is within the
state-of-the-art to assure spacecraft capture into some
orbit_ once the spacecraft has been captured, it is readily _
possibly (by checkin6 the orbit through telemetry signals)
to tune the orbit until the design orbit ts achieved.
Knovin_ the exact relationship _etween Mars ana _he orbit,
the entry vehicle can be .classed to enter the atmosp|_re
within m 2° 30 value. This would resul_ In a nominal entry
an_le of 15 ° with a maximum deeign anise of 17 °.
i
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The following paramete s....loads and heating, landing footprint,
and aerodynamic braking---indicazed on figure IV-h are related to this
s entry angle accuracy. As mentioned previously, the lower the entry
angle, the lower the loads and greater the energy consumed in aero-
90°)dynamic braking. For example a straight-in entry (YE would
result in the entry vehicle _eing at a high supersonic speed when it
closes in on the Mars surface---thus, making a landing extremely
difficult if not impossible. Scientlsts prefer small landing foot-
prints as they like to pinpoint the locations for their experiments.
Thus, out-of-orblt entry mode is preferable to scientists because of
the small entry dispersion angle and to the engineer for loads,[
heating, and velocity conditions. The parameter most favoring the
direct entry approach is cost. Assuming that it is possible to target
a vehicle from Earth to hit the planet, a high energy impact mission
could be carried out at less cost because there would be no need for
an orbiting spacecraft nor for the additional propulsion weight
necessary to effect orbit. Thus, a smaller launch vehicle cculd be
utilized and costs could be reduced all along the line.
L
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New Headquarters Guidellne--Lander in ""_
On March 9, 1966 a meeting of the Voyager Steering Committee was
held attended by representatives of Langley, JPL, and Washington
Headquarters, OSSA. OSSA stated that since 1971 mission had been
cancelled that sufficient time was available to pursue a landing
mission in 1973 to conduct surface experiments and, thus, to skip the
Probe mission altogether--the mission that AVCO had Just completed
/
studying per OSSA's instructions. Again, Headquarters edicted a major
mission change without technical input from the Centers and the blanket
claim there is "sufficient time" is not substantiated. Thus, JPL and
Langley were instructe4 to carry out a scientific lander mission
without benefit of the prior Engineering mission which was planned to
obtain design data for the lander mission.
JPL expressed the opinions "that the resources and time available
do not comply with the guidelines--and that the OSSA mission proposed
for 1973 is too ambitious. ''h Langley stated that "the guidelines were
premature"5 and should be subjected to more study, In his memorandum
of the meeting, Mr. Kilgore, Langley, noted that "JPL, in their role
as a contractor, reacts to OSSA guidelines as somewhat hard end fast
requirements, which are subject to a minimum of question and changes.
J LRC could mske a major contribution to the Voyager Program by studying
and defining a series of missions for OSSA, which we feel would more
logically focus on an end objective. ''6 ..-
and Systems Division, March 14, 1966
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In accordance with the above, Langley held a _eeting of its
PMTSC and decided that "LRC should pursue an in-house study aimed at "
evolving a logical Voyager sequence, A completion date of about
September I, 1966 was suggested so that the task results could influence
the selection of the mission mode of the 1973 Voyager. ''7 The study
would use the parametric data developed under the AVCO contract as
a base, Dr. Roberts would be program manager _nd I was assigned the
; project engineer responsibility. For the next several months, th_s
was my prime responsibility--defining, delegating, directing and
integrating tasks throughout the Center to define a rational Voyager
mission sequence. This study was primarily carried out by the FVSD
: team under my directioI_ with Research Division personnel used in a
consultant capacity; of course, close contact was main%_Ined with
Dr. Roberts and Mr. Kilgore. Thus, while JPL was attempting to
define the 1973 mission in terms of hardware, Lar_ley was mainly
involved in evaluating the broader problem in addition to pursuing
the parachute development program which AVCO b d identified as the
major problem area. It should be noted that Headquarters did not
", take issuance with Langley proceeding with an in-house study to
define a sequence of missions; further, Headquarters stated that it
,t
welcomed the assista_nce of Langley in this regard. Thus, there
" remained a doubt of how "hard" the lander guideline was.
•_ 7Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Planetary Missions Technology
Steering Committee, April 15, 1966
k
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Engineering Study of Fatr_ System
This section will be devoted to the.methodology developed for
the engineering systems synthesis performed by the technical staff tc
carry out the directions of the PMTSC.
As can be recalled, the problem was one of defining of the basic
parameters (weights and diameters) of the Capsule Bus which would be
! compatible with OSSA science guidelines for Voyager missions 1971
/
, through 1977. The terminology to be used is illustrated on figure
IV-6 and is broken down into the following main elements:
1. Capsule Bus--this is the entire vehicle separated from the
spacecraft in orbit including the subsystems needed for the deorbit
_T maneuver and to protect the vehicle against contamination from micro-
: organisms.
2. Entry Vehicle--this is the vehicle that enters the Martian
atmosphere and takes the entry structural and heat loads--the capsole
bus minus the deorbit motor, ,_dapter, and sterilization canister.
3. Delivered System--this is the package delivered to the
surface of Mars after separation from the heat shield. It includes
the science Da:kage and support.mS subsystems.
The block diagram illultrati_ the engineering syeteml synthesis
performed is shown on figure IV-r. ,_-- ,_e three basic inputs:
1. Entry vehicle parameters--the entry angle, entry velocity and
drag coefficient are fixed constants; the ballistic coefficient and
entry vehicle diama_er are given parametrically through the range of
t
• i
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Allocated Cspsuie Bus %leight :
be-Orbit Motor --_
[Spacecraft Ad_pt er--_ F_
Entrj Vehicle Weight: ____//
Heat Shiel_ _ _-
Delivered System Weight:
Science--"
L
\
FigureiV.6..-Cspeule_us%erminolo_.
' I_[PRC_OtJ(ibltllY Ot l}i_ _+)_I_,,Irj,hi;+AC.,I'.:l-:(_(.>i-(,;
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interest to cover all weights and sizes,
2. The allocation of science weights for missions 1971 through
1977.
3. The allocation of bus capsule _eights for missions 1971 through
1977.
Twelve cases (3 diameters with _ ballistic coefficients) are run
through the trajectory program which outputs the heat shield separation
conditions for design of the parachute, the loads ._nthe heat shield
for itb design, and the entry weight which is obtained by solving
the m/CdA for each _arametric value of m/CdA and diameter as !
follows :
CdTa_.e m/ A = 0.20
D2A=_ /4
A = "_ square feet (for D = i0 feet)
m= 0.20caA• 0.20 78
• 23.6 slugs
WE •mg • 23.6 x 32.2 = 760 pounds
This is the minis,m entry weight investigated; the maximum
weight, corresponding D • 19 feet and m/CdA • 0.35, is _800 pounds.
The output from _he trajectory progre._, thus, furnishes the buic
input for calculating the w+.iEhts of the other subsystems, i.e.,
the loads plus entry vehicle diameter are sufficient t,_ leflne the
heat shield weight, separation conditions plus delivered weight
define the parachute, etc. Froa various scaling laws, the net weight
available for science and total flight capsule weight _re obtained
1974020203-131
ii_
for each of the twelve parametric vehicles studied. These values can
be then compared to the weights allocated and a delta value noted.
These data can then be exs_ainedto find the best fit for the various
missions and, in addition, can be used to assess the weight penalties
associated with standardizing various subsystems through a range of
missions.
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Exogenous Events Related to Voyager Program
: During 1966, several events occurred outside the mainline of
Voyager activity vhich greatly influenced the future flov of events in
the development and manasement of the Mars lander program.
In March, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA) sponsored a technical aeeting in Baltimore vith the title
"Steppingstones to Mars." The meeting was chaired by Mr. Carlos de
Moreas of the MaCtin Company. Papers vere presented by industry and
NASA centers--Dr. Roberts presented a paper vhich addressed the land-
ing problem, identified the critical parameters, and discussed the
trade-offs vhich vould be necessary to dez_ine a mission mode. The
meeting vas yell received by industry. In informal meeti_s, ve
(Roberts, Anderson, McNulty) vere approached by Martin Company
representatives vho stated that they vere initiati_ a large company
funded effort and vould make the results available to us for reviev
and guidance. The informal arrangement vorked to the mutual advantage
of industry and Government_ ve obtained, in effect, additional
technical _ata and the Martin Ccmpea_ received the necessary direction
to obtain expertise in • technolo_ ne_ to them.
In June, JPL landed the first _trve_r on the moon. The chief
technological aehieveae_t of interest to us _ that the terminal
retropropulsion so_t landiz_ technol_ _e "in hand." The
remainl_ mission e].eoe_ts we not ecRpatible yith Mars applic&tiona _.
because of _ diLTereneesz
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_ I. the direct entry mode to the Mc_n could not be extended to
a Mars application because the emphemeris of the Moon was
well defined.
2. the fact that the moon has no atmosphere changed the entry
proble_ completely. There was no need for a heat shield to
• protect the instrument packe_e and there w_ no unknown
aerodynamic braking to contend wlth. Thus, the propulsion !
could be defined with accurac., and all events timed precisely.
3. In s_nation, it _'asa "deterministic" mission.
The success of the soft landing terminal phase revised our •
. thi_ to consider how to utilize the technique in conjunction with
a heat shield and a parachute.
In A_ust, Langley successfully orbited a spacecraft (Lunar
Orbiter I ) around the moon to carry out extensive TV upping in
preparation for the selection of Apollo landing sites, While the
mission was also deterministic like Surveyor, three items of interest
wer • not ed:
1. La_ley demonstrated capability in unmanned planetary
flights -- no lo_er did JPL have a monopol_ in this area.
2. the progr_ was a "model" l_o_rua in that it utilised •
Lan_le_ st•IT in con_unetion with • _or contractor
i (Boelns) -- pleasins _ _adqusrters. Con6ress. and
industry.
3. 8ebeAu.le and costin6 dtffteultlos rare "_Luta_" e__
with 5urvlTor--Lan_l_ mus_l_t •bLllt¥ va8 dlmonstrsted.
1
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In the late fall, Langley, in its research prGgram, successfully
deployed three l_rachutes in the upper altitude (above 120,000')
/ simulating Martian density. For the first time, it became known that
parachutes could be deployed in a low dynamic pressure environment.
Two flight::were rocket launched and deployed at Math numbers near
i.5 an_ a dynamic pressure of eleven pounds per square foot. One
flight was _alloon launched deaonstrati_ deployment in the wake of
a large cone (simulating a Mars entry vehicle)_ this deployment was
initiated at a _l_ch number near 1.2 and a dyn_ic pressure of 6
pounds per square foot. While the test data on dr_ values did not
prove conclusively that a parachute could meet all _aission o_Jectives,
the results were very encour_ing that Langley was on the ri@ht track
_,, in the develol_ent of parachutes.
f
L
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Results of Langley In-House Voyager Study
/
lu August, I reported the results of the langley in-house study
to the Planetary Missions Technology Steering Ccaaittee. Dr. Roberts
requested that I make the presentation because he revised the work
was primarily that of the FVSD staff and that he desired not to
compromise his position of chairman of the I_TSC. 'l_e study, carried
to substantial depth, included analyses of the entr_ vehicle si_.e, use
of parachutes in conjunction with a terminal retro system for final
phase landinK, standardization of mode and subsystems for _uture
missions, efficiency weight studies of various concepts, and a
rational sequence of VoyaKer missions throuKhout the l_O's to meet
the end objective of landiDK an automated bioloKical laboratory on
Mars in 1979./
The study Bade the follovins firm conclusions:
1. Selection of a 19-foot cone, maximun diameter ccsp_tible with
shroud, as the entry vehicle because it flwnishes the naxtmum
aerodynsnic braking for the first entry phase. It was
! further reccmMnded that the cone be standardized (destiEned
! for the later heavier missions and off-loaded in the first!
1 edssions) in order to atntatse torts of desJ4n aad fltl_t
qusl! ._ln_ a n_ber of 41ffert_ entry vehicles. The vetl_ht
cost of standardisin6 vas deteruAned to be ainor and deemed
a _ price to per.
f"
1974020203-136
119
2. Use of a l_xachute for lan_in_ in t_e first mission and to
furnish a transition mode (as well as servlng as the means
' of removing the landing package from the cone and furnishin_
efficient aerodynamic braking) between the cone mode and the
_er_inal landing retro mode in later missions. This us the
first time a parachute ha_ been proposed as a transition
: , mode and it allowed a common delivery mode (cone, parachute,r
i _ retro) throughout the four planned Voyager missions to
maximize stand_,rdization. An all retro l_diIRz, syste_
similar to Surveyor was st'_died and discarded for technologi-
cal reasons as will be discussed in the next section.
i 3. Identified a ballistic number (function of weiKht) of 0.20
! fo_ the first mission which _s compatible with a Math 1.2
parachute deployment and a ballistic number of 0.32 for the
1979 mission vhic_ would req?_ire &Mach 1.6 l_rachute.
k. Described a mission sequence for 1973_ 1975, 1977, and 1979
which allowed for a buildup of %echnolo6y with min_ risk.
A probe mission was recommended for 1973 to obtain the
necessary data fo_ the later lander missions--it should be
noted that t_ts r_ccm_ndatlon So,s counter to the 08_
_deline for the 1973 sdeelon.
Figure IV-8 ILlustr&tes the basic mission mode concept.
The stud_ r_ort _s _Sors_ by the _ sad _s recourses4
thereafter as the Lan_ position relat;ve to V_ mode _ i "--
s/saion s_[u_ct_. Yamyork was subs_t_ co,_ms_ ond pub_lsh_ i
t
i
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_ i!_ as Langley Working Paper 326, Modal and Conceptual Design Com_arlsons
i for the Voyager Capsule by James F. McNulty, Daniel B. Snow, and
Leonard Roberts. The study was a major contribution to Langley's
understanding of the Voyage_r-Saturn V program and, because of Its
prime importance, is included as Appendix IV-B.
/
W _
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High Level NASA Meeting on,Voyager Mission Mode
Headquarters OSSA called a high level meetln4_ on short notice for
September 26 to discuss the Voyager program to be attended by the heads
and staffs from 0SSA, 0ART, JPL, and LRC. Langley was represented by
Dr. Thompson (Director, LRC), Mr. Kilgore, Dr. Roberts and me. JPL
; was represented by Dr_ Pickering (Director) and senior staff Voyager
;o
Program Office members. OSSA was represented by Mr. Edgar Cortright
(Deputy Director), Mr. Oran Nicks (Director of Lunar and Planetary
Programs ), and Mr. Donald Hearth (Voyager Program Manager ) 0ART was
represented by its director, Dr. M. C. Adams.
• I recall vith some degree of amusement now how Dr. Roberts and I
scrambled the day before the presentation. As Langley had not as yet
committed itself to any mainline responsibility, it was difficult for
me to perceive what the "message" of our present%tion would be.
However, there wasn't sufficient time for us to think or worry about
that. Dr. Roberts outlined _he vu-graphs he wanted--not in any
particular order as far as I could determine and I got busy setting
them prepared, typed, reproduced, and merle into vu-graphs. As a
0_ matter of fact, ve bad the Reproduction Division working overtime
!,
• that night to get our work done. After ve had a miscellany, to me,
reproduced, ve adjourned to my home where my wife fed ue while we
z
looked over the data, selecting some and wastebasketing the others.
Finally, Dr. Roberts _l a dozen slides he was satisfied with and my _
daughter stapled the copies toaether o4 the dining room table. After
k ,
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Dr. Roberts left, I examined the dozen pages and I still didn't
• : understand -_ and so to bed, confused
: At the meeting, JPL led off with its presentation -- colored "
: _ slides, the whole works, pulled from their files. Their presentation :
/ _ centered on their "VPE-I4" (Voyager Project Estimate) which was
_ their selected mission mode for the 1973 mission and it was well i[
presented. JPL's mission mode is presented on figure IV-9.
, Basically, it is all propulsive mode. Ports in the cone open to allow /,
._ the retro engines to fire for deceleration purposes. Next, there is _
-: a controlled explosion, more or less, to allow staging of the lander. :
" Finally, there is the terminal retro landing system. JPL's
" presentation was honest _ud straightforward, a section of their report
was devoted to engineering technological problems associated with
: their mission. These problems consisted of:
f
1. The mechanics of designing the ports so that the outer surface
} would remain smooth through reentry thus avoiding discon-
tinuities during the sealing off of ablation material which
c_uld cause extreme hot spots or uneven aerodynamic loading.
Also involved was the question of the ablation material
" melting over the port eircamference to form a solid face
; so that the ports could not open.
2. The details of _taging remained to be worked out to assure
_ the integrity of the lander science and operation. ._/j
3. Because of the unknown density of the Martian atmosphere,
the velocity of the cone at initiation of retro fire was .:
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unknown; it could be banded by a velocity range of h50-ilO0
feet per second. This velocity band caused two problems.
The first being that sufficient fuel for the ll00 feet per
second had to be carried all the way to Mars with a good
pcssibility that most of it would be a dead weight penalty.
The second aisadvantage was that the engine would have to
be highly throttable with complicated electronics to assure
the correct velocity decrement was removed.
As JPL made their presentation, the pieces fell into place
regarding Langley's dozen slides. Every time JPL mentioned a
problem area, I'd note that that point was covered in one of our
slides. I could hardly believe it; I felt that I could get up and
make a very effective presentation with the same data that previously
: made no coherent story. And, if I felt that way, there was no doubt
what Dr. Roberts could accomplish. For the first time in 48 hours,
I relaxed and felt very comfortable.
Langley's presentation followed. As I anticipated, Dr. Roberts
made a masterful presentation. He quietly started off describing the
R & D programs which Langley was conducting to support Voyager. Then
he branched off into f_ley's system studies (the work reported to
the Pt4TSC) which he indicated were being pursued to define needed
technolo_ areas but Just might also have some applicatior,, to the modal
problems that JPL had been discussing. First, he pointed out (with
hard data) that the cone diameter might better be 19 feet than
16 feet to obtain about 50% more aerodynamic braking. But the main
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thrust was the use of the parachute as a transition mode and the
accompanying slide (figure IV-10) from the presentation was devastating
to JPL's presentation. The Langley presentation is included as
Appendix IN-C.
Following the presentation, Dr. Pickering (Director, JPL) made
the following statement to the group, "I know now why we were asked •
to this meeting -- to be the straight man for Dr. Roberts." The
meeting was all in good humour with high technical content but the
handwriting on the wall was clear. If it had been any sort of
competition, Langley had won hands down.
Once again the Langley management had remained, for the most i
part, in the background and allowed the technical staff full latitude.
It was surprising that Dr. Roberts and I could prepare a presentation
for a high level Washington Headquarters and Center Directors meeting
without a "dry run" or even an informal review at the Langley level.
i Whether it was a question of complete faith or unsuspected knowledge, •
I know not -- but it certainly was effective and efficient.
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/ SU_@4ARY OF PARACHUTE FUNCTIONS
• PROVIDES TRANSITION FROM AERODYNAMIC TO PROPULSIVE DESCENT
: • PERMITS COMMON DELIVERY TECHNIQUE FOR ALL MISSIONS
• REDUCES SENSITIVITY TO SURFACE I_RESSURE VARIATIONS
• PERMITS VERTICAL APPROACH TO SURFACE
• LONGER RESIDENCE IN LOWER ATMOSPHERE (DESCENT TV)
• REDUCE ENGINE THROTTLEABILITY _0M 10:l TO 2:1
!
: Fi_e l_-!O.-.-._vlmtqies of a l_e_'e_hu_;e tar VoyN_et'. 1
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Center Assignments on Voyager
Throughout 1966, NASA Headquarters wrestled with the problem of
how to set up a management structure for as complex and large as
undertaking as Voyager. Some way had to be found to parcel out piecel
of program to all available Centers and then to integrate and manage
the pieces. A Center similar to OSMF's Manned Spacecraft Center at
Houston for Apollo would nave been ideal to .handle the overall
_roJect control -- but none existed for unmanned scientific programs.
JPL, as noted previously, was a contractor to OSSA and Headquarters
was reluctant to have a contractor manage NASA Centers. Langley was
primarily research oriented with only a small program staff and
the mana6ing of large program like Voyager did not match its image or
resources. Marshall, an 0SMF Center, was a much closer fit in size and
managership capabilities but it had no experience with interplanetary
missions technology. Headquarters proceeded with the easy part of the
problem -- _hat of breaking up the hardvare into workable pieces:
orbiting spacecraft, launch vehicle, capsule bus (entry and landing
vehicle), surface laboratory, and tracking and dat_. f
The method was, of course, to assign these pieces (by negotiation
with the Center Directors ) to the v_rious Centers _ a| to obtain a
best miz et eal_bilitie|. In a stud_, the _k_--vard Oraduate kh_l
of _inees reported on this situation: !
'_arshail, of course, had the launch vehicle. Langley
evidently the first Center to be considered for one of the other "
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systezs, because it had shown interest and gained some relevant
experience in spacecraft through its Lunar Orbiter _rogram, and had
done reentry aerodynamics work on the FIRE project.
"Much of the debate in this last half of 1966 centered on who
was to get the lander (capsule bus) portion. This was a_knowledged
to be the 'Juicy morsel' of the program_ technological challenging
and scientifically promising . . . at any rate, there was a complex
series of _roposals back and forth between the Centers and Head-
quarters during this period. ''8
As the end of the year drew to a close, NASA Headquarters
succeeded in committing the various systems to the Centers while
keeping the overall management for the time being under OSSA
Headquarters. In a Memorandum to Distribution for all Centers on
December 22, Mr. D. P. Hearth announced the system assignments for
_ Voyager. Langley was assigned the capsule bus -- "the Juicy morsel."
This was met with enthusia: by the Langley vho had been vorking
Voyager problems, it was thought that ve might be assigned the
orbitiag spacecraft system because of the success of the Lunar
Orbiter. Other assignments are shovn on figure IV-If which Is
taken froR the _orand_.
The mmagment structure defined by WashJ_gton Headquarters for
: the Voyager Program _ a very cclplex one involving several Centers
and JPL with program lanagership responsibility in Wuhington. With
8baward Graduate School of Business Ad_nistra_ Lon, _ Plannt_d
Decision Making, Vol. 1.
!
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a very complex program and responsibility scattered from coast to
coast, the talk of integrating and communicating appears formidable.
However, an.aim of Headquarters has been, for some time, to get the
Centers to work together better and, thus, break down the parochialism
of the Centers. Perhaps, if this objective could be accomplished, it
would be an achleverent that would pay great dividends on future
programs. In any event, the structure is never cast in concrete and
is subject to change if future events indicate that will not be
!
successful, i
The work of the technical staff in carrying out the broad entry
system studies is believed to have influenced both Headquarters'
decision to give the capsule bus responsibility to Langley and Lan_ley's
acceptance of the responsibility. From past experience, Lar_!ey is
cautious about undertaking any responsibility without good assurance
that the expertise resides at Center to fulfill its obligations. In
addition to t_e Langley study effort, th_ research staff proceeded
with timely testing of the parachute which put some realism and
belief in the study recommendations. Regardless, Langley management
showed courage by accepting the responsibility for the Capsule Bus
Symtem (the "Juicy" morsel) because it was an extremely large under-
taking for a remes2ch _en_er. It is not obvious that the tall (project
work) wouldn't be wagging the dog (research)--a position that i
Langley always strove to avoid.
On the other hand, JPL charged mo|t of the year with full
responsibility for carrying out the 19q3 minion, concentrated its
(
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efforts entirely on definin_ a misslu:: and examining it in depthMthis
meant that JPL couldn't cover the broad Voyager picture. By reacting
strongly to changing Voyager '73 guidelines, JPL was forced to select
a mission mode early in the year and then analyze it in depth. It
appears that, unfortunately, JPL selected the wrong mission mode so
: that a large part of its effort of analysis has little utilization.
In its behalf it must be said that JPL had the '73 mission responsibility
which was a heavy one while Langley could afford to be loose. The
forcing functions of a '73 lau_.ch window and Headquarters' directives
together with responsibility for carrying out the mission might well
have required total commitment and effort toward getting the 1973
mission underway.
l
i
S
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Voyager Related Personnel Chan_es At Langley
In the late fall in anticipation of Langley assuming some main-
line hardware responsibility in the Voyager Program, Langley manage-
ment too_ the first step toward formalizing a project office to work
on Voya6er. Mr. Dave Stone was designated as the Langley focal point
for Voyager. He set up a project office manned by 5 engineers from
his FIRE Project Office plus _ engineers on loan from the line organi-
zations (including me). I was still to act as the interface between
the project office and my line organi_ation as much Voyager support
work was going on in my line _m_ineering _ivislon. Langley stated
they would officially name a "Capsule Bus System Manager" at a later
date.
In another, unrelated move, Dr. Roberts left Langley to accept a
position of Division Chief of the Misalon Analysis Division at ,(ASA-
A}4E_3. I was ext-emely so,ry to see L_._ley lose his talents because
althou_ anal_ically oriented he ha_ an appreciation (if not an
understanding) of engioeering hardware and was extremely apt in
defining en&ineering/research prog_a:s. However, with the switch of
Mars lander mission_ from study to hardvaze, it w_ an appropriate
time for hll to move to other pastures. (He is currently Director
of Aeronautics at Ames. )
Mr. Gene Love, a le&dlng national and IASA authority in
aero43_mics, was named to replsce Dr. 9oberts as chairman of the
Planetaa7 Missions Teehnolo_r Board.
&
_T J' ........
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Syno
A synopsis of the third year_ effort could be tabulated as
indicated below:
i. Completion of the AVCO contract with definition of a Probe
: Mission.
2. New guideline -- lander on first misslcn.
3. Langley sets up study group with broad guidelines to define
a rational Voyager program and mission mode.
L. Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter and Langley's parachute program ha_e
successful missions.
5. Langle3 completes in-house study, Defines mission mode
with parachute performing as a tre_lsition function.
_. Headquarters holds top level review of Voyqer m/asion mode.
J_.L and _an61ey make pr@sentations.
7. Langley awarded Capsule Bus System respunsibility.
|
t
I
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CHAPTER V
VOYAGER IMPLEMENTATION AND CANCELLATION - ].967
Summary_
During most of the year, Headquarters and the Centers were
engaged in building up the technicai and managerial staffs to carry
out the Voyager program. The organizational arran6ement for making
binding decisions across system (or Center) responsibilities was
complex and multi-tiered; rational decisions could be obtained,
however, with perserveremce from the technical staffs. In this
period of organizational buildup, informal inter-center contacts and
working relationships were established which allowed the technical
work to proceed. Langley appointed a Capsule Bus manager in June
and the control of Langley's effort was phased to his project office
from the previous technical staff, PMTSC, and Langley line management.
Headquarters also set up an inter-center organization -- the
?
Mariner Mars 1971 Probe Working Group -- to define a probe mission for
JPL's 1971 Mariner mission to Mars. This mission was to be a precursor
to the 1973 Voyqer mission. Langley's contribution in this effort
was primarily that of a consultant while the other Centers were in
competition to get their scientific experiments included. While the
_roup achieved its objective of defining the probe, the success o_
\.
this experiment to achieve and demonstrate inter-center cooperation ....
_.| open to question.
135
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When Congress, in August, disapproved both Voyager 1973 and the
Mariner probe in 1971, Headquarters OSSA was left without any inter-
planetary program for the 1970's. OSSA requested the Centers, primarily
Langley, to study and recommend a less costly program including both
Mars and Venus. At Langley, the only group with a background to
, respond upon short notice was the original technical staff which had
_' worked the early studies. In December, Langley presented to OSSA its
recommendations for a new program using the Titan/Centaur launch
vehicle as a base.
<
J
J
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ProJect Organization
'l_e Cent_,-Assignments on Voyager were given in the previous
chapter (figure IV-If). Briefly, the setup was for 0SSA to be project
manager supported by a staff; under the project manager were seven
systems (capsule bus, spacecraft, launch vehicle, etc. ) assigned to
various Centers and directed by Center system managers. The
responsibility of the Voyager project office was vast including such
elements as defining in detail the entire mission so t,hat the various
system managers could proceed with their individual system design
and procur_nents, allocating funds and weight allowances to the
various systems, coordinating the system outputs into a unified total
vehicle, data keeping and reporting on entire project, and making
final decisions in cases of dispute between Center system managers
on interfaces and responsibilities.
In order to implement the project rebponsibilities, OSSA set up
an interim project office (I_O) at the Union Bank Building in
Pasadena, California where it could draw on the resources of JPL which
was the only organization with the capability and ;esources able to
undertake project management duties in this interim period. The
organisational arrangements were extremely complieLted and are
described in full in A_pendix V-A (l_u_ley memorandum to the i
Associate Director from Edwin Kilgore, Chief, Flight Vehicle and . "
Systoms Division entitled "Meeting at Pasadena, California on March
1
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22 and 23, 1967 at JPL to organize Interim Project office for Voyager
Management"). A simplified schematic of the organization is given
in figure V-1. As can be seen from the figure, Mr. Don Hearth was
detailed to Pasadena from Headquarters to manage the IPO and was
given a staff of about 60 people (mainly JPL personnel) to assist him.
The key decision making group would be the Project Management
Committee where the various Center system managers could be
represented--since Langley had not appointed a Capsule Bus Manager,
it was represented in the committee by Mr. Kllgore (Chief, FVSD) and
Mr. Stone ',Langley'sVoyager focal point). This committee was to
meet monthly and use the working groups and panels to resolve and
advise on action items. While figure V-1 indicates that this is the
way the organization would work, the descriptive data in page 5 of
the aforementioned memorandum describes a mode not in keeping with
: the organizational chart. Mr. Robillard (JPL head of the IPO staff)
states that the working groups "would serve for the IPO as a technical
refree among systems." Since the working groups were chaired by
IPO-JPL members, it was not clear as to whether the working groups
were not, in reality, an arm of IPO rather than the Project Management
Committee.
: Implementation of Voyuer Progr_
, Many varied activities were undertaken by Langley and other Centers ._
during 1967; it was an extremely bus_ and complicated time for all _ --
' _erned. There were: I
!
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OSSA (Wash)
Director: Newell
Deputy: Cortright
!
Voyager Project Office
Director: Nicks
Deputy: Hearth (IPO Manager)
I.P.O. (Union Bank)
Staff Personnel
60SSA
50 JPL
Project Management Committee
Chairman - Hearth
Members - System Manager
1
Six Working Groups
In Various Disciplines
(Science, Design, TechnoloKy, etc. 1
Chairman: IPO Staff
Members_ System Representative
On Each Group
I
I Panels As Required To ISupport Working Groups
. .J
Figure V-l._Voyager project office organization. :
t
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:
(i) technical exchanges by the technical staffs from the various
centers with the purpose of communicating to assure that
everyone was working the same problem.
(2) formal meetings at working group levels where JPL, acting as
the coordinating arm for OSSA, attempted to define guide-
L
lines, schedules, and obtain interface agreements.
(3) directives from OSSA to all Centers specifying guidelines.
(_) neetings of the Project Management Committee wherein final
binding decisions were arrived at.
(5) large increases in the project and research staffs at Langley
which tended to confuse communications and the lines of
authority during the learning period.
The Voyager program at the start of the year could be described,
with some simplification, as follows. OSSA, with JPL staff support,
was project manager; Langley was Capsule Bus Manager; Marshall was
Launch Vehicle and Orbiter Manager; and JPL was Surface Lab System
Manager. The mission mode was not defined nor was the responsibility
for its definition. The problem that concerned Langley as Capsule
Bus Manager was how much freedom did Langley have in the Capsule I_As
System definition. Could Langley define the Capsule Bus mo_ from
separation to landing or did OSSA, with JPL, dictate this as a mission
requirement to Langley? A second item concerned the weight allotment
for the Capsule Due System. How would this be determined and how
tight would be its restraining force on La_ley's design?
J
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The organization at Langley at the start of the year with respect
to Voyager is shown in figure V-2. As indicated by the figure, there
were three types of activities underway. Twenty engineers, under
E. C. Kilgore, were working on design problems in engineering under
my direction; nine engineers were engaged in project coordination
under D. G. Stone; and approximately 60 research engineers were engaged
in technology development with funding and results channelled through
D. G. Stone. Both Kilgore and Stone were members of the powerful
Voyager Project Management Committee as noted previously. The Kilgore
and Stone activities operatic somewhat independently; Kilgore's
group was primarily concerned with technical design aspects while
Stone's effort was mainly coordination with other Centers, OSSA, and
research actlvlties--for example, the intercenter working groups,
panels, and project documentation were under Stone's cognizance. My
efforts were divided between Kilgore's and Stone's as I was assigned
to both, more or less on a "ss required basis."
In the engineering activity, my assignment was to firm up the
Langley concept of the Capsule Bus. Our OSSA guideline was to
consider maximum co-,,onality of subsystems in the planned missions
growing to a maximum 7000 pound capsule bus and that "the impact
of providing such growth on early missions is required to permit the
proper decisions on design approach. ''1 My studies revealed that in
order to obtain the maximum commonality among the missions to assure
IOSSA a_moramd_m, Don Hearth, January 18, 1967.
J
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; OSSA LRC Director's
Voyager Office
Project Director - F. L. Thompson
Mgt. Deputy - C. Donlan
I
Flight Reentry I
Programs Office Chief, FVSD
Voyager E, C. Kilgore
Focal Point
D. G. Sto e
i
I
JJ
I 11 1 [Langley 9 Engineers 20 Engineers[Research i fin Project ! McNulty in
IV _---I in Prelimina._yI Engrs •J {Coordination both groups Design
FigureV-2.--_e¥ Yo_ragerorsa_ization, O_auary,1967. _ -
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mintmu_ developmental costs, the Capsule Bus allocated weight in
1973 should be set at 6000 pounds.
My efforts in support of Stone's office was in two related areas.
The first was to be a lead Langley representative in purely technical
exchanges; three such exchanges were held--JPL at Langley on January
Ii, Marshall at Langley on February i, and Langley at JPL on February
13. Langley's position regarding these meetings was for a free and
frank exchange. The meetings were attended by solely the working
engineers and were most productive. The contacts made at these
meetings allowed for a continuing dialogue between working pelosonnel
by telephone calls and memorandums to assure proper technical
interfaces. The second area involved my membership in inter-center
working groups wherein all Centers attended and the meetings were
chaired by a JPL staff member. The main emphasis in these meetings
was on project management matters--deflnition of interfaces, system
requirements, schedules, documentation and progress reporting. JPL,
in its assumed role of acting foz OSSA as project manager, was
attempting to define the 1973 mission and pushed hard for Langley to
concentrate on an all propulsive lander with a _000 pond weight
allocation. These criteriae were essentially those propo|ed by JFL
I in the VPE-I_ docume,lt which were questioned by Lan_le_ previous_.
Since LanKley's reco_endation8 were for a 6000 pound weight allocation
and a parachute-retro landing system, these meetinsn were somewhat
unproductive except for pointi_ up problem areas. _ instruction8
upon attending these meeting8 warn to cooperate as fully a8 possible but
i *
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not to commit Langley to any position which wou]d limit its option
insofar as the Capsule Bus was concerned--any broad inter-system
decisions should be made by the Voyager Project Management Committee.
Despite the division of responsibilities between Stone's and
Kilgore's groups, there was some conflict between members of the
respective technical staffs. No longer was the FVSD group the prime
force; in matters of day to day management, it supported Stone's
office which was manned by Stone's men from "Fire." This concerned
those members of the FVSD staff who had hoped to be implementers of
say follow-on program to the study work. Members of Stone's staff
were also uneasy because their knowledge of Mars missions was not yet
equivalent to FVSD's staff. The hope of the FVSD staff to be main
implementer was not a realistic one in that it lacked experience with
big projects. That the FVSD staff had an opportunity to contribute •
directly through Mr. Kilgore to the Voyager Project Management
Committee was an extenuating motivation which kept the group's
performance at a high level.
The working relationships outlined above remained in force through
the first h¢lf of the year. On June 2_ Langley Director Floyd Thompson
announced that Mr. James S. Martin would be Manqer, Capsule _s
: 8yst_. Mr. Martin had been Asotstant Manager, Lunar Orbiter Project
) Office. Logical reasonf for Mr. Martin's appointment were:
i (1) Mr. Martin and the Lunar Orbiter team had proven manageship
$
i and hardware capability. "_
(2) A much enlarge_ team was required and the Lunar Orbiter _
: staff was available.
k ,
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(3) The previous technical staff had performed its function of
expertise--the defining of the program which was now ready
for hardware execution.
(_) A transfusion cf "new blood" would furnish new ideas and
fresh enthusiam--the previous staff had already worked the
problem for four years and was susceptiblE: to going stale.
Althou_h this decision _'asexpected from rational considerations
(other possible candidates were Kilgore and Stone), it further de-
flated FVSD's role to a s_pport basi_ and members of the FVSD staff
began to look to Venus seriously. Mr. Martin would be assisted by a
staff of five engineers from the Lunar Orbiter Office immediately
with the plan that the remaining Lunar Orbiter staff of approximately
25 englneers would be assigned to Mr. Martin upon the completion of
the Lunar Orbiter project in September. Therefore, Langley's
Voyager organization was revised as sho'_nin figure V-3 with Messrs.
Kilgore, Stone, and Martin as memoer_ of the Voyager Project Manage-
ment Committee. Mr. Martin's appoir.tment brought stror_, aggressive,
and capable leadership to the Capsule Bus System_ there was no doubt
that X_ey's decisions regarding Voyager wou_d be made principally
by him.
It was soon evident how Mr. Martin planned to m.nage the Capsule
Bus System. He planned to rely principally on his proven and known
Lunar Orbiter Staff for project lmplementation_ he planned to use
- 9
Kilgore's team (under _ direction) as consultants and advisers to
b_ing his staff up to spee_ and he planned tight control of the
e
i|
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OS_ _C Director's
Voyager Office
_oJect Director: F. L. Thompson
_t. Deputy: C. Donlan
I) I
1
Manager, Capsule Flight Reentry Chlefl _SD
_s _ Progrms 02lice E.C. Kil_ore
J. 8. Martin D.G. Stone Engineeri_
_oJect Mgt. Rese_-ch Design
_ogrms
L
Filpare V-3.--Lan_leM Voyager organisation, June, 1967.
funding to Mr. Stone to assure that the research was properly oriented
to his needs. Even in the period before Lunar Orbiter wms closed
out, he was at work getting the Lunar Orbiter staff familiar with
the Voyager project.
Prior to a meeting of the Voyager Project Management Committee, I
0
prepared a memorandum.- stummarizing the implications of the weight
allocation for the (apsule Bus; this memorandum was based on the
studies performed by the FVSD staff. I was asked by Mr. Kil6ore to
brief Mr. Martin and _tr.Donlan (Deputy Director) on these study
results. I did so in an informal meeting and found Mr. Martin
impressive in his grasp of the salient points even though he did not
have the backsround to understand _ne Lechnical details. Following
the Voyager Project C(_nittee Meeting, OSSA issued a memorandum
of "Revised Project Level Guidelines" dated July lO, 1973 which
allocated a Capsule Bus weight of 6000 pounds. This was an important
Project decision and again backed up Langley's recommendation. I
drew two conclusions from this decir ion. One was that JPL had again
spent many hours trying to define the wrong mission e._d force
a_reement, and the second vas that, if one was firm and perservering,
the engineering staff could make an impact at the highest level to
cha_e the course of a project.
_orm_dt_ to I_C Representatives on Voy_er Manqmaent Committee,
O. F. Mclkalty, June 19, l_T, "Capmzle Bus VeiEJrt Allocation,
1973 - 1975."
!
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Cancellation of the Voyager Progra_
In late August, Voyag__c was canceSled to the complete surprise of
NASA and to the engineers working on it. Only a qouple of weeks
previously, a joint House-S,_.nateConference Committee had approved
a Voyager authorization of h2 milli,_n dollars for prelimina_y design.
Washington 0SSA Headquarters had been working closely with Congress--
pe.rticularly Rep. Karth (Minnesota), _ead of the House Space Committee
who was one of Voyager's most powerful supporters--and thought
Voyager approval was assured. However, the House Appropriations
Committee rejected all appropriations for Voyager.
While it is unknown whether the Vietnam war and the summer riots
would have been sufficient driving forces to cause Congress to cancel
Voyager regardlr.ss, thera w-_sanother factor _vhtchmight have
influenced the decision. I recall that in the early summer _wo
enginee,,s from HousSon's Manned Spacecraft Center visited Langley for
consultation. They were directed to me and we discussed a manned
flight to Mars. Their thinking was most ambitious and preliminary; it
was obvious they had been working on the proble.m only a short time
and had no appreciation of the landing problem. We dlscuased the
problem for a short time and they left expressin_ their appretcation.
MY feeling was one of amusement and wonder that they could even
envision such a pro_re_m without _erious study; I felt it would be a
long time before MSC would have a serious concept. However, in
Au6uat in the midmt of the Congressional deliberations on
Voyager, MSF (a OSMF Center) 'ssued a Bequest for Proposal to 28
i
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emmgaales for studies of manned Mars and Venus missions stressing
coordlnstion %,ith Voyager f_ights. Thus, 0SMF was planning "manned
Voyager" flights at °Lime when OSSA was depicting Voyager as an unmanned
scientific mission. This astounded Rep. Karth snd caused some confu-
sion in Congress about Voyuger being a precurser to a mannnd mission.
Rep. Karth stated, "Very bluntly, a manned mission to Mars or Venus
: by 1975 or 1977 is now and always has been out of the question--and
8nyone who pel'sists in this Kind of misallocation o_ resources a%
this time is going to be stopped. ''3 In any event, the House cancelled
; both Voyager and MSC's planned study.
3Willla J. Normyle, "Priority 8hlft Blocks Space Plans," Avi&tlon
We__ek,Sept. ii,1967, p. 27.
5
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Mariner Mars 1971 Probe
In a letter dated March 16, Mr. Oran Nicks, Acting Director,
Lunar and Planetary Programs, OSSA, Washington Headquarters .requested
Langloy's participation in the atmosphe:'ic probe mission to be
included in the Mariner Mars 1971 project. A Probe Working Group,
chaired by OSSA, was to be established made up of representatives
C
from jpT Langley, Am_s _nd Goddard with the objective of defining
the probe, its mission definition, its instruments, and its development.
I was selected ar Langley's representative and met with Mr. Donlan
and Mr. Kilgore to receive instructions regarding Langley policy
: wlth respect to the 1971 probe. I was advised by Mr. Kilgore that I
• was selected because of _ expertise in Mars entry probes and my
- knowledge of Voyager. He further advised that I would have two
main _ut_es :
1. to t_j to influence the probe definition so that its results
wou_d be applicable to the Voyager Capsule Bus design.
2. to work with OSSA ss a management adviser with regard to JPL
planning since it was expected that most of the other
representatives would be scientists.
Mr. Donlan cautioned me not to accept any "chores" from OSSA and
that Langley was not interested in any hardware development
responsibility for the Mariner probe since it was heavily committed
t_ Voyager work.
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At the group's first meeting on March 23, Mr. Nicks made the
fo±lowlng points :
(1) The Probe Working Group (PWG) is an attempt to get a].[_Centers
working together in the decision making process for maximum
utilization of resources and definition of objectives.
(2) The probe should be simple so as not to compete -,_th the
Voyager lander and objectives. OSSA's first priority is
Voyager so Mariner should not impinge on Voyager perogatlves.
It w_s obvious from the first meetir_ that it was a very diverse
group; opinions varied widely as to both the type of probe and to the
merits of various instruments. Five meetings (usually two days in
length) were held from March to August and were quite fe.ctlous in
nature. For example, JPL proposed an ambitious probe which incor-
porated a small lander on a parachute. As project manager, JPL
thought the mission was viable (although risky) and would give the
maximum return. The scientists from Ames and Goddard were more
interested in atmospheric physics and ",-antedemphasis on instruments
and scientific data. It was like comparlr,g apples and oranges--JPL
had "engineered" a mission whereas the scientists knew what data they
wanted but did not have a mission plan to obtain the data. Since the
PWG could not agree, the matter was "solved" by r_sortin6 to a vote
by the Centers; this method became the standard means for selecting
between alternative options. The vote was t_ree to one for a
"dual probe approach .., without survivable landing. ''4 My sympathy
_Final Report, Mariner Mars 1971 Probe Working Group, page 5.
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was with the JPL engineering approach but I felt I could not support
f
it because of its possible conflict with Voyager obJectlves and, in
any event, it would probably require Langley technical support which
I was under instructions not to provide. It was a3so my impression
that OSSA was using this forum of the PWG to put a rein on JPL and
its approach to the i971 mission.
Most of the other meetings were concerned with the selection
f of instruments. The merits of which were debated at length and when
it was evident that agreement was impossible, among competing groups,
a vote was taken with Langley usually being the "swing" vote which
put me in a very uneviable position considering my lack of creden-
tials. I tried to find my way out of the box by requesting "scientific
advisers" from Langley to help me. While I got some help, Langley
management wasn't too interested in the whole exercise (perhaps
recognizing its futility), the advisers recognized the game and took
a cautious stance. In this manner the PWG obtained its objective of
defining a probe mission and its instruments. However, the objective
of getting the Centers to cooperate was not _ined--the discussions
wer_ competitive in nature, very little coope_ :ion was evident, and
relations were strained. Dr. George Brooks (Langley) attended a
N^SA's Planetology Committee meeting where a presentation was made of
the PWG efforts; the report noted that "there has been considerable
disagreement among the representatives of the various Centers on the
i Working Group because of parochial viewpoints and the Group might be ....
!
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, disbanded. ''5
i The PWG effort, in any event, was an academic exercise because
the probe funds were omitted from the authorization bill in order to
furnish funding for Voyager which OSSA considered its major new
start.
A
II III I
_nutea of the twenty-third meeting of the Planetary Mieslonl Temh-
I nolo_ 8_eering Coelittee, July 20, 1967.
' i
)
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A N,._wStart
On September 6 Langley's Planetary Mission_ Technology Steering
Committee was convened with a large number of other Langley personnel
in attendance. The pur_,Jse of the meeting was to discuss the future
of NASA planetary _ned programs to Mars and Venus. Quoting
from the minutes of the meeting: "Mr. Draley 6, Assistant Director,
Flight Projects explained some of the background of the change of
direction which was caused by a Congressional cut in funds. OSSA
has been informed that the cut was predicated by lack of funds because
of other higher priority programs and not because of any disapproval
of the Voyager Program. Further, OSSA has requested assistance from
the various Centers in defining a more modest program. An in-house
informal study group is beir_ formed with the objective of having a
project concept by November l, 1967, for submittal to OSSA.''_
Deta._Is of the study objectives and the study group personnel were
released on September 8 and the announcement is included as Appendix
V-B. It was a very ambitious undertaking including the following
tasks:
(I) Defining and prioritizing scientific mission objectives
and instr_ents for Mars and Venus.
a_
bThio is the first mention of Mr. Draley. Previous to this occasion,
Mr. Draley was the responsible person in the Director's office for
supervision of the Lunar Orbiter Project.
7Minutee of the twenty-fifth meeting of the Planetcry Minions
Technology Steering Committee, September 6, 1967.
k
1974020203-172
(2) Evaluating payload capability of all launch vehicle systems
smaller than the Satwrn V.
(3) Preparing a conceptual spaoecraft design for each selected
launcn vehicle.
(_) Costing the missions.
(5) Trading off alternatives.
(6) Recommending system to NASA Headquarters.
To perfon_ this task in two months, a new organization (ad hoc) was
formed with Mr. C. H. Nelson, former Lunar Orbiter Project Manager,
?
as study manager, with thirteen working groups under him (a totsl of
_bout 80 engineers) in various disciplines--for example, I was head /
of the probe definition group. The structure is shown on figure V-_;
key people with expertise ir Mars and Venus mission work are circled
to identify them for the reader.
After a short period of time, Mr. Kilgore, recognizing the
enormity of the task and the organizational problems, decided to
initiate a parallel effort utilizing his Flight Vehicles and Systems
Division (FVSD) technical staff under my direction which had been
working Mars and Venus problems for several years. Our efforts _;o
make a meaningful contribution vas enhanced by two factors:
1. Mr. _tlgore kep_ in close co_unication vith his OSSA
r contacts which he had ensen_ered dur.tng his stint on the
J
Voyager Project Management Committee so that our york
vould be compatible vit_ OSSA inters|re.
! i 2. Our studies vere restrained to only Titan based vehicles an_
• 1! science _s only included to e veliht allowance depth.
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Given a new lease on 1ife because of the emergency situation which
required its unique expertise, the FVSD staff put forth a maximum
effort and produced two definitive studies in a four month period.
The first--Langley Workik%g Paper 483, "A Building Block Approach to
Mars and Venus Planet_ry Missions in the 197£'s Utilizing a Modular
Spacecraft"--was a broad examination into th- flexibility achievable
by varying Titan staging for various Mars and Venus mission weight
requirements. The second-_Langley Working Pape:_ 547-- "Study of Titan
fliP/Centaur's Capability to Carry Out a 'Voyager-Type' Mission"--
analyzed total Mars mission systems from launch to touchdown and
concluded "that the Titan IIIF with a Centaur upper stage provides
the performance capability to allow flexibility of mission design and
logical growth from a Mars entry probe to a soft landed surface rover."
(These Langley Working Papers are included in the Appendix: LWP 483
as V-C and LWP 547 as V-D.)
The actual assignments given to the Langley In-House study group
and to the FVSD staff were formidable. To put the problem in the
proper perspective, it will be recalled that OSSA had requested
Langley to propose a "more modest" program than Voyager. This was
taken by the Langley in-house study group, at the start of its study,
to mean a mibsion with mu_h lesser objectives a_d emphasis was put
on stud_ing the followi_ type missions:
(i) Orbitir_ spacecraft only
(2) Direct entry capsule (probe or hard lander) with f_Yby
spacecraft
]974020203-]75
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(3) Direct entry capsule (probe or hard lander) wlth orbiting
spacecraft.
It was the policy of NASA to utilize launch vehicles from the NASA
stable--oy developing and retaining the launca vehicle responsibility,
NASA could retain control of its prngrams without dependence on the
DOD. With the cancellation of NASA's Saturn 1B/Centaur development,
NASA's launch vehicle stable was left with a large performance _ap,
_A_ofar as appliable to !_-z M_ssions, between _h_ Saturn V and _he
Atlas Centaur as illustrated by figure V-5; DOD's Titan vehicle, with
various staging options, could provide the capabilities shown in the
shaded portion. Since the Saturn V mission was now disapproved,
Langley's problem was reduced to what type of mission could be per-
formed vlth the Titan or Atlas/Centaur launch vehicles. Before
proceeding, it is well advised, at this point, to review the parti-
cular_ of the Saturn V mission in order to grasp the magnitude of the
problem. Figtu-e V-6 shows a typical Saturn V mission. Of the 68,000
pounds launched toward Mars (53,000 pounds injected), it is noted
that only _,600 pounds of useful payload is landed on Mars after the
various shroud, orbiter and neat shield separahions together with the
propulsions burns for orbit, de-orbit, and landing. Since the Saturn
V was to be used to deliver dual spacecraft to MArs, the _,600 pounds
landed weight represents the weiKht available for tvo soft l&nders.
Figure V-7 shove to scale the comparison between the Saturn V and
the Titan_ this comparison gives insight into the meani_ of a "more -"
modest" mission and the problem confrontin6 Lem_ley.
L
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The problem as defined by the Langley in-house study group i&
shown sehemat_ca!!y on Figurc V-_. Thi_ bi_ck jJag,'am couiS De
considered a mathematical mGdel ,of'the pr_:gre_si._ns from launca
weight to payload weight. For each candldase launch vehicle, there
would be (after sh_ 3ud separation) an inject, i weight to Mars
representing a spacecraft-capsule combination. Three different mission
modes are possible for this spacecraft-capsule; the options are:
Option 1--separate the systems while on approach so that the
spacecraft flies by Mars ";hil_ the cspsu!e makes a
direct entry.
Option 2--separate the systems on approach so that the capsule
makes a direct _ntry and the spacec_'aft is orbited
abou: Mars. Another possibility under this option
would be to use the entire ,,eight availabl _ for an
orbiSer and have no capsule.
'_tion 3--Orbit the combination and separate the capsule ih
orbit for an entry from orbit .mode. This was the
Saturn V Voyager m_,ssiun mode;.
- For each of these options, the payload weight could be determln_d
and cam1_zed with the v_rlous scientific alternate, so as to @,_ide
the decision makin_ process. A_ can be s_rm_ed, quantifyin_ the
numerous eieeents represents a major undert_kin_ particularly w_,en
such a large group, with many members n_w to the technoloEy, _s
involved. For example, the launch vehicle study group, a sub-element
; of the study team, analyzed the launch vehicle problem. Its
' \ =
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recommendation was that Lar_ley "go forwar_ based on use of Atlas/
Centaur providing spacecraft weight could perform scientific
objectives. If this were not feasible, then the group recommended
use of the Titan IIIC.''8 Two conclusions can be drawn from this
recommendation:
1. The group was making a r_.commendation without knowledge of
the mission mode or the requirrd payload (scientific) weight.
2. In accordance with "more modest mission" requirement, the
group was emphasizin5 minimum launch vehicles.
The FVSD staff study group approached the problem differently
because of its past experience. Its previous mission mode work had
convinced the group that, if tne latu,_h vehicle would allow, the best
mission mode was to orbit the spacecraft-capsule combination and then
release the capsule for an out-of-orbit entry. The staff group
then formulated the following technical approach:
i. Investigate the capability of the vehicle, next smaller to
the Saturn V in performance, to perform the out-of-orbit
mission mode. This restrained the problem to the Titan/
Centaur which was still "_moremodest" than the Saturn V.
2. Investigate the problem from a "systems" viewpoint wherein
constant feedbacks would be monitored among the launch
vehicle, spacecraft and cap=ule so as to arrive at a unified
concept.
_emorandum to Study Manager, Planetary Ekploratio_ Missions from ._j
LRC Launch Vehicle Study Group, September 29, 1967. i
J
}
i '
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:
3. Prepare a unique baseline preliminary design of the entire
system.
A block diagram model of the systems approac_ used is given in
figure V-9 together with a summary of th_ results of the final
iteration, In block diagram terminology, the factors (A, B, C, D, E)
represent multipliers of the inpu_ to give the resulting weights at
7'
various stage of the mission so that the fin_l output represents the
landed weight. While the diagram shows an open loop sjstem without
feedback, the process used was to define the factors from actual
<
analysis, run the input through the system, and examine the result.
If the result was unacceptable (less than the 1500 pounds required for
a soft lander), the factors would be subjected to another analysis
cycle with the aim %0 increase the landed w_i-bt_....As revealed in the
summary resu/ts, we were successful in obtaining the 1500 pound landed
weight. A ii percent efficiency . Input" was achieved for the Titan/
Centaur against 7 percent for Saturn V Voyager, an efficiency incr,ase
of 57 percent. This was possible mainly because the staff was
familiar with all aspects of the subsystems interactions in order to
define the system. For example, the major gains were related to:
: i. "loosening" the orbit ai_,t Mars so _hat less propellant
would be needed for capt%u-e. By making the orbit more :
elliptical, the orbiter's science would be degraded but
the lander objectives could be achieved. This resulted in an
increase of the orbit factor (B) from 0.40 to 0.60.
_ 2. reducing the head shield weight factor, working within the
197402020g-18g
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restraint of keeping the "Voyager" ballistic coefficient
<
constant to ensure the identical satisfactory entry trajectory
(M/CDA = constant), the area (A) of heat shield could be
reduced proportionally to the entry mass. After several
iterations, it was found that a diameter of lh feet was
compatible with the ballistic number and a landed weight of
1500 pounds; this was a reduction from the 19 foot diameter
for Voyager. Since the heat shield weight increases with _
the linear value cubed, the heat. shield weight could be
reduced to h0 percent i_ _ of the 19 foot diameter weight;
this resulted in an increase of the heat shield separation
factor (D) from 0.69 to 0.77.
The result of this engineering systems work was that the FVSD
staff provided the technical base which proposed that the much smaller
Titan/Centaur could accomplish the Voyager objectives; it would, of
course, require two separate launches whereas the Saturn V would
have the capability to launch iual spacecraft with one launch.
There are three important points to make regarding the above work
which are central to the overall NASA Mars landing effort:
i. For the first time, Langley demonstrated interest and
capability in the entire mission from launch. On Voyager, i
Langley_s only involved in "he Capsule Bus entry system.
2. The proposal to use a DOD vehicle, the Titan, instead of a
vehicle from the NASA stable was a departure from nvrmal
I NASA operations.
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3. The identical mode, _dentified previously by the Langley
staff under Dr. Roberts, for Voyager was adhered to in :
totality, i.e. out of orbit, parachute, and retro landing.
With the completion of FVSD's staff effort, Mr. K11gore arranged
a m, !ng at Langley on December 4 under the auspices of the Planetary
Missions Technology Steering Committee to be attended by OSSA
representatives and all other interested parties--Draley, Nelson,
Martin, et al. At the meeting, the FVSD staff reported the data
included in the two working papers for the consideration of Langley
and OSSA in their deliberations regarding a NASA Mars project.
Langley's In-House Group, in the interim, had produced a Langley
Working Paper - "A Study of 0rbiter-Probe (Titan III Class) for Mars
I
and Venus Missions for the Purpose of Identifying Problem Areas"--and
i
forwarded it to OSSA. The paper primarily dealt with sub-system
options and demonstrated that Langley had a large staff experienced •"
in the _arious disciplines. A block diagram of how Langley organized
to meet OSSA's request for assistance in demonstrating a program is
represented in conceptual form as figure V-10. The input, OSSA's
request, was directed to the Langley Director who set up a large ad
hoc Langley Study Group. Mr. Ed Kilgore, in his line organization
position under the La_ley Director, set up a parallel effort _thin
his division; the dotted line on figure V-IO represents informal !
contacts with OSSA. The outputs from the two efforts in terms of
Langley Working Papers were tran_itted to OSSA_ data from the FVSD's
staff Working Papers were presented to Langle_'s Planetary Missions
k 1 d
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Technology Steering Committee with OSSA representatives in attendance.
While the official organizational arrangement set up at Langley
to respond in a technical sense to OSSA's request was cumbersome, it
should be noted that Langley did respond in full. The FVSD technical
staff could work the problem outside the official structiLre with
Langley's management's approval and present its findings directly to
0SSA through the auspices of the Planetary Missions Technology
Committee. Least this method of operation appear roundabout and
unlikely to succeed, it must be argued that L_ "_leymanagement had
relied on this mode with success for many years. It was fully in
keeping with the Langley management practices as presented in Chapter
I of allowing its staff freedom to pursue its interests and to provide
forums for all parties to present their beliefs and data. From
Langley's efforts in these studies, OSSA received support in three
vital _a-eas:
1. Wholehearted support in the political area by Langley
management as evidenced by sincere interest and the
assignment of a large Langley staff.
2. Acceptance and enthusiasm of the Lunar Orbiter team to begin
working the problem of a Mars landing and, thus, indicate
its potential of being a s'rong force in the future.
3. The definite technical recommendations made by the experienced
FVSD staff which allowed progress tc be made on a new problem
in a short time frame.
1974020203-188
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Thus, at the year's end, there were groups at Lang.ey, JPL, and
in industry--Martin Company, at least--worklng on the pr_bleJn and
furnishing data and recommendations to OSSA. All options were open:
types of science, launch vehicle, mission mode, hard or soft landrr
The only restraint was cost and that was only qualified ("modest")
and not quantified.
J
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Synopsis
! A synopsis of the fourth year's effort could be tabulated as
indicated below:
i. NASA Headquarters formally organizes Voyager Program with
OSSA as project manager utilizing a Voyager Interim Project
Office at Pasadena.
4
2. NASA Headquarters sets up an inter-center Mars Probe Working
Greup to determine probe concept for 1971 Mariner.
B. Langley appoints a Vojager Capsule Bus Manager and sets up a
Voyager Project Office.
4. Congress disapproves both Voyager 1973 and Mariner probe 1971.
5. OSSA requests assistance in defining new program.
6. Langley's technical staff reccmmends a new program utilizing
the Titan/Centaur l_unch vehicle to OSSA.
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VIKING DF/INED AND LMPL_ME_TED - 1968/69
In 1968 there was a revitalized _md concerted effort by Head-
quarters and Langley to define and obtain apDroval of a new Mars
landing program. Langley obtained %he services of industry tb/'ou6h
small study contracts to e_amine various candidate mlssi ,ns and Head-
quarters enlisted the support of National Academy of Sciences and
Bureau of the Budget. A plvotsl meeting was held at Langley in
November with senior Headquarters personnel present where all
contractors presented their findings and a mission decision was made.
%
Funding for the new Mars landing program--"Viklr_"--was approved
by Congress. Contract documents for competitive proposals were pre-
pared; the proposals evaluated; and in .May, 1969 a co:,tract wab
awarded by Langley to Martin Marietta as the prime contractor for the
mission hardware.
173
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Headquarters Ac,*tvity (1968)
Dr. John Naugle, Associate Administrator for OSSA, issued guide-
lines to Langley "relative to studies and planning of potential
missioi,s to Mars" on February 12. The %:legram, included as Appendix
VI-A, stated the following:
i. Launch vehicle to he a Titan/Centaur or Titan lllC.
2. Program cost estimate = $385,000,000.
3. Baseline mission = "Mariner" ,type orbiter with 800 pound
hard lander.
4. Alternate missions:
a. hard landers, with or without orbiters, direct entry
or out-of-orbit entry.
b. soft lander, with or without orbiters, direct entry or
out-of-orbit entry.
7
5. Project management will be at Langley.
6. Fiscal year 1969 funding will be $20,000,000.
The principal items to note from the guidelines are (i) Langley
will manage the project and (2) mXssion d_'_ v !_n is open to include
a vide range of options. The fact that tbL '_i_an/Ce, "_Lur launch
_-ehicle was included as _ candidate gave cred_n: _ tna* the recommenda-
tion of tM FVGD's stl'f w_s still under eo_J{.te_r.ton despite its
hl_hes t cost.
In the spring of 1968, _ H_dquarters announced • personnel
chan6e vhich would affect both Langley and the )_rs Landi_ progr_.
EdlA - Cortri_ht was named director of ban_ey, Dr. Floyd Thompson
i
J
k ,
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having retired after long servlce at Langley. Mr. Cortright had been
with NACA's Lewis Pesearch Center or lO years and Joined NASA Head-
quarters soon _fter NASA was formed whrze he held high level positions
in OSSA and OSMF. Voyager had been under his supervision while he
was OSSA's Deputy Administrator, and he was recognized as a strong
supporter of a Mars program.
NASA Headquarters also concentrated on mending _ts political
fences during 1968 with rega-'d to its interplanetary program. OSSA
sponsored a National Academy of Sciences Summer Program to study and
make recommendations regarding NASA's planetary program. The
program's final report recommended a "vigorous" planetary program and
furnished impetus to carrying out a Mars landing. Since the National
Academy of Sciences is made up of authoritieq in the scientific
community, its recommendations receive serious consideration in the
C_._ress. In addition, NASA representatives met regularly with
personnel from the Bureau of the Budget to work oat a mutual agreemer..
on funding emd programs; the solid technical base furnished the needed
confidence in NASA's position to obtain BOB's support. Finally Dr.
Naugle testified before various Congressional Committees %rid
emphasized the need for the planetary pr, _:am and NASA'_ desire to
work with Congress in its definition.
A _ | 2
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Langley AS tivit_ (1_
Langley's effort in 1968 was primarily centered in two groups--Mr.
Martin's project office and Mr. Kiig,nre's engineering division.
_. Martin personally was a driving for_'e during this peric_ and
h_s office was a hub of v_ried activity. The priaary functlon ¢f the
office was the gathering, integration and dizsemination of data. Work
statements were written and contracts let to industry to study the
various types of missions. The contracts were let expediously and
competently monitored primarily by members ol hls staff. For example,
contracts were ie_ to General Electric to study a r._rd lander, _o
Mc_onnell-Doug)_s to study a _oft lander, and to M_rtin-Marietta to
study the _ission mo@e--direct and ouL of orbit ent_'y. As a result,
the project office obtained a complete documented record on all
candidate missions. _. Martin al_'o contacted ana worked w/_h JPL
during this period to obtain JPi's _,ipport in the orbittr portion of
the mission. ,Mr. Martin was constantly on ira,el during 1968--to
industry, to JPL, and to Washington Heedquart:rs--to obtain support
for the program. It was his office that fed data to Washington
Headquarters foc its planning and to answer Congressional and BOB's
questions; he assured that the prog2am kept moving through his
constant contracts with e_l parties including the _cientific community.
Mr. Martin has been credited _y an industry ,epresentative aa being
the main force keeping a Mars project alive during this period.
d
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Flight Vehicles and Systems Division's technical staff was
_ charged with three responsibilities in 1968 by Mr. Kilgore. These
were :
i. Conduct an in-house systems trade study among the options
with the objective of advising Mr. Kilgore and Mr. Martin
of FVSD's recommendations.
2. Respond to the project office's request for technical data
so that the project office could disseminate the data to
Headquarters, contractors, and JPL.
3. Monitor and critique the contractors' efforts in their
studies to assure that problem areas were exposed and
smalyzed; in fact, Martin-Marietta's contract for mission
mode studies was put under my direct supervision by an
i"
agreement between Mr. Martin and Mr. Kilgore.
These three assignments ran concurrently with item i being the
primary effort. Items 2 and 3 were considered supportive to item i. i
The result of FVSD's in-hou_e trade off studies was documented I and
transmitted to the project office (Appendix VI-B). The study analyzed "
soft and hard landers, direct and out of orbit entry from vievpoin_s
of cost2, technology base, risk, and growth potential. The sugary
_- chart from the memorandum is shorn as fi_e VI-I, FVSD's technical
1Meaorandum to Jame 8. Martin, Jr. from James F. McNulty, 1973 Mars
Mission, November I, 1968. "-_
2Costs for various systems were furnished by the pro_ect office from
contr_tor data. _
e_
: ¢ i
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Recommend Titan/Centaur
Soft Lander Out-Of-Orbit
,,f.
• Best Understood Mission
7
: • Smallest Risk, Flexible in Operational
Sense
• Lowest g's for Instrument Development
" • Provides Platform for Instrument
Deployment
• Less Demanding on Decelerator Systems
: • Has Growth Possibilities with Same
Technology
BUT
?
• Highest in Cost i
Pig_re VX-I.--F4_ mtafi"'an rec_dationm aad rationale.
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3
: staff's reco_aendatior again favored the out-of-orbit soft landing
t'
_ mission as presented to OSSA in December 1967 unless cost wr : an over-
ridi_ factor. Martin Marietta Corporation's contract study of mission
' mo_e also reco_ended the out of orbit soft lander; its recommended
: entry system consisted of:
_: I. A i0.5 cone shaped entry vehicle with a ballistic number of
O.35.
2. A total flight capsule weight of about 2000 pounds, and 625
pounds of landed equigment.
The study concluslons3 are contained in Appendix VI-C.
I
/
";' _tnal Re_ort, Study of Direct versus Orbital Entry for Mars Mission,
': Vol_ 0-StuarT, _rtin-_krlett& Corpor&tion, Ausust 1_8, PK.
' 89-90.
t
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The Summary Meeting and Mars Decision
A full scale two week, 6 day a week, meeting was held at Langley
October 28 through November 9, 1968 under the chairmanship of James
S. Martin, Viking Project Manager to define the Mars Mission. The
meeting was attended by the head of OSSA, Washington Headquarters;
Center directors from JPL and Langley; and senior staff members at
Langley.
The first week was devoted to the contractor's presentations of
their final reports together with their recommendations. The second
week was closed to contractors and was restricted to internal NASA
deliberations. Members of Mr. Martin's Viking Project Office made
presentations of their distillation of the contractor reports and
pointed up the options available to management. The presentations
were unbiaseQ in that no recommendation was made; it was concluded
that all options--hard lander, soft lander, direct entry, out-of-
orbit entry--were technically feasible and could be engineered. The
differences in cost, amount of science data obtainable, technical
problems, and risk were defined. The meetings were carried out in an
open fashion; many questions were asked from the floor to assure
that the problems were understood.
Dr. Naugle, 088A, Bad the Center Dtreotor|--tc4etL_r with
consultants as required--then held & private meeting to deliberate
their reccamendations to Dr. Paine, NASA Director. It was felt by
Langley's technical staff that cost might be an overridi_ factor
197402020g-198
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and that the direct entry, hard lander mission would be the selection;
the absence of absolute knowledge as to "weights" to be assigned to
evaluation factors (cost, scienc-., risk, etc. ) was the primary reason
that Langley did not make a hard recommendation on mission definition.
Dr. Paine's decision to go with the most ambitious mission--the soft
lander out-of-orbit--came as a distinct, hap._- surprise to Langley. i
His sources obviously encouraged him that he would get more support
from Congress on Viking than he did on Voyager. Thus, the direction
had been set--Langley was now responsible for mounting a Mars mission
utilizing the soft lander with out-of-orbit entry. The decision
resulting from the meeting reflected an understanding of the salient
technical Anoints and was a correct and popular decision from the
: technical point of view assuring enthusiastic support from the Project :
Office personnel. This support--together with Mr. Martin's leader-
ship, Mr. Cortright's strong interest and backing, and the developed
relationships with Headquarters and JPL--augurred well for the
success of the project.
\
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The Commitment to Hardware
Mr. Martin set up the organizational plan shown on figure Vl-2.
The main elements of this plan are:
,.- i. Lewis Research Center to supply the launch vehicle.
._ 2. JPL to supply the orbiter.
3. Langley to supply the lander and total system integration.
In much the same manner as the Lunar Orbiter Project, a large
prime contractor to Langley would be responsible for the actual
hardware development with Langley acting as the technical manager.! .
It is interesting to note the differences between the Viking and
Voyager manngement organizations. Where Voyager was complex and
aulti-tiered, the organizational plan for Viking was simple and
straight forward. Responsibility passed directly from OSSA Headquarters
: to the Langley Director to the Project Manager; all other NASA clients "
reported to Mr. Martin. Two other factors also contributed to making
the Viking plan more operationally stable, these were:
I. Mr. Cortright, as Langley director, could act as a shield
I_ainet changes in Project guidelines by _eadquarters
priIarily beeauIe of his Ipace expertise aa_d hil statttre /
_. with Headquarters permonnel. --
" 2. The firI deIi_&tion of Langley am project manager. It is
generIdAy acknovledged _hat inter-center conflicts _rise
when there is caipetition for the lead Center role. The _
' el_bliIhil_ o£ clear roleI for the w_riowI CeI_terI increaIeI
J
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the cooperative aspects and allows all par_ies to concentrate
on their respective responsibilities.
Given the authority to implement the Viking Project, _ai_ley's
Project Office proceeded quickly to get the major oont_act underway.
The contract would provide for procuring the lander as well as the
integration of the entire system--the _,uildup of the lander with :
the Government Furnished Equil_zent (the GFE), the orbiters from JPL
and launch vehicles from Levis Research Laboratory. The technical _:
statement of york (Appendix VI-D) was released for proposals on
March i, 1969. Proposals were received from the Boeing Company,
Martin Marietta Corporation, and McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. The
proposalJ were evaluated during April and May by a large group of
NASA evaluators (Appendix VI-E). I supported the Man_ement Evaluation
C_ittee and was concerned priaLrily with evaluating the realtml _
of the schedules submitte_ by the proposers for taple=enting the i.
4
project; i.e., blocks of time designated for mission definitio_,
design, fabrication and test.
Following a review of the findings of the evaluation bY Dr.
Fletcher, I_ A_inistrator, Mr. Cortright, La_ey Direotor,
snnounced on May 29, 1973 that Mar_in-_kriet_a Corporation would be !
&yarded the m_or Viking eoatraet. This seleetlon _ s reeJonsble
one as Martin Marietta Corporation had been etu_tag the Mars landing _
problem intensively for an extended period of time. With the award
of the approximately 300 million dollar contract (not including lsuneh
1974020203-202
+ vehicle and orbiter cost), NASA and the United rJtates were finally
)
firmly c_itted to carryi_ out a landing on Mars.
i
L
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S3mopsis
A synopsis of the 1968/1969 effort could be tabulated as indicated
below:
1. OSSA issues guldelines that give Le_gley project manager
responsibility for planning potential missions to Mars.
2. Mr. Edgar Cortright named Director of Lzngley.
3. Langley and industry study of matrix of potential Mars
missions.
4. Study results presented to OSSA in a two week meeting at
: Langley.
: 5. OSSA approves "big" misslon--soft lander with out-of-orbit
entry.
6. La_ley requests and evalu_te_ proposals; awards contract
: to Martin Marietta Corporation for mission hard.re.
l
4
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CHAPTER VII
INTRODUCTION - TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MILESTONE ._MMARY
Summar_
This chapter will delineate the key events, technical and
administrative, in the development of the Mars project. These key
events will be presented in an integrated milestone format depicting
the interactions between the technical work and the administrative
decisions. Also included will be a description of the arrangement and
approach to b,_.used in the subsequent Analysis chapters.
188
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Technical and Administrative Milestone Surm_r_
It is pertinent now to look at the project from an integrated
point of view rather _han in the fra_nente _ yearly sequences. Figure
VII-I has been developed to show the important technical and adminis-
trative developments in the form of milestones with respect to time;
action arrows ere provides to deter! the impacts of the technological
base on administrative decision makir_ and, vice versa, the adminis-
trative decisions on th_ technoloMical base.
The chart divides the years i96_ to 1969 into three phases, each
approximately two year_ lor_. Phase I was the Saturn I_ Voyager
mission with JPL as project man_er a_,dLangley a consultant on entry
technology. Phase II was Saturn V Voyager mission with OSSA as project
manager and Lm,gley the lander _anager. Phase III was the Titan Vikinl
mission with La_ley the project manager.
The first phase was initiated by Dr. Roberts assembllng a multl-
disci_Axned Langley staff, vlth the tacih approval of Langley manage-
sent, to study Mars entry problems (milestone 1). This staff defined
a novel probe concept utilizin_ a parachute to pull the instrument
pack•is from the heat shield--this parachute utilization remained •
constant factor in all future reftnemeDts and played a hig_ly impor-
tant rele in the pro_a_'s evolution. Dr. _ober_s reec_ewted a,_
in-de_th contractor studM be made of the conce_t (mlles+_ne 2). This
recc_mndation i_pe_ted LanIley's "dadHeadquartq,rs' a_kainistrative
processes sn_ its approval marked Lansley',_ :,_ree into interplanetaA7 '_ "-"
studle|. Head--era lz_resaed .'ez_le_'e r_,,sibtltty by requlrin_
, i
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the inclusion of lander feasibility in the study. This edict
impacted the technical staff by adding a new technology under its
charter and further strengthened Lan61ey's position (milestone 3).
Another important milestone during this phase was the initiation
by Langley (based on a recommendation from its technical staff) of
the development of a parachute suitable for operation in the Martian
environment. This undertaking was important since it furnished the
data which would later give credence , : _angley's recommendations and,
• in addition, allow sufficient lead time for the parachute's development
(milestone h). Headquarters' direction to switch launch vehicles from
! the Saturn IB to the Saturn V (milestone 5)--a change in the mission
of more than one order of ma6nitude--signalled the end of Phase i.
A Langley technical staff, made up primarily of FVSD personnel
and directed by Dr. Roberts, carried out an in-hou_e study of the
Saturn V at the behest of Langley management (milestone 6). This study
culminated in the definition of a landing mode (soft lander out of
orbit with a parachute transition stage and retro landing). These
data (milestone 7 ) were presented by Dr. Roberts and me to OSSA at a
Joint 0SSA-Langley-JPL meeting where JPL presented a o.ounter all-
i propulsive landing mode. The technical data vss considered by OSSA
, and Langley ,ms named lander manager (milestone 8) which demonstrated
the fmpact of the technological ba_e on administrative decision making.
While _A was gearing up to carry out a Saturn V mission, Congress
cancelled '_oya_er" owin_ to the funds squeese_ this ended Phase II. _
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A request from OSSA to study a "more modest" mission (milestone 9)
L
impacted technological base requiring the technical staff to work to
j new guidelines. Because of its broad past experi_.nce, the FVSD
_ technical staff was able to react quickly and recomm,._ndto OSSA a
Titan/Centaur mission similar to Voyager in mission mode but more
limited in weight (milestone i0). Shortly after receiving this
: rec_endation, OSSA named Langley to manage a study effort of all Mars
candidate missions using Titan as a base (milestone Ii). Be.sed on this
impact, Langley initiated and carried out, in-house and contract, a
broad based study of the candidate missAorAs (m.il,-stone12). This
effort culminated a large Joint technical-administrative meeting at
Langley where all technical data was preqented in-depth. After this
meeting, the administrative decision was made for a Mars landing pro-
Ject (soft lander out of orbit) to be managed by Le_gley and using
the Titan/Centaur (milestone 13), Finally, the project was co_mitted
to hardware by the contract award in May 1969 (mile _.one14 ).
J
m
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Approach to the Analysis
i The analysis will be divided into three main categories. The
first category will consider the Langley administrative system and
th? operation of technical staff within it. Formal system concepts
will be utilized to illustrate "how" and "why" the system worked to
allow its technical staff to make major inputs influencing a national
proKram. The second category will examine the operations of
WashinKton Headquarters as it endeavored to define a national program
acceptable to NASA and the Congress. Its decision to promote a
Saturn V Voyager mission and its creation of a 1971 Mars Probe
Worki_ Group to define a Mariner probe will be analyzed. The third
category will be devoted to the final decision process wherein
Washincton and LanKley were in aKreement on objectives and the decision
was a cooperative one. The alternate missions under consideration
rill be analyzed from a formal analytical viewpoint.
It is felt that this breakdown into three categories is particularly
appropriate since it i8 consistent with the develolment of the program.
i DurinK the first tvo phLses of the proKram, the Saturn 1B and Saturn V
phssel as defined on figure VII-l, Id_ey and Waahinston acted more
or lees independently with onl_ intermittent 8rid f_Bl interactions.
Time, dttrinK those phKeeso tho opel_tionn can be examined e_ewhat _
independently. The third phase (Viktn6) vas, hoverer, • close,
cooperative effort and @sn be best exs_ned u • Joint adntnistrative-
teehnloal system.
i1
; • j
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: CHAPTER VIII
-_ ANALYSIS OF LANGLEY OP]_A"IONS
_' Suunary
:: Langley' s administrative system and the technical staff' s role
are analyzed for Both the pre-Hars years and the Voyager period of
Mars studies. The formal concepts of Easton on political systems,
Homan on the technical staff's performance, and Kuhn on scientific
breakthroughs are used as a backdrop for the study. Similarities are
noted between HouBolt's work on Apollo and Roberts' work on Mars.
Conclusions are drawn as to why HouBolt and Roberts were successful in
defining the mission modes.
;
t
" L i
I
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The Pre-Mars Yesrs
: Lar._ley Administrative System
"" Langley's operation in the NACA days was characterized by high
research quality and low visibility to the public (independent
operation). The individual researcher had great freedom within his
field to pursue his research and publish his results which were
_. eagerly awaited by the scientific community. Supervisory positions
were relatively small in number and the opportunity to progress up
; the mana6ement ladder was slim. Thus, the researcher who was desirous
of more materialistic rewards or fame oftentimes would leave to
_ccept positions with industry, universities, or to serve as a nucleus
fox' a new _ACA Center "mothered" by Langley. The system operated
: successfully because
(1) there was a sufficient supply of dedicated researchers and
new graduates to keep the output high in quantity and quality.
r" ( 2 ) there were sufficient openi_s available elsewhere for a
Langley trained researcher to siphon off "ambitious"
researchers before they became disgruntled and sufficient in
number to uause a stress o_ the system.
(3} the char*.er on the technology--aeronautical research--was
well defined and understood by the researchers and by
_ management. This restricted the researcher's opportunity
o to venture into new fields where ze_a6eRent aisht lack
: expertise.
,| i
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(4) the system was more or less a closed system in that, not
being in the public's eye, it could operate in a near
independent mode without being perturbed by outside forces.
Langley management took pride in achieving excellence in
technical competence and, also, in its providing leaders to industry,
universities and other NACA Centers. To perform excellently and to
export leader's could almost be termed a Langley tradition. In my NACA
days, I saw many promising engineers leave for want of an advancement
that had been earned and that could have been given; it vas the
iI unwritten policy of Langley management not to "bargain" with
individual employees. Based on the above, it is my conclusion that
this attitude enhanced the operation of the system by preventing the
system from overloading itself with too many hi@h level researchers
for the positions available while at the same time furnishing a channel
for cross feeding the technology to the nation. Thus, by taking pride
in its export of leaders, it does seem that Langley management found
a way of "having its cake and eating it, too."
With the advent of NASA and the increased attention on space
activities, Langley management strove to retain its system of operation _
rather tbmn to _ke any wholesale reorganization to reflect the change
in emphasis. Langley's effort c_ed _ one near totaA dedication
to aeroaautics to one primarily devoted to space activities in about
• year's time and without e_y noticeable cha_e in the systm'e basic
operation. To achieve this, Langley _emmt save up ne of its
authority to both W&ahington Headquarters and to the individual
1 t
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researcher. The individual researcher was given more freedom to work
outside his aeronautical specialty and the work emphasis was shifted
to reflect the desires of Washington Headquarters. The space work
was, thus, co-opted into the existing system bringing the researchers
with it. As the researchers acquired expertise in space work, they
were given additional freedom to pursue their ideas within the
system with lesser restraints than in NACA days partially because the
top Langley management lacked expertise in space technology and also
because the dynamic environment required action. The system continued i
to work and produce high quality results because
(1) the technical staff had been socialized into the system and
could be depended upon to act in conformity with past
tradition as much as possible.
(2) the researcher training which had stressed thoroughness and
/
accuracy was most appropriate in the new technology which was
emphasizing performance with cost a secondary consideration. '
(3) Langley management except at the top level was primarily
technical rather than administrative and was, thus, heavily
engaged in mastering the new technology.
(h) ttere was no influx of new experienced epaoe personnel with
fixed ideas but rather a shift of york emphasis by most of the
Center.
T
: Ik_ed on the above reasoning, the significsnt contributions of Messrs.
j
! Kouboult and Faget can be attributed to their researcher background of
r
i thorouEhness and inquisitivenens to6ether with the freedom given the
I
o
2
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technical staff to broaden its field of interest. The separation from
Langley of Faget's group to serve as the nucleus of the Houston's
Manned Space Flight Center follows in the Langley tradition and also
resulted in Langley still remaining in its status quo position as a
research center. Langley mane&ement's confidence in its technical
staff and its socialization allowed Langley to undertake, at Washington
Headquarter's request, the Lunar Orbiter Project and the construction
of the Mercury Tracking Station with management's realization that
these projects would be competently completed utilizing adjunct
technical project offices without serious affecting Langley's norual
operational mode. It is important to note that in the Houboult and
Faget cases that it was the technical staff who perceived the national
need without direction from higher authority (President Eisenho'+er
termed Sputnik a "trick"), went to work on developing a sound technology
base, and made a major impact on the direction of the nation's effort.
The Langley management system can be examined on the basis of
formal system concepts. Utilizing the concept of EastonI wherein the
Langley management mode could be considered as the political system,
figure VIII-I from Easton can, thus, be utilized as a model. The
analou seems appropriate and useful. Easton divides his system into
enviro_ent, inputs, the political jystem, outputs and feedbaok loop. +
The total environment (endogenous and exogenous) furnish the inputs
to the political system in the form of delands and supl_rt. The +._
: 1X_vid F,_ton, A Frepmror_ for Political. Aualysis, (_.ewood
Cliffs. Nev Jersey. Prentlce-NJal£, Inc. i_5)
/
i +
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political system is the "black box" within which the process of con-
version of _he demands to decisions by the authorities take place.
The political system has two essential _nique elements (i) the capacity
to make decisions and (2) the probability of their frequent acceptance
by most membe1"s as binding. The operational ;_ode of the "black box"
will be dependent upon the management philosophy and I have indicated
previously the major facets of the LRC management philosophy. The
output of the political system is in the form of "authoritative
allocations" which then feeds back to the society (Langley researchers)
and, thus, affects society's (Langley researchers' ) demands and supports.
The process can be visualized as a continuing exchavge of society-
government (Langley researchers-Langley management) system responses.
Easton defines "persistence" as the central question for theoret-
ical inquiry by political systems analysis. He states the "members
of a political system [LRC management] have the op_ortunity...to respond
to stress in such a way as to try to assure the persistence of some
kind of a system for making and executing binding decislons. ''2 He
proposes the following three conditions as nece,_sary and sufficient
for persistency: (i) regulation of the inflow of da_ands (2) maintenance
of a minimum level of support and (3) the adoption of measures to cope
vith stress.
The response of the "black box" to stress determines vhLt type
of change (in the Langley operational mode) takes place. The "black box"
i im i
2Ibid., p. 78
i ....
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is considered to have enotu_.hflexibility (normal rar_e) to allow for
some changes - i.e., some project or mission concept work is permissible
providing the basic research work retains the primary emphasis. For
other char_es caused by stress driving the system above the normal
range, changes in the "black box" are needed to assure persistence,
i.e., Langley would have to change its operational mode. The conclusion
is evident that Langley mana6ement system had proved itself flexible
enou@a through several stressful (not normal) episodes to Dersis%
without changing its "black box" operation--the main business of the
Center re_Lined basic research &nd the other elements (while important
and performed diligently) were not regarded as normal Center pursuits.
Thus, the Langley management successfully remained stable despite
(I) changing technologies, and their technical paradigms 3, from
aeronautics to space, and (2) includin@ the execution of project
missions in its charter. In a sense, it could be said that the fact
that the Langley staff had bee,; socialized into operatln_ under the
males of Langley's NACA's administrative paradigm enabled the staff
to switch technical paradi_s efficiently. It is believed that
had Lan_ey's __ent mode, or paradi_a, changed simultaneously with
the technical chan_e, co.side.hie more stress would have been applied
%o the _stm with counter productive results.
_radl_--a term used to denote the conceptual _brella or $overn-
inE model under which nore_ science is c_rrie_ _t. In the strictest
sense, it is the hi@heat order of conceptual abstraction, a met&theory,
upon which theory _d conceptual fra_rks _e based. --_
J
F
J
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,- Given the stability and managene- _ethods of Langley, the
:"estion now ari_-_ of how has th-_ ," idual researcher or the
tec_ ica! staff made the si_,_.'i- _ _ontributions that are a matter
i
of record. "o a_alyz_ ,_._ : i..,=,use will be made of the concepts
and conclusions or"_,,,,',_:,,_s ",_J::nin his study of scientific break-
throughs. Some of th_ co_.-,_ctJto be utilized together with my
simplified interpretazions, ate:
paradigm--the accepted or governing model or pattern
puzzle--a problem with a solution within the rules of a p_radigm
ano_ly--a novelty which does not fit the expectations of the
paradigm
. extraordinary science--the science proceeding outside the bounds
of the paradigm to account for the anomaly
Kuhn's thesis is that science advances mai:Lly through revolutions
caused by the study of extraordinary science which over_urn the
t
i established paradl_, i.e. _tep function advances rather than the
_ historical concept of a gradual, bit-by-bit add.rich of _cientiflc
data. Inter_stinsly enough, tboush, he credits normal science (the
puszle solving) as _eing the main ingredient to extraordinary science
in that it uncovers the sncmalieo which lead to advs_cement of science
by enlarEin8 the concept of the parsdi_s or overturning it.
_:mss 8. ]0ahn, The Structure of Scl4m if c R olutl ns , 2nd ed.
(Chles£o and London: The University of Chics@o Peas, 1970)
....... i
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Against this background, the Langley staff can be visuali_cd as
problem solvers working the unsolved problems of the governing paradigm
and on the alert for anomalies. Because of the novelties uncovered
by the Langley staff (slotted throat wind tunnels, "coke" bottle
shaped aircraft nacell_,_, supercritical configured wings, etc. ), the
Langley management's mode had to be able to cope with both normal and
extraordinary science without being perturbed.
The Houbolt episode, described in the narrative, will be examined
to illustrate "how" the researcher makes the contribution within the
s_stem. Vcn Braun, since childhood, had been tantalized by space
travel and had foreseen the possibility of men to the moon. Further,
he visualized a concept of large booster going directly to the moon
and returning. After World War II and his involvement with the United
States booster research and development, h_ championed space travel
and his concept. With President Kennedy's dl,'ection to NASA to land a
man on the moon and return him safely in the 1960's, Von Braun, now
director of NASA's Marshall Center, put his staff to wor,k _o solve the
puzzles associated with hls governing model (paradigB) of a direct
landi_ on the moon. Neanvhile, Houbolt, not bound by Von Braun's
para_ilDm, worked the problem differently and arrived at the "novelty"
of a Imll Ilbip (IJ_) landing _Xl rQtur '12 to a mother s_ceerat_
orbiti_ the moon. A striking parallel in reactions to data contrary
to the governing _radi_ can be draw bergen a case cited by Kuhn
and the Hou_,i_ wMA_e if Boubolt's solution is viewed as an anomaly
_ the Von Braun l_radi_ and an _ of extraordinary science.
1
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= Kuhn5 cites a case of a short and controlled exposure of a series
of playing cards; the paradigm being that it was a standard deck.
"Many of the cards were 'normal', but some were made 'anomalous,'
e.g. a red six of spades or a black four of hearts. Each experimental
run was constituted by the display of a single card to a single subject
-. in a series of gradually increased exposure&.. For the normal cards
:_ these identifications were usually correct, but the anomalous cards
_ were almost always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzle-
ment, as normal (consistent with the expectations of the paradigm).
?
The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four
of either hearts or spades. With a further increase of exposure to
the anomalous cards, subjects did begin to hesitate and to display
awareness of the anomaly. Exposed, for example, to the red six of
spades, some would say: that's the six of spades, 'but there's
- something wro_ with it....Even at forty times the exposure [time]
required to recognize normal cards for what they were, more than i0
percent of the anomalous cards were not correctly identified. And the
_ subjects who then failed often experienced acute personal distress...In
,_ science, as in the playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with
i difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided
by expectation. Inltially, only the anticipated and usual are experienced
even under conditions where anomaly is later to be observed. Further i
acquaintance, however, does result in awareness of something wrong or i
5 ld, p 62-6},.
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does relate the effect to something that has gone wrong before. That
awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are
adjusted until the initially anamoulous has become the anticipated."
r
Compare this with "Sure that he had the answer, Houbolt attended
meetings of NASA's moon-shot planning group to promote the lunar-
:_ orbit-rendezvous (IX)R)scheme. His reception was cool. 'Your
?
figures lie,' shouted one excitable member of the group, 'I don't
believe a word of it.' Wernher yon Braun, present at the same meeting,
dourly shook his head at Houbolt's proposal and said, 'No, that's no
good'...Gradually [upon repeated exposures] others began to realize
the virtues [accuracies] of Houbolt's scheme. One of the hardest to
convince was Werner von Braun. But when he was finally converted to
the LOR technique, he became a formidable advocate. ''6 In a personal
letter to Houbolt, von Braun apologized for his late conversion 8rid
attributed his delay in accepting LOR to the fact that he had lived
with his direct concept [paradigm] for many years and it influenced his
thinking. Another relevant facet of this episode is, that according to
Kuhn, "Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions
of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field
whose pare_igm they ch.e, ''7 This certainly applies to Dr, Hou_It
vhose previous work had been in structural mechanics where he was a
reeognisod national authority and this ve_ his initial endeavor into
-- ,ini 6 i
"@pace", Time, February 28, 1969
TThamu 8. E_ihn, T_e Structureo_ 8_t,ntt£t@ RevQ_ution.e, p.02nd9ed"r _hice_o and London: The University of Ckicqo Press, 19TO),
,i
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aerospace.
_ Returning now to the basic question of how the individual
-. _ researcher or technical staff makes a significant contribution, the
i general conclusion drawn fro,,the above is that it is through the
combinatioz_ of three elements:
_ I. the accuracy of his technology base "
L
2. having available forums and channels to present his data
_ ! 3o perseverance i
J
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The Voyager Years
i Im_le_ Administrative S_stem
During the years 1964 through 1967, Langley management continued
its normal operation mode established in the pre-Mars years. It was
supportive of the technical staff's work in mission studies and in
research, offered forums for the researcher to present its data, and
guarded Langley's traditional responsibility to charter its own
course. Until Langley management could see the end of the Lunar
Orbiter project in 1967, it restricted its interest in a Mars project
to consulting and supportin_ research. Once it became apparent that
the Lunar Orbiter staff would be available, Langley moved to accept
entry vehicle hardware responsibility on Voyager, set up a project
office, and appoint a manager to interface with other NASA elements.
Even then, Langley's management's instructions were firm that Langley
should define its own charter for the entry vehicle rather than have
its definition edicted by the ov,,rall project office. Langley'8
participation in the Voyager program was compatible with its previous
position regarding project participation; i.e., project participation
was a positive v_!ue provided that _esearch remained the primary
•,Jmphasi8 of the Center.
The following actions of Lan$1ey mane_emcnt _uring thi_ period are _
cited to substantiate the thesis that Langley'8 management mode was
supportive of the technical staff and consistent with its policies of . _ _
_llewing the researche_ freedom of action and providing forums for the ' _i
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presentation of data.
(i) Approved Dr. Roberts initiating work in a new technology
with a high level competent staff.
(2) Approved Dr. Roberts recommendation for a contractual study
: of $500,000 and acted as intermediarywith Headquarters.
(3) Approved tecnnica! staff's recommendation to pursue a para-!
chute research program including the approval of the
utilization of the balloon launch tecb_'_ue although the "
/
Deputy Director was not convinced that that technical approach
was optimum. -.
(4) Approved a request of Dr. Roberts an_ the Planetazy Missions
Technology Steering Committee that Langley study the Saturn V
Voyager entry mission mode problem, i
(5) Allowed Dr. Roberts to present his findings at a Joint
\
Washington Headquarters meeting with OSSA and JPL. Top Langley
management attended the meeting evidencing support of technical
staff.
(6) Appointed James Martin as manager of Capsule _s system
consistent with Langley's Lunar Orbiter policy of divorcing
projects from research activity.
(7) Accepted the technical staff's findings regarding reccmmend•-
"i tion for allotment of capsule bus weight and assisted in
obtaining • revision of JPL's allocated weight diltribution.
1974020203-226
2O9
i Technical Staff's Role
_L
The technical staff's role in the Voyager period will he examined
in two particulars. First, an analysis will be made of the staff it-
J
self during the important initial effort in an attempt to explain the
: s_aff's productivity when viewed in the context of Homan's work group
behavior model. Second, the staff's success in defining the Voyager
mission mode will be analyzed in relation to the concepts of Kuhn.
As detailed in the narrative, the nucleus of the initial effort
was a group consisting of Dr. Roberts (Loads Division), Mr. Roger
Anderson (Structures Division_, Mr. William Mace (Flight Instrumenta-
tion Division), and Mr. James McNulty (Flight Vehicles and Systems
Division) with direction and _st=nce from the respective line
! organizations as required. This group within a period of five months,
starting with a very limited knowledge of Mars mission technology,
defined a probe concept including conceiving of a parachute to remove
the instrument package from the heat shield. This work furnished the
bas_ for Langley entering the Mars missions contractual studies which
led eventually to Langley management of the Viking project. The
conceptual scheme to be used to examine the group's high productivity
is shown in figure VIII-2 and is based on the work of Professor George
C. Horns. 8 This concept models the system as four main parts:
||
/
8Paul R. Lawrence and John A. Seiler, 0rganiz&tional Bebavlor a_ .
Ad_.Inls_ratlon (Homewood, Illinois: _Ichard D. Irvln, Inc. and the
Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 15h-16_.
i
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: i. Bacl_ground Factors: factors over which members of the group
have little or no control--personal characteristics and back-
grounds, external economic and social infleunces, management
policies and practices, the supervisor's behavior, the
technology, and the Job design.
2. Required and Given Behavior: these are the activities,
interactions and sentiments required by individual members of
the group to accomplish the task together with the given senti-
: ments which the individual members bring with them.
3. Emergent Behavior: This is the "black box" which is the actual
behavior of the group members after the group has adjusted to a
work mode. It is to be noted that different groups may determine
different work modes for the same task--hence the term "black
box" which implies an indefinite or mysterious working which
cannot be formalized or directed by manageme_t outside the group.
h. Consequences: These are productivity, satisfaction, and
individual development which can be used by management to mea-
sure the effectiveness of the system. By means of feedback,
management can adjust these "consequences" by altering the
"background factors" and "the required and given behavior." _
In the background factors involving personal, economic and social
factors, the members of the group were much the same. Each member had
bee_ socialized in the Langley tradition, was a respected researcher
i
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or engineer, was approximately the same age, and had demonstrated
initiative and conscientiousness on past assignments. In accord
with Langley's management assumptions and practices, the group was
given nearly free rein to develop the new technology_ further,
competent leadership behavior and capability resided in the group.
The required activity of the group--to' develop a focal point for
Langley's activities in the form of a baseline concept--was one that
required the interaction of all members. The required sentiments
were that the individual researcner's parochial interests (structures,
loads, or instrumentation) be set aside for a time while an integrated
concept was defined. This caused no conflict with the given senti-
ments because, regardless of the details of the concept's definition, the
output would define many problem areas in all disciplines requiring
research programs.
; The emergent behavior of the group became one of a solid front
wf_ere problems were discussed and agreed upon by the group before pre-
senting _ay results up the line. Dr. Roberts emerged as the unquestioned
leader and spokesman to Langley management _ he played the lead
technical role as well as group's spokesman. Mr. Anderson acted as
Dr. Robert's "deputy" and was interested in the overall mission
aspects a| yell as the structural problems. Mr. Mace remained primarily
an instrumentation consultant but, nevertheless, cooperated fully and
was sympathetic to the group's objectives. From my engineering
i coordinaticn experience as technical pro_ect engineer, I fit the role
as an inte@rator to mesh the disciplinary inputs into realistic
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engineering designs. In addition to, or because of, my "chief engineer"
duties, I also emerged as the focal center for data collection and
transmittal; thus, I was relied upon by the group to draft reports,
work statements, presentations, etc. In substance, the group's small
size and discipline mix could be likened to a "critical mass" in
nuclear energy. They were the "necessary and sufficient" conditions
to accomplish the task; there were no extraneous elements to divide
_he r_ponsibility or to drain the staff's energy from its main goal.
The consequences reRulting from this emergent behavior was
• extremely high in terms of production, satisfaction, and individual
development. The relationship and work requirements were stimulating
and enjoyable. The group members felt they were making a contribution
to Langley and NASA and the organization setup was compatible with the
requirements of innovative thinking and approaches. The feedback that
I received through m_ line organization was positive in that our group's
efforts were recognized to be highly important.
The technical staff work later on the Saturn V Voyager will now
be analyzed. As stated previously, the Langley staff could be
considered puzzle solvers working on the border of normal science.
When Dr. Roberts and the technical staff undertook to study and define
a Mars mission mode, there was no Mars mode paredism existin$ compared
to the Yon Braun paradi$m for the moon landing mode. JPL had been
worki_ on the puzzle for some time, had a concept_ the concept,
however, had not been fully articulated and was no_ entrenched ,-_
sufficiently to qualify a4 a paradi_. Thus, JPL and Langley vere both ,_
L
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trying to put the pieces of tb- puzzle together to obtain a fit of
all pieces.
Langley's technical staff's solution to the puzzle was docu-
mented as Langley Working Paper 326, "Modal and Conceptual Design
Comparisons for the Voyager Capsule," McNulty, Snow and Roberts
(Appendix T.¢-B). The main elements of the mode were a 19-foot heat
shield for maximum aerodynamic braking and a parachute performing
the dual fmctlons of removing the landing package from the heat
shield and furnishing transition braking prior to a retro-propulsion
landing.
A forum was arranged in Washington Headquarters for Dr. Roberts
to present Langley's findings and for JPL to present its modal
recommendation of an all propulsive landing. Both technical staffs
were accompanied by their top management. Evidencing our newness into
interplanetary study, Dr. Roberts remarked to me on the p3_ne to
, Washington that he hoped no one would ask him if he ever saw a
rocket; I replied, in kind, that if he got cornered, he should switch
the subject to soll mechanics and "I'd kill them."
As detailed in the narrative, Dr. Roberts presented Langley's
puzrle solution without contradiction. JPL's mode, on the other :"
hand, had three pieces vhich did not fit the puzzle too well_ they
vere:
(1) a mailer heat shield which did not furnish optim_ brakerS.
(2) the retro firing through ports opening in the heat shield
vhich represented technology beyond _he state o£ the art
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(figure IV-7).
(3) the requirement that excess propulsion be carried (reducing
payload weight ) because of the unknown density of the
atmosphere to furnish braking.
Lansley's mission mode work was Judged sound enough for Langley
to be awarded the capsule responsibility.
Further along in the program when the OSSA-JPL guidelines on
capsule bus weight allocation threatened to limit the technical
staff's position o._ design specifications, the FVSD staff was able
to obtain a revision in project guidelines through an analytical study
and push its recommendations through the multi-tiered project
organization.
Thus, Lansley's technical staff had created a governing model
(paradi_) for landing an instrumented package on )(ars_ normal
science could nov proceed with the hardware design and development
puznles within that model. As in the Houbolt case, it should be
noted that this paradigm development yes in keeping with Kuhn'L
thesis that the pioneeri_ york is achieved by those "either very
young or very new to the field."
In |tmmatton, ve find that the same three elements have ccmbSned
in the Nars |tudy as aey did in the Apollo etu_ to alloy emergence
of a model. To repeat, they are:
1. the accuracy of the technolo_ beJe
2. the a_LtlabtlSty of forum
3. pereever_ce
l
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CHAPTER IX
HEADQUARTERS' OPERATION IN VOYAGER YEARS
The chapter analyzes the operational system of Headquarters
during the years 1964-1967 when it was tie-piing to define a _.Jor
l
Voyager program. It discusses the factors influencing a decision
_ while Headquarters (OSSA) is lacking adequate resources and a proven
: technolo_ base. The Saturn V decision is examined analytically by
use of a statistical mathesatical model and insights into the
ineffectiveness of the Mars Probe Working Group are provided through
application of Homan's model.
216
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Background Fact.ors
0SSA, Washington Headquarters, relied on JPL to _r_," out limited
'_ interplanetary missions in the pre-Voyager years. Faced with a po_sible
future requirement of mounting a major program to the planets after
completion of Apollo, OSSA took a tentative step toward increasir_
its capability by approving Langley's entree intn _Lrs entry and,
late_-,landing technology. This step, however, was far from suff,-
clen_ when viewe_ from the overall NASA _rogram--a machine geemed to
a yearly budget over six billion dollars and the prod:ictlon of
Saturn V's at Marshall. Despite the gathering political clouds
described in the narrative, OSSA "hit the bullet" an_ proposed a Saturn
V Voyager mission under OSSA managership and requirinK cooperative
support from JPL, _ley, and Marshall. Not having the Center
resources that OSMY had for Apollo, OSSA realized t_at a new _ode of
cooperative effort fr_ varied NASA centers would be required. To
Further a ¢ _perative spirit amonK Centerm, O_tA set up sn inter-C._nter
J4ars Probe Workin_ Group to define a probe for the !_i J4ar8 Nsrtner.
With _mKleY, an OART Center maintain:n@ its independence and JPL
with a capability sufficient unly for Jiariner type aisaions, 068£ was
in the unevtable position of nakin_ independent decisions with a
ltntted data base. Two of its decisions viii be analysed, in
retrospect, in the followin@ sections. The Saturn V dectaioa will be
emli_ed b_ ccm_4_etim4 • Bsthemstieal nodal of the risks associated ---:
with the various nisaion _lternstivas available to 068A in daftnLa@
I
1 ,
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: i the Voyager program in October 1965. The effectiveness of the Mars
: Probe Working Group will be analyzed in terms of Homan's model for
groupbehavior.
j
p
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The Saturn V Decision
The situation prior to OSSA's decision to use the Saturn V as
the launch vehicle was (1) OSSA had assigned Voyager project
responsibility to JPL with Langley providing "support in the area of
entry teclunology," (2) Langley's contract with AVCO was to be used to
define the probe lander, and (3) the Saturn 1B and Centaur were to
be mated as the launch vehicle. JPL was, at this time, to be
responsible for the launch vehicle, orbiting spacecraft, operations,
and overall management in the same manner as it had been on the Mariner
missions. This existing relationship is shown on figure IX-1. Once
the probe lander was defined, the total mission hardware responsibility
would become concentrated in OSSA-JPL. This arrangement was reviewed
by OSSA in October 1965 when it became evident that the 1971 mission
was threatened by a lack of funds to allow the development of the
Saturn 1B/Centaur launch vehicle. This, in addition to other factors
including the need to define a major program to follow Apollo,
requlred a reassessment by OSSA. These factors, as discussed in the
narrative, are indicated on figure IX-2.
A mathematical model can be constructed to represent the probability
of carrying out a successful Voyager mission in 1971. In developing
the model, Bayesian statistics will be utilized as there is insuffi-
cient data to allow the use of classical stetistics. Bayesian
statistics incorporates the utilization of estimated or conditional
probabilities based on previous knowledge and iteration of the
_' A_ocess aJ better data becomes available.
J
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' 'VOYAGER I PROBE
MISSION LANDER
', RESPONSIBILITY DEFINITION
JPL LANGLEY
C0NTRACTORAvCOI
, Figure IX-l.--Voyager organiza%ion plan (July, 1965).
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LACK OF FY 67
FUNDS FOR SATURN
: IB/CENTAUR
DEVELOPMENT BACKING FOR MARS
-, NF_ TO DEFINE _ INVESTIGATIONS
MAJOR NEW START ..,_ _ _ FROM SCIENTIFIC
PROGRAM TO FOLLOW _%_ COMITY
L1APOLLO
1971 _1 JPL NOT A
VOYAGER
VMISSION NASA CENTERDEFINITION
SATURN V
AVAILABLE
RUSSIANCOMPET TION
ASSIGNMENT FOR
MARSHALL AFTER
APOLLO
Figure IX-2.--Factors forcing a reassessment of Voyager Definition
(October, 1965).
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As stated by Tribus "We shall adopt the view that we are
: engaged in a chain of inductive logic and that at each point where an
answer is required we shall report the best inference we can make
f
based upon the evidence available to that point. As new evidence
becomes available (which evidence may pertain to the truth of that
which we had previously t_en as given) we shall use the same procedures
to update our interences as was used in the first place. In this
approach, nothing i_ ever considered to be settled with finality. All
that can be said on any particular question is that the evidence is
so overwhelming that it doesn't seem worthwhile to pursue the matter
any further. ''l As an example, a simplified model to give insight into
the problem is developed below:
-J Let
A = obtaining 1966 funding
B = obtainin_ sufficient subsequent yearly funding
C = solving the technological problems on schedule
D = defining a satisfactory management organization
X = state of knowledge based on past experience
- The probability of a successful mission could be expressed as
p(ABCOIX ) which is read as the probability based on past experience
of obtaining 1966 funding and obtaining sufficient subsequent yearly
funding _ solving the technological problems on schedule and i
_, defining a satisfactory manngement organization. Expanding by the i
,, _L - |
on Tribus, Rational Deec;iDtions, Decisions. a_d DesiRmJ
(Sew York, N. Y.: Permamon Press, 1969), p. 26.
j
P ml Ulli i t i _-
i
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product rule, we obtain:
p(_CDIX)= p(AIBCDX_p(_DIX)
= p<A!_CDX)p(_[CDX)p_CDfX)
= p(AI_DX)p(BICDX)p(CIDX)p(DlX)(EquationZX-1)
First, equation IX-I will be examined for the proposed 1971
Saturn iB/Centaur mission. It is immediately evident that the
schedule for the 1971 mission has zero probability of being success-
fully followed since the first term p(AIBCDX) is known to be zero
owing to the funds squeeze caused by Vietnam, Apollo, etc. However,
t
: equation IX-I can be examined for compressing the schedule and waiting
until 1967 funding to start the launch vehicle development. Now
< p(AIBCDX) has a real number where A equals obtaininE 1967 funding.
Let us be optimistic and assume p(AIBCDX) = 0.8 because expert opinion
;
is that the Vietnam war will be windlng down. The second term
p(B[CDX)--the obtaining of subsequent funding--will be assumed at 0.9
since the program would be an ongoing program Katherine momentum and
its budget would only be of the order of 200 million dollars p_r year
out of a NASA budget of 6 billion dollars or 3%. The third term
p(CIDX)--solving the technological problems on schedttle--becomes
significant. Past experience (X) shows that it took five years to
develop the Atlas/Centaur and then there was an additional two and
one-years before it was mated successfully with Surveyor. While a
learning curve should shorten this interval, the p(CIDX) should be _
/
less than 0.5 for shortening the interval to four years_ assume _- _
P(CIDX) " 0.33. The last term p(D[X)--defining a satisfactory
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management organization--should be high based on JPL's Mariner
experience (X); assign p(DIX) = 0.95. Thus, the estimated probability
of a successful 1971 mission (with launch vehicle development delayed
to 1967) is:
p(ABCD|X) = 0.8 x 0.9 x 0.33 x 0.95
= 0.226or
Another alternative to be considered could be the postponing of
the 1971 mission co the next launch opportunity in 1973. The funding
requirement per year would then be decreased, _nd the Apollo and
Vietnam pressures should be lessened. These factors tend to increase
both p(AIBCDX) and p(BICDX); assume p(ABCDIX) = 0.9 and P(BICDX)
= 0.95. p(CIDX)--the technical and schedule problems--should increase
appreciably to about 0.85 and p(DIX) remain unchanbed. The
probability for a successful 1973 Saturn iB/Centaltr mission would be:
p(ABCDIX) = 0.9 x 0.95 x 0.85 x 0.95
= .69 or 70___%%
The model will now be used to estimate the probability of carrying
out a successful 1971 Saturn V Voyager mission. The probability of
, obtaining sufficient 1966 funds to start the Voyager program was
considered good since the deletion of funds for development of the
L
S_turn iB/Centaur was felt to be a sufficient reduction to NASA's
proposed budget to obtain approval; assume p(ABCDIX) - 0.75. The ....
estimation of the other three probabilities is less clear than for
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Saturn 1B/Centaur" c_e because of mission unknowns (the problems not
previously studied) and that the much greater launch capability allows
for a larger and more expensive mission. However, by assuming true
(p=l) the OSSA guideline that the 1971 test capsule (lander) to be a
relatively simple package and landed by subsonic chute only, it is
possible to make rational probability estimates; the uncertainty
concerning the guide]ine assumption (p=l) then means that the resulting
overall probability wi]] be on the optimistic side. The probability
of obtaining sufficiez_t funding in subsequent years p(BICDX) is
influenced by two counter-acting forces, the inertia tending to
increase the probability and the larger funding requirements for a
Saturn V launch decreasing the probability because of its visibility
and larger percentage of the NASA budget. Thus, it is estimated that
p(BICDX) will remain at 0.75. The probability of solving the technical
problems on schedule is estimated to be less than for the Saturn 1B/
Centaur mission simply because the problems b*ve not been as deeply
studied or defined; set p(BICDX) at 0.8. The defining of a
satisfactory management organization becomes complicated with the
addition of the Office of Space Manned Flight's (OSMF) Marshall
Center to supply the Saturn V. The management organization, then
i in process, is shown in figure IX-3 and it is doubtful that JPL could
i exercise sufficient project control over Marshall_ thus, some, as yet
undefined, changes would be required. The project utilization of
centers from three different Washington Offices would be a novel
• undertaking and require new management techniques_ assume p(D[X) •
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ENTRY PROJECT [_UNCH VEHICLE
VEHICLE MA_GD4ENT
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i
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leilp_reIX-3.--Vo_er orpni_ation plu (October, 1965).
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0_67. The probability of achieving a successful 1971 Voyager Saturn
V mission would be:
?(ABCOIX)= 0.75x 0.75x 0.80x 0.67
= .30or 30_/%
A summary of these results are shown in matrix form below:
p(AIBCOX)p(BICDX)p(CIDX) p(DIX) P(A_DIx)
1966 Funds 1967-1971 Technology Management Mission
Funds Success
1971 Saturn IB 0 ...... 0
(1966 Start)
1971 Saturn IB 0.80 0.90 0.33 0.95 25%
(i967 Start )
1973 Saturn i_ O.90 0.95 0.85 0.95 70%
(1967 Start)
1971 Saturn V 0.75 3.75 0.80 0.67 30%
(1966 Start)
An analysis of these data indicates the following:
i. A 1971 Saturn IB m/salon (with a delay of one year In obtain-
i_ vehicle development funds) had only a 25% chance of mls|io_
,- success. The main factor in this low probability wls the llkllhood
of solvim_ the technical problems in the compressed time schedule.
, 2. Postpcnin6 the Saturn 1B miesion to 1973 increased the
probability of success to 70%.
I
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3. Swltehing to the developed Saturn V for the i971 mission
only increased 1971 mission success probability to 30% from 25%. This
was because the technolog_7 probability gain in changln6 to a developed
launch vehicle was balanced, more or less, b_ an o_s_nizational com-
plexity unique to NASA's experience which increased the uncertainty.
Headquarters, thus, had a choice _umo_ alternatives--a 1971
mission (Saturn IB or :iaturn V) with only 25-30% probability of
uc, e__s or , 1973 Saturn I_ ._.=ssion w_tn a 7_' probability. I_ would
appear likely that Headquarters would forego the 1971 mission and /
decide on the 197_ Saturn IB mission; this conclusion, however,
neglects other important factors influencing the decision. These
factors, as mentioned previously are:
i. The need was great to define a new major program to follow
Apollo. The overall "climate" at the time was such that NASA was
expected to go on to greater thlngs--exploration of the planets,
space stations, lunar colonles, etc.
2. Of possible follow-on program alternatives, the science
community favored a Mars program, "In October 196h, the Space
Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences recommended that
unmanned exploration of the plnaet Mars involving both physical and
biologic&/ investigations, and expressly the search for extraterrestrial
life, be made the pr.4m__ry objective of the nation's space effort in
the decade follow_ng Project Apollo. ''2 *
... P. Hearth, "Voyager," Astronautics and Aeronautics,
Vol. 3 No. 5, Va,y1965, p. 16.
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3. The long lead time necessary from pru6ram initiation to execu-
tion required that a decision be made.
Thus, the utility value of a major program may well have been the
major factor in the selection of Saturn V mission. It is also likely
that OSSA considered data not available at the technical level regard-
ing funding and mana@ement in its decision making process. However, as
" indicated by the low probabilities in the analysis, it appears that
OSSA did not have a sufficient data base to ensure that the mission was
viable.
Following the Saturn V decision, OSSA set up the Interim Project
Office at Pasadena where it coula rely on JPL for staff functions
because of the limited resources available to OSBA. Asain, while the
organization (manasement committee, working groups, and panels ) was
complicated, the problem of managing and unifying diverse Centers fro_
coast to coast required a new approach. Further, in the one case--that
of allocating weights for the Capsule Bus described in the narrative--
the organizational system was responsive to pressure from the technical
staff in its decision making process. It is unknown whether the organi-
zational arrsnpments would have proved viable in the long run. Opinions
vary on thLe subject amos| those vho were paa_icipattn 8 in the Voya4er
effort. Some felt that the organization vas unwieldly and that overall
pro_e_ mana4aent would be desiEnated eventuall_ to a Center--probablM
Marshall when it 6or fmaillsr vith the yroJect. Others were encoura4ed
vith the v_r the Centers were cooperatins at the technical staff levels
r j
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and felt that once the system interfaces were agreed upon that the
_.ctualwork could be carried o,:t efficiently.
With regard to the Voyager cancellation, it is apparent that NASA i
He_idquarters failed to evaluate correctly the political factors. The
further lack of appreciation of the sensitivity of the OSMF procurement
release for a manned Mars study (described In the Narrative) inaicated
thc omission of an overall coordinated plan. Finally, when Voyager
was cancelled, NASA Headquarters had not made any contingency plans
and was lef_ without a planetary program of any type. NASA's lack of :
expertise in this political area c,.nbe explained by the fact that it
was a new a_ency created primarily to ¢ar_, out a technical mission,
Apollo, which did not require "marketing." tiowever,with Apollo comin&
to a conclusion and the fiscal pressure bu!Tding for social programs,
NASA could have realized that NASA's operation was cha_Aging and giw:n
more emphasis to factors other than technical.
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_."neProbe Workln_ Grou_ Ex_erlm_
The objectives of the Probe Working Group (FWG), as expressed by
OSSA, were to obtain the definition of a 1971 Mars Mariner Probe and
to promote inter-Center working relationships by including Center
partic._pation in the decision making prc-_ss. As discussed in the
narrative, the concept did not prove viable in the promotion of inter-
Center cooperation. No favorable group sentiments evolved_ from
start to end, there were five separate factions--OSSA, JPL, Ames,
Goddard and Langley. An examination of Homan's model (figure VIII-2)
would have given indications that the PWG exercise would result in
failure in this instance. For exampie, the following elements can
ue noted :
I. The Job D_sign vas not clear. Was it a scientific Job, an
instrument Job, or an engineering Job? If all three, the
time was too constrained to meet the objective.
2. The Physical Conditions were such thst group sentiments
could not develop--a large conference room vlth the various
camps grouped together. In addition, the number of people
vere excessive--ty_ieally, six from 088A, three from Ames,
four from Goddard, five from JPL, and one frcl LIn_ey_ it
was not unusual for over 30 people to _ in attendance
includin6 experimenters.
3. The Social Environment vas non-existent. The indtvidt_l
members, except for their ovn Stoup, met only in the
conference r_om.
!
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h. In External _ewards and Punishments, the Center representa-
tives, with the possible exception of JPL, were not beholden
to OSSA but _rere dependent upon their own Center. In
addition, OSSA managed the meetings in an authoritarian
manner--with OSSA as a self designated leader; however, it
is doubtful that any management behavior could have succeeded
under the circumstances.
For an effort similar to the PWG to succeed, careful planning is
essential. It is suggested that the following elements be considered:
I. Breaking up the group into t,ams
(a) a scientific team to define the objectives
(b) an instrument team to define the instruments
(c) an engineering team to define the hardware and its
development
2. Allowing each team to select its leader and do the Job _n
its own way with OSSA staying in the background.
3. Keeping the teams together for a sufficient period of time
to dev_lop group sentiments--perhaps, a "retreat" type of
work shop.
4
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lCHAPTER X
TECHNICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGP_TION, THE VIKING YEARS
Summar_
This chapter examines the means by which NASA "put it all
to_ether" to culminate all the previous work and define a Mars l_n_ing
project. T_p_ wil_ nclude the definition ,:,_objectives mutdally
satisfactory to the technical and administrative staffs, the technical
and administrative efforts performed to obtain the necessary data for
a decision, and the Viking decision. An analytical model will be
presented to examine the "pay-off" associated with the various mission
options and its correlation with the final decision will be analyzed.
5
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Th,e Uniting of Technical and Administrative Objectives
This section will examine how and why the technical and adminis-
• trative factions became united in an approach to defining the Mars
landing project. As will be recalled, OSSA requested assistance in
defining a more "modest" Mars mission after the cancellation and
Langley responded with full cooperation.
The Technical Staff's Role
The FVSD staff, given the freedom to pursue its concepts
independent of Langley's mainline effort, derived a new model for
the entire system, launch to landing, which utilized a new launch
vehicle, the Titan/Centaur, in conjunction with the Robert's paradigm
t
for the entry and landing mode. This was Langley's first attempt at
solving the entire system mission puzzle; the solution was achieved
within three months and documented as Langley Working Paper 547,
"Study of Titan III F/Centaur's Capability to Carry _t a 'Voyager
Type' Mission," Snow, McNulty, Carmines, and Falk. Again, a forum
was arranged by Mr. Kilgore and Langley management where the findings
of this small group could be presented directly to OSJA personnel by
the technical staff personnel almost as Houbolt phrased it, in his
case, "as a voice in the wilderness." The FVSD staff was able to
make this contribution Ln such an effective manner because of the
following elements:
(i) a highly motivated small team experienced in the technology.
L
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FVSD staff had experience with the total system concept
through studies of Venus missions.
(2) a well defined puzzle--largest possible mission without
Saturn V.
(3) effective leadership by Mr. Kilgore, FVSD Division Chief,
who filled the group's management role left void by Dr.
Robert's departure.
Mr. Martin's technical staff, hindered by an ill-defined puzzle
and too many participants, were working effectively in sub-system
areas and demonstrating their ability to transfer their Lunar Orbiter
technology to Mars applications. Their study of broader missions
carried out with total dedication indicated their readiness to assume
[
and cmrry out any project responsibility assigned to L_ngley.
_rManagement's Role
For the first time in the Mars program Langley management entered
! into a new policy of full cooperation with Headquarters on the
definition of a more "modest" mission. A large staff was assigned by
the Director to york on the problem and channels were furnished to
Mr. Martin and Mr. Kilgore to present findings to OSSA. The evidence
indicateK1 that Langley management believed that a more "modest"
mission vould be vithin Langley's resources and mode of operation.
Thus, the objectives of NASA management and Washington Headquarters
coincided on the need to define and carry out a national Y.a_s landing
project.
l
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The Union of Washington Headquarters and Langley
Two months after FVSD's presentation to 0SSA, OSSA announced that
Langley would be manager of a comprehensive contractual study effort
of various mission options to Mars with all data to be obtained in
about ten months. Some general OSSA guidelines, detailed in the
Narrative, were included but :_earabsolute technical responsibility
was given to Langley on procurements and mode of operation. This
action negated any competition between Centers and allowed the technical
work to proceed wlthoat interruption or change _n guidelines and, thus,
obtain the necessary technical data. It further" freed Headquarters
from the technical area so it could concentrate on the political
aspects--obtsining support from the scientific community, Bureau of the
Budget, and Congress. Thus, responsibilities were set so that
administrative and technical studies could proceed in a rational,
methodical manner toward an end point.
Langley took +he necessary steps to fulfill its responsibilities.
Langley management gave full support to the project. It created a
Viking Project Office under James Martin reporting at the Director
level and supported the office in its dealings with Headquarters and
in contractual procurements (studies and mission hardware). The
Viking Project Office coordinated the mission planning by contracting
various mission option studies to industry, working with JPL on
spacecraft definition, and serving as a hub in data transmission to
Headquarters. FVSD's technical staff .erred as a technical consultant
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to the Viking Pro lect Office and continued to study and evaluate the
various mission mode options. The results oP its independent in-house
studies on the r_lative merits of the options ware documented and
forwarded to the Project Office for consideration.
Headquarters, meanwhile, conducted a study of the political
environment--obtaining and developing support from the scientific
community, Bureau of the Budget, and Congress. Thus, near the end of
1968, all the pieces of the puzzle--technlcal and administratlve--had
been collected so as to determine a fit. It was the first time in the
Mars program that there was technical and administrative agreement on
the definition (not the solution as yet) of the puzzle.
The main determinants in obtaining sufficient data for the mission
solution (answer to the puzzle) are Judged to be:
(1) OSSA assigning full technical responsibility to one Center
under broad guidelines which remain firm throughout the data
collection period.
(2) Langley's management's full political support to 08SA, i.e.,
common objectives.
(3) The Viking Office's dedicated effort to obtain the technical
data, i.e., team self motivated.
(4) OSSA emphasizin_ obtaining political support, i.e. getting
a good sense of the political environment.
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The Vikin_ Decision
Once the pieces had been assembled, an innovative concept was used
to assure that the technical data was communicated correctly to the
decision makers. This concept was the two week meeting described in-
depth in the Narrative, where various mission _.ternatives were
detailed by contractors and NASA personnel. These options can be
?
examined analyticall) by using a "utility" concept in a decision
tree format to illustrate the problem which _;as facing NASA management.
Fi_e X-1 defines the ma_r options presented to NASA management
at the summary meeting. The lander options are based primarily on
the choice of launch vehicle. The smaller Titan IIIC vehicle will
allow either an orbiting spacecraft vlth a 200 pound atmospheric
probe or a flyby spacecraft with a ii00 pound direct entry lander.
The Titan/Centaur vehicle has sufficient capability to allow an
orbiting spacecraft with a 1500 pound out of orbit lander. Costs
s
for the various elements, total mission costs, and the mission 11
science capability are also shown on the figure. It should be noted
that option 3 (Titan IIIC, flyby spacecraft, and direct entry hard
lander) most closely approximates the OSSA guidelines for cost
and mission objectives.
An analytical procedure will now be developed to obtain a
relative utility value per cost unit for the various options. It is
first necessary to subjectively assign utility (Ui) to the scientific
data obtainable for the various option missions. The following utility
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values are assigned:
UI = I001
U2 = 500
U3 = 500
Uh = 2000
U5 = 2000
The rationale for these assignments is as follows:
The science for option 1 is only atmospheric data. This data is
already known to some extent from indirect measurements from Earth
and from orbiting spacecraft and the new data would only increase the
accuracy and confidence level. In addition, it is felt that the
mlsslonwould not be considered worthwhile by the general public. The
value of 100 is assigned as a baseline messure.
The science for options 2 and 3 would include landed data but
would be limited by the one day operation of the batteries. The
total communication capability could be taken up by the transmission
of a panoramic TV picture of the M_Iti _ planet_ in any event, the
time would be too limited to allow, for example, sophisticated
instruments to take soil samples, analyze the sample, and transmit
the data to Earth. The pictures of the Mars surface might well
interest the general public in addition to providin_ the scientists
with new data to analyze. A factor of 5 was applied to the U1
baseline value.
The science for options h and 5 contains TV pictures in addition
to sophisticated measurements taken on the Martian surface for an
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information fol-scientists to Judge whether conditions are favorable
on Mars to allow for any lifeforms to exist. The utility value for
this data package was estimated to be four times that of the short
landed mission.
The corresponding estimated required fundin_ (¥i) in millions of
dollars for the mission options are as follows:
FI - $225
F2= $365
F3 " $325
Fh--$615
F5 ffi$530
Lander and orbiter costs are taken from Viking Project Office
document entitled "Discussion of Mars '73 Mission Baseline and
Alternatives" dated FebruAry 12, 1968. Launch vehicle costs are
_aken from General Electric Corporation's final report "Direct versus
Orbital _atry for Mars Mission" dated A_st I, 1968.
In order to develop the utility value per cost unit, it is
necessary that probabilities be assigned for each mission option.
These prohabilities are shorn on figure VI-3 and their rationale is
discussed below:
J
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Ai: launch vehicles
Titan IIIC is proven launch vehicle; p = 0.98. Titan/Centaur
mating does not appear to be problem and, in addition, will be
flight tested prior to Mars' launch; p = 0.95.
Bi: spacecraft
Mariner orbiters have been successfully demonstrated; p = 0.93.
Fly-by spacecraft would have slightly better reliability since
orbit propulsion burn would not be required; p - 0.95.
Ci: landers or pro'e
Probe mission from out of orbit would be the simplest mission.
Low ballistic number and low entry angle would minimize leads
and allow use of subsonic parachute; p = 0.90.
Direct entry soft lander would be the hardest mission. High
entry angle would challenge the terminal stage technology to
safely effect a landing; p = 0.50.
Direct entry hard lander would have similar entry loading and
deceleration problems but could De designed to take high
impact loading; p = 0.75.
Soft lander out of orbit is well ,mderstood but environment is
extremely demanding on terminel stage design; p • 0.8.
Hard lander out of OrbAt presents less demands on tel_Inal
entry technology but technology is not understood on how to
orient the impact ball at the landing, remove impact attenuation
material from ball, open ball, and deploy instruments; p • 0.75.
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•he expected utility per million dollars for each option can be
expressed as:
<_-I El> = _-i Ei P(OilEi) (Equation X-l)
where
0i = successful mission
Ei = evilence
and P(Oi[E i) : p(A i Bi Ci[E i)
where
Ai = successful launch vehicle
Bi : successful spacecraft
Ci = successful probe or lander
Fi - funding required in millions of dollars
expanding by Bayes Equation
p(OilE i) : p(CilA i Bi EI)P(A i BilEi)
: p(CilA i Bi Ei)P(Bi[A i Ei)P(Ai[E i)
(Equation X-2)
The above equation could be expressed in the following maam_r:
"The probability of • successful mi•aion is equal to probabilSt$
of • successful landing (given a successful launch and s_ace-
craft) multiplied _y the probability of • successful sp•cecr•f¢ -
(given • _uccessfYul launch) multiplied by the probability of •
succeslful launch."
9'
J.
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Equation k- _ can now be substituted into equation >1- i to express the
expected utility per million dollars as:
<_ Ei>z _ _i p(A_IEi)p(BilAEi)p(cilh BiEi) (EquationX-3)
The elements of the above equation are quantified on figure X-I and
are shown in matrix form cn figure i(-2 together with the solution
for the expected utility per million dollars for each option.
An analysis of the results on figure X-2 reveals two pertinent
_. points :
i. the expected utility value per million dollars is much
greater for landers out of orbit with the hard lander
showing slightly greater utility.
2. the probability of successful miscion for a soft lander
out of orbit is 0.71.
A discussion of these two points is in order. On the hard versus
soft lander option, it is acknowledged that the hard lander has the
higher "mean" in a statistical sense. However, as mentioned '.,
previously, the hard lander data (technology) is based on less know-
ledge. It is, therefore, concluded that the result is less definite
and its variance, in all likllhood would be much greater.
On item 2, it must be remembered that two independent launches
are planned. Th_, the probability of the success of a% least one
, mission can be calculated _n the followin6 manner to be Lpproxlmately "
n
i
4". L
........ •_ ...... -....... L,-- 4 '
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Let p(A+B) = i - p(ab)
where
A = success in first mission
B = success in secot.dmission
A+B = A and/or B
a,b = denial of A,B (failure in mission)
ab = a and b
thus
p(a) = i - p(A) = 1 - 0.71 = 0.29
p(b) = 1 - p(B) = 1 - 0.71 = 0.29
p(ab) = (0.29)2 = 0.084
p(A+B) = 1 - p(ab)
= 1 - 0.084 = 0.916
The selection of mlssfon option e_n now be understood. For
maximum u.ili'Lj per million dollars, !anders out of orbit are a clear
winner. The question becomes one of cost. Will Congress approve the
more ambitious program? NASA management believed it would and selected
option 4 at an estimated cost of about 600 million dollars. The select-
ion of the soft lander in lleu of the less expensive bard lander also
appears reasonable based on the small differences in utility and the
larger difference in state-of-the-art of the technology.
The Viking model (paradi_) had now been established and would
the definition of the design puzzl._s. This Viking paradigm
would be made up of the FYSD system concept and incorporate the Roberts' _
paradigm for entry and landing. _
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That OSSA had made a clear reading of the political environment was
substs_tiated subsequently by Congressional approval of the project.
Viking is scheduled for launch the summer of 1975 under Langley manage-
ment.
In analyzing the reasons for the final success of translating con-
cepts into models for actual hardware application, it is found that a
fourth factor is essential in addition to the three factors previously
defined. These t_=re_ items are:
I. the accuracy of the technology base--evide_ced by the accumula-
tion of data.
2. the availability of forums--the two week in-depth meeting.
3. perseverance--by the FVSD staff to generate mocle3s and by the
Viking Project Office to keep the project alive throu6h constant
technical and administrative efforts.
, However, while these three items may be c,ufficient to establish a
paradigm, they are not sufficient to allow the normal science to proceed
under the paradigm. For work to proceed, the following determinant
must be present:
h. the coincidence of technical and administrative objectives.
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CO_CLuSI01'_S_
Summary
Technical
The technic,._l staff made major contributions in the definition
of the Mars landing p:'r,,!ectleading to Langley Research Center being
assigned project managership. The I_laJorcontrib_:tlons in the
engineerin& systex::s area can be categorized as:
(!) The definition _'f the lander missi_n m_,J as soft lander
out of orbit using a parachute for both removal of the
lander from the heat shield and :'or a transition aerodynamic
deceleration mode prior to retro i£:nition ['or landing.
(LWP 326, Appendix IV-B). _{hortly after Langley's
recommendation, Langley w_s ns/ned Capsule l'us System (the
I, • I!
julcy morsel} Manage," for Voyage_'.
f2) The recommendatic, n that the Titan/Centaur launch vehicle be
used to carry out a more "modest" mission than Voyager but
utilizing the previous Voyager mission mode (LWP 5h7,
Appendix V-D). This is the definition of the present Viking
project scheduled for launch in 1975 under Langley's
managership. ,,
The system analyses work carried out in the studies above were
expressed in the formal systems concepts formats of block al--gram _,
' 2_8
L
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and mathematical model _'lowchart form in Chapters IV and V; these
concepts are Judged viable and useful for planning, reviewing and
documenting the work fo- these type studies.
The theories of Kuhn regarding scientific advances were found
appropriate in explaining how the techninp.l staff's concepts became
the governing models for Viking and how major contributions affectir_
policy can and are often made from the lower technical levels.
The performance of the technical staff in carrying out its
study effort was Judged outstanding by Langley management. A formal
systems analysis utilizing Homan's work Group Behavior Model
(Chapter VIII) revealed that the staff's productivity, satisfaction,
and individual development were compatible with theory and that
Homan's model is a valuable concept for analyzing group behavior in
an aerospace group. It is Judged that a maln reason for the staff's
performance was its high degree of independence leading to self
motivation. This Judgment is substantiated, to some degree, by a
recent NASA sponsored study which attempted to determine the main
reason for NASA's success in space projects. Th_ thors hypothesized
that the determinant was the personal skills, characteristics, and
management style of the project manager. Their intensive study of
numerous managers resulted in no eorrelation_ the hypothesis was
Judged false and the authors concluded that a main element was
"teams whose aembers were highly committed to the project and who
derived @Teat satisfaction from selflessly contributing to the team's
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purpose...organizational lines and personal ambitions were submerged
,,Iin a common effort.
Administrative
The administrative system of Langley (research oriented with
emphasis on independent studies by the technical staff as discussed
in depth in Chapter I and analyzed as a political system in Chapter
VIIi) _rovided the proper enviroi_ment for the technical staff to
carry out its studies. In addition, Langley's administrative system
supported the in-house parachute technology development and provided
mechanisms for transmitting the technical staff's findings to
Washir_ton Headquarters as detailed several times in the preceding
chapters. Finally, Langley agreed to take the responsibility
for the mission flight hardware when it was apparent that the exper-
tise resided at Langley. The system analysis revealed that Langley's
administrative system was stable and able to "persist" through
perturbations to its normal research mode; its efficiency can be
Judged by its staff's major contribut'Lons to Mercury, Apollo, and
Vikirg.
Headquarter's decision making in the planetary pro6rams during
the 1960's was made difficult by the lack o_ his_,orical funding data
and by external forces acting on NASA. Planetar_ programs were low
priority whe n compared to Apollo. While it Ms believed that Mars
1NASA SP-32h, Project Management in NASA-..the System and the Men;
Chapman, Pontious, and Barnes; National Academy of Public Administra-
: tion, p. 120.
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investigations would eventually supplant Apollo as NASA's prime
program, there wasn't sufficient net funding after Apollo in the mid
1960's available to allow a gradual systematic buildup of fly-by
spacecraft, orbiters, probes, and landers to a large Apollo-type
program. The external forces--length of the Vietnam war, urban
crises, environmental problems, general downgrading of technology and
cpace investigutions--were difficult, if not impossible, to prognos-
ticate correctly. Thus, Headquarters decisions on mission types
were tactical rather than strategic. As would be expected, decisions
arrived at from a technical base (inputs from the Centers) were more
often correct than those made unilaterally (the switch to the Saturn
V). The probability of the Saturn V decision culminating in a
successful mission was investigated by use of Bayesian statistics in
Chapter IX; the analysis indicated that funding, technology, and
management problems combined so that the decision had approximately only
a 30% probability of resulting in a successful mission. The conclu-
sion is drawn that the decision was made prematurely and without
sufficient technical analysis. Conversely, the two week Joint meeting
at Langley to arrive at Vikin8 definition was a innovative concept
which led to a rational decision. The technolo_ base, in this case,
was e_tensive; the mission options had been exemine_ in depth as
described in the narrative and documented in the Appendix. A systems
study using block dla6rem concepts was developed in Chapter V to
show the applicabillty of the method _o define the technical trade-
offs among competi_ options. Fur%he_ a decision tree analysis,
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ircluding the concept of a utility function, was generate_ in
Chapter X co determine the option with the optim'_mbenefits; the
results of analysis substantiated the a_ministrative decision. In
the final Judgment, it must be considered that despite Headquarter's
decisions being overturned by events causing the study to proceed
on some lost time tangents, the length of time from _tudy initiation
to hardware commitment was not exorbitant for a complex project and,
at the same time, the enlarged technology base which resulted was
useful in the final winnowing process among mission alternatives.
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Concluding RemarKs
Considering the exogeneous forces acting on NASA during this period,
it is concluded that the definition and commitment to a Mars landing
program was carried out in a most creditable manner. As with the Apollo
and Mercury, early definitions which followed similar paths, the tech-
nical and administrative procedures utilized should serve as a general
pattern for future similar projects. The main ingredients deemed
essential are:
I. A small indepeudent, self motivated technical staff to provide
the technological base.
2. An administrative management which will (a) consult with the
technical staff to get the essential input, (bl provide broad
guidelines but not direction, (c) utilize the data for long
range, overall NASA planning, and (d) carry out the necessary
interfacing with OMB and the Cougress.
It is also concluded that the problem of obtaining a cooperative
effort amongst the centers is a naJor one requiring much planning and,
perhaps, further research. It has been shown, by the Mars Probe Working
Group experiment, that cooperation cannot be edicted. The Voyager
Saturn V project organization planning by 06SA offered eome promise of
obtaining the necessary cooperation via an Inter-center project manage-
ment committee. However, the project was cancelled before it could be
determined if the complex organiTational method would be successful in
the long term.
k .
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UNITED STATES GOV_,RNMF.N'F
Memorandum ,.o,,.,
TO : kesearch godels and Facilities Division DATK; Hay 9_ 1969
FliBht Vehicles and Systems Division
WaOM : Deputy Chief, F.ngineerir. o end Technical Servtc_s
SUSJ_CT: Duties of • Technical Project Engineer (TPE) a',d relstlonshlp to E&TS
line msnogement
The duties and responsibilities of the Technical Project Er.81neer have not
changed bignifica.Lly since the conception of the TFE system in 1962, TI£'a
will be appointed by the cognizant _ivisfon chief, k'suggtited ruideline co be
used In determl_ing which Jobs require s TPE mrs those Jobs in_Lvlns t,,o or
more engineering sections with relatively complex interfaces or m_Itiple
desclplincs. IroJect Ensine-rs shall be used for the remainder of ansinee_-
in S Jobs lnvolvin_ essentisl!y one snslneering section with no complex inter-
faces across section or division l_nei. Unde= the E&TS philosophy of
engineering management, it is essential that the _PE act and operate _s the
Project H_nsger within E&TS for his psrticfilar Joo asstcnment. He i8 the
one man in E&T$ with total reipnnsibillty for cost, schedule, and pertor_nce.
It is felt that the TI_ and his line supervisors should understand this
responsibility and work toward seeing that it is carried out. In a_der to
describe the TPE's authority to meet this broad responsibility requires m_
underit_ndlng of t_e Vertical and Horizontal 0reanimation concept with which
we operate. The Vertical Organization is the line organization (dlvJsic_,
branch, section). The Horizontal Organization is the f_mctional or_eni_atlon
for one project headed by the TPE. Personnel co_prisin| the functional p_o-
Jest o_enizstion s_ay be located in several sections, however they must be
reiponsiv_ to the TI_ and his overall project schedule and technical require-
ments. This 'in no way relieves tfe line supervisors of their rdipo_sibiltty
for e,_i_n_nt and review of work _f their personnel. If it is necessary
to reassisn or interrupt the work on a project in _ny section, the TFE
should be notified and alternate _rrensements made to either enable him to
hold schedule o_ to_ke schedule ehan_es ratio:_illy.
AI_ secants of the Z&TS o_$an/sat|onmuet Reap the TPK t_tmlly informed on
_tters re2sted to his project. Similarly, the TPE must disseminate info_-
_tion to those parts o_ the line orsaniret',on involved in hie project.
Duties, responsibilities end reletioc_hip_ ere wore ep_cificslly detailed
in the s_tschlsnt.
m - h.
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T_C_ICAL PROJECT ENGINEEI_
1. Ti_ - The engineer aesiE_ed prime responsibility for th, ETa support
of an l_C project,
2. TPE will Oe epp ,.nted by the En£1neerin| Division Office havln| lead
responsibility.
3. The TPE 11 the single point of contact for all'enalneerln| and technical
service aspects of the project and is responsible _r control at associated
costs, qchedules, and technical perfor_nce until released by the appointin$
division o{flca.
4. In cerrylng out this as_isnmcn_, the Tt_ is responsible for tnsurlng
aatlsfac_.ory perfor=ance.o_ the fol;owinl; function_,:
a. Establishing the technical a_proach fro,J the research requirements
b. Preparation and update of cost estimates and a11ocatlona
c. Preparation and update of project schedules ', .
-_. Identifying required engineering she technlcsl service support
e. Functional organization of an appropriate ETS team
f. _re_ratlon of any required specifications, york 8tatawnts or
relented _ocuments
g. Coordination of al_ orga, izatlonal interfaces
h. Information exchange throughout the project usln$ project umuoa,
smetln_s or other approprlat_ tech,_Inues
i. Continuing revl_.vs of technical performance
J. Scheduling of a,_d ETS presentations at r4viavs necessary under the
LItC review syste_
k, Coordinatlml and Justification of project travI_
i. Coordination an. _u-tificetion of project o_trt_
_,_ Keeping the research project engineers lnforued on all aspects of
r.. Keeping i _ediste supervisors informed of overall proJe¢_ itatl_J
$. Ln executing these functions, the Ti_ should deal directly vith any appropriate
level of line management necessary to obtain required support or seek solutions to
probleu aL-aas. It is of particular lu_ortanca that" _he TTE identify critical
probleu areas to the line uanaGers at the earliest practical date as that
coordinated action can be initiated to obtain appropriate resolution.
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6. Appointment of a TPE in no way _elteves engineering 11ne supervisors of
full ad_Inlstrat_ve and technical responsibility for project activities wlthln
their organizational element. Specifically they will:
a. Advise the TPE in their area of competence
b. Nhen the scope of.the work _erlts, appoint • section project
engineer to assist the TPE
c. Conduct technical reviews of the project uork performed in
their organization
d. Consult with the TFE on any decisions or actions wh.i_nvill
impact the project
7. The TPE will utilize full ETS capability to achieve project goals. He
should consult wlth the Technical Services Division supe_vlsors concerning the
_.,algnment of lead technician support In'areas where si_flcant fabrication
ot operational technician effort is i_volved. Y
NMmmsmmm'"-- .................... _ - -'_'---_m
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1.0 I_rI_ODUCTION
I.I _ckzround
During the next decade, NASA's Planetary Exploration may need an
unmanned capsule to probe the Martian atmosphere and to _ on the surface of
Mars. This probe/lander capsule could be transported to the lrf¢inlty oi Mars
by a bus vhtch may also serve as a communication ]_l_nk v_th Earth. This probe/
lander could be used to obtain detailed information on th_ F_rt_ut atmosphere
(tmasmuch as the design of any subsequent spacecraft del_nds on this informs-
tion) and could additionally acquire sufficient information on surface eond_-
tions to allow the formulation of subsequent definitive experiments to deter-
mine the nature of possible blolo£1cal life and the surface env4ronment.
Moreover, the design of the probe/lander should allow for grovth in veight into
subsequent more elaborate landers while retednir_ _ of the basic features.
The present sterilization requirements for m vehicle landing on the
)k_tian surface v_ll produce unique hardvare problems. The ster_lAzation
f
procedures established to solve these problemB should set the pattern for
subsequent landers In the rrog:am,
The development and qmallflcatlon of a sterne probe/lander must be
acecwplished in such a manner as to provide a maximt_ assurance of mission
success. In addltlon to a comprehensive pro_ of c_mponent and system quali-
fication tests in _round-based faeilttles_ a series of t"Aght tests in the
earth's atmosphere ma_ be necessary to assure oatlsf&otory operation of a]_l
nystemx and to q_ty • prototype for mission use.
1.2 Objectives
The objectives of thls stmd_ contract are to define a nonlittl_
probe/lands_ t its $rovth potenti_ for mows e_borLte lm _r m.t|ilonm_ the
k ,
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procedures required to aeeure its sterilization, and the extent and value of a
flight test.program in the earth's atmosphere as a means of developing and
qualifying a sterile probe/landcr (includi_ electrical, mecl_mieal, and
commundcat_on interfaces _riththe bus) for planetary missions. This stud_ rill
be performea in sufficient depth to determine the most suitable approach, the
coacep'ual design, ana the development plan.
2.0 SCOPE
The contractor shall accomplish the necessary engineering investigations,
analyses, studies, detailed conceptual design and planning required to accomp-
lish the tasks described in 4.0, Contractorls Tasks, consistent vith the
restra. _ ts presented in 3.0, Guidelines. The tasks rill be divided into tvo
general l_rts as follovs:
Part I rill include comparative studies of the probe/lander and the defini-
tion of the impact of the probe/lander require_ents on the bus design. It rill
aAso include studies of sterilization, ground test procedures, the feasibility
of • flight test program in the earth's atmosphere •s • _ of developing
and qualifying • ,terile probe/land_' for missic_ use_ an_ the £rovth po+_ntial
of the probe/la_l_r for more elaborate mlsslous. Part I viU further include
a preliminary development pro_a_ plan and a_ costs associated vith quAlii_i_
a probe/lander prototype.
Part IX _ incl_le optimizatzon of the sele_ed oysteme tt_etber vith a
detailed coaceptu_ design an_ detailed q_LlAfication procedures. Part IX vi_&
include the prepe_ti(_ o _ • cc_rehen_lve _ for the productl_
oterl_:_tion, and q_fAcatlon of the selected _ystm for aisaioa _e.
This st_d_ eontre_or Is not resl_,_lble for the bus _eai_n vithin the
occ_, of this _tud_. It t_ e_tieil_ted that other _ stt_ eont_s
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be proceeding concurrently to define the bus and overall mission profile con-
cepts; the NASA will keep tne contractor aypr_sed of information dcveXoped
_herein so as to assure that the overall results will be coml_tible.
3.0 OUIDELINES •
The technical guidelines under which the tankJ outlined herein sha/.l be
accomplished are as follows:
2.1 Mission Profiles end Anal_ses
T
(a) The mlsslon profile of the probe/lander shall be consistent with
the sampling times required for experiments and the co_Anication time required
to transmit data.
(b) The Saturn Y.B/Centaur ahall be asaumed to be the launch vehicle
for the bus-probe/lander combination.
(c) The probe/lander _i_ll be separated fr,_ the bus _n the Mars
approach path. Cons£deration shall be given to both fl_-by and orbitln8 bus
nodes.
(d) A c_plete DS_F network sha/.l be aJsumed to be a_ilable.
(e) _ Mars model atmospheres are delineated in I&ASATN D-2_
3.2 _ua
The bum _¥ serve u a rela_ station for transitttal of probe/lander
data to e_rth. The bus will net be sterile.
).) PTobe/Ian_er
>
(s) _oastderatlon abe// be .1yen In t_e GesL_n of the exte_ ahell
to possible future lander mAn,one wherein the same external structure _ be
wed in co, unction w4_th internal po_l_ whose welghte will _y %o • mmxi_m
_omalstent with the capability of the _turn lB/Centau_.
' k
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(b) Three concepts shall serve as a basis of study end comparison:
(I) Tension shell
(2) Apollo shape
()) Large angle blunted cone
Information on the above configurations consisting of (a) external coordinates.
nondimensionalized and (b) force and moment coefficients will be given to the
contractor for use during this study.
(¢) (I) The experiments a,ld Instrumentation to be carried on the
probe/lander shall be defined In the detail and scope specified by this
• docu_nt
(2) The instrumentation shall include scientific instrumen-
tation and engineering Instrumentation to monitor the operating status of the
probe/lander sub.systems, structure and heat shield throughout the mission.
()) Three scientific payloads shall be ce.pered for th• 1971
mission in Part Z of the study and one selected for more detailed design
during Part ZZ. One advanced payload for th'_ 1973 mission and one for the 1975
opportunity shall be studied during Part ! to detemine their effect on th•
growth potential of the 1971 probe/lander shell to later missions. Thes_ two
i_yloads shell be designed in greater detail during Part II.
(;_) The three payloads for t_;a 1971 opportunity ere defined as
follows:
Payload Concept No. I - AI I recommended Instruments ar•
• vQllebl• or well •long in dev•lo_*_ent.
Payload Concept No. 2 - Recofmended |nstrmmnts ere
iv•llabl• or My b_ _avlloped with • minim_ effort.
r
s
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Payload Concept No. 3 - Heasurement technique Is scientifi-
cally sound but Instrumentation may not presently exist. However, there musL
be a reasonable assurance of its availability for the 1971 mission.
(5) The f_,lowing measurements and instruments shall be con-
sidered as candidate items in the payload conceots, but the candidates shall
qot be restricted only to th:s list.
Measurement _uqqested Instrument
Density Accelerometer
X-Ray Backscatter
Altitude Radar Altimeter
Composition Hess Spectrometer (GSFC)
Trapped Radiation Radiation detector
Ionosphere (not selected)
Pressure Electrical transducer
Temperature Resistance Thermc_eter
$_rface Roughness Radar Altimeter
Surface Hardness Penetrometer (LRC)
Surface Winds Hot Wire Anemometer
Pressure Probe
Soil Composition Alpha Scatter
Dust Particles Hicrophone
Solar Constent Solar Cells
(6) The determination of the conceptual peyloads sha!l be
eccompl|ehed through e serJ_s of trade-Qff studies v_lch should include such
factors el: scientific merit, technicel feasibility, performence mergins.
m
M_ ....
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availability, physical characteristics, int_r_ace problems, sterilizabllity,
and rel|abillty.
(7) The primary mission of the Frobe/lander in _he 1971 oppor-
tunity is to obtain detai_ed information on the Hartian atmosphere and to
obtain such information on surface conditions which w|ll permit formulation of
definitive surface experiments to he ca;ried out on later missions. The prime
lending target is Syrtus Hajor unless mission and systems analyses dur!ng the
study reveal this landing site to be toc, technzcally difficul_ to achieve
(8) The missions Ln 1973 and 1975 should utilize payloads of
expended performance capability including TV and bi_lo_ical =xperiments. Capa-
bility should be restricted to that associated with a stationary observatory.
Hob ile experiments should be considered beyond the scope of the 1973 and 1975
missions.
(9) |n the evaluation of instruments, experiments and patloed
concepts _11 sources of date shall be explored to provide the most authorita-
tive results _nd recommendations, including the literature, source agencies,
anq" internal Avco sources.
(d) The probe/lieder shall be designed so that subsonic speeds are
achieved ot en altitude of et least 15,000 feet above the surface.
(e) The primary deceleration sys:em shall consist of subsonic para-
chute(s); the subsonic parochute(s) shall be designed to furnish sufficient
dwell tine in the atmosphere, end provide a terminal velocity (assuming no
surfoc@ _lnds) not exceeding _0 feet per second.
{f) The surface of Mars shall be assumed sufficiently dense to
|upFort in |nstru_nt peclulge. The following assumptions shell be used for
design of the lml_eCt attenuation syste.n:
r
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(I) Surface shall be constdeced nonyieldin 9.
(2) Maximumhorizontal velocity at impact shall be taken as
I00 feet per second end the peckage shall be arrested by • nonyielding vertical
surfoce.
(g) Heximum tending deceleratfnn shall not exceed I000 earth g's.
i
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._._ Sterillz_t ton
(a) Components shall be capable of satisfactory operation after
three cycler,of heatln_ in a dry atmosphere to a temperature of i_9 ° C for
hours.
(b) Subassembly surface deoontamAnutlon may be aeeomplishe_ using
ethylene oxide.
(c) Terminal sterilization ",_the probe/lander shrillconsist of
heatlng in a dry atmosphere to a temperat,ire of 139° C for 2_ hours.
(d) The probability of _llovi,_ga viable organism to exist on the
payl_d at a_y time subsequent Lo term.lralcterlti'atlon shaJ_lbe less than
i in I0,000.
A carePully plan.ned qualification progr_:n _Ii be form,,_ated to
maximize the probability of mission success. Th_ prc,grsanLnall delineate
_ound envlr_'nmenta_tests and all required fl_g_,ttests in the earth's atmos-
l_e gxistin_ Government launch facilities sh_ll be utilized in the flight
testings. Yhe _uJliflcation program should be a1.m_.d%o_rd completely quail.
fy£_ the probe/l_er (including electrical, mechanical, _ eammnlcatic_n
interfaces _.th the bus). Selection of equipment and procedures shall cot-
sider the needs of future heavier internal l_yloada.
_.6 l_eliabillt_y
Prime and detailed consideration s_ll be given to the et'feets
sterilization, testing, _ iom4_ space flight time.on ._stem rellabllity.
X_d_erem_reliabil_cy shall be _Ou4_t in all design emeas throt_h the means of
_ni_am c_lexlty and re_nda_. Cc_eide_t_on shall be given to o]_i_z_.ng
_elAabllity in the design of probe/lander system.
k ,
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cOntractor shill t_rnlsh all npceeea_ matprtaJ% equLpment, peroonnelp
and faCiLLties to l_rf,_ all lnyesttptions, deetens, en&tneertn_, ar_ docu-
aent&tlon required to •¢c_x_llsh the tukJ described hereinj consistent vlth
the restraints _resented In section 2.0, G'_dellnes.
:_.1 Fart I is) Technle•l Stu_ A.reas
II..,:e scc_plish_nt of the taskap the technical ett_ _re_l ohL_
Include, •e • minlmma, the fo!low_ng:
&.l.l Ml_elun Profilee and Analyses
(1) The contractor ohell review the _rewlo"5 •p1_lle,bl, )_a "1
otud_ reports for minions thr_uKh 197_ and deterlaine critical yalue s £o_ the
fol_c_rl_ design lxmmetero:
• . Bus fly-by _ri_psie altitude
b. Bus •_to_i,. •!.,_roaeh_elocity
c. B_ orbiter TertapetS altitude
d. Ibm orbiter s_pele •ltitude
e. B_a orbiter _l-ht and size
i. _0_ -,1/,e
(2) T_e alas/oz, protllee of _he bu_ and lin_be/land_r
_pamtlon tJ the end of c(_mmlc_t1_ shill be defl._d.
lan_ sb_Ll _ defined.
(i_) A_e .i_U be ICe to m_i.wU_, t_ e=Smt of dl_t,_
OM_Md far v_lC_ Ila4en of fatlm'_ _ the$_r e_W.-Ir,o an /e, obe_Lllad_r
ea_len euceee_.
4
b_ .................
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! (i) The extent and makeup of the probe/lander data receiving,
storage, and retransmission systems to be incorporated in the bus shall be
defined.
L
' _2) The mechanical and electrical interfaces with the probe/
lander shall be defined.
(_) Means of assuring the aLlll%y of the bus to find and
track the probe/lander shall be defined.
t_.l.3 .Probe/Lander
(i) An optimum size and strength of the external structure
shall be determined to meet the requirements of the probe/lander and future
lander missions; considerat._n shall be given to the influence of each of the
following on _uturc lander missions: (a) _erminal guldance_ (b) lander separa-
tlon after orbit is obtained, and (c) establishment of model 2 atmosphere as
governing deslgn criteria. Graphs s_Lll be prepared of the relationships
between lander's total weight, its structural fraction, and size for the
vLrioua entry conditions to illustrate the trade-of Is associated with staz_ard-
; Izlng a slngle size mult_lssion vehAcle. Weights Of the struct_tral fractions
• (shell, thermal protection, propulsion units, ",'etardation, and impact attenua-
tion systems) shall be based on actual analyses except where the use of scal_ng
er:teria is established. As a partial fulfillment of the above, the contractor
sha_ _ecomplish the rolluwin_:
(a) Critice_ probe/_.ander aerodynamic loeds and heetin_
inputs I both convective and radistive, sbaJ-_ be ._etermined independent_7 for
the _e| of trajectories Lnd atmospheres urger consideration.
i
4
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(b) Item (a) •bore sh•ll be ,epeated to determine the
aerodynamic loads and heating inputs associated with utilizing the shell for
the lander missions. The penalty involved in using the overall aerodynamic
criticll loads In the probe/lander design shall be assessed.
(c) A material analysis and structural approach shell be
defined to result in • minimum weight structure to resist the combined critical
aerodynamic and _e•ting loads.
(d) Stress analysis, including thermal stresses, and
I_ight estimates shall be made for the external structure with its thermal
protection; additional thermal protection may be added to the basic shell for
the future lander missions. Theoretical aerodyn_ics shall be used where
experimental data •re not available. The shell shall be investis•ted for ell
anticipated loading conditions, including launch.
(2) The experiments end instrumentation to be carried on the
probe/lander shall be defined •s follows: '_
_a) A master list of possible scientific experiments
end associated instrument•lion shal! be compiled.
(b) [•ch scientific instrument in the n_lster list $_tll
be examined first to determine its development status and classified •s •
candidate for • payload concept, (desc, ibed in paragraph 3.3(c)(_)) in accord-
imce with its _evel_pment status.
(c) Each scientific instrument shall then be evaluated
in accordance with the cofq_lretlve criteria of paragraph 3.3(c)(6) end
rejected or •bsigned to one Or more payload concepts.
(d) The three p_/Ioed concepts shall be compared In
aecordence _ith the criteria of per•graph 3.3(c)(6) end one concept selected i*
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@$ the reference payload with approval of the Langley Research Center. The
selection of the payload concept shall be subject also to proper mating with
the reference _robe/lanoer concept and its subsystems.
(e) Scientific nxperiments and associated instruments
shall be formulated for application to advanced payloads for the 1973 and 1975
missions. Emphasis during this part of the study will be on the character-
istics of the payload which will affect the probe/lander and its subsystems.
The prime purpose shall be the definition of growth potential requirements for
the probe/lander shell.
(f) Comparison studies of the engineering instrumenta-
tion for the 1971 mission shall be made and a reference system selected, for
LRC review, which will provide an optimum tradeoff between the scope of status
monitor|ng and the impact of the instrumentation on probe/lander size. com-
plex|ty, data handling requirements and tel|ability.
(3) Determine the possible need for. and characteristics of,
Spinup and despin devices on the probe/lander.
(4) Determine motions of probe/lander during entry for design
_,,_ possible off-design conditions.
(5) The motions of the probe/lander after entry shell be 1_
t
dmtemined a.d considered In defining data transfer methods to the bus.
(6) Means of storln9 date obtained durln9 blackout _'or
subsequent trensmisslon shall be defined.
e
,
' II
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(7) A method of packaging all internal symtems _ min-
taln_ _nvironmental control throu6hout the mission s._all be def__ned.
(8) All propulsion units, including performance character-
: _tles I conflguratlonj and weight shall be defined.
: (9) 'iRe subsonlc parachute system shall be defined including:
_ (a) Mode of development.
(b) Analysis of ensuln_ motion of separated parts.
_'- (c) Trajectory time history.
(d) Parachute size and welght estimate of system.
(e) Pac_ methods.
(f) Stress analysis and load reactions including
d_mamle effects.
(g) The determination of system motions while
/ penetrating _C-foot-l_r-second gusts of 10-second duration 1_r_chu_e descent.
(10) Detailed studies sh_ll be made to define an impact
attenuation system which will permit acquisition and trans_,ission of data
after landing.
)
(AI) A c_.plete weight brea_own to e_nponent level shall
be lade.
(12) An anLl_sts shall be made to e_alunte the influence
performLnee of adding a super,_ntc parachute, deployed at a maximum Mach number
of 2.5, to the _le system.
_, k.l._ Qt_llflcation
(i} PlrOced_|j e_il_aent, and facilities ,hell be defined
in,win proper sterlll_ti_n of:
I
........ i
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_ (a) Components.
: (b) Subsystem aase_lies.
(e) Probe/lander throu._h manufacture, assembl_, handling,
test, and launch phases. Assay procedures shall be defined VheFeby tests can
. be _ade to establish levels of contamination throughout all phases from manu-
facture to launch. Critical stages in each phs_e at vh_eh assay procedures
:_ ShOUl£ be undertaken sha3_ be defined.
(2) Procedures, eq'" ,nt, _,A facilities sh_ be defined to
: ,rake _ use Of ground environmental testAns. Value of los8 t_e exposure
to v_eu_ conditions to verify satisfactory operation of components t subsystems,
and _stems shall be st._ied. Means of simulatin_ and evaluating radiation,
: there, and structural loads on cos_nents, subsystems, aM systems shall be
determlned.
(3) The contractor shall study the value and extent of flight
i tests in the earth's atmosphere in the development of subsystems and in the
; q_uxlil_leation of a probe/lander prototype. T_ajeetory and la,_uch dete£1s of
_ e6rth entry flight tests corresponding to Mar_ trajectories sl_l_ be identified
for both sealed and prototype configurati_ns insofar as environmenta_ conditions
¢oocerned. De_-ee of simAlitnde achievable with respect to loadln_s, sub-
r_ste_ operations, and component motions shs_l be determined. The feasibility
Of @heckin_ out. dttrin_ the l_4i_ht tests in the earth's atmosphere, the
eleet_iee£, meebs_ie_l_ and eommmAcatton interfaces with the bus shaA1 be
deterstnad.
(k) T_e l_roeedu_es established above, _.1._ (1), (2), ea_
(_)_ mhe3£ Include, to the _ extent prsntieable, p_,_risions spl_Aeable to
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future landers. The growth potential of these procedures iIAto a loglca_ and
overall qualification program shall be examined and assessed.
_.2 Part I (b) Contractor Recommended System and Preliminary Plan
_.2.1 S_.__em Coml_erison and I_fin.i.tion
Based on the results of task studies conducted in Part I (a),
the contractor shall make comparison studies of the relative merits of the
candidate probe/lander shapes and subsystems and she// define the cumplete
pl_be/lander system which he considers optimum to satisfy the mlssion(s)
requlrements. The various trade-ells shall be detailed in sufficient depth
sO that _ can make an independent evuluation and select the system for
detailed study in Part II. The contractor shall establish and document the
present develop=ent status of all suSsyste_ and components considered in the
trs4e-off studies.
_.2.2 Reliability Studies
Reliability shall be made an integrated major factor in all
delklsn are_ with reliability ensineeri_ data, studies, ans_sesj q_ntlta-
tlwe amLlyses_ and predictions bei_ used to enhance comparative studies and
deslins_ opti_zation of the eyste_ and subsystenmj and to provide contrlb-
utt_ data for the substantintion of conclusions and the conceptual design.
The factors of _ ccmplerlty and inherent reliability, redundancy,
n_btllty and elimination of potential sources of hu_n-induced failure, i
the effects of sterilization on parts and materials shall be given l_rttcu-
• 1_ _tderstton in Isxlltsln6 _lseton reliability. The effects of eterlllza-
" t_ _ the reli&blltty' of coaponontsj partop and materi_le utilised in the
destCn and _ f_ i_rc_i_ rel_bility within this c_mtr_lnt shall be
o
_ stw_d in detall_ tneludin_ reees_ch of published data and doc_ented test
i
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4ats. The contractor 8h_l perform such reliability stu_es, inclu_
_tmntltatiwe probab_ty ard_yse8, as necessary to establish relisbt_Lt¥
ohJecttves_ requtre_nts_ and _oels for the subsystems, eyste_s, and the
overall alsslon.
The contractor shall perform applicable pl_u_tng for
re_iablllty program actlv_tles to be utilized In an assumed follow-on detail
destKn and de_.lopment proKram , Including plannin_ for a_y critic a3 items which
nay require special emphasis _lth regard to develol_uent, testing, qualtfleatton_
or re_blllty demonstration testi_ in order to achieve the design reliability
, goals.
The contractor s_ submit as part,, of the final report a
separate dOc_ent containing the deta_.lm and results _f the reliability studies
" ana_se8 and predlctlonsj details of tht, stud_ of the effects of sterilization
on re34abt_ity and the proposed means for increasing the reliability and, as
@ seps_te section_ proposed reliability proKram activities. This does not
pa_clude the use of speckle reliability data in other doc_ent8 to support
J
the conceptut_ design presentation and conclusions.
_.2._ .Com_arl@on and I)e_lnltion of _uallflcatton Program
The contractor shall make a conpartson stud7 of qu_lf_catlon
procedures to dete_Lne their re3attwe nerlts and prec_lcabtllt¥ in _rder to
define an lnteKral _ualtflc_tlon procedure. The v_rlous trade-off8 shal_ be
ew_tod add the cce_tracto_ shill define a qukllf' c_tlon proKrsm In sufficient
deta_ so that NASA can select a qualification pro_re= for detailed 8tud_ in
Y_. Th_ e_tl_cto_ s_kll es_bltsh sad docent the present develolment
stat_ of all _va£1fle_tten l_'Oeedu.-ee considered.
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_,2,_ Problem Area Identlfic_tlon
During the perfor_nee of Part I of the contract, the eon-
tFaetor BIll1 uake a conttnut_ effort to search out and tdentlf_ a_ lon_
_" lead ttemB _nteh requlre accelerated development. _he results of this effort
_ be included in the Part I report.
_.2._ Prellmlna_ PlAn
The contractor shall submlt for _'K conslderatLon a prelim-
Inary plan v_lch shall lnulude schedule and costs for the fabrication and
i _iflcatlon of a probe/IAnder (£ncl_llng electrical, mechanical, and
e_._tcatlon interfaces vlth the bus) and any required G-_-e-. The plan m_
delineate the bardvare requlr_nte tncludtn_ a/1 test 1terns and the aamoclated
• e_t and schedule of e_nufacturtn_, sterilizing, _,rou_ testing, a_l flight
_ testing. The p/An sha31 be presented in sufficient detail ms NASA _n evaluJte
al_ _hases of the plan and designate a pr_ram plan to be studied in depth in ..
Part II.
k._ part TT (a) Fi_ Ana._sls and Conceptual Des.i_n
To provide u_ax_nce t_at the selected system _ meet _tn£on
e_ulre_ents, the co_tractor shal/ review and expand in depth the per*_tnent
: a_fses (perfoxwed in Part _) am resulted to perfom the conceptual d_sign.
T_e eo_traetor sb_ll prepare a detalled conceptua/ design for the
• ]m_e/landsr (tn_l_L_ electrical, mechanical, and c_anlettion interfaces
, _th t_e bum) and _sh a draft of component performance s_cifleations f_
• _eh detail speeiflcatio_ can be witten suitable for a posSibls fal£o_-on
$itiw _t. an use_bl7 da,avt.n_ of the pr_be/land_r st_ll b_
pee_ _e_Aalng the la_eraal _rr_agemnt, exterra_l ntr_cture, ecuponen_ ;
_M_e, e_-,o_-_l'_v/.t¥ leeatlon and _e_nts of ln_rtla. C_e_t_al _ :
j,
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drm_{ngs of the e_t|re ven!cle shall be orepared to illustrate (I) the mating
of launch vehicle, bus, prroe/lender, and shroud, end (2) arrangement of probe/
lender end bus within r',le ._hrGud. All Interfaces and separation mechanisms
relet|ve to the probe/lender shell be defined.
Each instrument of the payloed concept selected in Pert | es the
reference system shell be designed t_ t.,e detail end scope necessary to com-
pletely end authoritatively define lt_ criteria as listed in paragraph
)._(c)(6). Evaluation end design of each instru._ent end the tatel peyloed
shell be conducted in accordance with the procedures of paragraph ),](c)(9).
Cemponent performance specifications, from which detail specifications can be
written suitable for • j_osslble follow-on competitive procurem_,_t, shrill be
provided for eoch lnstrumer, t.
Each instrument and txperiment of the advanced payloads for 1973 end
197S shell be designed tn greater o,_.pth than the evaluation of Pert ! but not
In the detail of the Pert {! design of the 1971 payload. The primary purpose
I_|ll be I[o certify the Pert ! con_lusions relative to the |nterfece between the
advanced payloads end the probe/lander to Insure the growth potential of the
pro_/lender shel I. ,,
A detailed conceptual _ieslgn of the refe,_nce engineering Instrumen-
tation system shell be f_rmuleted _d_;_h will expend In depth the design studies
of paragraph 4.1.3(2)(f).
ti
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_' 4.4 Pert II (b) Probe/Lander Oevelop_nt Plan
4.4.1 General
Based on the preliminary plan selected by the NASA at the end
of Part |, the contractor shall prepare a complete develol_ent plan aimed at
febr|ceting and qual ifyin 9 the probe/lender (including electrical, mechanical,
end cocmunlcetion interfaces with the bus) end any required GSE. The plan
shell delineate the hardware requirements, including ell test items, end the
essoclet ,,I cost end schedule of manufacturing, sterilizing, ground testing,
end flight testing. A format of the develol_nent plan shall be prepared for
NASA approval at the start of Part If.
/ k.k,l.I Project Work Breakdown Structure
A tdork breakdown structure shell be developed for
the total program it a systems level and shell serve as the framework for the
development of planning networks and the cost estln_ting, i
4.k.l.2 Project Plennin s Networks
Planning networks structured in accordance with the
work breakdown structure shell be developed for the total program. These
netv<)rks shall not be in • fine level of detail and, generally, will be at
the systems level with ect|vltles of from 2 to k ,_onths duration. Activities
shall cover ell phases of the program from start of design through launch end
Include development testing, qualification testing;, environmental testing end
i
"_ u t f
2
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3n_la_aeh opersti_e. These networks s _11 conform to _he NA.e_ FJD_ and
C_lnnton Cost Systm Handbook dated October _0, 1962.
k._.l.3 Pro.leer FundinA P_sn
The L_ndt_ plan sbeJ__ present the eontrsctoa"s
es'.Jmste of the totsX project coots t_ a completed flight test _
sn4p in sd41tton, the costs associated vith _urnlshtn_ sdditloM_ aleml_
qvs31fled probe/2anders up to a _ of ten. Usln_ the york breskdovn
st_aetm as a frsae_rk, cost estlestes s_Ltl be develol_4 for each syst_s
ba_mn don by qusa-tere for the same time span covered in plannlnl_ netvorkm.
IkljmJemted subtotalJ shell be shorn for spacecraft eysteas and vehicle _st_.
_._.2.1 _ufaetu_.i
IC1tme_mtractor elmll prep_Jre a manufa_t_a_ M
(I) Tool_tn__, lnclud_n_ _Lque m Jot tools.
(_) moa:t_m _, _ t,_t._=_t. :,
(_) As._b_ _.
_ae ee_cto_' S]_LLI prepare a _erili_atlon ]_
S_lvltla re,via'g4 •
/
(_) _.
(_) At_ Jtte.
g
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_._.2.3 Environmental Test Program
The contractor sh_-_l ]prepare an enwlronmental test
plan lncLm_ln_ considerations of:
(I) Simulmted space mcu_m.
(2) Thermal barnes.
(9) Y_crometeoroid hazard.
(1_) Radiatio_ hazard.
(_) Ground tmn&l.lng conditions.
(6) _tructur._ d,_n_ca.
(7) latchet tL_; inS.
_.lb.2.k Fli£ht {_uallficat,ionTest _h'oK_
Based on the acceptance by the NASA ('_:.2._) of the
eaeltrmmto_ leter_Ir.atlon e_d reeoemen_tion in _ I (a) (4.1._ (]_)), the
eoMtnletoa" i._lJ3=l prepare • fli@ht q_ltflc&tion test pla_, includl_:
(1) C(_pohent e_d subsystem tests.
(2) Tests of _t_6rated probe/lander.
(_) IA_nch veh_-les, sl_es, and tm_eetoa-iee.
, Ib.k.2._.l O_emtt(_nl Pl_r_ for FLt_ht _llflea.tlon
_M e_r_ct_: _ shall prepare a e_n_lete
e_emt_em_ _nel_a_:
(z) a..==_ .=4 ,_Am_.
(_ _=¢_.
4at_ _ttt=.
t •
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_.k.2._.2 Poetfll_ht _lification Temt Data
Evaluation ProKra_
The contractor shall prepare • postfllght
gkata handli_ and evLluation plan inclu_ _._:
(1) Ffaluation of perfon_ace of
_stea,.
(_) Cc_-Incn of results Obt&lne_
flt_ vith knovu atmospheric and surface characteristics.
_._._._ Facilities Plan
The contractor shall _repare a facilities re_Lutre-
Dents an_ utilization plan for ;_ara_raphs _.k.2.1 throu_L _.4.2.k, specifying
the no J•• facilities t_t vii1 be required. This plan shall delineate a_
mAqua l_tlitles required for this project vhieh o_renot currentl_ available.
treevlli be made of f_ve_ent facilltlenIn this plan.
_.o Wq_ _cz_oN
_.1 This contract viii be adaAnistered and monttor.-d by the Iau_ley
]kmee2_ Center of the ](A,_. The scope of the task requires that a na_._er of
IM,BA pe_mnel of wu_ou_ discl]plLnes be lnvo_v_l in the mcmLtorJnl%. The
teehal(_l _e_emt_t_,ve of the Ceat_tl M Officer viii be the _ polnt of
_tlna the m of exchll_ of tnfonmtlon.
_._ The _ _ ]lmmtL©i_te In the p_q%rmast an_ time and to the
_ de,me4 neeeeea_r to t4m_e _atisf_eto_y dLrectton, _s_s, and
1_qmee. JoJ_ ILU_emtn_c_r m_y _ vLu be ).eld alternately st
%as _ mad eonUa_w's sita to _lw the l_e_mse of tb_ _w_ _d to
e_mOo b_h_wMAon. _ _afematlon _eo_l_l_ trm this eemtn_t tdL_t be
a_LLTid_To_t dJssi41tle_ by l_e ]g_.
1
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_ 6.0 _o_ _ __o_
Reports and doc'_entatlon shall be furnished in accordance with
:_ Table I, D_t_entation Schedule.
- 6°2 Interim _
5.2.1 NASA Pro@-_n Progre_ Reports together with cost reporting ,'
Ol_ _ Form _ shall be implemented and maintained In accordance with the
provisions of the contract.
• _ 6.2.2 Monthl_ Progress Reports
_ The contractor shall furnish fifty (_0) copies of a monthly
_ _ profess report which shall comply with the following format:
_ (a) The Initial page (limit two) shall present a brief
- nIrrative analysis of the work incl_ling:
(i) A summary outlook for the total effort.
(2) Overall status, such as significant progress,
lwoble_ _s, plans_ and change in plans since previous report.
(_) An_ rec_endations as to actions required tO
wet or improve schedules, _,
(b) The remainder of the report _._.I discuss briefly the ,
IITOI_'ISS_ probleII, a_d p_nl for ei_ technical area defined in sections g.1, i
4.2, 4._, and _._.
• (c) _ copie,, Irked "prell_inl_'y," of _ teeb_teI1
: lilies pa_epl.-_l dttri_ the I_th's reporti_ period s_ be Included with
:. tbs r.-port,
t
Z
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6.2._ Part I 0ral Report and S_rting Documentation
At %he ccmpletlon of Part [2 the contractor shall present an
oral briefing to the _k_A-LR.C su_r_sr_Ing the contractor', work in Pal-tI.
_ This report 8hAll present the contractor's sJsessment (1) of the systems and
eonfl_trations together with his rec_nendatlons (with substantiating reasons)
! as to the final selection and (2) cr the qualification procedures I together
_i. with his recommendation of a qus/ificatlon pro_rsm. Copies of the presentation
slides and supporting doctmentation shall be transmitted to LRC for NASA :
• ewLluJtion at the end of the oral report.
6._ Final Report
"L 6._.I Oral Report
At the comple_lon of Part TT of this stu_7 _ the contractor
shall present an oral briefir_ to the }_ASA-IRC sumnarizir_ the contractor'8
work In Part I and Part II. Copies of the slides utilized in the presentation
phsll ve transmitted to t_e LRC st the collusion of the oral report.
6._.2 Written Report
Within _hirty (30) da_s followin8 the completion of Part II,
the ealtr_ctor shall submit to the HASA-LRC one-hundred (100) copies of &
e_hensive written report setting forth the result8 of this cord.met. The i
Z_rpoFt shill co_fora to a Kener8_ arrs_eaent acceptable to the MA_ s_d shall
Include:
i (a) Brief statuary and referencing o_ all prevlou_'reports. _,
(b) DetaLled conceptual design - This report shall include,
" but not be 12_tted to, deslKn l_outs_ detail anal_k_ o'..1 _8 of _erfo._-
• 8PJ:e irj_ec_Lfl_tl_ellJ. _ _esl_n L_rBeJ use41 in the deJ_ to_hef vith
1974020203-306
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their complete derivations, or literature references, shall be furnished. All
as|umpttons used in the design shall be noted so that, _f necessary, the design,
i
ealculationzp and results can be verified.
(e) Drawings - The contractor shall furnish a complete set
Of drLwings in s_fficlent detail so that detailed design and manufacturer's
drawings can be completed. These drawings shall include, but not be limited
: to, pri_,ry structure, detailed dimensional l_7outs, system and subsystem
lurTangements, wiring schematics, bus interface, deployment meehardsmsp and an
owe_/l assembly drawing. These drawings shall be prepared using the con-
trLctor's internal system and _ULSA's title block and numbering section. All
dzawin_s shall be approved by and become the property of NASA. One high-
qullity reproducible copy, such as Kylar, of each drawing shall be submitted
with the final report.
(d) As a pe_t of the final report, the contractor 8h811
: lul_tt, as separate documents, the plans required under section 4._ as well as
_' the rel_bL1/ty document required by paragraph _.2.2.
\
t
1974020203-307
290
1974020203-308
291
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
TECHNICAL AND 8US[NESS PtANAGEHENT PROPOSALS
PART 1. GENERAL
" A. Indiscriminate and premature release of information concerning pro-
posed projects of t_,e National Aeronautics and Space Administration can lead to
public misunderstanding and confusion. To avoid this, your cooperation is requested. "
Specifically, _ ask that your orgdnization refrain from making public statements i
or issuing news releases concerning the work called for by this solicitation of
proposals.
B. The offeror _,hould set forth, in detail, the technical and manage-
ment plans by which he intends to accomplish this work. These plans will be an
;lllportan[ factor in the selection of the offeror, and should be specific and complete.
C. The offeror, in his Technical Proposal, shall present all informa-
tion necessary to demonstrate his understanding of the problems, to evaluate his
prol0_sed solutions to the technical requiren_nts, and t', indicate his capability -
to successfully complete the objectives of this Mars Probe/Lander study. Evalua-
tion of the proposal will he on the ba_=s of the material presented and substantiated
in the proposal an_ not on the basis of what may be implied. Legibility, clarity,
, and completere_s of the Technical Proposal are important. The Technical Proposal
shall be |_mlted to the equivalent of two hundred (200) pages, 8_ X II inches.
This shall include all text, charts, graphs, drawings, photographs, figures and
append|ces. Necessary personnel resumes shall be added as an appendix to the
prG_osa| and will not be counted against the two hundred (200) page limitation.
The offeror shall submit fifty (50) copies of the Technical Proposal.
O. The Business Management Proposal shall be completely separate
from the Technical Proposal and shall contain all information relative to Cost and
Financial Data. |t is also requested that the Cost and Financial portion of the
Business Management Proposal be prepared in such a manner that it can be separated
from the rest of the proposal. The Business Manage,_nt Proposal shall be limited
to the equivalent of fifty (50) pages 8½ X ]1 inches. The offeror shall submit
twenty-f|ve (25) copies of the BuSiness Management Proposal.
E. Elaborate format and binders are neither necessary nor desired for
th_ proposals. The actual area of any fold-out or oversize pages will be counted
a,l_|nst the ;lmitatior, s _pecifled. Sheets printed on both sides will be counted
a, _wo (2) pages. All type shall be standard 12 point or larger, double sp_ced,
and shall be prlqted black on white paper.
F. The Technical and Business Management Proposals and the factors
thereunder, i.e., technical approach, technical qualifications, past performance
and experience, relation of projected workload to capacity, management structure,
.' I and cost factors and financial capability are set forth in order of relative
; importance and shall be evaluated on this basis.
r
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G. Classified material submitted with offerors' proposals will be in
accordance with prescribed regulations, tssued by the Department of Defense,
: governing the safeguarding of classified material.
PART II. TECHNICAL PROFO_AL
A. Criteria to be Considered in Evaluation o F Paragraph B {Contents
_._LPro_osa_.£)
f I. Overall Technical Approach
a. Detailed Appro@ch
During the evaluation, the offeror's approaches to the
solution of the problems of each technical area outlined in paragraph B, and more
:, _peciflcally set out in section 4.0 of the Stater_'nt of Work, will be assessed T
for the excellence and applicability of proposed methods, ingenuity° and proper
emphasis. The offeror's discussion of each technical area will be examined in
• detail sufficient for assessment of the 0fferor's understanding of the problems
and his understanding of the current technology in the technical areas.
b. Substantiatinq Data and Analysis
The offeror's discussion will also be carefully assessed
for the applicability and credibility of his reasoning, engineering and existing
test data, and anal,/tical procedures used or to be used to substantiate the pro-
posed engineering approach and the basis for the proposed emphasis to be placed
on each technical area.
2. Technf:zl _ua_if!cations
The offerorls discussion of each of th_ technical areas out-
lined in paragraph B, and more specifically set out in section 4 0 of the Statement
of Work, will be examired for evidence of his ability to perform the study based
on personnel and pas_ exper!ence. This evidence wil| be evaluated with emphasis
: on the excellence and suitability of the following: •
a, Hanpaeler, including types and number of men to be available,
with the background specialty areas and the applicable experience of the key per- !
sonnel to be assigned to the study and pe, centage of time to be spent on this
project.
: b. Previous company exper|enc_, the nature and extent of such
• work es releted to large systems Itudies.
R. Contents of Proposal :.
In his proposal, the offeror shall discuss the problem orals and
the trade-off studies associated with elch of the technical areas included in
- 2 - L-5295
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sect|on 4.0 of the Statement of Work. The offeror sha;I present the level of
_ffort which he estimates can be accomnlished with approximately 30,000 man-hours.
To f4cilitate the evaluation, the offeror shall arrange his kr_oosal int_ the
technical sections listed below:
I. Subsystem Conce_ts and Associated Analyses
a. To demonstrate the soundness of approaches recommended in
: 2.¢. apd 2.d. below, the offeror shall discuss in detail, each of the areas
listed below, relative to mission requirements.
(I) Communlcatsons, instrumentation , and electrical power
; subsystems.
(2) Structures and materials, including thermal pro-
tectiofl end impact attenuation structure.
(3) Space flight and at_lospheric entry performance
(including thermodynamics, aerodynamics, and flight mechanics),
(4) Mechanical subsystems, including parachutes, separation,
spin-up end despin devices, rocket motors, and environmental control.
b. The offeror shall also present the following:
(I) A preliminary layout of the probe lander (including
an inboard profile and weight characteristics), having an external configuration
based on the tension shell concept presented in Appendix B of the Statement of
Work.
} (2) Preliminary design concepts of all mechanical sub-
systems including parachutes, separation, spin-up and despin devices, rocket motors, :
end environmental control.
2. Overall System Concept and Integration
The offeror shall discuss each area noted below only to the
L depth necessary to demonstrate the overall conceptual philosophy and to divide
the problem into defined elements for specialized discussion in items I, 3, and
k. (|n a. below, for example, the offeror shall restrict himself to a discussion
of the scientific measurements required, means of making these measurements, and
means of Communicating these measurements to the bus. The details of achieving
the desired communications and instrumentation design, such as specific instruments
Ir_ components, should be discussed under I.e.(I) above.)
e. Experiment selection, data sampling methods, end transmittal
of date to the bus for relay to earth,
b. Mission profiles and aria yses.
- 3- L-52_
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c. Optimization of external shell design considering size,
weight, aerodynamic performance, and future lander utilization.
: d. Optimization ot internal payload design considering sub-
: system integratiOn, sterilization, an_ environmental control.
e. Criteria and procedures to be used in establishing the value
and extent of flight tests in the earth's atmosphere as a part of the overall
qualification program.
f. Interrelation of areas a. through e. above and the associ-
ated trade-offs considered pertinent to provioe an integrated system commensurate
with overall mission requirements
_ 3. Qualification Program
The offeror shall discuss the following items to be incorpo-
rated in the qualification program:
'_ a. Criteria for establishing and the methods for L,nplementing
a detailed ground test program, including a preliminary ground test plan.
b. Criteria for establishing and the methods for implementing
a detailed flight test program in the earth's atmosphere (including t preliminary
flight test plan) in the event such a program is recommended.
c. The effect of the sterilization requirements on the ground
and flight test programs.
d. A preliminary reliability program outlining the offeror's
:' Ipproach and proposed methods and procedures for the accomplishment of the relia-
bility requirements as delineated in paragraph &.2.2 of the States,ant of Work.
_. Sterilization
The offeror shill present his capability to solve the problems
relative to the sterilization requirements by discussing, in detlil, the following:
e. Sterilization influence on component selection.
b. Establishment of sterilization and assay procedures.
c. Facilities required by b. above.
d. Sterilization control during r,_lnufecturing, handling,
transportlti_,% Ind checkout.
I. Sterlllntlon's Impact on schedule Ind costs.
Atticnmnt 0
i
1974020203-312
_95
5. Technical Manaqement and Plans
The offeror shall outline:
a. A program plan (manpower. subcontractors, and schedule} to
carry out the various elements of Contractor's tasks in the Statement of Work
This plan _hall Include the estimated men-hours (including subcontractors) required
for each of the technical areas in items I through 4 above.
b A detailed technical management plan, Including a discussion
of the offeror's planned organizational arrangement, lines of authority, communica-
tion, and coordination between the offeror, subcontractors, and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration.
PART II_. BUSINESS RANAG_HENTPROPOSAL
Tne offeror shall present his Business Management Proposal in accord-
ance with the details requested below. Paragraphs A through D are listed in orJer
of relative ie_ortarce.
A. .Nanaaeme_t Structure
I. Set forth in dvtall your understanding of the total management
Job, particularly as to n_nagement m_thods to b_ utili_ed in undertaking and exec-
; uting the proposed w_rk _nder this proposed contract with particular consideration
given to the fo!]o_.nq elements:
a. Lines of _uthorlty, communication and control by the
National AeronaLtics ard Space Administration and the prime Contractor predicated
on the e_senti_ Gove'_n,_nt requirement that the co_pany provide • Project H_nager
Nho reports to an individual in a top-management position.
b. The proposed communication and control between your company
and subcontractors _hou!d be specified.
2. Subn,lta resun_ of all key personnel who will conduct the
_nlgerlal affairs of this project, Indicating the percentage of tln_ that these
key persGnnel will devote to this project. Indicate evidence of your company's
willingness co devote company resources In other branches or divisions to help
support this project with key personnel to solve difficult problems.
3. Submit evidence that the project can be properly staffed with
que||fled personnel, _r:;ad|ng the offeror*s record with regard to work stoppdges,
strikes, lockouts, and labor disputes during the past three (3) years end date
of expiration of labor contracts of crafts essential to this project, with comments
Is necessary.
_. You should submit clear a_d convincing evidence of your firm's
pertic|pation in the NASA Co_t Reduction Program; e cost reduction progr_ which
- 5 - L-5295
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is IKImlnistered by any other Gnvernment agency; or _ cost reduction program which
_, is Contractor-sponsored. in the event that you have previously submitted evidence
to this Center of participation in _uch a program, the response should So indicate.
However, it is desirable that any previous submittal should be updated to en_ure
that complete evaluation of this segment of your proposal is possible. Further,
if you are participating in the program under circumstances wherein administration
" is effected by another NASA Center or Government agency, your propose| should
Identify the source of administration.
%
B. Past Performance and Experience
The offeror should submit evidence of contracts in fields relating
tO this p-ocurement which have been or are in the process of being performed by
the company within the past three (3) yea's, specifically setting forth for e3ch
_ cofl_ract, the contract number, Government agency placing the contract, type of
contract, brief description of the work. lnJic3ting for each cost-type contract
amounts of overrun or underrun_ reasons therefor, and percentage of fixed or
; [ncQntive fee. For each contract, show the record of contract completion against
the enti:lpated comp!etion date at time of entering the contract, with explanations
as considered necessary.
C. Relation of Projected Workload to Capacity
1. The relation of projected workload to capacity, giving con-
: slderation to:
a.. The average and peak percentage of available capacity
:, required for the task.
b. The schedule labor buildup.
C. The extent of new-hire laoor requirements (Including any
relocation of personnel).
d. The possibility of interference with other projects at
the p:ent.
2. Indicate availability of facilities required to accomplish
the protposed work under this proposed contract by completing the forms attached
hereto as inclosure I, Facilities Questionnaire and Summary Sheet I _nd Exhib:t I
thereto en'itTed '_dditional Industrial Facililies Required". Consideration will
be g_ven _o:
a. Current Inhouse capability.
b, Principal vendors and subcontractors facility availability.
c. New facility requirements and cost thereof
(I) Offeror
: (_) Subcontractors _nd vendors.
-6- L-$_
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d. Government-armed facilities.
O. Cost Factors end Financial _apabilt_y
I. Cost Factors
: The offeror shall submit • detailed Cost Proposal which will
be prepared so as to include, as • minimum, all of the subdivisions of work end
: elements of cost sho_n in Attachment F, EstlNted Cost and Fee Summery.
2. Financial Capability
_ A balance sheet for your last Fiscal Year end accompanying
profit and loss statement must be furnished. Eveluatiofl will be based on your
current financial condition and general corporate rating.
- 7 - L-5_JS
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No. 1-65
LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER ;" ANNOUNCEMENT DATEJanuary 7, 1965
SUBJECT; So,,rce Evaluation Board for Comparative Studl¢,s of Conceptual Design
and Qualificati¢m Procedures For a Mars Prube Lander
Pursuant to Chapter ] of the Source Evaluation Board Manual (NPC 402) I hereby
designate the following individuals to serve as members of the Source Evaluation
Board for the subject Mars Probe Lander contract:
(;ha i man :
Edwin C. Kilgore, Chief, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Other Votin,¢ I Mem_ers:
Andrew G. Swanson, Technical Assistant to the Assistant Director for
F119_lt Projects
Leonard Roberts, Dynamic Load_ Division
Eugene S. Love, Aero-Physics Division
David B. Ahearn, Procurement Division
George T. Halley, Office of Chief Counsel
Wllll_ T. 0°Bryant, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA
Headquar te rs
Ralph W, P_y, Jr., (alternate: Peter A. Cerreta), Office of Advanced
Research and Technology, NASA Headquarters
IkJ_nvQt| nQ Recor_lr :
Henry J. Pratt, Procurement Ulvlsion
The Source lvelustion Board will conduct its business in strict accordance w|th ,_
the provisions of the Source |valuation Board Manual. It will be the responli-
: b|lity of the Ch41rmdn to determine that each Board member (both voting end non-
voting) |s tully conversant with the lnstructic, ns contained in this publication. :
: ll04rd duties will take precedence )ver other normal duties of the Board members.
Attant;,_,n of the Chairman end each lk)drd member is particularly directed to
• I paragraph !02 of the Source Evaluation Board Manual VdhiCh specifies who shall b_l
authorized t,, select a source for the nerotiation of a contract, it IS amphiP,
lind that tlv= findings of the source Evaluation Board are only guides for the
final selection process and must be presented in sufficient depth Of information
tO permit the intelligent weighing of alternatives. All acceptable propel=Ill
wlll be evalue:ed, ranked end reported. The Board's written fln'Jlngs will give
no consideration _3 elements _hich are extraneous to the technical and business
¢dqNIbilltlas of the contractors evaluated.
t
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/.(:.=_;_'to._ of th_ Chalr_._ _,_ :-" :. . ., further specifically directed to
f_6S."PR _.._OA.'_ which L_,. =b*" , ;osure of informatiun to anyone who
is not _._") ;=Jr "c_pa_ ; =', • -valualion proceedings. Prior to the
Openlr, 9 (_f ,,_.n._,a.c,, t:_*:B_)._'. = -I:close such inforntation aS may be neces-
Sary for the p_op_ _'_v, _op,. , ' _.re request for proposal and t_en only tO
the e_tent _n_ t:: f,_,,_ per',., considered essential for tFat purpose. After
the opening of Drrp_.,cst,,, a • _f_:_.ation will be kept privy to the members
(voting and nonvot,ng) of s _ . _/_rd and tn prr_perly designated committees,
panels, advisers and conS_;_a _- c,- o ,_ced-tu-know basis. The right Io
information on a fleed-_o-kn_ b_siS does r_o( e-xtend to the n_rmal chain of
supervision affecting any mc,_ber of the Board or arising out of technical
r_.spOnsibjlity for the action being evaluated except as specifically approved
by the Chairman on a case-by-case basis. Indivi(.uals designated by the
Chairman will be notified by him, in writing, with respect to the privileged
character of inforn_tion.
Floyd L. Thomson
_ Oirec tot
Copies to:
_' Each Committee Member (through official channel_)
K_SA, _Code R
NASA, (odes
Oi rec for
Associate Director
Assistsnt Directors
Chief. Engineering end Technical S_rvices
Procurement Officer
All E_gineering and Technical Services _ivision Chiefs
All Pasearch Division Chiefs
tlech_nicel Service Division 8ranch Hedds
Administrative Services Division
Flies
r
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; :
t!L7 _/V/'V'OL,/_/C_/: " D"rEpebr_,_:r9, 1965
T:_',;,!{ " -, _--- ............ .: !:..-.]u_tlo= Co=alttees to
SUBJECT: a.; , l 1 ; " • . ,- : " r :'L'_'_S_S cOVe' r I _ _e
C:-_ xt.--_'.7, . : ' . .?'rtc_tton Proced_l-es Tot
1. _ ev-lUation " ,,':c.'', .... ,' i '-, .... oOU-_ce Evnlt_atlon Bo_r_
I_ ev_lua_t_ dl_1":.re" _ ,,:,.m -,:" t_ _. s :' '_ , 'ned _ Req,_st _or ]_copos_l
_: L-_?05. Personnel _r,, . ',_..; +,,
A. T_,c_fe_d ._',_'.,, t'.-. C,,: _. ....
,, _ Cllreoee T. _¢_.,, Jr., E. __,m _d Systems Division
" (1) Ov_r_J. 'v t,..-. _,-, ' ,'l
' W_.LI£m:. b:. ::_cr.a,,'._, ,' ._
;a) _ , ,
W:_IYta;= b. % ,., ';r, h:.', '" .. iT!rector (Group !_
Wi211a _ F. ',?:_,', = ,',-- _, .
; Welt C. be,n;, l :; t :_:a*'- '.
/_o_ J. P; ', • ,: ",
:Pilz-cy J, _).q, ','# _yn,,.._. ' '." '
John i_. ¼'!l;,.y, ':',, F_t '.'.'::u
Robert. A, ,v ..... ,, : -.:.V
_eld,]:' ?. :, ".'',"n, ;
_4%tin C. FO'adrl_t, _n.J_,:-,J__. - _ ,,
: (3) _t_1,._*_e,t,o_:__',.' _-,,_- :
_eJ'_.P.,'e _. G!]:'_ _. _ ('_ ' _ ".,. "_i_3 ,D1V_ItOI_
' ]_en_y _. ",_:._ ,, :r., ! L':',' Ion
' Jos.,_:, M. }:,..:'_'' , Jr., " _ " _. ,:_Jo_
J_ '_. ,N_W- , " .d_, '_,
R[ PRCD[NJC I'[_ll I _ Y Of IHf ORI( 'trdA( PA(;[ 1(') P/D(_; _ _ i
-/
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__ (_) Sterilization Panel
Billy L. Dove, Chairman_ Instrumer_ 1_csearch Division
E. John Brock, Jr., Flisht Vehicles and Systems Division
C_arles H. McLeIJen s Aero-Physlcs DI_ _ion
Harold E, Poolc, Instrument _escsrch Division
(5) Tcchnlcrl _n._cment _nd Plen_ £_nel
/
:. Wllll_ C. ]laycs s Jr., _nl._n_ ttOl_ _tudies Office
_.iorlon D. $cyffert_ _4eehenle_l Service Div:sion
b_;'k w. Coles J_'., Electrlcel Systems Division
D. Business Ewluetion Co_ittcc
Henry J. Prat_: Cheir_n, Procurement Division
John C. l'_c, Procurement Division
]lQrold Crate, Research Hode_s an_ Facilities Division
Arthur R. Friend, Progr_ Control Analysis and Budget Ofl"iee
2. The duties of the co_ttees will be to assist the Source _hml_tlo_ Board in
arriving at its assessments of the proposals in the mumer to be prescribed by the
Source Evaluation Board previously established for 1_Is proeuresen_.
3. Attention of all committee members is directed to NASA PR 3.80_-k which prohibits
. the disclosure of infore_tton regarding this evaluetion to anyone who is _ot also
o partieipntin_ in the seas ewluetion proceedings. The l'l_ht to IDl_rmation does
_r DOt extend to the normal chain of svpervts_'_n e_feetin_ any oomlttee member.
Edwin C, Kll_ore
CbeJ_a_, _ource Evalustioa BOeml
, APPaOVAL;
A
,no_ L. T_ _
Direetor_ Langley Resecrcb Center
C_ies to:
Each Cc_mittee _m_r (throuch official charnels)
Director
Associate Director
Asslst_ Directors
_hlef_ E_i_eerln_ and Technical Services
Proe_rment Offlcar
AIA Eaglneerln_ and Technical Servlees Division Chiefs
All Research Division Chiefs
14_chenical Service Division Branch _sds
Administrative Services Division
l_les __
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_IRT's Role In Vo_er Prol_ram
Toe Voyager Pro6ran is a major new-s_rt pro6rsm aimed at the explo-_tlon
of Mars and Venus, an_ must precede any _anned planetary explor_-tionprogrn.-L.
_ should pl_ce itself In a position to Influence, to sc_e extent, the obJee-
rives of the Pro_rem and to ensure that d_ta which may be required for future
_ _aed missions is obtained on a timely basis. (_e Voyager Program in the
Planetary P_oSr_m plays the same role as Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter play in
tl_ I_nar Prosr-u._.) _
_k_h of the technolo6y associated with the Voyager Prosrsm relates to
atmOSpheric entry, and is to be found In C_RT (i.e., Langley and Ames), rather
than O_A, and CART's participation Is important if NASA is to achieve it=
: pro_a= objectives in planetary exploration. The participation, moreover,
voald prove.de both focus and incentive for (_RT advanced technolog7 in many
diverse areas.
The mechaui_ for OkRT's participation In, and influence on, the Voyager
_ lies in the _ Centers taking some responsibility for part of the
Pl_i_a_, _he extant of Lan_ley's capabilities in the technologies required
in the Voyager Program to_ether vit_ the alternate roles that Langley could
! aUu_e in the Pro6Tsm are outlined below:
I Lan_le_ P,ese_rch Center's Capabilities
: Toe technoXot_ associated vith the development of the Voyager
_ _plmle Bus 1|, in esse_e_ the technology of atmospheric entry and laadlng,
&_d _eludes the technical ar_=s of entry vehicle desl_, the_l protection,
e_unlcation, p_lston_ impact attenu_tt_ add landing. _
Tnis technology has been pursued in depth at _ley Res_mh Centcr
for _ b_srs thrcu6h _ound and fl/sht test progress and has resttlted in such :
i
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developments a_ Project _rcury, Project P._ (Radio Attenuntion Y_asurements)
and Project Fire. The_e proJc_ts in effect have established the state-of-the-
art in destzn, com_u_Lcatlon, and heating for atmospheric vehicles in the velocity
, range 20,000 f_/secto _0,000ft/sec. S_ller, but nevertheless si_niD_cant,
prOjects at Inn61ey Research Center include supersonic and high altitude l_r_-
chute deployment prognuus, and the develol_ent of entry vehicle diagnos*.Ic ln-
strument_tion, data storage and dnta transmission systems.
Toe technolo_" assOCiated with the Capsule Experimen_ is primarily that
of developing instrument_tion to cover an extremely wide variety of measure-
merits, including life detection, atmospheric properties, surTace chen_str¥
and physics, meteorological cu_dittons, etC.
Iangley Research Center h_s experience in many, but not all, of these
\ areas and includes the development of fli6ht lnstrumentatic_ for the _easu-'e-
merit Gd" at_ospheric prOperties, planetar> horizon definition, surface stren_h
c_aeteristics, and l_ndtng dyaa_cs (for Surveyor).
With this ba_kErcamd, an ln-hOu.-e resea_h pro_ h_s been pu_twd at
I_y Research Center for the past two years mined at the technology require4
for the Voya_. r Capsule, reco6nizing that these are unique design problems
that a_N as n result Of the tenuous _rtlan a_mosphere, the requirement for
_erA/i_ation, and the long spaceflight prior to land£n_.
_he continu_n_ pro_/a_ has included structural and thermal materials
tests_ wind tunnel tests, flight tests of atmospheric measurements Instr_._en-
ta_;lon _ad cu_rer._y includes coz_trac_ed c "_p_rative stud£es Of system design
: and of all develogaen_ and _ualAflcatlon pro_odurvs. It Is antlclpa* _.d that
entry vehicle str_eturee and Instrumsnted crush-u_ pseka_s viii be f_brlc_te_
_. _ 'lt_sted durin_ 't_s,,].m.r.
L
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: Alternate LRC Rolez (Stigmatized in Charts 1 and 2)
I. LI(C would have Project responsibility for the development of a
Voyn_er Capsule (for use i_, 1971 and subsequent years) consisting of a
_nAltimisslon Capsule Bus to_ethe." ,-th the integration of Capsule Experi-
meets to determAne the atmospheric and surface characterlztlcs o _ l.L_rs.
These experiments would be supplied from various sources, iu('udii_._ u-PL
NAZA Centers, for integration into the Capsule system. IntegrEtlon of
t.he Capsule with the Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle wottld be JPL's :'espr%-
slbillty (see Chart 3 for orga.nization_i plan).
II. LRC wo_ld have Project responsibility for the development of the
", Capsule Bus with JPL having respon;ibility for The Capsule System [i.e.,
imT_41_tion of the Capsule Bus with Capsule Experiments). In this role,
LRC w_uld define the capsule bus_ provide the experiments for meas,.rament
of Mars atmospheric properties, and provide the Project direction to devel_
: the flight qualified capsule bus. (See Chart 4 for organization plan.
III. LRC would not assume a_y Project responsibility but would supply
definitive study i_ormation prior to Capsule development and contlnulng
supporting technology during the early development phase. Such support
would imc]ude flight testing of capsule suhsystem_ and of the complete
Capeule Bus, in the Earth's atmosphere. Additionally LRC would supply an
ktmospherLc Mensurementa Packege for incorpor&tion in the Voyager Program.
(See Chart 5 for organization plan.)
L
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Preferred LRC Role - Case II or III
A comparison of Cases I, II and III on Chart I shows that Case I
involves the greatest Project rezponsibility and a corresponding large LRC
manpower requirement of 120 people, more than half of whom would be
associated with a Project Office. Cases II and IIX have lesser demands on
manpower znd for this reason appes2 more attractive.
Case II, requiring 80 people, represents a technolo_y effort involving
50 people plus a Project Office of 30 people end %-ouldallo-#LRC to have
Project responsibility and authority to develop the Capsu/e BIs for the
Voyager Program whereas Case i_ represents the technolo_ effort (i.e.,
_O people) but w±thout a Project Office (and without the correspondi_
Project mlthority). T_as, LRC could rr _in authority to implement tec.hnical
decisions at a cost of 30 people in a Project Office.
The technology effort in Cases II and III would consist of three
major elements :
1. Capsule Definition Program
2. Earth Atmosphere Flight l_'os_.'i_n
• 3. Atmospheric Measurements Package Development
Then elements are described, in more detail as follows :
: 1. Cansule Definition Program
: The present 5RC program consists of:
(a) An in-hc_se stud_ effort leadir_ to a contractual study
by the AV_O Corporation on "Comparative Studies of Conceptual
Del!gn and QuAlification Procedures for a M_rs Probe/Lander"
which Is due to beg_n May 20.
; (b) An in-house research and technology effort in most of
the areu that. relate to the Capfuls des:Lln.
, -'-9
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It is proposed that the AVCO Study, together with the results of the in-
'_ house research effo_, be used as the basis for the preparation of C_ps_ule
design specifications (i.e., these specifications w_uld constitute
"Preliminary Definition" and would be USed in further desi6n and develop-
ment contract_). I_C would continue to participate in the Capsule Definition
up to"Final _efin!tion"through an increased level of effort on the
supporting techno._o6M,particularly in the followin_ at,as.
AerodTn_lc s
Dynamics _.ndAeroelasticity
" Structures
Thermal Protection
Co"_nmicat ions
Dia6nostlc Ins entation
Propulsion-. _.ms
_ Retardation Systems
Mechanical Subsystems
Sterilization
Such • technology program would allow OART to contribute to and influence
_m Capsule desl_ in • _Jor w_.
The application of these technologies to the Voyager mission is shown
in Chart 6 and the phasing of the technolo_ effort in relation to the
lPnlule I - Phase II Capsule development is illustrated in Chart 7.
1974020203-325
"_ 30b
3
2. Earth Atmosphere Fl!_ht I_ocra_
A_thoug_ the major p_r: of the Capsule research and technolo_
effort can be accooplished through the u_e of ground facilities, a limited
progrem, designed to develop and test mission hardware in the Earth's
atmosphere, is anticipated.
The scope of such a flight program is still under study but
the possible major elements together with the flight objectives are out-
lined below:
_" _ _Mm/l scale Capsule Confi_ara.tions,u3in_ Scout, to investigate:
: (a) rigid body dynamics
(b) thermal protection
(c) blackout (transmission through w_ke)
Parachute develooment test, to determine:
(a) steady and transient perfc.nmanceof fullscale parachute
@ Earth Atmosphere Entr7 of Capsvle Bus, using Saturn IB to:
(a) qualify Capsule Bus subsystems including structure,
_i heat shield, communication, diagnostic instru_..ntation,parachute
,: deployment, etc.
mccomplishment of such a flight program is considered to be well within
the capabilities of LRC and would utilize the past experience on Trailblazer,
Scout, Project FIRE, Arcu (parachute pro_rram)and other projects.
3. Atmosphere.Measure_mentsPackage Develovment
It is anticipated that the Capsule _us, during its descent
thl_h the Martian atmosphere, will acquire detailed information on
at'mspheric properties (density, pressure and temperature profiles,
cc_osition, etc.) prior to impact on the surface. LRC proposes an
d
1974020203-326
309
4
Atmospheric Measurements PackaEe capable of acquiring, storing and
tra_smlttin6,_prior to impact,_data on the Marries atmosphere. Such a
\ J
pae/ce6e would contain instruments and components developed at I_RC and
elsewhere, and would include an x-ray backscatter device (for direct
measurement of density), pitot syste_ {pressure), mass spectrometer
(c_ositlon) ; solid state =emory, battery and antenna for data handlln 6.
This package vould be developed under co_tract and ground and £116ht
teated by LRC px_ior to incorporation into the Capsule.
LBC experience in the techniques of atOmpsheric meuurements and
interpretation of data are reflected in previous pr &rams relating to
determination o£ the Earth's atmosphere _ncludlr_ a program leadi_ to the
definition of the 1962 Standazd Atmosphere.
]
!
I
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CHART i
ALTES/_TE LRC ROLES IN VOYAGER FEOGKAM
I II fly
TCTAL SYSTF_ INTEGKAT!0N _ JPL J_L
S/C Bus JPL _2L JPL -
8/C Experlmant integration JFL JPL JPL
_/C r_xper_ents From Ex_er:_enters
Capmzle Bus Development LRC LRC JPL
... ,,
C-psule Bus Definitton Frogram LRC LRC LRC
Earth At._sphere FiIff_t Program LRC LRC LRC
C&p_Ale Experiment Integratlcn LRC JPL /PL
At_jpheric Measurement8 Exper. LRC LRC LRC
Other Experiments From Experimente_s
LRC MARI_W_ 120 80 50 i
i
I i •
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ANUAL |PAGE 1 of Z
LA.GtET "JS,A'C" C'"''' |OATE May Zl, 1965
'|' '! ''_ _IBJECT Planetary Mlsslons Technology Stt't_rlng Com_nittee
I. GENERAL
This instruction estabhshes a Planetary Mlss,ons Technology Steerlng Com-
mittee, reporting to the Director, and sets forth its functions and member-
ship.
Z. FUNCTIONS
The functions of this commlttee are to.
a. Survey in-house and contractual supportlng research and technology
pertinent to planetary mlssions.
b. Recommend new elfort jr changes in effort in supportlng research
&ud technology.
c. Monztor research programs so that new results and developments
can be made available to study contractors.
d. Partlcipate in the definition of the scope and depth of contract studies.
e. Guide and review the progress of contract studies.
f. Evaluate results of studles and recommend future actions.|
3. MEETINGS
&o ]_teetlngs are to be held on the call of the Chairman.
b. The Chairman is to appoint a Secretary to record the minutes of each
rnee tin S•
: c. The min',tes of meetings are to be submitted to the Director. '_
4. MEMBERSHIP "_
The following are designated to serve on the committee until relieved in the
capacities indicated'
Chairman: Dr. Leonard Roberts
Members: Roger A. Anderson _".
i,...
.e
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C"A',"Z-9 @ MANAGEMENTeAoe Z of Z NUALOATE May ZI, 1965 tA.OLR* IIstMacH CINTI-
i i
Paul R. Hill
Edwin C. Kilgore
Eugene S. Love :
W*lham D. Mace
WllhamH. PhlLhp_
James E. Stltt. :
5. SUPPORTIN G COORDINATORS
a. To ass,st the comm*ttee *n obtalnlng ,nformation to carry out its
funct,ons, diwslon chiefs have designated personnel who are hereby ap-
poin.ed as coordlnators for their respective dlvisions:
Aero-Physics D1v,sion Robert A. ,Tones
Applied Mater_,ds and Physlcs Dlv,slon Edward M. Sullivan
Dynamic Loads D*v_s*on Harry L. Runyan, Jr.
Flight Veh,cles and Systems D,vls,on James F. McNulty
Full-Scale Research D,v,sio- Cornelius Drlver
Instrument Research Divlston Sheldon T. Peterson
Space Mechanics D,vlslon John D. Bird
Structures Research Dlv, slon Lawrence D. Guy
b, The specific funct,ons of supporting coordinators are to:
(l) Coordinate information between the committee and their
divisions concerr.*ng existlng and proposed r_search and technology
pertinent to planetary rn, ss,ons.
(Z) Part,cipate in the formulation, technical review, and
evaluation of contract stud,es.
(3) Disseminate the results of contract studies, as appropriate,
within their respective diviszons.
'_ T.S. Z9
: -_,e_°_c_iL'rY oFTH_o,_,o_,_LP,_o_sPooe.i "
1
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_E¢O_._.IOEDI_C POSITTON _.NTHZ VOYAGER PROG_
The proposed LRC position in the Voyager Program is easentlal_
one of technical responal_lllty and strong tachnlcol support in the
area of Entry Technology and is described in ter_ of z
(1) aup_ortlng technical programs to be conducted b7 LRC
(2) working errsngemsnts between I_qCend JPM
Tale position is based on our current estimate of the tcchnlc•l need:_
of the Voyao-erCapsule Program in the areas in which LRC can make •
major contribution and is subject to modification in the later phases,
particularly in th:,area of flight testing, as more definitive require-
mlnta are established.
The Voyager Capsule phasing sequence _s dlctet_.din pert by the
need to develop the Voyager Capsu]..in pnrallel with the Voyager
Spacecraft and so allow proper integration o_ the rue systems. The
race.ended Voyager CBpsule phaslnr,schedule is _ho_n _n £i_urc 1;
also •hewn, for reference purposes, i_ _he Voyager Spececreft phasing
schedule. In the Capsule phasing schedule, the Freli_1.ery Deflnitl_n
Phase would be cat.Iota by J_n,z_r/1966. The Flnsl Definition and
Development Phase would be initiated by release of an industry-dJideRFP
leading to the selection of • single contractor by June i.c_6. With •
single contractor selected at this early date, the Capsule development
schedule can be msde to p_rallel the Spacecra/t Development schedule.
The recomr_endcdLRC position in the Prol_Ircry Definition Phaae
and In the Fioal Definition end Development Phases for the Voyager
Capsule ia documented in the following paragraphs.
Prsltm_nar-r DcflnitJon _hese o_ the Vo_re_orCensure
June 1%_'; - January _6
It is racon_endad that the AVCOStudy "Cooperative Studies of
Conceptual Design and Qualification Procedure• _or o Mars Probe/Landor"
{see Appendices _ and B), closely monitored by LRC and JPL_ and|upple_entad by In-house efforts et LRC end JPL, be used as the heals
for Prellmlnsry Definition. Is order to ensure con_etlbillty wlth the
nwerall Voyager System it Is essential that JPL assist LRC during
this phase particularly in the areas of alectrouicn •nd C•paule/Spmee-
era_t interface definition. _
The recommended workin_ arrangement between LRC and JPL during this
Phase is sho_n in fi_u-a 2. Lqc will have responsibility for rune@ernst
nnd technical direction through • Stt_ Dkrector r eportin_ to the Offl¢_
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of th• Director. Th• Study Director will be assisted by • unscemnt
st•if end functional staff consisting of technical mon_tors from
appropriate I_C Divisions. It i8 recoa_mended thmt JPL particlpata £n
the following _nn•rs
(I) Establish, under the JPL Capsule }4anagor_ • corrslpondin B
tunottonsl stiff to york vlth I._C cotmterparLa in the various t4_lcel
e_ess.
(b) Provide JPL representatives st LqC throughout the SttK_ to
soooeqpIieh the necessary coordination.
(C) Assure Voyager Capsule menOge_nt participation by having
the Vny•gir Capsule Hinagor attend revlewn (nsldterm end flflel).
PZni_ l_eZtntt_nn an_ Development _ho_•s
_f _he Voyager _e_ule
February" 1_6 -
Xt 1i aasu_ed that this phase at the Voyager Program _111 be
au,aSKe8 by JPL uith LRC performing a supportin¢ technical role. TO
fulfill _t5 technical role, IRC will assist JPL tn the flail definition
of the Voys,Ter Capsule, p_rt_cu]nr_ in the erie of Entry Technology
including the tnatrum.nt_tion a_d co_:untcatton method• to be used
during entry; In addition, IRC ui_l pls_ and execute 8 Support/n|
Techuo_o_ Program. Speclftcs_ly it ie reco_nended that LRC a•Su_
the follovlng ra•ponsLbLlities_
(a) AsSist JPL in the preparation of the RFp for th• _insl
i)_finitto_ •_d Development Phase.
(b) Serve On the _ and its technical co_ittees.
(•) Conduit • aupport!ng R & D ground program to periLS; final
deflnltlon 0£ the VoTager Cap•ult (see Appendix C).
(d) Revlsv vlth JPL, dalton end epenLf/cat/ona _or ViOliSt Cspl_le,
(o) Plan and execute s aupporttn 8 flight rrocrsm in the E_rthll
: 'lt_lphers (lee App•ndix CI, Thls flight progrim to be dstLattLssd
i dmP1ni the Pre11.dnory Dellnitlnn Phil•,
(t) Preside technical ae•iatance to JPL to their pertomaoe of
• fU_l-401_l p1_te_ f_tlbt teat :In the hrthgs it_olphoree
/
+
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" {|) Serve eJ con|ultentJ Ln the area of Entry Technolog to JPL
', _ _mr_were development se required.
The s_looa_onded vorklng srroco+emlnt between 1/_ end J_]+ duPLn S
pheeo is |hown in figure ). JPL vilI have respono$blllty for the
lmlllgomont end technical d/rection throu.+h s Voys;er Capsule Project
Office vhlch viii integrate LP_ inputs into the overall pro£rez.
"Through 8 Planetary Ntsolono Support Office (sin,41or to existing Flllht
- ReeotrJ Progress Offtce)j LRC will hove the reeponstbiltt), for the
IIImlpmnt end technical direction of the supportin i flight program
lad for the coordination vith JPL of the supporting R & D I_ound program°
Zt 18 further recommended that LRC personnel attend pertlMnt JPL-
oootFsctor meetings and thet the LRC p1.,ce+_ry Hiesion8 Steerlnil
'+ P_Oa_ttee be represented et the mJor rovSlwe.
+
; REPRODiJCIBIt.II_Y 0t THE C)RI_...;I_,,I.,",,IPAOf I.b POOR.
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loonsrd Roberts, OLD Tachnlcel dlrectJon of Stud_
Technical directlo_ at Functional
St_ff
Tlehnicsl nanreaentetive
! V.C. Iklyesj I_RL Contract Negotiation
Contract changes
,+ (plus I 8as|steot) All communication vith Contractor
and JPL
Finenclal ResponnLbl]ItLes
Schedule Responsibilities
I. R. £. Jones, £PD kerodynoaJc Configuretlon
Aerodynamic HeatLng
_. |. N. 8ulllvso, JU4PD Propulslon
DeceIeretorn
Flight Test Pro_'n
), P. J, |obbltt, DID Entry Dynamics
Entry Lomds
A. J.F. J_Jultyp /NSD $¥ntes ]nt_i:z'ation
hechenics 1 I)es ltm
Znvironsents 1 Control
qvol|flcmtton Pro_'mm
5. 80 T. Pet_rloll, IRD Coneunlcstlon SynCs
InetrwmntmtLon
Trscklog
Sterillsntion
60 L, Do Oq)'palD StructurslAne_ysis
l_wrul Protection
llplot Structure
ltruoturml Contll_rstJos
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) - C_mer,JIV - ||-2. _ P_ctures De_end:ngU_,_n Atrno'_I,here
TV Resolut,on from _0 r'(, to |14N,
4 Penetromeh,r) lot S'Jrt_ce MatChleSs
) - LegDop_terlot', ,,,¢_Measurement
NKJh ilr_ _OvwAIllIU_ RaO4r5tot S_.r_'acegourjhneS5
Almosphcr_r. Corhposlbon aI_Q5'hu_ture V,e r, urements
• D[OI_BII CAPABILITY
trro_ [.Uzphcal Orbt5
700 - |_00 m,mPerla0s_5
4000- ."0000ILmAIX_psJs
• F_',GH! CAPSUL[ tFC)
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|_' Oma.Alumv um Hone_cor o, Purple Blind _,_o_
ACS Acbve Cote C.a5ACS anO N_aneuver
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_mr_t E_ne 1400FPS f_
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FLIGHTCAPSULELAUNCHCONFIGURATION
PRESSURIZATION
SYSTEM
ENTRY VEHICLE
SEPARATION SYSTEM
/ _FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
itl AOAPTER •
_', _ZJ....... ACCESSDOOR
/
/ FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
STERILIZATION
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
STERILIZATION CANISTER
SEPARATION SYSTEM i
760116P
Thle chart, as well as the next four, pros, ,- .he physical layout of the FC to give
an early indication of the salient features .f thL conceptual design.
The sterilization canister is made of thin aluminum monocoque construction in
three major sectzons: I) the lid, which covers the entry shall and is jettisoned
prior to orbit injection, 2) the outer conLcai section _f the b_se. which houses the
separation system (linear shaped charge), and 3) the snner circular section of the [
base. which provides the access door for assembly st the deorbit motor. All
three sections are welded together durlng asserr,bly, together with the semz-
mo_ocoqua FC-FS adapter running throui|h the canlster.
The FC-FS separation system is located at the forward end of the adapter and
consists of a clamp-cable mechanism /or tie-down. The FC is released by tour
explosive bolts, any one of which will release the system. Electrical separation
occurs simultaneously with, and is caused by. mechanical separation. A
pressurization cystem is provided in the :anister to maintain a slight positive :
pressure differential (l psi) across the canister during the time period from
T terminal heat storUization to canister lid deployment.
---4
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SUSPENDEDCAPSULESTRUCTURES
• t
._t j MAIN PARACHUTE/
I-.-A i
CHUTE
.y,_CK
-,,%
/ VEL
PARACHUTE
I--A_ i I HARNESS
i i ARRANGEMENT :_
V:EWA-A :\ !!
__ (ENTRY SHELL REMOVED) \ j j
\ li
, ENTRY SHELL _jj "_
MOUNTING RING
76-o118P AND SEPARATION
i
TIM t.omplete eusl_nded caplul_ structure is composed of two semt-monoc')que
atructurea. _o forming the aftarbody contour (60 ° truncated-cone) and the other
• cylindrical laotian around the AV engine. These two structures are heft; _
tolcther by a ring at the aft end, and eight radial beams and the entry shell b
Mounting tin I at tha other and. The majority of the equipment is mounted on the
eilht radio _ beams in the front portl_ of the suspended capsule. The Iongerone
jOJldn I th_ el|ht rad_JI he•ms form the primary load path system for the /tV
online thrust and for parachute opening loads. Parachute harness lines run from
fot_r points at the molmting rl_g to a central u_.ivel joint from which a single riser "*
line attaches to the parachute. The parachute system, including the pilot chute.
t8 bin,lead ne&r the front of the stru:ture and ts deployed from its housin 8 on the
aide of the aftorbody.'
i, i /
1974020203-348
5331 v
/
c
SIGNiFiCANTSTUDYCONCLUSIONS
- n OnlyFeasibilityQuestionisLowq ParachuteOpening
• NewTVSystemDesign(onPlatform)ReducesWindGustEffects
to a Remote HazaRI
• FC System Has Adequate Performance and Weight Margins, a
High Oegree of Redundancyand AdequateFailure Mode
Provisions
;_ i_
r
£
+ ?6OZlBP
T,
The clesip of • physically inrle FC hen made it poeslble to accomplish mission _*
objectives with conservative desi|n. The system has eu/ficisnt weisht coatin8en-
efas so that n_Jor FC design chanson will not be necessary to accommodate any
ran|enAble increase in mission Inetrumen_tion requirements. All meier
possible failure modes have been considered in the delian. This considerntion
hls resultad in the inclue!on, where &ppropriata. of redundant luhlyltams or ±
L•¢reaeed cleeilll marline Cn overcome etnlle failures in a liven eubeyeteurn.
The Lncnrporetion of the two-axis limb&lied TV platform |inved I0 ibn _ rrt&Juis
,+
it possible to ob_in hllh relolutiaa TV pictures even in the presence of hills wind
Busts. The TV pintform maintains vertical orientation for capsule elevation
anjle,s lees U_s 4S o. Althonlh capsule swan I enlle. 8reetor than 4S ° eaa oce_.
with very hi|h wi_d lUSts, the capsule will return Is en annie nell _ 45 n wttht_
three to five eeconcis. When the capsule anlle is Irenter than 4S n TV shutter
operatise is inhibited. '.
+
_t l_matns to be domcms_rnted tJ_¢ IAr8e Imrnchutes can be deployed at low dynamic
pl'OSllnl's II. _--+
P
+
+ ?*
++
+++
+
+
+ +
• , • _ + /
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_" PRE-ENTRYWEIGHTSUMMARY
Calculated(C)
or % For Total
Estimated(E) Contingency
FLIGHTCAPSULE - (2967.0)
SterileCanisterLid E 0 ]25.0
PressurizationGas C 50 ]5.0
PRE-F/CSEPARATION - - (2827.0)
SterileCanisterBase E ,0 163.0
PressurizationTanks,Etc. C 0 35.0
Adapter C 20 125.0
How.,Cables,Bkts. E 0 45.4
SEPARATEDVEHICLE - - (2458.6}
PropulsionPropellant C 0 400.O
ACSColdGasExpelled E 0 L 0
WCHotGasExpelled C 0 17.6
ENTRYVEHICE - - (2040.O)
760164P
The definitise of Fll|ht Gzpclzle (FC) Is used on the &boys table represents _e
cmnl_ON woiJht of the FC &e mmmted to the _. The weisht summary is them
preIented in • bre&kdovm startin 8 at this point &nd subtrScti IUbtO_l wel8hti of
Jettisoned or consumed elements to arrive it the next sys:cm wnlsht, For
mzmmple, the sessile canister Ls Jettio_med end the pressurtsatimz pe Is ezqNtlnd
p_._r to orbital I_ecti0e_. The sum of these wollhts is sUbtlPlcNd _ro811the FC
_Jisht to &rrive et the pre-FC sel_lqZtiou or orbit woilht. 1Per eaclz v_ljht
element, the •boys _ble _'41c&tIS whether the _isht wee celc_zlated (hence has
lu4ppoz'thz8 I_elimina17 •nalyol8) or estimlted (_s_&lly • percezztAp of w_Jor
_Jijht U_SlOriOs). The perceetale ellowed for cozltinlpzncy im showzz in the third
eolumm. This eQmttnsptncy percentap is over _d above any safety incests, etc.
that rosy be used in individuA! weilht cslculattm_. The Z'et co_m_n shows the
wQlJkt re, each item. includlnj ccmthsSee_cy{•ctol..
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ENTRYWEIGHTSUMMARY
MICDA " O.22 DIAMETER" 15ft
; CalculatedIC)
or % For Total
Estimated_E) C_o.nt_ Weight
ENTRYVEHI CLE (2040.0)
EntryShell HeatShield C 29 370.7
Entry Sh_ll Structure C 20 343.0
Thermal Control E 0 30.O __
ACS- ReactionControl C 20 36.O
TVC- ReactionControl C 20 27.0
Hdw,Cables,Bkts. E 0 81,0
Availablefor Growth E O 127.3
SUSPENDEDCAPSULE (]025.O)
TbOIbSP
The tots! entry waHtht of Z,040 pounds _s based on an M/C_ o| 0. ZZ and a
diameter o! IS leer. The diameter was selected to allow conservatism in design
aS we II as el|owin 8 weilht available |or 8rowth to accommtJdate increased
mission object;yes. (urther (allure mode effects, etc. The entry weight cons;sis
¢_ two major cate|orlss: l) the entry shell end associated attachments (t_a._
portion jettisoned at pdrach_te dep|oymon_) dnd Z) the suspended capsule (that
port,on s_spanded o_ the _rachute, tn_l_dtnli the p_rach_te weiSht _.
A contingency |actor is included tn midst of the subsystem weight catejor(es over
and above the usual f_ctors of safely used on the operst;n g io_ds for material
slain|, st,:. to account for unknown brackets, material tolerances, etc. that
cannot be determined at the pre|iminary deslEn point.
%
¢
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SUSPENDEDCAPSULEWEIGHTSUMMARY
Calculated(C)
or % For Total
Estimated(E) Contingency
SUSPENDEDCAPSULE (1025.O)
Instrumentation C 25 ]%. ]
Altimeter;,Doppler C 25 54.4
Telecommunications C 25 III. 8
Power C 25 160.0
Parachute C 20 84.0
InertialRef.System C 20 21.6
Structure C 20 150.0
AfterbodyHeatShield C 20 _ 0
PropulsionCase C 20 49.0
Hw_, _kts,Cables E 0 129.5
k' .,ableforGrowth E 0 3?.6
760|$6P
The instrumentation wel|ht indicated in the above table includes both mission
experiments end dtallnolttc IPstruments, The redav altimeters end the doppler
racier are listed separately although they supply experimanUti data as well as
INIrformtnli ol_er fumctions. The telecommunications weisht includes all of the
relay communication link subsystems as v_ell as the date handlinB and storage
=ubeystemQ, All subsystem _'ezghts tndiceted above znclude the weight of necessary
associated hardware, i°e,, mo_ntlnlj containers, wirlniL. fasteners, etc. '.llother
btecketry, interconnectin| cablins, and miscellaneous hardware ere inc_ ,ct m the
', I next to llb|t wel|ht c&te|ory, V,rhich tS estimated at 15% of the suspended c, ,sule
i welsht, exci_dAn| the available for 8rowth wei=ht.
"_ The inertinl reference system mtlst be located in the suspended capsule since it
provides the orientation reference for the TV camera platform. Similarly. th,,
AV rocket case wel|ht is included in t_e suspended capsule weiliht since the cs,e
is retained aher deorblt thruetln=. -_
1
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MOll_l AND CONCEAL DP2IGN COMPARISONS
FOR THE VOYAGER CAPSULE
By James P. McNulty, Denlel B. Snow
and Leonard Roberts
IEI_OIX_ION
With the reductlon of the lower estiemte of atmospheric pressure on Mars
f_'oli0 millibars to 5 millibars and the substitution of the Saturn V for the
Sat_n IB as a launch vehicle, many technical areas in the Voyager Program
lWevlously studies must be reassessed. In reference 1, a thorough study was
_de of the entry from orbit mode for the currently predicted range of
al_ospheric pressures (_-10 _)_ utilizing the Saturn V. However, this study
via limited in scope in that 1% was concerned primarily with the entry phase
Of a single early mission and did not consider Integratlon of this m/salon
with futt_e missions in a manner to assure logical development of subsystems
with progr_ growth.
In an effort %o evaluate and identify the subsystem requ_relents
tJ_ou_out the Voyager P_ograla, an analytical study was made of capsule syste,as
required to land payloads of weights compatible with launch vehicle capability.
BINs and welghts of flight capsules ;ere lnwestlgsted parametrically in order
to determine the penalties associated with the standardization of subsystems
for the capsule delivery |yste_. Various decelerator mdes were considered
and a preliminary assessment was lade with respect to welght, reliability, "
dewelol_ent time, aLd standardization. Terminal landing systeus were also
tDwtstlaated and a trade-off comparison between modes was carried out.
In order to provide a basle for a meanin6Tul analysis, it was necessary
to bou_ the limits of the study with sole specific 6_ttdeltnes.
4
rJ ..... -
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These guidelines are defined in detail in the body of this report, but in
general, re._trlct the study to solely the out-of-orbit mode, utilization of
the _aturn V as launch vehicle, and to consideration of V)4-1jVH-2, V}4-3,
Yl4-h,V}4-7and VId-8as pos ible atmospheres. Specifically, the technical
study could be divided into four phases. Phase I is trajectory analyses.
lh/merous trajectories wer_-l-un to determine the load, velocity, altitude, and
flight path angle re. latlon_hip for the entire capsule wel_ht range under
consideration and, also, to cover capsules combined _rlth _t_ersonic
decelerators. Phase II is the development or' the l_rametric weights of
subsystems as a f_unctlonof capsule weight and 31ze. These weights were,
in general, derived by usln6 scaling law3 in combination wlth weights
detailed in AVCO's finnl report (reference I). Details of the scalln4; laws
used are presented in this report. Phase III is the synthesltl_4_ of the above
data lnto system estimates and presenting the system options in _ompariaon
form to illustrate the adwlntagee 9tnd dlaadvant_es of the various approaches.
_se IV is the conceptual representation of the selected mode, capsule and
subsystems to be carried throt4h the various ettaalons of the Voyager Program.
ST_mOLS
A c_oas sectional area, ft 2
CD drag coel*ficient
D dieter, ft.
• natural Ic_ bmsej 2.7182818
• acceleration of 6rarity, 32.2 _/seC 2
lsp s_eclflc lwpulae, lb
l( constant - : 120.
2
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M M_ch number
m mass, slugs
mb Lilllbar (atmospheric pressure)
q dynamic pressure, PSF
RADVS Badar Altimeter Dopple_ Velocity Sensor
V veloc_ty_ ft/sec
VII Voyager Model, used to designate a particular model
atmosphere, as YM-3 or VM-8
W _ight, Ib
¢ angle of attack, degx'ees
7 fll_t path angle, degrees
0 density, slugs/ft 3
C allocated cspeule
D delivery system
g entry conditions
f final, after rocket burn
I impact
l initial
IL impact llliter
P ]ropallant
p _araehute
PL _l_d
R reeldml
L m retz_ eystAm
•8 e ent_ sho_ etm_tmw
3
i
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SLS soft landir_ system
T total
t terminal
GUIDELINES
The follovLn_ is s llst of basic ays;em ground rules and constraints
that vere used throughout the study.
A. Booster - Saturn V
1. Geometric constraints placed on the cal_ule by the shroud and
spmcecraft are shorn in fl_ure 1.
2. Yhe payload capability of the Saturn V ls sho_ In fl_e 2.
B. Atmospheric 14odels
1. The model atmospheres considered are _lven in flIJura 3.
2. Ry]potheslzcd atmospheres havir_ surface at_ospherie densities
less than 5 mb are asstmed identical to the VM-8 atmosphere
except for pressure end denalty.
C. Capsule Aerod_rmmlc Shape
1. Co_lturatlon shall be 60 ° half a_le blt_,t cone.
2. l_'q coefficient . 1._
D. Calnule Separation
1. Capsule Is separated from the spaceernft vhlte In _'blt about
N_rs.
2. (_psule has octlw control systqm to ntt_In and bold thrust
vector control u61e for de-orbit thrust and to control angle
o/' attack (_l • O) durln_ entr 7.
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E. S_aeecraft Orbit
i. Only restrained to orbits vhleh vl]1 811ov the following:
S. _psule deorblt velocity increment - !_00 ft/_ec.
b. Capsule entry angle = -15 °.
c. Capsule entry veloclty in the 17,000 to 16,000 f_/see ranle.
d. Spacecraft to serve as s coIBunicatlonl relay.
STUff RESULTS
_me I - Trajectory A.r,,,lyses
The emery trsJectorles were obt_Irad by she use of the Li_le¥ Research
Center's A/wlysis and C(_tation I)Ivlslon's Ih-ogrem No. 7_. Thl8 proEram
CQSeputes the point uss trs_ectery of s capsule entering _he atmosphere
of • _pi_erieal hon-rotattn_ planet.
Cal_ule trs_e©tor'.es.- Values of :he trajectory parlterl (altltude,
vS1OClty_ tLBe, deceleration, heatln4g, and flight plth ar41e) vere ob_ilned
for t.be follo_ng lnput co.that.Ions In the Vl4-3 and _IW-8 atmospheres.
,/cDa. o.l_ to 0.3o
7s .4o ° _o -_)o°
= 12,0(20 to 16,000 tt/.ee
sad
-. ,/c_. o._ to o.75
_'I " "]'+s°
VI . 12,0ooto 16,0o0_/,ec
Plots of the traJeetory data are lJ_l_ded am fil_mes k, _. an4 6.
The reprasentatlv_ im'itera presented here _V| = 1_,(w_O _t/see, 7_ - -15°_
sad 1M-8) m t.he us_msd critical deslln conditions for the entry phase.
J
!
i
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The follovlng resultd are of interest on these plots. F'comfigure _¢,
q
two polnts can be made:
I. For capsules with m/CDA'S <0.35, aerodynsmlc br_klr_ has reduced the
capsule's velocity to about its terr.lnalvmlue; thus, deceleration has been
accompllshed with maximum efficiency. For m/Ci,k's> 0.35, the treJectorles
show that the cepsulp._ hnve not reached constant velocity and ere still
belr_ decelerated at impact; i.e., the "_4-8atmosphere is too thin to
decelerate efficiently the heavier capsu/._, therefore, an add,itlonel
dectlerstor system (more weight) must be eaploye_, to take out thls velocity
Increment above terminal.
2. A capsule with a m/CDA • 0.25 reaches a condition of Math 1.0 st
an altitude of ]5,000 feet. This altitude Is au/,,elent to allow deployment
Of a trsnsonlc parachute prior to landing. Conv,rsely, csl_ulea with m/CDA'S
ueater then 0.25 will require some type of SUl_rSo:Jic decelere%o_.
Fig.s 5 glves de_a on the capsule's flIEht path angle vhlch Is
pert.nent to the landin_ problem. As ls obvious, the landln_ problem is
aluaplifled with near vertlcel descent of the ce_u/e since both the rears
flrtr4 en_le and the look an_les of the alclt_le mmasu='lni%radar wou/d not be
chan61nG rapidly with descent altitude. The priory -.onclusio r- to be
drmw_ /Lrom these data is that for even s capsule vlth a m/CDA of 0.25 the
fll|ht path angle is a relatively shallow -&50 .tap altlt_le of 12,000 feet.
The deceleration-altitude history is liven on fi1[u_re6. The lntereltln_
_oints presented here ere that the deceleration t. relati,,ely 1_ _eemitive to
h/CDA w_letiona and that the "1;" lewll Is low which %ndlcetes that capsule
4ell|r _ 1_ r_ltrsln_ by _Linl_ _ conaidr,.stlomm under _ conditions.
s_
/
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..Trajectories of capsule s supplemented by supersonic decelerator.-
different types of supersonic dezelerators were considered: (1) expandable
afterbody type of high Mach n_nber deployment (M /_3.0) and (2) supersonic
parachute for deployment under Mach 3.0.
a. Ex_ndable afterbody
Since this type of decelerator sould be compatible with the higher
velocity deployments, i.e., heavier capsules, the parametric analysis was
used to investigate capsules havlng a vlde range of ballistic coefficients
(0.32 to 0.75). A computer iteration procedure was used to determine the
decelerator drag necessary to slow the capsu_ _ _ach i.O at 15,0OO feet for
a variety of initial conditions.
VE = 12,0OO to 16,O00 ft/sec )
?E = "i0°, "15°, "200 I Parametric
_4-8 ataosphere
Figure 7 atm,,nLrlzesthe decelerator drag-deployment math ,_tmber
relationship throughout the m/CDA : ange for the most critical entry
envi_ .rment. The important items to note from this figure are that
decelerator size requirements increase very rapidly vith capsule _/CDA and
that deployment roach number also increases vtth capsule m/CDA. For example,
• capsule vith an m/CDA = 0.75 would require a supersonic decelerator ten
times the size required by a capsule with m/CDA . 0._2.
b. Supersonic parachute
This study was restrlc_ed to ballistic coefflcAents 0.30 to 0.50 in
o_-der to be compatible with depl. y_'t in the low supersonic range. A
parametric study vas made of d££:erent size parachutes deployed •t various
7
t
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linch numbers to obtain the math number-parachute size relationships which
result in _tlsfactory conditions for utilization of a terminal landing system.
M = 1.0 to 2.5
Parachute N/CDA - 0.02 to 0.08 Parametric Ra_e
_M-8 ataosphere
F_ure 8 shows how the parachute size-deployment Math number relationship
wartes with entry Cal_ule m/CDA In order to obtnin a terlLlnal vertical descent
velocity less than 300 ft/sec and a flight path anale steeper than -75 ° at an
election of 10,000 feet abowe &he surface of Mars. These velocity, flight
_th ar_le, and altitude rtstralnts were selected in order to assure
compatlblllt7 w_th the 8tu_veyorsoft landing system. Three items of interest
ea.e evident from the data plotted in figure 8. An extremely large (120-foot
dtoaeter) pea'aehute, deployed at Mach 2.35 , is required to decelerate an
I/CDA = 0.50 capsule. An _-foot chute, deployed at Math 1.75 would suffice
for n%/CDA'S up to 0.35 while a s_ller parachute, _-foot diameter, would meet
the requirements for an m/CDA = 0.35 cspsule If deployed at Mach 2.5.
Phale II - Parametric Weights of Subsystems
Parlmetrtc weights of subsystems can be divided into tvo areas: area
No. I is concerned with thoo su0eyetems weights relatt_ to the delivery
oysl;eu (aeroshell, deorbit motor, etc.) and area No. 2 relates to the
ambr_tem velihts of the landin_ syatem (impact attenuation, decelerators,
ere.). Further, it Is helpful to separate the analysis of the problem
tUt@ the two rhases of delivery and landis. For purposes of analysis, the
@b_e@tlve of the delivery sywtem will be to delt_r the contents of the
@_ttle (lt_ '_resldtNLl" wet6ht)p to • condition of Math 1.0, at An altitude
8
_ "V "-- - _- ..,
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of 15,000 feet above theM artian surface; at this point, the landing
system takes over.
Delivery system.- There Is a delivered residual weight associated with
each slze and weight capsule launched and our objective is to define the
capsule which maximizes thls residual weight. This study is constrained,
by the shroud, to capsules less than20 feet In diameter, and by launch
vehicle capability, to capsules less than 12,0OO pounds. As the first step,
this delivery mode is divided into two phases: Part I from orbit to entry
and Part II from entry to an altitude of 15,OOO feet. Weights of the
•pproprlate subsystems are found as in the following manner:
The weight breakdown contained In AVCO's flna_ report is used as a basis
of scaling and Is reproduced in thls report as figure 9. The Items listed
below are subjected to scaling as detailed below In order to obtain
parametric data for a variety of capsule sizes.
i. Sterilization canister lld and base - This was assured to be a
constant unit weight structure and was scaled as •n area ratio or D2.
2. Pressurization gas and vslvlng - Since this gas is used solely to
maintain a small positive pressure within the canister and its
required voltme is more a function of leakage than capsule slzej
this Item was considered to be a constant.
3, Adapter and hardware items - These were scaled as functions of
capsule velgh_ since they wlll be sized by load criteria.
_. Deorblt propulsion system - The assumption of this study was that
deorblt velocity chlu14[e is equal to • constant. Thusj propellant
systela veilht can be considered proportional to the force associated
i with the mass underEoingvelocity chan4_e. Scale according to capsule
velght.
9
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5. Control gas system - Weights of the components for controls are
considered proportional to the inertia of the capsule (WD2) arid
inversely proportional to the moment arm between tne nozzles (D).
Thus, scallr_Efactor is WD.
6. Entry shell heat shield - For _nvlronment,l loads considered in this
report, AVCO found that the ablation weight is relatively
insensitive tO m/CDA (pg. 140, Vol. IIl, _k. I, Ref. I). Ablation
weIKht will be scaled according to surface area, D2.
7. Entry shell structure - Minlm_z gage considerations vitiates any
direct scalin@ procedure. Figure i0 is a plot of the par_etrlc
atruct_al welKhts obtained from AVCO's _chine program.
Expressing the stagnation pressure as a function of m/CDA and entry
condltlons, the following equation can be derived:
8. Thermal control - To be conserve%Iv( in this report end with the
lack of any clear-cut scaling c.'Iterla, this weight Is scaled by
volume (D3) relationship aasumlng interior of the capsule must be
kept at a specified temperature.
By _ing these sealing laws, the capsule's entry weight Is calculated
• f_nction of its allocated launch weight and diameter. This is carried
OUt by noting from figure 9 those elements coupr _ the difference between
allocated veiKht abd entry weiKht, and aubtractl_ .-lr scaled weight from
the allocated weight. This entry weight can be expressed as follows:
. vc - _._ - o.185_ - o.ooo_Wc_21
10
!,
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This equation is plotted as figure 11 and the capsule's ballistic
number can be found from figure 12 for the entry weight and diameter under
considerat ion.
From the capsule's entry weight, the capsule's residual weight can
be calculated in like m_nner from the scaling relationships. The residual
welght can be expressed as follows:
" 225 333 2-_
This equation is plotted as figure 13. The results shown on this
figure ass_e that the Martian atmosphere is sufficiently dense to slow the
capsule to a Mach 1.0 condition at 15,000 feet altitude by aerodynamic braking
on the capsule. Should this not be the case, the weight of _he required
supersonic decelerator to accomplish this deceleration must be subtracted
from the residual weight.
.L_ndln_ system.- Once the residual weight has been delivered to the
satisfactory conditions for initiation of the terminal landing system, it
becomes essential to identify the landing mode in order that the residual
weight can be divided into landing subsystems and payload. UnliKe the delive_y
system _Ight investigation, these landing system wei@hts are strictly
dependent upon the landin_ mode.
The first item of Interest, therefore, is the identification of this
landing mode. Two basic landing modes wer_ considered: i) Hard landing a
payload (surrounded by impact attenuation) with a parachute, and 2) Soft
landing the payload in a Surveyor-l_ke manner.
4
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Many parameters were of concern in deciding between these two modes.
In addition to weight, consideration was given to topographical effects,
deployment of experiments, reliability, and growth. Figure 14 shows that
either mode will land approximately the same payload fraction; this is because
the hypotheslzcd high wind velocity causes a high impact velocity for the
l_rachute borne payload so that the weight of required impact attenuator is
of the same order as the equipment and _ropellant required to effect e soft
landing. The topography may determine which concept, ball or legs, is
preferable. Legs offer stability on level ground under wind load but
conceivably would not be satisfactory if the surface had sharp discontinuities.
Deploying instruments through thick impact attenuation material presents
difficult problems; in addition, there is the possibility that the impact
attenuator will be sca.tered in the test area at impact thus effecting the
purity of the testing. The Surveyor system has proved its reliability by
landing an operating payload on the moon, while the engineering problems
associated wlth the ball concept have yet to be thoroughly studies. In the
: final COml_arlson area, it is felt that the soft landing concept is more
eompatlble wlth growth considerations since _al,ned sot% landings will be an
eventuality.
The soft landing concept was selected as the preferred landing mode
as a result of the above evaluations. In addition, it is noted that a
legged vehicle could be used to drop an instrumented ball should
topography indicate that a spherical payload be advantageous.
Follovlng selection of the basic landing mode, it is now possible to
identify the candidate landing subsyste_ and to obtain approximate
_r_etric for_ula,_ for the veight of each. This will allow the calculation
12
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of the landing system weight for various missions (capsule allocated weights)
and determlnation of the optlm_ combination of candidate landing subsystems.
Transonlc _rachute.- The size of the parachute is determined by the
terminal conditions desired. Its terminal veloelty-s£ze relation is given by:
C_A = Ws
2
CD _ A = WS
_g
°r A = CD_DV_
Since deployments will tame place at very low dynamic pressures, it Is
anticipated that deployment loads (with reefln_;,if required) will be
sufficiently low to allow use of a minim,-- gage structure. Thus, the
parachute weight will be proportional to its size.
_fp - Kv_S , where K represents the constant factors
"t
Uslag the AWL0 calculations where it was found that the parachute would
weigh 70 pounds for a suspended weight of 1025 pounds and a terminal velocity
of 128 ft/sec, the value of K is found to be 1120. Thus, the parachute weight
can be expressed as
,. 112oWs
I,_act attenuation.- Considerable work has been done by l_O and others
in determining the payload fractions associated with balsa wood impact
limiters. The payload fraction is defined as the ratio of the weight of the
payload (WpL) to the c_bined weight (WT) of the payload and the impact
limiter (WIL). Balsa wood is being taken as reference because of its high
energy absorption to _mit weight ratio over a wide range of imPaCt velocities.
The ratio between gross payload fraction and impact velocity (V$)
is given in fiigure 15s as reparted in reference 2. For making comparison
13
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evaltmtions, the followlng simplified linear equation wl]l be used for the
weight of the impact llmlter:
Retro S_stem.- The ratio of initial weight (Wi) to the final burned-out
weight (Wf) can be obtained readily from the following formula and is
dependent upon the specific impulse and the velocity increment:
Z_V. Isp g In Nt
wf
this reduces to
WI • • /xV , where = 270 for, solid propellant
wf _ z,p
_= • AV
wi-wP
.dV
wp. wl(1-e_)
to this propellant weight, it is necessary to add 20 percent to
account for the auxiliary rocket hardware. Thus
-_V
Wm - 1.2 Wl (1-e _ )
Inflatable supersonic decelerator.- Preliminary weight estimates were
lmde for attached inflatable afterbodies required to decelerate various
al_e add weight capsules to a condition of 14ach 1.0 at 15,000 feet above the
"Mlrtian surface. These estimates were based on in-boule analyses
aaltming an inflatable torus at the base of the cone with fabric in tension
between the aeroshell and the torus. These weight estimates are Kiven in
figure 16. Since these weights were calculated for a static condition to
9rewent buckling of the torusj a factor of at least 20 percent should be
added to Iccount for d_'n_lie effects.
Soft laDdl_ system (Surveyor t_fpe).- S_a-veyor loft-liMed on the moon
with the aid O_ II rider lltlmater and doppler velocity lenlor (RADVS).
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The terminal descent mode of the landing on the moom Is given on flg_e 17;
it should be noted that the vernier retro system takeover occurs at a velocity
of 350 ft/sec end an altitude of 25,000 feet. Hughes Aircraft Company made
a Irrelimlh_ry study to define the mo_ficatlor.s req_:i_,' tL,v,a_-,the system
: applicable to a Mars landing. The recommended Marc '_aJc,"ory qond. tlons
are indicated in figure 18; the correspondlng condlt_ons for the ver:,ler
retro system takeover sre a velocity of _00 ft/sec and an altitude of
I0,000 feet. The primary dlfference in the concepts is that for a moon
la_di_ the primary deceleration is by a main retro burn while at Mars tl_e
deceleration is caused by aerodynam_ brakln_.
It remains now to deflne the subsystem weight of the landln_ system so
that the net resldual weight evsllsble for paylosd can be de_ermlned. The
aubsystems can be placed into two categorles--flxed welght item_ and items
whose weight will vat? with magnitude of the lander. As a reault of
discussion with representatlves of Hughes Aircraft and JPT, together with
In-house est1_m_tes, the followlng weight estimate was derived:
Fixed Wel6h_ If_Js: 8J60
Structure 300
Flight Control (KADVS) 75 '_
Cowmun. and Power 120
Cabling, Thermal Control 100
Propulsion System 2_
Variable Weight Item:
_o_n._ wi(1.e_)
t
15
I
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Fig_e 19 shows a resldua] w._.Ightcomparison between two 19-foot dlazet_r
entry capsules. The dashed c,_cves are.for s cap:_le of I_360 pounds entry
._elght (_axlm_ u]lowable for each oe two equal-welght c_pzn]es In a Saturn V
booster) and a ballistic nlmber (m/C/w%)of 0.52. The solid curves are for a
capsule of 5bOO pounds entry weight _.: a ballistlc number of 0.25 (the
largest n/CDA which will permlt deceleration to Mach number 1.0 at 15,000 feet
from capsule aerodyn_.micbraklng in VM-8 atmosi_iere%rith VE = 12,000 ft/sec
and _ _-15°).
The 0.25 m/CDA curve represents a system designed to enter 8 _ mill_bar
pressure atmosphere and the associated delivery system (WD - 1600 po%h_ds)
is designed for the conditions encountered In this atmosphere. Its velght,
therefore, is lIxed. If the atmosphere Is found to be _eater than _ mb,
which wotuld allow more entry weight "greater WR and higher m/CDA) , the
delivery system would be unable to aeco_ate it from a stl-uctural standpoint.
Consequently, 1800 pounds of residual welght (WR) is the maximum whleh can be
aceomodsted with the )600 po_Ad basic delivery system. _he stralght sloplng
llne _cera t_ _i weight capability for attw_spheres of less than 5 rob.
7c_ example, at h mb the WR = 1120 pounds. If an addltinnal decelerator
system is used to decelerate the capsule %o Mach 1.0 at 15_O(X) feet In a b mb
atmosphere, the residual vel_ht is 1700 pounds as read on the curve aretn_
down to the left. Thls c_ve shows the added residual velght w1_tch can be
obtained in lov pressure atmospheres by the. addltlon of a superson£c
decelerator.
Using t_e maximum capab111ty of the Saturn V booster, a systla can be
4esl&_ed vhteh vould provtdl 1_60 pounds of entry wsl_ht (ihovn on the
I/CDA = 0.32 curve). The delivery system weight for thi_ ¢_sa _uld be
]97402020:3-370
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Bus, the folloTLng equation will be used for the weight of the soft
lander bus :
wsrs = _4o + wt (1-e _)
Phase III- System 3ynthesla
_ain s the device _11 be used of dividing the capsule into two systems:
• delivery system and a landing system. The obJectiyes will be to determine
an opt/m_n aeroshell for _eliverlng the payload and to define the method of
soft landing the payload on the surface of _,ars.
_Del.iver_system.- While it is important to obtain laxtmtm trtillzattou
of the Saturn V booster cap•hi!try in deliverln_ an In_tr_ented Psyload to
MaI-s, prime consideration must be given to the sizing'of a capsule which
results in dellverln8 the maximum residual welght to the ter_tml landing
conditions. It is, therefore, necessary to select a capsule with the optimum
ballistic number (m/CDA) that will perllt deceleration to the d•alred terminal
&ltttude-_sch number conditions, for the probable range _f atmoel_eric pressure,
without lnctwri_ an unacceptable delivery weight penalty for the lnstrLm_nted
payload. Residual weight, as used herein_ Is defined as follows: "The veldt
resld_n_ in the aeroshell (NE-WD) which is delivered to an altitude of 15,0GO
feet above the s_face of Mars at velocity equal to le.;ch 1.0."
Th|s study provides ecuparison of residual welKhts achievable with •
variety of capsules, varyin4_ Fro• the heaviest capsule or dtutl c•_attlaa which
can be accomodated by the Sattrn V to minimum capsules of the Apollo and
Mercury size. Parametric ee_ht equations derived tn the preceding section B
were used to determine the c•psule vel_ht allocations s entry weights, •nd
residual weiShta.
16
"- L
i
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1800 pounds and would c_ry 2560 pounds of residual payload for an atmospheric
pressure of 6.4 mb or greater. For lower press_e atmospheres, the arclnc
llne shove the residual weight capability _'Ith a supersonic decelerator
system and the straight sloping llne snows the residual weight c•Mahillty of
the delivery system without a supersonic decelerator.
It is easily sho_n, by observing the two straight slopin4_ lines, that if
a delivery systc_ is death.ned for _axlm_ booster capability vlthout s
eul_ersonlc decelerator ald and '.heatmospheric pressm'e turns out to be less
than 5.3 rob,a weight penalty existS. This penalty is 203 pounds frol 5 mb
down.
Figure 20 makes the same comparlson ea shown ir °Igure 19 except that the
capsules are 13._5-feet in diameter; an are• factor of I/2 for con_e_Ison vlth
the 19-foot diameter. For this capsule size, the 1,elght penalty for using
the maxi_ booster capability vii.hour a Ju_ersonlc decelerator aid occurs at
pressures below 6.05 mb and mmot._ta to 360 pounds •t _II In'eaaures below 5 rob.
It is obviouJ from Figure 19 and 20 that if a capsule of maxlaLm
cspablllty ls used, the 19-foo_ diameter design ls advantageous for all
_ressu_es belc_ 10.7 rob. It can also be seen that the 19-foot capsule
provides greater c•pabillty for the case Here m/CDA . 0.25.
Vlth only • 200 pound penalty for the saxli,m capability syste_ and the
potential for luch greater residual weights at pressures _ow _.3 _b, a
19-foot dLaaeter capsule designed for loads c_patibl_, with • ballistic ntmber
of 0.32 presents advantages which sake it attract_vo. •s an entry capsule
cOnfl_rnt Ion,
_n additional cc _rtson can be made of the realdua _- vell_l_ts available
_t_a one capsule _ad Prom _vo capsule systmms. _t Is lpp_te_ tr_s flg_re 21
_8
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that two _O0-pound capsules vlll deliver more residual veight than • slnsle
12pO_-_und capsule for the sntlclpateQ stmOSl_herlc preesm-e range. At
pressures above 11.5 mb the one capsule concept becomes .m-efersble _rom t_e
residual v_Ight standpclnt. Since it is unlikely that the _t_ospherlc sur._sce
_a_ss_e vii1 exceeJ 10 sb, the sole advantage of utlllzlnl_ a mir_e 12jO00
cmpsule vould be to deliver, in a |%r_le T_cke_e, a residual velsht uester
than 2_0 pounds (liaited to a aaxlmum of 3_-pounds in d 5 mb staospt_re).
0n the basis of the above, the follovlr_ selectlon Is i_de: use the
/m'_st size cepb_le (19-foot d_met_r) and the dual cnpoule syotem. This
selection offers many advantases.
The 19-foot disaster capsule vii1 alloy:
s. Parachute deployment st Hsch 1.2 in the early aission because
a_-odyr_ltc brakt_ viii reduce velocity sufficiently.
b. £ co.on aeroshell lot ell missions since St _Ltalailez the _/CDA
_ ILIIliOni •
e. Parachute deployment st less than Msch 2.0 In the later heavier
Ca_, "-IS RLil SlOl_ •
4. A scion dellwer_ sodr of eeroshell _d parachute to deliver payload
to te/_ln_l coodltions for the landln_ systeL
The dual caps.@ syet_e ,Jill alloy:
a. Delive_,v of _ore _load _l_ht.
b. _ flaxlblllty in nitro and scieoce experis_nt selection.
e. l_e4undaney.
4. USe O_' _ _l(_t_ (Mash 2.0) dleeelerslr_rs (one cspa-le eo_ee]_,
_t_dre a_s_rl--t41_ )beh _.0 4acelerntors).
19
/ I • . ...... _ ......... ; '"_l_ -_"_111_,
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_I_II system.- In a ;nevious section, it veto det_rained that a soft
landl_ controlled retro m_de yes superior to hard /andlng • peyloed
gush.ended f_ol • _achutc. The problem is nov redu," _d to determining the
best mea_ of conveyln_ the landing payload from .he lmq_act trajectory Of the
tmslc m/CDA . 0.32 capsule to this soft landing condition. The alternate
means of retro deceleration end aerody_mai_ braki._4_ to effect this transfer
are indicated on figure 18; vhlle : tvo-burn retro syJtem Is indicated, • one
burn system coui_ be utilized If It vere highly throttleable. It is
ewphasized that the transfer points smo_ de:el•ration modes can be moved
f_rgm the lo: ations indicated If trade-oft" _tudles show better efficiency
@ml be obtained. Hoverer, e_h an ln-d_pth trade ot_ study Is beyor_ the
ocope of this report and the location of the deceleration Interfaces as shorn
"J Ir FII_e 18 vlll be asaLmed vL11d for purposes of coe_srleon.
The follovln_ l_Idln_ systems _ere considered and cow;e.rlmona made on
the basis of the m/¢Da . 0._ rspsule.
s. kLrolhell, retro, RADV_ - In this mode, attar the recto•hell
decelerltes the ¢apaule to ii00 feet/second •t an altitude of •ppr_t_tely
1_000 feet, s retro system is initiated vhlch deceleretsj the capsule (by
:_'1_ t.hro_."h openings in the aeroshell) *,o a velocttF of •bout _CO feet/
m_ond). I_DV_ takes over at this point _nd lands the cs]_.ule. _ alternate
lmadl_ _odes are possible: 1) land the aeroshell on its apex •t • low _
welo_lty so that Itnimtm leper •ttenu_tion Is required for the Imylo_! or
2) retro-oep_rsta the asroehell n_ar the surface and -and vith lels.
_in_l_ ehm_scter1¢tles of the sy|teln &re lllustr&t_d on f;_rure 22.
b. £m_oehell, parachute, 1_2V8 - Yhim sods (1_i4_we 23) is i_e_tteal
tJ_ brakiM ph_o ]rovtded by the met•shell. At appr_lmtely 19,000
o
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feet a parachute is deployed (Math 1.6) and the aeroshell Jettisoned. The
]_yload is decelerated to 300 feet/second and its flight path angle increased
to near vertical (-75°) as it descends by parachute to the I0,000 foot
elevation. At this e]evstion, the parachute is released and the payload
descends under controlled retro fire. In addition to soft landing, this mode
offers the additional advantages of i) long stay time in atmosphere for
atmospheric experiments without _pewlng rocket exhaust which could affect data
.weasurements, 2) being adaptable to release of instr_mented spherical ball
shortly before impact since payload could be support-d in an open framework,
end 3) a parachute operation which is practically independent of atmosphere
u it will reach a satisfactory terminal velocity at the desired altitude
for RADVS operation.
The efficiency of the two systems were investigated by making weight
estimates of the operational peJloads the syst.-ms could land. The results
are 8_ized below:
Aeroshell- Aerosehll-
Retro- Parachute-
RAD_ RADW
Capeule Weight 6000 Ibs 6000 ibs
8elmrated before entry -16_0 -16_0
Entry weight _
Separated at 19,000 ft 0 -1800
Expended by 10,000 ft 100
I 0 1040
Soft Iandi_ System
Ae,'o_el.1 1800
_1oad io3o l_o
]_c&wle of the ]_.rach,_e mode's greater efficiency s its flexibility to
_d_ust to varying atmospheres and payloads, and its state-of-the-art
technolo_ (the perfor_r_e of retro-propuls!nn _ys_e_ in the presence of
21
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l_yloads ere considered to be of tvo types: those suitable for early missions
(1973, 1_5) vhere emphasis will be on atmospheric prol_rties and gross
surface characteristics, and those payloads for later missions (1977, I_9)
vhere the objective is primarily blolo_ical.
Figure 25, "Probe," and _,'_robe/Lander," represent the ea_'lymission
payloads. The Probe mission is, in esse1_e, the mlssio_ studies by AVEO
(reference I) which was a non-survlvable atmospheric probe with descent TV.
The Probe/Lander is a duplicate of the Probe vith the addition of a
strwlvable 210 pound ball to obtain some surface data. It is felt that either
of these missions can be carried out in 1973. The choice rill depend on the
economics involved and on the feasibility of developing a vorthwhile scientific
surface package vithin the _ight limitation. Figures 27, _'Semi-soft Lander,"
and 28, "Advanced Lander," represent the later mission payloads where
experiments performed on the surface take precedence. The overall weight is
restrained by the launch vehicle's cal_hility but it is evident that the net
weight deliverable to the surface, for either mode, is sufficient for an
Aut_ated Biological I£boratory; the Philco study (refere_e 3) indicates
that 1200 pounds of payload is required for the A_L. _'aechoice between
Lenders in this category will depend UlXm the topogr&l_y. The TV syutem in
e_ly _iaslona is planned so as to furnish the neeesury data to guide
election of the landing mode: cluidir_ctional or legged.
It ehould be __._+ed that these four pe_loade use the _ delivery
lyNtem (aeroehell) and l_ding ly_te_ (parachute-retro); i_-the_ each ie
deet_ed to be _oun_ed in_i_m th_ aeroehell. In addition_ the _o_pt _kee
_oseible a clean interface bet_en the Icie_tific payload and the landi_
lyete_ f_ ee_e in integration.
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an oncoming supersonic flow and the logic to control the retro fire so as to
perform the mission requirements in an unkno _ a42aosphere _re regarded as :ore
difficult p_oblems), the aeroshell-parachute-RADVS syste_ is selected as the
preferred mode.
Phase IV - Conceptual Design
In addition to l:r@senting concepts for the various facets of the problem
ouch as mission mode, capsule definition and candidate payloads, it is an
objective of this phase to indicate how these various items Lutegrate to form
a unified system.
As defi_ed in the preceding sections, the selected mission :ode uses the
maximu: diameter aeroshell to make opti:uB use of the capsule's aerodyuamAc
braking. The capsule's braking alloys the deployment of a parachute (at a
maximum roach number of 1.6 for the heavier dual capsule concept) which
accomplishes two objectives; It decelerates the payload and separates the
l_load fro_ the aeroshell.
The 1Lrge diameter of the capsule is in keeping with the concept of
_rc_th. The sam aeroehell structure can be used for the early and the
subsequent Voy_er lilsions with a mall weight penalty. In addition, the
capsule's slle allc_ the eal_ule to house a variety of payloads fr_
ema-ly mAssion probes to late lission landers with a mlnlmnm of interface
_oble_. _nis capability of the capsule is illustrated in figures 2_
t_t_ 28. Fi_e 2_ presents a si_if'.ed dr&viag of the ealIule's
de_tvery s_tem and indicates the vol_ae avoAlable for tr_nsl_t_ •
_loe4; the wight of this delivery syste_ is ncted so that c_aplete
eyete_ for v_rions candidate p_lo_s can be deterlined. The candidate
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Advanced-Lander: This mission is the same as the above mission cxept
the lander bus is landed in the Surveyor manner on legs with
the ABL mounted on the lander. It is necessary that sufficient
topographical data, either from TV and/or from the engineering
landing experiment on a previous mission, be obtained prior to
using this mode.
SUMMARY
7
The following items represent the main findings of this study:
i. Selection of the two 6000-pour,d capsule systems, rather than one
12,000-capsule system, because it lands greater total weight and affords more
flexibility for landing sites and redundancy.
2. Selection of a 19-foot diameter capsule, maxLmtm diameter compatible
with shroud restraint, because it furnishes maximum aerodynamic braking and
is compatible _th future growth _acka_ing and weight considerations.
]. S_ndardlzation of aeroshell for all missions. This results in a
linor weight penalty on early missions.
_. Selection of a propulsive type lander system because it permits soft
landing even in the presence of vln_s.
5. Use of a parachute to provide the transition from capsule trajectory
to propulsive descent. Parachute deployment Mach number will vary from 1.2
in early missions to 1.6 in th_ later missions.
6. Emplo_ent of a _ommon mission mode fo_" all lander mismionl 1973 -
1979. The mission 1ode should co_ist of aeroahell-l_arachute-lropulsiw soft
ll_tding vhi@h ItllOV| for the eaximtm col_onaltty of Submyst_.
25
k
1974020203-378
361
Figure 29 through 32 indicate _he mission modes that are compatible with
the above payloads. These modes are briefly described below foL" the
respective payloads.
Probe: The parachute is deployed at a Mach number of 1.2 at an altitude
of 21,000 feet. The m_Jor experiments (inclndlng TV) are made
during the parachute descent and the descent packs_e does not
survive impact. Some preliminary information can be obtained on
surface hardness by the deployirg of penetrometers shortly
before impact.
l_robe/Lander: This mode is a duplicate of the above mission until the
pamachute is Jettisoned at about 5,000 feet. With the vernier
motors controlled so that the capsule obtains zero velocity a
short distance above the surface, a 200-pound ball is released
to impact at less than 50 feet/second. This package will relay
impact aceelerometer data e_d will monitor atmospheric
conditions at the surface for a short period in order to note any
variations with time.
Sea-Soft Lander: On this mission, the parachute is Jettisoned at
approximately lO,000 feet and the lander descends under active
vernier control. A 1400-pound bali (a i omnl-dtrecttonally
protected Automated Biological Laboratory) ls released near the
e_a-faceas in the Probe/Lander mode. It is noted that an
e_lneering experiment of attempting to land the lander hue on
legs could be included vlthout endangeri_ the success Of the
priam m_salon.
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c
:: TABLEVI
WEIGHTSUMMARY
M/CDA = 0.22 slug/fl2
Diameter - 15 feet
c o - I.Q8
Flight Capsule 29ZZ. I
Sterilization canister lid 125.0
t Pressurisation gas 15.0
= Pre-FC Separation Z872. 1
Sterile canister base 163, 0
Pressurisation nozzle valvus 6.0
FC - FS s,4apter IZ5.0
Hardware. brackets, cables 29.5
{
Separated Vehicle Z4S8.6
Propulsion propellant 4G0, 0 _
ACS flag expelled 1.0
'PVC gas expelled 17.6
' Entry Vehicle 2040.0
Entry shell heat shield $70. ?
Entry shell structure .343.0 '
Thermal control 30.0
* ACS - reaction control 42.4
TVC - reaction control 48, S
H_rdware. brackets, cables 83.5
Available for 8rowth 96.9
_aepen_ed Capsule 1025.0
"_*_ Instrumentation 205.6
l_adar 56.9
Telecommumcatim18 117.4
*_ Power supp,y 178.0
- Parachute 84.0
_rt/Al re.rinse e_ten 21.6
; Propulsion case 49.0 _"
Structure 96.0
Hardware, brackotl, cables 131.0
Prolrammi_g _d sequencing 23.6
', Af_rbody heat shield 36.0
Available for growth 8S. 9
/
FI4p_ 9.- Vqd4lb_ emma.,/for probe sd.sLtm
"' i
./
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I..'N!_'" D STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ' p
Lansley Research Center
TO : Associate Director DATZ: Parch 27, 1967
FIOM : Chief, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
|UIJI[C_I': P_etlas at Pasadene California on March 22 end 23, 1967 st J1FL to organize
Interim Project Office (IPO) for Voyeger manasement (see agende, attachment
l)
The follo_Ing members of the Project Pansge=ent Cousnlttee attended the subject
weting:
Donald P. Hearth - ('c:In$ Project Henager) (Interim Project Office)
_orge Nesh - (Sec_ _4ry from Earl Sample's group) (Interim Project Office)
Robert flock - (KSC [_uneh Operations)
C. H. Foss - IL_C
G. Ioblllerd - JPL (Project Office Support Need) (I.P.O.)
Leonard N. Plaseckl - JPL (SIS Manager)
Nick ^. kpnzettI - 3PL (SFQF) (T & DA PLaneser)
Charles Chambers - MSFC - L/V
Dave Nevby - HSFC - SIC Bus
DOn P. Burcham - JPL
Walk F. Eichweld - JPL - HOS Manager
Hr. gon Hearth announced that he had talked to Kr. Otan Nick8 who appeared with
Dr. Eomer E. Neve/.Lb4t/ara the louee Sp@ce C_ittee (Rep. I_rth) on Hatch 22 t:
rev/ev the Lunar and Planetary program, l_r. Nicks felt that the cOunlttee's reaction
to the Voyeger project yes very favorable, klso he Tcported thec the 19_I Hare fly-
by vlth stmoepherlc probe had a favorable receptlon.
The OUA Headquarters' Voys|er PrOlrr_ Offlce at present is ae follows according to
Nr. Rearth:
(see attached Chart 1)
pep 2
\
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Hr. Hearth described the Voyager Interim Project Office setu? to date. The office is
located on the top two floors of the Union B_nk Building in Pasadena C_llfornia (co_.
• er of Lake and Cordo_,a Stre__ts). He stated that he would serve as the interim pro-
Jeer manager and would spend approximately half his time in Pasadena. The final Pro-
_ect Office is to be formed no earlier than July 1967 and no later than October 1967.
YEa X.P.O. is ss follows with lead personnel named v;,ere they have been selected.
(see chart 2)
pal_e 4
Mr. Iobillard dlscussed the mode of spar, ion for the Hission Analysis and Engineering
Group. He stated that they will concern themselves with mission end design problems
which interact across syster's such as co_munlca_ions and veisht. Also they would
serve for the I.P.O. ae s technical re,teree among systems. It is intended to keep
this group In operation at least until October 1967 to insure compatibility of designs
end RFP's for Phase "C" procure_,ents, Some technical capebillties will be needed in
the Project Office subsequent to October 1967. The Mission An,_lysls end Engineering
Group vllI support the Hisslon Design Working Group (discussed Isle0.. Data for buy-
off by MD_ will be generated by the HD & g group.
To provide participation, visibility, and revlew by key systems personnel an interim
_alement arrangement yes discussed end agreed upon as a means of coordination, and
integration amens tFe Voyager Systems. This is hkaded by a Project Manasement C _ _.rtee
chaired by the Interim _oJect Hanaser (Hearth). The committee ',s composed of a , . _er
or umbers from each Voyager system (S/C, CB, SLS, 1405, TO$, L/V, LO). The IMC would
oervt to coordinate, exchsnse information end review output of working groups. The
mode of operation would be interim meetings (prob4bly monthly) railed by Hr. Don Hearth.
IM&E would . lpport the group technically and action ttem, u would be taken beck to the
Canters' involved for york and resolution.
A series of vorkin s groups would report to the FI4C. These groups would b,_ made up of
members from the Systems involved chaired in most cases by 8 man east&ned to the Interim
Project Office. A_stn, the wo_ n$ groups would function through persist meetings vlth
members taking action items bac_ to their Centers for york and resolutil_.
Some vorkln| groups would appoint panels to break the york into smaller u_Its.
Technical commitment and interface for Centers will be m_de through the _Orking groups
vile review by the P:oJt_t 14anasemenL COmmittee. All agreed that the gr_s should
primarily concern themselves with items which interact amens all eyetesns. For example,
illterfaces between only two systems should be settled by the systems involved.
The emtire structure for lnterl:l )/anas4ment Is ehovu as follo_:
(Joe shut 3)
pqe 5
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Mr. Walt E'chv,ald of JPL talked on the prellm_nary Hlsslon Operations System plans, i
He stated that the Has would be responslbile for the hardware and software for
missions operation and control. MOS would also be responsible for HOC (Hission Opera-
tlons Complex) design. JPL is setting ul_ design team to familiarize mission operations
sequences and Interfaces and to implement. It was not clear as to the systems eontrsct
responsibilities In the Has and HOC area. It is recommended that Hr. Bayer and Hr.
Martin of LOPO review the preliminary documents (attachments 3 & 4) prepared by
Hr. Eichwald.
Hr. Eichwsld requested that LRC assign personnel to the HOC design tess.
Project guidelines were reviewed. Decisions were made on some. Others were left open
fat more study.
I. I;i11 use two planetary vehicles on one Saturn V
2. Backup launch vehicle. No decision was made but two slternstes tmre discussed.
a. 1'vo Saturn V's erected simultaneously on pad 39. Shift planetary vehi-
©lea to backups in case of problems.
b. Hove launch to next launch window (two to three months later) and change
trajectory (type I to type 2)
3. Lifetise - No decision x'eached; however, two days on surface most probable.
To be sxsmlned as to use of batteries or RTG. It was felt tha_ the capsule should be
desilmed thermally for the RTG in 1973.
A. Capsule weight - No decision reached. However it was decided to consider
500at, 6000# and ?00OQ capsule weights and determine trade-oils and penalties for
desil;_ing 73 mission for heavier weights. MSFC will examine design of S/C Bus for
7000_ capsule.
$. Design falsest size capsule which will fit Ln shroud.
6. Two planetary vehicles identical for 73 missions.
7. Design for Mars only as starting point.
8. Capsule B,is will be entered out of Hat's orbit.
9. Type I trajectory will be used Is starting point. (Type X has encounter
st less than 180_, Type II has encounter .sore than 180°). Type 1I is double trip time
end dist.,.,_ce for Type I but allows more payload vtisht.
10. Staple payloads (experL-ments) viii be furnished by l?O as stetting _uidel/ne.
11. liar's sodal will be furnished by the Y.,'_J es ,t_rtln8 pointi density, terrain,
@to.
1974020203-431
7The phase "C" schedule was reviewed, moving the RFP relcsse date fr_ October 67 to
November 67 to alloy more time to take advantage of Informatlon from the Fh_se B
contractual and in-house studies was discussed. All parties were asked to loQk at
their system procurement schedules in detail and discuss these 8t the next IM¢ meeting.
Mr. Hearth asked for a discussion and recommendations from each system at the next PH_
meeting on the role and responsibilities of the Latmch Operations System (KSC).
|. I_o heads up assembly and checkout te_ at the Cape?
2. Do systems contractors partictpate_
It was requested that a11 systems review the f.y. 67 and 68 budget (attach_nt 5) and
be prepared to discuss their 8peclflc requirements at the next PKC meeting.
H discussion on repotting was held. A preliminary document (attachment 6) for review
msa submitted by Hr. Hearth. The proposed system is based on the HIC System used by
13tO on the Orbiter. Co, meats on the proposed document were requested by Hr. Hearth
by I_rch 31, 1967.
ACTION ITEHS (Next PHC meeting i8 scheduled for "_Id-Aprll 1967)
l.Comnent on HOg plan by next PH¢ meeting.
2. Appoint Working Group representatives by April 5, 1967.
3. Doe Hetrth, JPL, and LRC will meet r_ext week on capsule and 51.5 interfaces.
4. Iteview and c_t on l_ase C schedule by next IMC meeting.
3. Arrive at reconNnded position on operations at LSC prior to next PHC meeting.
6. levity recoenended zeporting system and cownent b_/ Hatch 31, 1967.
7. Mike rec_endations for chairman for Facilities Working Group. All attendees
felt someone who is recoKnized and respected byCof F personnel in Headquarters i8 needed.
¢OL_ budget must be prepared by Nay 67 if posslble.
8. |evleta budget for f.y. 67 and 68 by next _ qeeting and recommend concurrence
C_ changes (attachment 5).
9. The _riter discussed the Voyager experiments with Hr. Ne_toy of NSFC, Dr. Burcham
of JFL and Hr. Don Hearth. All agreed that the experiment hardware development should
be s project reaponaibility. Nr. Hearth agreed that the entry experiments in psrtlcular
were primarily engineering experiments needed to determine and analyze the operation of
the Capsule Bus and possibly could be handled in a manner similar to the Ltmar OrbLter
experiments. Mr. Hearth 8ussasted that Lansley represantativea should contact Bob
Fallows of 0$5A on this matter in the near fu*_ure.
v/n C. Ltlsora
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IN-HOUSE FEASII_ILITY SIX/DIES - PLANETARY EX3LORATTON PROGRAM
Ob_eetlve
The objective of thls In-house.study is to enable the I_ngley
Research Center to recommend to NASA Headquarters alternate approaches for
plametary exploration, in vlew of the present deferment of the Voyager
Pro6ram.
_ethod of Approach
Scientific and enKineerin_ obJ_ctive_ will b- _peciTie_ and priorltlzed for
planetary exploration in the period 1971-73 for both Mars and Venus.
The payload capability of the spectr,Amof available l&unch vehicle
_ysteus smaller than Sat,_rn V will be evaluated and a liI_ted number
selected and used for this study.
A conceptual spacecraft design shall be created for each selected
launch vehlcle to carry out as many of the stated scientific objectives
as practicable. A mission plan will be evolved for each spacecraft/
launch vehicle combination to verify over-all feasibility. All recommended
eomblnatiuns shall be examined for future _Trowth ca_billty. The _eed
for advancements or additional study _nto tec}mology areas will be idpntifled.
Trade-o_f studies eomongthe various configuratlons shall be carried
@ut leadIDK to the flnal LRC recommendation to NASA Headquarters.
_Idellnes
A. The following El_delines and/or constraints shall govern during
%he performance of this study:
I. Planets to be considered - Mars and Venus
2. Launch dates: Mars - 1971, 1973 6F£SoT_
Venus- 1972, 197!)
3. ConfiEuratlons - Orbiter spacecraft with _nd without probe
_, Orbit characteristics - polar orbit desired to provide full
planet coverage.
_, Orbit lifetime for a nonsterilized orblter spacecraft to be
90 years as required by NASA planetary quarantlne criteria.
6. Entry probes to be _terillzed in accordance with
NASA a_reements.
7. _en_h of _sslon - a Eoal of covecsge o_ a planet seasonal
change la deslred for Mars; Venus n_eds further study.
, \
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8. For each launch opportunity, thrre shall be twL- launches;
a third spacec-at't shouhl b, Frep_red and available at the
launch fa_-illty as a back-',,, to help assure the intended
launches.
9- It _s desired that each la,znch window be not less than
about 30 days in duration.
lO. The launch facilities at ETR are to be utilized.
II. Plannin_ shall be on th_ basis of usinK the exlstln4_
capabillties of the Deep Space Network (Deep Space Stations
Lnd the Space Flight Operations Facility).
12. Maxlmum use shall be made of space-proven hardware.
i_. This study shall not consider the development of a new
launch vehlc It.
l_. A minimum perlapsls altitude of l(k)O k_ shall be used for
purposes of this study for both Mars and Venus.
B. The following areas need to be Investigated early and related
_[uldelines established:
1. Transit time - available error analyses should be used to
establish thc approach trajectory criteria in order to
determine th_ spacecraft payload capability.
2. Desired length of mlsslon at Venus needs to b,' d,termined.
_plementa tlon
A. The _nage'_ent structure for the in-house feasibility study is
ahown in fi_r,' i.
B. FOIIowI_ iS the schedule on whlch thc "-tud_° i_ to be carried
out:
_£_n-_&-
1907 - Interim status report due along wlth
identlflcatlon of areas which should be
supplemented by contractor effort.
Nowember I, 1967 - Results of the task area activities available
for assembly into an integrated report for
presentation to NASA Headquarters.
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PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT TO TASK AREAS
Task No, and Name Personnel
I. Def'udtiou of Venus and Mars LRC Planetary Missions Technology
Scientific Mission Objectives Steering Cornrnittee_ E. Love,
Chairman
W. J. O'Sullivan (AMPD}
C. T. Brown (FVSD)
A. T. Young (LOPS)
LRC Planetary Missions Technology
Steering Corru_ttee, Subcommittee
G. Brook s (DLD), Chairman
J. Stitt (FID)
G. Wood (APD)
W. Michael (SMD)
Z. Launch Vehicle R. Girouard (LOPS), Leader
J. Cannady (AMPD)
J. Unansst (AMPD)
G. Lawrence (AMPD)
C. T, Brown (FVSD)
3. Instrumentation for Scientific W. Cuddihy (FLD). Leader
Measurements G. Wood (APD)
F. Staylor (APD)
C. Broome (LOPS)
R. D. ,_mith (LOPS)
P. Yaeger (IRD)
J. D, Lawrence (IRD)
I. MacConochie (FVSD)
D. Csuchon (FRPO)
W. Sherman (SMD)
E, Goyette (ESD)
4. Spacecraft Subsystems R. Sproull (LOPS), Leader
a. $_ru©turss, Mechanisms, E, Hank/neon (LOPS), Leader
Thern_l D, Carter (AMPD) 'r
W. Slemp (AMPD)
i
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Task No. and Name Personnel
b. Power J. Harris (LOPO), Leader
c. Communications W. Moore (FIE)), Leader
C. Green (LOPO)
T. Bundlck (LOPO)
d. Attitude Stabilizatzon and J. Reid (FID), Leader
Control C. Engle (LOPO)
e. Velocity Control D. Carter (AMPD), Leader
R. N. Green (AMPD)
R. Averill (FVSD)
S. Probe J. McNulty (FVSD). Leader
J. Dixon (FVSD)
H. Tolefson (DLD}
W. Moore (FID)
L. Fisher (SRD)
L. Vosteen (SRD)
K. Hughes (LOPO)
G. Walberg (AMPD)
W. Erickson (AMPD)
C. Gillis (AlviPD)
6. SteriLisation J. Zanks (FID), Leader
L. Daspit (VCBSPO)
E. Mason (2VSD)
H. Hendricks (AMPD)
7. Wit_sion Des,gn Support J. Ne,_'comb (AMPD). Leader
R. N. Green (AMPD) /"
W. Hampshire (AMPD)
D. Snow (FVSD) _,
J. Williams (SMD}
B. Lishtner (LOPO)
8. Mission Reliability .'... Bre' ler (LOPO), Leader
J. a4my (IX)PO}
O. Children (LOPO)
H. Ricker (FID)
T. Bonner (FVSD)
o
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9. Mimsion Operations W. Boyer (LOPO), Leader
.*. Graham (LOPO)
D. H. Ward (LOPC)
10. ]vhssion Environmental Cr,teria D.J. Martin (DLD), Leader
S. Clevenson (DLD)
R. Girouard/J. I,ovell (L_PO)
T. Bonnet (FVSD)
I I. Conceptual Des*sn and (Organization to be identified by
Integration FVSD)
12. Operational Orbit Deterr_nation U.M. Lovellce (LOPO), Leader
Cspabihty W. Mayo (LOPO)
A. Mayo (AMPD)
L. Hoffman (AMPD}
G. Youn_l (AMPD}
13. Cost Estimates, Contractual J. Hall (VCBSPO), Leader
Considerations. Manpower F.._enn,ngs (VCBSPO)
Requirements. Schedules C. McKee (VCBSPO)
R. Parker (VCBSPO)
D. Church (VCBSPO)
R. Anderlon (SRD)*
I, Will turnishinputs relat,ve to Headquarters Study Contract, "Cost Effecnve
Desisn for Future Space Syst, ems"
4
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?]_-HOUBE FEASIBILITY STUDy TASKS - PLANETAEY EXPIDBATION MISSIONS
]. DEFINITION OF VENUS AND MARS SCIE?_TIFIC MISSION OBJECTIVES
2. L_UNL"HV_HICLE
3. I!_STRtI_TATIOtl FOR SCIENTIFIC MEAS_S
2. SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS
;,. PROB_
6. STERILITATION
7. MIBSIOt_ [,ESIGNSUPPORT
8. NISSIOt; I_FLIABIISTY
9- MISSIO_ OFERATIGNS
IO. MISSION ENVIrOnmENTAL CRITERIA
11. C(]_CEP'I_A[DESIGN A/D I_LD4ENTATION
12. (_ATIO_'AL (_BIY DETE_LI/£ATIO_ CAPABILITY
13. &_ST ESTIMATE.S, CONTRACTILALCONSIDERATIONS, MANPOWER REQUIBEMENTS,
SC_KDU'_/S
i
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I_-HL_E FEASIBILITY $L'UDv TASKS - PL;C_L_Z FLY_LORATION MISgIONS
i. DEFINITION OF VENUS AND MARS sCIEI,TIFIC ,MISSION OBJECTIVES
A dellneatlon of sclent!fle objectives for missions to Venus and
Mars during the 1971-1973 peri_ Is required. The reco,-n,ended
scientific measurements should _,_nslder "he uze ef an _rbiti_g
spacecraft as well as a ¢omblsation orbiter ans proDe.
2. IAU_CH VEHICLE
Performance study and confi_ratlon selection to suppor_ mission
desiEn for planetary i_vestlgetlons. The medium space la,.._ch
vehicles - smaller than Saturn V - expected to be available for
the m/salon time pe:'iod will be examln,d for maximum performance
and to best support spacecraft requirements. Mission re_tralrts
imposed by launch vehicle Systems and traJec_orles will be identified
&s well as payload weight o&pability and envelope size.
3. IN_ATION FOR SCIENTIFIC MEASURf'2_NTS
%nllylls of the instru,-entation approaches for satlsf_ng the scientific
million requirements; comparilon of various approaches to satisfy a
Kiwe._ measurement requirement; abl tlty to make measurements with
required degree uf accuracy; present state of theory and experience
of each proposed instrumentation technique; suitability _nd
characteristics of presently available Instrumentstlon; pos_Ible
required extenyions in theory and Instrumen_atlon developm-nt to
satisfy obJectlve. The anml_sls and stu_ should be guided by such
factors as the basic m/salon _rameters (e.g. , altitudes from which
messur:m_nts will nave to be made), the use of a probe for atmospheric
lurvey, the need to mlnim{ze instru_entatlon welght, size and power
¢onsu_tlon, the need for matchi_ measurement rates to com_unlcation-
link d&ta-rate capability, the duration of the misslct_s _ the
resultant effect on data rate and instrumentation design and
rellablllty, etc. To _tlafy mission obJectlves for the measurement
J
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of planetary fields, particles, environment and surface characteristics
will involve the consideration o_ Instr_m_entatlon such as:
imaging syst_s
mapping radar
radar _itlmeter
mlcro-wave radiometer
ultraviolet spectrometer
infrared spectrometer
infrared radiometer
magnetometer
mlcrc_eteorold detectors
radlatioc detectors
prezsu.re se=:o:=
temperature _ensors
water vapor sensors
RT occultation
_. SPACEC_u"T SUBSYST_
Identify requirements for and investigate problem &reas of the
fol/owlng subsystems relative to a Mars/Venus spacecraft.
a. Structure, Meehan/sms, Thermal
b. P_er
c. Communications
d. Attitude Stabilization and Control
e. Velocity C0atrol
- -4
k
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5. PROBE
Study ,_f the ability -_f the !ntendeJ class of spacecraft to
carry and deplcJ an atr.c_p_erlc probe; Inv_tAgation of probe
types anJ =_nfleF_rati..:.- :n conzi!erati&:, c" w_ight limi_.a -
tions, desir,'l air 's[h_,rlc meas'_:rem_n_.,: d_!initlon of data
transmission problem, an: po._sibie _.o!ut.c::z; eraluaLlun of
poss!biltty of probe zurvi%ing impact oe the planet surf_ oe;
probe ;.zopu/zion requ_reme_,t.
6. STERILIZATION
Determine *he most fea._ible _pproach to _e_.'_nal _,,r_IZ_t_n_
of an entry probe. :.e., oven, hot gas, other. A[;:o d_termtne
the blo clean req_iremen£a :'or assembly _r,:as ct" the entr_
probe necezsarj to meet the requir_, "_ntarlnat'_on lewel prior
to temmlna] sterJliza'i_n of th-, pr. "_. [,.t,'."_,inethe
ccxzpat_bili'_ of ,*z,.[,,ne :_idc lecont,_mln, "io,. _f an Crbltil;_
Spacecraft af..? eva/ %be method: c[ }_ • :;_. l,:l:,_ and e_ectlng
the sterxle probe _t ._r2 the spacecrat't.
7. MZSSION DESIGN SUPPORT
To gu_ort mlsalon de_ign_ basic studies _f launch opportunities,
launch enerKy requirements, tremslt/arrlv_l tlmeu, _eboost &V,
planetary crbit designs and variation _ith time, mi|slon duratlon,
]_l&net_.ry reasons, var!a'ior of c_r_.%_catlon dlst&ncea w_th
•,4_gion time from launch, nun occultation _riodg, C_nopu_ ocuu/ta-
tion periods, etc., are required. To develop error m_lyses
iDdlcatln_ #_V and VACS require,.ents for midcouzses, aeboost, orbit
tr_l_, pointi*t_ for photograph_ _r other planet [ma4_in_ devices in
terll_ of at, .nable orbit detemmlnatlon (To investigate e.nd ezt_bl_Jn
if m_Mm_m p,_riapmis _Ititude* less th_', £C'90 KM can be utilized.'
8. MI_ION RELIABILITY
TO |ruby the mission requirements for lon_ lifetime operation of the
Ipacecre2t/probe system e.nd relate those requirements to itl]l)iySt=
delt{n approaches (e.g., redundancy, duty cycze, etc,) c_mponent
selection, quality assurance approaches, etc.; e=t&bllsh the required
reliability {ml.ll for each lubsystem; for the fln -I conceptual
dell_na, predict _he expected rel_abillty a_ a function of mission
1974020203-442
!
r
II
9. MISSION O_h_AEIONS
fjom launch, |_ .r; "_l .... %ry ..: ,_,:,*_-. nn _ crb.tl,.,,_ _haq--. 7i*'w
Of cel,Lra]17 ,'_ ; 4 .,,.r....,iL_z.,d -c_'r-_. .m_,_r _:_J ]_'',l'l,_r: cf
trackln_ 'Ir.J/cr " r-.-An_,s t,.s, ,it,. ar,J • ,nt: l.....r ""r ha:-:wlr.. _n'
softwar- r_'q_lir-.ment , _it_-_--_tt-- "_mrnI_nl_./'on9 "c_qulf_m,n_s,
oporatlonal req._!-,.m, nt_ ,_:%! _'_1,"2. q[;! • _erqt [_t ._spacer r_ft aP
Sclentlfi" Instr'im,'n'it_.rn _-. ,,_l tl, , J,'s[_n.
lO. M_SSIO:I _RONMI_.,NTAL _kiTM.[_
To define the major ,'nvlr.._:_-n'_[ r_:,tr_nts frc,m _hc !,',--_gnar-.a
thr_,uF)l fsbrlcation, t_st_ng, ]_,,--b ,r_ _-rm_n-.t[:'._ ._t the planet
sur face.
iI. CONC,rF_/AL DESI;N A:_ _._K_T._,?N
To r,.]at., ard Integr_t- th,, . :tcynt..m tr,_,:;y're= _lement_ of the
s_pa-,.rraft, probe _nd s[,ac_ ,,.hlrl, _r'' "onc_Ft,_a l ov,:r-_l! !,'siEna
tn d_.r_n:tr._t,,and 5,.[,port t_.m "-*:'i_,i'v ,_f the propos_-drelation
conc,.pt. Tnls vii! .'nv(_lv- -b'a:,.InE _._rle ccmponent an_ subsystem
char'_.;teristi,-s frem -aPh a[}-,'_ri,_'- t_sk _r-_, conceiv_n_ and
Int-grat_n,, all -l#m_nts of tb.. sp_',.t'raft, pr)b- _nd s.p_c- vehlci-
into an optimum arr_n_.e,,ent in sc ",_r!_nP- wlth :herm_.l, e:Ivironment,l
and other consid-ratlon, o, esta_,lILhln_, ov..r-a!i weights :" b,,
u" llzed in mis|ien lesi_n, et-.
12. OPERATIONAL ORBIT DYI_I@dI'dAIqON CAPA._ILIT'f
To study Zhe eapatil_.ty of _pe2t,.l tra-k[_ sya,ema tc provide th_
required data for orbit .!-tP._Ina' ,c:_.,th-, ac_-tiracy with w_t(-h the
state vector and orW,Ital psrum_t*r_,: ,an b# :ieterm/ned with various
_unts of tracking data ,lurlr_ ': verlous earth-planet _e,_m-'ries,
Includin_ the effect of uncertalnt ¢ in the plan-tary gravi_'_*" hal
field and the presence of aeons at _, Mar..; retatlon_nlp ef such
u{_:ertalnties to mls-lcn des Kn _:_ th_ ability to satlsf) th_
wti$_ion _b_ectIvea; d-':In_ti(n of po.',:Ible improvements r--(lu% d in
&rackind_ {rystema or orbit determination programs.
13. C'(_T ESTIMATES, OONTPAC%"DAL COI_IDEKATIONS, _ REQUqR_NTS,
sc_zm31_s
To fcrw_-,late and e_tabli_h for the selected miaslon over-all co_t
e|timatew; contractual doeument&tion and coordination aspecta; review
Ot_t_i_ _d_power requirement#; coordinate a_d provide over-all
schedules.
Cli or H. Nelson
S_tV Xaaa_e¢
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE AI]M,INISTRATION
Wcrkln_ P_per No. 4@3
A BUILDING BLOCK APPFOACH TO F_RS AND Vk_S PLANETARy MISSIOI_9
IN THE 1970'$ UTILIZING A MODULAR SPACECRAFT
By Flight Vehlcles and
Systems Division S_udy Team
A program for planetary missions to Mars and Venus In the 1970's which
utilizes the Titan faml]y of leunch vehicles and a spacecraft modu/_r concept
to promote maximum commonality between missions is defined In the paper and
Is outlined on figure 6. It is felt that this program outl_ne can be used to
pinpoint various technology areas requiring development so %hat the leadtime
req&Liredfor futule planetary missions Is mlnim_zed.
The Titan III-C* was selected as the launch vehicle for missions to Mars
Venus in 1971 to 1975 opportunltl__s. The Titan iII C suppl''_ssufflclent
energy to orblt e 1,400 spacecraft (190 pounds of science) and, depending on
mission, to carry a 150- %o 300-pound probe to Investlgate the atmosphere. _'
These orbltlng spacecraft can be made up of Instrument and propulsion
modules with much co_monallty; eddttlona_ propellant tanks would be required
for the Venus missions. This spacecraft modular approach can be extended to
aFor the purpose of this study, the following desi_natlons are used to
deserlbe various Titan launch vehicles:
T III-C _aslc Titan wlth two five-segment strap-on solid motors and the
_mnatage.
T III-D Same ms the T III-C except no Transtmge.
T III-F Same as the T III-D except solid strap one are seven-segment
instead of flve-segment. The T III-F is the non-man rated
complement of the T1_.an III-M.
..... qm.-..,.qmi_
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the later missions when a higher energy launch vehicle and lander are phased
into the pro_cam.
Ssturn V and Titan III-F Centaur are satisfactory candidate launch
vehlcles in the 1975 to 1977 opportunities. A Titan ]-II-F Centaur vehicle
c_n be staged and hasnaerheaded to carry a 4,000°pound capsule bus into orbit
for separation and lsu_iin4_.
Tbis program allows each succeedlng mission to bu/id on the technology
of the preceding mission, thus minlmizln6 development costs and enhancing
rellabillty.
DqTROIXETION
In order to provide a basis for the definition of the required technolo_
_o support a planetary exploration program for Mars and Venus in the early
_970'a which demonstrates stead_ growth co the landin_ of a surface laboratory
qrstez planned for the late 1970's, a study was conducted to determine payload
_ight allocations and general planetary vehicle configurations using the
_Itan III-C launch vehicle. In _rticu_r, an attempt Is made in this paper
_O deAineate mission parameters such as launch dates, energy requirements,
orbit dimensions, etc., and to show, through conceptual drawings, the =odulaz
concept permitting ccmnonality between missions and growth capability.
After reviewing launch vehicle payload capability as supplied by Lewis
Research Center personnel, the Titan IZI-C Transtage was ,elected as the earl_
Lls,tc_ wehicle on which the study would be based. The problem then win, to
,elect an orbit which would utilize • mininm_ of propellant for orbit in0ectlon,
while pe_ltting relatiwely clo,e observation of the planet for a lor_ period
of tile from an orbiting ,pacecraft. Orbit, of the order of 1,000 x 20,000 to
2
\
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1,000 x )O,£XX)_ npp_._red to best satisfy these-requlr_ent_ _nd were
therefore ae:ected as l_irmmeters,
With available Iwiyh_d Information, It w_e then posslble to determine the
_ne%Lry vehlele wel_ht, propellant weight, and _bltin_ (dry) weight. From
%hess data, _redes were developed which demonstrate al3owmble weights for ',
deployed pro0ee; conslderatlon was glven to deployln_ probes both "9m orbit
and from approach prior to insertion of the spacecraft into orbit. This weight
bFeq&kdo%-nwla g, _era,tedon the basle of three different epececreft weights -
1,200 pound-., I,)00 pounds, and !,40(?pound_ - and re.u/ted in various probe
weLl;hts.
In the preparation of _ conceptual design of the sIwieeereuft,an approach
wlS se_e_te_ to permlt maximum utilization of ¢L_mmon systems between miselons.
A _u/q_r concept peFmlttin_ grow_(hand commonality was _e the objective of
the d_$1gn; th1_ objective was to be realized by ehangln_ on/y the propulsion
_ and capsule size, as the allowable mission weights _ncreased.
The performance and weight data contained herein were developed on a
minimum time basis and are therefore presented as approximate values. This
_,ormmtion, however, Is vm/Id for illustration of concepts _ud approach
te:h_dques. :"
C_ twice the %otto/ injection ene/-_.yper uult ._, (Mm2/se_2)
V veloeLty (w-/sec)
hyIw_bolie excess velo_it_ at launch (Iota/see)
¥. hyperbolic excess velocity at encounter With target l_tanet (k_/sec)
J
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_/C spacecraft not Including probe
_¥ velOCity i_crement required for spacecraft velocity change
Including orbit insertion (km/sec)
gravitational acceleratlol, (ft/sec2)
ACS attitude control system
m/CDA mss/(dra G coefficient x crons-sectio_l areB)
M MJch number
• angle of attack (degrees)
7 fllght-path angle (degree_ or radlans, me6sured negative downward
from the local horizontal)
Subserlpt
]_ entry condlt lons
&
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R_ULTS
A. Mission Requlr_ents
An analysis was made to drtcrmtnc the pertinent mlsalor, parameters for
missions to Mars and Venus in the 19-(2to io_ opportunities. These parameters
axe tabulated in table I, The launch energy (C3) required in each of the
opportunities is shown _nlch determines the planet payload for the various
launch vehicles. Also tabulated is the planet approach velocity (V®) which
defines the propulsion requirements for orbit. Finally, the ratio of spacecraft
weights, before and after orbit, i'm given for representative orbits of
1,000 km x 20,000 _m and 1,000 _m x 30,000 km.
The results of a pe_ametrlc study of planetary vehicle system weights for
the various opl_)rtunitles compatible wlth a Titan ZII-C launch vehicle axe
given in tables II and III. For various weight spacecrsuet (orbit weights of
1,200, 1,900, and !._00 pounds), table II defines the propellant requirements
for e 1,000 x _0,000 _umorbit and shows the net weight available for probe(s)
either sea.rated on t_l_aetappr_eh or after orbit has been obtained. Table III
gives similar data sh_,t.F _he effect of tlghteni_g the orbit to
1,000 x 20,000 bum.
_. Probes
While It Is ant.'cilmted that any probe will be configured to fit the
l_Icttlax mission lnsofax as _eight and volume are involved, sever_l stud:es
have ldentlfted probe sizes and weights required to accampllsh specified probe
obJeetlves. These probes axe su_maxlled In appendix A and were designed for
the followJn_ functlons :
\
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i. Ames/AVCO Probe fur Venus and Mars - a 12_-pound probe to make indirect
measurements of the atmosphere.
2. Buoyant Venus Station for Venus - a _O0-pound probe system to result
in a balloon hovered station for direct measur_nents of the atmosphere.
). IRe Parachute Probe for Mars - a 440-pound system for direct measure-
ments of the atmosphere.
_. _ Probe and Lander for Mars - a 540-pound system to make indirect
measurements of the atmosphere and put 5 to i0 pounds of science in c s_mlhard
lander.
These probe data can be used in trade analysis where the _robe weight can
be evaluated against spacecraft weight and -bit deflnlt'.on. If probe data
are of • hlgh priority, the spacecraft welaht can be reduced and orbit
eccentricity increased from the data given in tables I, II, and III.
C. S_acecraft and Vehicle Conceptual Deslgn
Spacecraft were confl_ared for the _arlous opportunities with a design
gO_l tO utilize common modules as much as possible. In order to evaluate the
d_lc envelope restraint of the spacecraft with various size capsules, studies
were made utllizin6 dynamic envelopes of 1(90 inches (standard Titan), 170 inches
(bumerheaded Titan), and 240 inches (Saturn V). It was found that the
lO0-inch dy-mmlc envelope was satisfactory for the early missions a/though it
_a_ld require solar _nels to be stored in a compact folded package and wou/d
limit the probe diameter to about 5 feet. The 170-inch envelope w_u/d be
required on the Titan 6-_wth mission where the shroud would be hammerheaded
and • lar6e csplule carried. The 240-Inch envelope Is required for the full
Voyqer capsule of 19-foo_ diameter which ls ccmsiatent with Saturn V
........... .... k ' I
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1&unch cslmbillty. These spacecraft, planetary vehicle envelopes_ and launch
vehicle integration are shown on figures i through 5.
lO0-Inch Dynamic Envelope
As Bho_rnon figure I, the spacecraft prop,,Islon module is basically a
tubular truss structure vlth an aft ring vhlch interfaces wlth the launch
"vehicle adapter and provides the separation plane for the planetary vehicle.
A forward rln_ provides the field Joint for mating with an elght-polnt tubular
truss adapter vhlch terminates in a field Joint at the a_t end of the Instru-
meWmtlon module. The propellant is contained in four spherical tanks _Ich
are attached to the basic structure of the propulsion module. Two cyllndrlca_
I2 pressurant t:nks are provided and are located diametrically opposed and
neoted between the propellant tanks. A 3OO-pound thrust engine Is gimbaled
and supported by tubular members vhlch are mounted to the aft ring of the
module structure. This engine could be a scaled-up ve_-slon of the lOO-pound
thrust Lunar (_blter engine or an engine developed for another program. Should
this e_Ine not be developed, the 100-pound engine could be used and burned m
longer time aStho_ this would be less efficient. The reqtctlon control
thrttetersvottld be outrlgged near the aft end of the module structure at the
lo_Itudlnal center of gravity of th" system. The tankage displayed in thls
@c_rlg_rstlon is adequate for a Mars I77_ mission and by simply replacing the
spherical propellant tanks vlth cylindrical tankS having the same diameter as
the s_erlcaA tanks, sufficient propellant for a Venus 1972 mission can be
sce(Isodated. Tvo additional N2 pren_ant tanks can be provided in the
t_ diametrically oppoeed wold spacee provided which are not used for the
Mars misslon.
\
J
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The Instrumentatlon module, which is oeta_5on shaped, is 60 Inches across
the fiats and 19 inches high. Approximately 30 cublc feet of stor_e volume
Is provided to contain all proposed ACS electronics, Sl_cecraft scleneej data
l_wdllr_, telecommunications, data storage, batteries, progr_er8, etc. This
lOdUle Is designed as a c_on module, capable of uatisfylng the requirement8
of • Nars or Venus mission, as well as 8 Voyager mts0ion. The vidicon require-
merits of a _4ars mission are satisfied by mounting the threeoemzera peck, on a
scan pl•tform, erterior to one of th, module's flat _urfaces. The vldlcon
paek_e is envisioned as a self-conta_ned, ther_lly controlled bolt-on modu_le.
For • Venus I_Isstonwhere fewer cameras or different cameras may be required,
the NLrs video module could be replaced by one tailored to the Venus require-
memtm. The steerable o-foot diameter, hlgh-gain anten_a can be stored parallel
to the lon_itudtn_l axis or, by usln_ a longer boom on the antenna, it could
be extended forwlrd in front of the probe. The solar panels must be stored
in • compact folded packs_e and deployed subsequent to shroud ejection. The
InStrtmentstion m(xSule is basically a tub_Isr truss structure termln_tlng at
s rlmG on the a/'t end which provides the field Joint interface with the propUl-
sion module. A forvaxxlrtr_ provides the field Joint interface with the probe
-Aapt_. InternLl structure is provided for instrumentation motmtin_, and the
total module is covered with • metal skin to provide • thermal eomp_rtment.
Ft_tre 2 |how_ this Sl_cecraft integrated with a probe_ ehrottd_ and the
TitLI lll-C launch vehicle.
170-Incfl Dynsmlc Envelope
Yhe 8_e l_OlXtlmt_ m_dttle am prevlou_ly described is s_m on fi_e }.
|mm'_, there ts clearly _m'e vol_-e •_11•ble for t_k extension should •
8
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larger and heavier capsukle be used within this shroud rest-alnt. The instrument
a4odude is identical to the unit prevlously described. The added volume eases
the problem of the m._untingof the solar panels and the antenna. The steers _._
6-foot diameter high-galn antenna Is attached near the aft end of ".heInatrl-
mentatlon module and utilizes an extendable boom for deployment tea position
(m_tbo_rdof the probe, A fixed solar panel ring extends outboard fro,,the aft
face of' the instrumentation module, and mou_ted at the periphery m" the fixed
panels are e1_'.,deploymble penels which combined can provide about 200 square
feet of solar Iwinelarea. The experiment arrangement for a Mars mission is
shown on figure 7.
Fisure 4 depicts the most advanced planetary vehicle concept envisioned
fc_r m Titan launch. Shown Is a 4,0OO-pound, 14-foot diameter capsu/e
(12,000-pound total planetary vehicle weisht) adapter to @ Titan III-F Centaur
wlth a hammerhead shroud which is 180 inches in di_eter. This Titan III-F
launch vehicle is defined am two seven-se_ent, 120-inch dlame_er solid rocket
motors foL"the _ero stage with two liquid core stages. The f!rst sta_e is
stretched about _ feet and employs two engines vlth a 15 :i expsnslon ratio.
Itls the non-man rated complement of the Titan III-M. The Sl)scecre£t arbiter
utlllzes the common spacecraft Instrument module in conjunction with a mission
deoign_i propulsion module.
_O-Inch Dynmmlc Envelope
A larger propulsion systea, the L_ engine, is used in the configuration
shown to _cccmodate +he larger vmi£ht associated with Voya£er. The ccw_on
lnstr_en_ module is compatible with this concept and is adapted to the lar£er
capeule and proi_Alslon unit. A significant increase In volume is LlSO evident
I
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im _ for stor_e of s steerable 6-f(_t diameter hlgh-oln antenna,
square feet of solar _nels and other equLI_nent _h.ich may be necessary on
later zlsslon_. The capsule shov_ in this conflg'---urstlon coukd be any of s
variety of 19-foot diameter 6,0OO-pound capsule concepts whi-_h evolved during
Voy_er Phase B Study.
DI_ ION
A. Kission Desl_n8
ar_klyslm oi' the mission parameter data (table I) reveilm t.J.-mtenergy
requirements for Mars mlssionm in 197) and 197_ are nearly equal; Mars 197)
requires about 5 percent =ore propellant to obtaln orbit. The Venus 1972 and
19T_ have high approach v_ocities and low C5 requlrements when compared to
Nars. Thls means a largJ, r payload can be sent to Venus but a high penalty will
be l_id f_ ccbltln_ the spac_r_t mince a 11_rge AV will be required.
_s 7} Lad 7_ - aV - 1,)O¢ _-/mee
Venus 7) -aV " 2,0C0 x_m/mec
V_ 72 - _V " 3pOCO Ins/see
JLS e an be Laferredp the orbit _ Veu In 1972 requLrN approx./m_tely
twice as much prop_nt u for MAr- snd _0 percent _e :hart Venus 197).
'J_,b.].elI sm that a Yitan III-C veh,_.cls rill se_d about 2_._00 po_s to
Warm in 19T) or 197'_ and about _,_0 pounds to Venua in 1972 or 197_. A
l,tOO-]_u_d sl_:ecr_lrt ham be_n estla_teO (see table _) for the Ms,re mission41
JJe_ilwll_ &l_n_t 1_0 lpo_dm o1" scLence u shorn In l"ldp_lre _. Uslql lrJIls veldt
_m • beaLam_ Lt 1amnov Ix_stble to Lnvestll%ste the trade,, emong proI_klsion
10 " _"
i "
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weight, probe weight, _nd orbit geometry. For both Mars missions, 11 appears
reasonable to select a comb!na*,_ionof a 1,400-pound spacecraft, 1,000 pour.ls
of propellant, and a 12"v-poundAmes/AVCO probe released on plene_ approach.
For Venus, it appears advlsabie to loosen the orbit sli_htly to reduce _V in
order to gain some velgh_ for probe experiments in 1972. This is dictated by
the planet's dense atmo_nhere which is of Interest to the scientists, plus the
cloud cover w_.ich reatrlcts a phctographlc mlssio._. It is felt that a
30_-pound probe, rele_sc_l on apF.'_-_n, could ce_-y a minimum instrumented
parachute payload to make direct measu_'ements whL:e s_¢_ly descendln_ throug_
the dense atmosphere. Thls _-pound probe added tc _,,e btandard l,_O0-pourd
spacecr_ w_uld allow a net of 1,900 _urds of propellant which is sufficient
to orbit the spacecraft in a 1,0OO }amx _O,OOO k: o-blt. Fo, _he 1973 op_or-
tun/ty to Venus, the approach velecity is r_duced and, thus, it vould - "-
poo|Ible to fly s heavier probe such as the buoyant station and/or to tighten
u_ the ,orblt. -,
A VAts 1971 _sston w_s anLly_ed. The da_a are not included herein since
1971 reprerents a much more favorable oI_rlunlty than 1973 or 197_ and, in
event, the mountl_ o_ a more sophlettcate_ mlsslcn in L971 than for 1973
is not con%eaplated.
The possible _,otrth of the Titan vehicle to transport a -_ps_le bus capsule
O_ sO_ l_ndinS a e_a_e 1_borator_ 8ysteu-_s lnveetilated. The flndl_i_was
t_t s Tltan IIIoF Cent_a,r vehicle could be developed which vo_ld be capable of
eendin4 • 12,tX_O-pmmd payload to Mar= In 197_.. This payload Ll).owance would be
a_FFlclent for orbitln4 • s_sceera/_ vlth about r _,jOO-po_md capsule bus.
This e&p_e b_umw:a_ld be eepezwted in _rblt fo_ • l_ln_ on _s.
II
%
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B. Orovth and C_onality
The Erovth and commonality aspects of a planetary vehicle associated wlth
the Titan class lau_ichvet_=le is illustrated in figure 6. A su_em*e@, program
utillzln_ a m_xlulsx concept is out!Shed which maximlzem the eontlnul-g developlr_
technology mc as to reduce the cost of new start programs and develoI_.ente.
For 1971, 197_ Mars and '.j,'2,197;,Venus mloalonm, the basic buildlr_ block :s
m l,_OO-pound common {pacecreLft. Thlm o_cecraft consists of two modules:
(i) an instrument moduJe and (2) a propulsion module, with a mLxlmum of common
lubmystems. Additional _.anksand propellant are added for the Venus mission
but the same prop't1'-;tonsystem is utilized. An Lpproprimte probe Is mated to
the s1_cecraft and the planetary vehicle Illmounted on the Titan III-C launch
vehicle within '_ stAnc_LrdlO-foot sb*_'OUd.
Growth to a lander in 197_ or 1977 is ind:cated coneel_ually with various i
spacecraft prcpu/slon modules substituted as shorn. H-mmerhetdi_ "he
Titan III-F Centaur will allow the incorporation of Itlarge diamet_rm
/#,OOO°pottndeapaule bus_ hammerheadIP4_has been in_estlgated in wlrd-tunne/
Jtudlem and Is not anticipated to 0e a serious problem. The use of the
Saturn V will allow the uJe of the 19-foot di_eter, 6,000 capsule as previously
envisioned for Voyw_er.
_'Atherlaum:h vehicle would alice the capsule bu_ to be rele_a_i out of
orbit SO am to minLai_e the near Mars velocities for _till_a_inn of about a
_ch _.0 parachute as _n aerod_c decelerator. The S4ttttr_V, i.la_dltlon
_j Incorlx)ratln_a heavier eapeule b_l, w3u/d fills, for th'.trluu_oz'ti_ Of
_#U _lunetltry vehicles per l&_h.
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C. Unresolved Fundamental Issues
The study outllned in this paper Is based primarily on the theoretical
performance of var:ous Titan launch vehicle cor_Igurltions. Little consideration
_a given to detailed l_.t_rfaceproblems which may exist between payload and /
launch ve_ Icle or between payload and launch facilltles. For this reason,
several basic areas of interest are :isted below which regulre resolution to
evsJuate the feasibility of the overall program. No att_Irt is made to resolve
these questions within this paper.
i. The structural capaDlilty of the Centaur may be exceeded with a
12,000-pound payload and/or a hammerhead shroud.
2. Thu_ far, launches of the T III-F are planned only for the Western
Test Rathe.
3. Launch facilltie_ ,.ay not have the capacity to handle the cryogenic '
propellants used by the Centaur.
i
j
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T_LE ,-V.-PIANETARyVEHICLFWEIGHT SU_MAI_y(M_r )
_TAT IO_ MODULE
Structure I00
ACS Elect. 60
Prc_ramer 20
_lecommunlcations 220
Power 290
Therwa/ Control _0
Probe .,elay _uil_ent 20
Moclmnlsins 20
Belence _190
Total c_20 92O
PROI'JLSIOW _ODULE
8tr_ct,=e _00
VelocityControlInerts 120
AC_ Inerts 90
Thermal Control 50
Selm4ratlonand Mech. 50
ACS _s --/9-
Dry Total _8o _o
ORBITINgS/C WEIGHT 1,400
Propellant 1,0_9.
8/C with FcopellantTotal 2,_
Probe (Direct) _
Total Separated fr_ L/V 2,_0
A_ITIONS FOR
Propellant 875 879
Pa'obe (Direct) 175 (To_,cl Probe - 200 pounds_ 175
Tot4tl._w_,==-atedfrem L/V 2,600
17
b
!
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APP]_IDIX A
PRORI_FORMARS AND V_US
1970 - 197 _
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APPD_DIX A
PROBES FOR _ AND V_US
1970 - 197)
SUGARY
This report is a brief 8u_ of possible probes for atmospheric
investigations of Mars an_ Venus. The basic concepts of the probes with
pertinent technical lnfo_atlon are presented. Table I-A gives the weight
allocations f_r the vLrlous missions considered. Table II-A shows the
e_tlbility of the probe syste=s with these mission_ for s minimum veisht
Spacecraft.
• 4
19
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PROBE DESCR II_lON
Code Letter A
AVCO/Ames Probe
Application: Mars and Venum
Probe System Weight I_ Pounds
En%ry Shape ii0° Blunt Cone; 3-Foot Dl.ameter
_tr_f Weight 50 Pounds m/CDA - 0.167
Instr_entat ion ' Weight
Aeceleromet _rs i .8
Pressure and
Tewperature _ ._
Radiometer 2
_s Spectrometer
. _6._
_tter: 20-w_t% relay to S/C 10 to 1_000 bpe
_ta period 20 to 60 6e_ (_rs)
8O
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_h8
2500 K_._; "_ 1:8cj.5 se''
Vl(:2.2OOOft/_ec,M /C o A= .15 SLUG/FT _, __70 e "_\
PaL =7 millibort
300 t=O.Osec
105K _]_8._tIc,PEAK _1
15"
67K _ tmlO.Sle¢, PEAKg
"llt_ K T, ||ttt,lO 000 (t/Se(:
(end of blockOut}
_ 1=21,5te¢, MACHNO_Z
(temperature probe eltendlld)|SK /-
_:._'_.. t. 4z,.,,MAC.,o- ._4
•/-_._._._IMPACT t¢_,'._. ;._-._,
--,r,..,%.z.:;r..... ,l_.*4.,'..:p .,,_._,-_; _.._::....
@ROIMEENTRYSEQUENCE
(_mxc_, _ e_APJ_CZow
21
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PROBE D_BCR 13_fION
Code Letter B
Buoy_r% Venus Statlor,
Application: Venus
Probe 8ybtem Weight _00 Pour_s
]h_tryShape 120° Blunt Conej 6-For_, i'i_aeter
Dn%ry Weight _9(,Pounds Buoyant St_tlon Weight 2C_3Pounds
Fatty Inatrume_tation Weight
Aecelero_et ers E
Preusure and
T,laI,cratorc 4
}__lometer 2
8
Buoyln% Gtatlon Instrumentation Welght
Temperature 1
Preus_u.e
Compor-ition
K20 I._
o2 t.5
A 1.5
coa 1
Dee,lty ._
(2) Drop 5ondea Well;ht
Tmperature 0 ._
Pre-eure 1 ._
R2o
_.0
Transmitter: 5 watt _0 bpej commJnd relay to 5/C
Oat& period 7 days
§
t
4
\
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PROBE DESCRIPTION
Code Letter
LXC LWP-328
AFpllcatlon: Mars
Pr¢_ SystI Welght _C Po_s Ill
l_t.-7_ape 120° BluntConr 6-Foot9-1richto 7-Foot 6-1nch Diameter
Welght _o _o a/C_Aj O._ to O,15
Zmrt_e_tst lon Weight
Temperature 0.9
Pressure 1
Accelerameter 2
Altimeter 8
Ikn Spectrometer 9
l_etrome%er 8
28.9
Trsnsittt_r: _0 watts relay to $/C, 280 "Do
_ta period I_0 tO _00 aec
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P_O_E D_CIqIPlqCN
Code Letter D
JPL EPD _27
Application : Mars
Probe System Weight }_0 Pounds
Entry Shape 1.'0 ° "_lunt _ne 6.5-Foo% Diameter
M_ Weight 186'Pourzlm m/CDA : 0.12
X_er Weight _ Pounds, 16-inch Sphere
Optional landers
1_r_e irmtrtmeM&tlon Weight Life [
detection Env Ironmental | Arm( _htrlc
Aecelercmetqs'8 1.5 Gulliver 4 Ib Wlnd I Ib Mass s )ec. 8.0 ib
Proo|ure i..'_ Pres. 1 Ib Pr_s. IIb Pres. 1.0 ib
_t*rature 1.9 Tamp. 1 ib Temp. I ID T_. 1.0 ib
Ib _.20 I._ lb I0.0 ib
MaSS .peetrcme_er 8.0 "g" i Ib
z2,5 _
7.0 Ib
,' _ _ra_ltte_: 8 watts, _00 bpa, relay to S/C
,_Ddla" : _ wattS, I bps, direct Earth
Bed_r_ _ata Period 20-2_0 s_
I_d_ Data Pm-lod 1-2 ho_rs
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/,_¢a$AMrL_C_I---_-_\ 1 _/I_I L:__ I _ msu
-_,;, , /'CAPSUL_ TURN ON
_k'!>--i ;IF-_ I /RELAYA,_D DI.ECT
7" BOOs000 ft
BE_N-_AC_O_rr /"
_,4-_'-----_\ / _E'_:*"°
0 .Ig t / YE="$0_.23'000_h/:_c
BEGIN DATA _ / @_E
STOI_GE _/
/
END BLACKOUT_.._ _ MAX. ACCEL.
STA._TEOM2OSITION AND "_,,-/ 47-146 I/
STO_O DAT, Pb'\Y_,_,CK
VEL. _0,O00 h/,_c
ALl. 50-130 K n
_.pL(_LU.._.Nu_D / E + 50-60 _¢
E  58-71: /
_,CH. _-_.2 /_ -'
ALT, 4,300-93,000 ft / ,/._ ,__ C=HUTEDESCENT.
TIME 46- I ,SGO_
VERT. VEL, 30-112 ft/_.e
IMPACT ACCEL. 2,500 g
/. [urth
MP_" S/C/ -15_ Ol*,cllon LANDED OPERATIONS
l/ Y 1 hemln
E_ 41_-344J IOIAL BITS 600
VEL. 237-69S _]_ _
C,,peute Entry ,rid La_ded Phaee 27, "
REPR_(_OUCIBILITYOF. THE ORIGINAL'PAGE 18 POOR. "
L
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TABLE iI-A.- PROBE COMPATIBILITY
Mars Venu_
]971 1973 1970/72 1975
Orbiter F/B Orblter IF/B Orblter F/B Orbiter F/_
s/c s/c s/c :s/c s/c s/c s/c s/c
L
_o A A
+J
° _ A A A A A A
_> _o C C B B B
_: D D
_ A A A A
,oo C C B B
,., ,s_: D D
_._ • • A A A A A A
_ c c c c B B _, r.D D D D
29-hour orbit 40-hour orbit
1,000 x )),500 km 1,000 x 97,900 kn
29
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:_ANGLEY WORKING PAPER
STUDY OF %ITAN iII F/C_TAUR'S CAPABII,I!"Y
TO CARL _ A "VOYAG_-TYI_." MISSIOF
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i_ f,
SELECTIOn; t_F A p[A/;_TFAPY ';._}:l,':""A:;D
LAU_'C_;.V_{ICLE FC.R A TITAL [il .' "[ADS
_L_d_SMIgFIr_I_
SUNPARY
Described _.Ithln this pap,': 8me the r,.s._ts _f _J study -cnd_:cte_ t_
establlsh • :eallstic _r.d s[gr_f_',:.t .-...ssiDntc th, ;,[,unet 5:are in th,. m:i
IS_C's usIDg a Titan Ill F boDster. Previous ctudi,'.: :_ve showr., t_at "r,.
T1t_,n III C, w_th T_.an,._ts_eor Ager_, is "-',._g_.ta'! r,rfo_nnce [.r,teJ. ?h.s
vei_ht limitation results in designs _pe_'_.f[c_Li[y ":.'a_ [e for ,:e r lss['r
v_th little po_.entlal for use cf c rz-._:_lity f h_r"-n_.-,:_nd grD_n 1'_r later
mlssions. This study !ndleates :_t tt.e Tits: [1: : vitn a Centa:r upper stage
pzosrldes the perfo-mance capahillty to aLl-w :"._x[tL[it, of mission desi;;n _,,,d
logical crovt_ from a Mars entry prob,: t_ a s-f. land, 3 g.:rf_ce rc,v,.r [_,e
_oneept provides for sn entry capsule w_tN % ll.-fo_t ii_meter _eroshell which
4| _'o_n to all _.Isslons. T_,e caps,is car. be loaded t'rom 2000 _n.ls to',
IKX)O Dcund_ to s_ccer.sfully provide m pr_[_' m,sr.lou, a !a:,der mission, and a
rover mlsslon for 1973, 1975, _nd 19"7 e??_rt',r Ities, respectively. Thl_
(_e|Ign concept _iso prov_Oes _he CF_c_r_ .:_ t"r _.-tl,r_tln4_ the more
ambitious lander and rover missions to a:_ earl£er _ plx,rtunlt# if *he
_u_tlflc&tlon e,nd funds necessitate this course of _" Also. the same
l_-foot dla_eter ¢_p&uhe syatem can be _.dspted tc -n V l_anct_ vehicle
for later missions If this is deslr&ble.
'l'nJe |tudor In_icate_ that the origin_l Voy._er ot _eetives Ight of
|¢lebtlflc In_tl'umen_tlon) can be ac_omplIsht, d -_r_tha." _ .y (>COO pounds
Of }%_'<_wS/'e (s_tce(_r_.._nd ¢a]_sule eys%e_) vernu_ ..h_ _ . ',_0 to I_.OC_) pou ,d.
_n_osed for Voyager Se%uzn V concept. Th_s reduct _on in hs_d_n_re weight and
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use of the les_ expensive Titan Ill F Cents ,r booster _hould result in a
£ub_ta_,tlal <_v,.r_ll prc6r_n: cost r_ductio_',
Ihq_e[JUCTT_J:,
To date z-_versl stcdies ha',_ _.... nd:<'te_ +9 d-l:neate and sulve the
problem, s _ucs_'.ated with the exec,'i_n ._" :: _.uccejsf'_l entry mls_ionn to Mars.
_ese problems Includ_ aerod_Tm--nics, 6ul,lq:.:'- s:'d -ontrol0 prop_Islon,
co_.d_r.ications_ etc , aS well as c-,noept,_l "] _._r. pack_i,'ir_ techniques, 8_nd
m_ISlon mode omalyses. AmoP_ the '._t_li,:s p,:r:'_.-,'_ It. t'_es(_ task areas aro:
l) AVCO Corpormtlon's stuly f _ _ ._,e_Le_,_*-rv, ,". (m) Inv.s' Ig_ted
e_lLW-_problelml for ca_Nlule s,.p,_rsti.r,from planet appr ,_,'_,and o _-of-or_ _t,
(_) ewlluated Saturu IE _nd Saturt. ',",is la,n_ch w,._._.c!,.s,8-n,_(c_ s_l,-cted
Iclemee (incl,'dlr4_ TV) for entry _c,d m,:rt'a_+,d_',_ ,_,';u[Jttl ,n.
_> L_ley Research Cer,ter's t,_,_ms_ _i: _f tL,, Vey_4_er C_psule w_lich
(&) _l_e subs_11_e_ trada-offs _.nd se&-ct[.ns for _ .°_%turn V m/salon,
(b) de.ned a basellne m/s_ion mo4e for tt.,.i,_ V'yager, amd (c_ rvah.at-d
IZow%h ;ad co_onallty of subsystems fgr :0"3 - 19"'"
]) McDonnel lod M,_rtin-M_rletta C,_rp rsttgns' Vey,_er Phase h St_dles
I_O1eJI _,rt,i.:,&_ _d._|e_nn_] back_ro.nd _nd _fm[_ses. The_e _t'_dles evaluated
&.he owcrlll Voy_er pro@_-lm in ord,'r to sel-_:t apr, ferr,,d mission mode and
• _ll_@Ule _,'ai_n. _n-depth l&_lys-s of the v&riuus aspects of" th_ ' _ion
requited in _h_se stu4Ltes to cle_'ly define e_cn phase of the mission
la_ _e.h eolpe_nent of the el_.,lle
_ne M_',rk perfoz_me_ in thes_ studies r_'.S provided the information _o
_ef_me _.he overall l_Islon _ode as w_il _s the capsule descent m_de, the
:)&I,_%I,T Of %hhleh 18 ShOV_ in figures i I/%d 2. Althou_h these _t,ldles h41ve
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demonstr_Lted the +ec:.r.lcal ft.aslbi]!ty f ?aturn V laurched Voyager/Mars
mls_i .T,ni_. t_: 11"3 - 19 _ time period, +.).,"cost as,oclated with such 8
program mak,.._evalu_.._h of alternate wds_cr',s _dvlsabLe. For th.c reason a
stud i of mls_.l_ns w.,l_, w_al4 he c_mpatibl_ wi'h tt,_:_scientific objectives
e_ lesser bud_,:t requlremen's Was underlauen. The dat_ contained within
thl| pap, : reflect the efforts of this n'_:d/.
FRES_2_ATION OF L_TA
in order te d_fine t_e ?l_netary ,ehicl, (i' ) "h_ science objectives for
the capsule _nd Ipacecrsft were first es.._hllshe 4-_,_hen the capsule f_d
m_cec/-eLf't which wDuld s p:..r" t:e sc_,.:,-,.,q.i_ment were defined; an'l flz.aLly,
the orblia_ insertion prtpul&' _n mmdule w_s _eflned.
Ca_ule Wel _ht
Baaed on this met:,od of app-o_c _ three -,_?s:l,u, ,f varying sctent[fl __
_bilit¥ were defined. Tt..¢seca_,_.les wer,: ,_f thu 2000, 3_A_k),an: _>,%2-?, ".d
CI_@. l_igure _A illustrates the t:/_ _f _/.,s! -:_ar.'ici_t_d f'r ,2.e
200C-_un_ capsule. LarMley Rese_rcY_ Ce..ter's Plan_tal D' Missions Tcc:!:',[o,._"
S%eerin4_ Co.tree h_ defined the science ':,_tr._,,:_'s for th_ entr, _'rt_,:
Of the first Vo_er m/_si_n put_InE empn_sls on ,_talnl',Z _t_v.s_h,.rlc data
@u/-_'_.eepicture@. This p_&c_a_/ , WLIC _, w,,_Id eea._ to o_era+- _ft,'r tmp_Lct,
wDuld We$_ &_prox_matel:" 1000 pOundS durlr 4 _arac_,.u,_ d_cent _u_d w_, _
include 80 _o,mda of mcierce.
eofleept rot&ins the 80 p unds of at.try ' 'tence eq._t_nt, u used Ir_ t_e
_(X)O-pound capoule, with @ _600-pound soft lander Of the _6_A) _u_ds,
/
' t
|
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r 170 pounds are the science equiument defined by J_ for the Voy_er SLS. The
rest of the 16OO pounds is required for str_cture, thermal control, descent
prol_Alsion, co_mJnication, etc.
The most ambitious concept is 8ho_ schematically in figur_.3C. This
: figure represents the incorporation of a rover vehicle into the c_psule. This
rover, _th its 220 _ounds of science equi_xnent,permits data acquisition at L
points remote to both the lander and the propellant contaminated planet i.
surface. The 80-_ou_d entry science,,package is skein retained on the lander !
in this concept making a total science l_s_ge of 300 pounds. )
When selecting the science packages fo_ the above capsules, an a_tem_tJ
; yea made _o achieve the same scientific objectives in theme Titan launched
nisslons (3003- and MOSS-pound capsules) as _'ere planne_ in the larger
(_300- and 700S-pound capsules) Saturn l_unched Voys_er uAesions. To
• accomplish this vithin the lesser wei_t bounds, the prior elation Of
_alXSUlebus and SLS systems yes abrogated and the syste'=s integrated into
i couon IxDversources, _unlcatlon fluke, etc. As a result of this decrease
; in equipment and weight, t_ _as posslble to _ck_e the required equilment .
, into a slaller volume; this, in turn, reflected in veight saVlru_s in many other
arch4. Figure l#shovll the velght savings vhich alloy the 19?3 Mars mission to
SccO_lish Voy_er obJecti--.8 vith a 3000-pound capsule instead of a
_O0-1x_und ca_ule A co_ete and more exact vei_ht breakdovn for each of
: the three proposed ol, l_ulel il Sho_rn in fixate _. "
: _iteule 81se
_- HIwII_ based this stud_ 0,', the Titan _l'lF clue of launch vehicle requires
: _t not ouly the e_Veule _l_ht be reduced significantly, but that the capsule
dAemetel"be slnAla:3_y:educed. Xn order to keep ballistic numbers (_/CDA)
_e
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compatible with those found optimum for the Voyager program the diameter of
capsules considered in this study were reduced to a value which would yield
an area approxlmately one-half the area of the Voyager (19-foot diameter)
aeroshell. Thus, by reducing the veight and area both by approximately
the same factor (2), the ballistic number remains the same as Vevar_er'a
permitting utilization of present Voyager technology. This co_Ison of
capsule sizes is showu in figure 6; on this basis, selection o_ a ll_-foot
diameter aeroshell vlth 2000, 3000, and bOOO-pound capsules is made.
t
'" To check the required altltude-Mach number relatlonshli_ of the above
capsules for low altitude atmospheric descent, trajectories w_re computed
_ and the data plotted as shown in f_Igure7. These data shov that parachute
deployment falls within the established guidelines including & requirement
for deployment above I0,000 feet to permit the landing radar to lock-on the
surface. This mode allows descent propulsion, _.ere used, to burn a
sufficient time and effect a soft-landing on the surface. Entry conditions
?
shovu on this figure are considered to be nominal for aioslons as presently
envisioned.
; S_ceeraft Wei6ht
In establishing the vetght of the zl_cecra_, the oaJe guideline vas
used as for the es_eule; that is, identification of the science first.
FA_Are 8 shoal the results of s_c¢cra._c _lght studies which have been
by sevel_l nources. The three Vo_er m_cecratt contractors shorn
the Boeing Co_xl_ TI_j and General Electriej the L_u_ley Planetary
_lore£ton PTo_m Stud_ _eea is co.?rimed primarily of _ereonnel _ the
_Ala&r Ox_tter _'o_ect Ottlc_ vtth usls_ce _ 80_ I_eClalilnd pel_or_nel
)
1974020203-487
i!
y
_i from other divisions at Langley Research Center; and the current wel6ht
• allocation columns represent the science requirements established by the
authors of this paper.
; Three main areas of investigation have been selected by most study 6roups
:- as bein_ critical to the mission. These include topography, atmospheric
:t definition, and field and particle data; instruments to examine these areas
are given in the second column of figure 8. Imagery has been given increased
importance in the first (1973) mission _rimarily as a result of the success
;. of Lunar Orbiter. To provide a signlficant mission xn this area, SO0 pounds
_as been allocated which would permit the use of a sophisticated film system
With vidicon backup. Such a system would%prcvide 50 feet of 35 Nm film with
selected readout. In the event TV is preferre_, the weight availability existu
to provide any of a variety of combinations of medium and high resolution
cameras or a reduced ca_ility film system with a different vldAoon baakup
system. It is anticipoted that the _magery capability w_uld be reduced
$
, considerably in later missions. Other weights sho_rn in fi_tre 8 also reflect
the importance placed on the spacecraft for the firlt milelon in order to
increase the probability of a large return of meaningful data.
_ Ulln8 _0 _oun4J as the total science allocation for 197_, other
lubsyitelnB and cos_onente were detenmtned after reviewing current existing
_ta aS shown on figure 9. _nese subsylltem velghta, I_LieJ1 Fe_eseBt the entire
spacecraft vel_ht excluding the orbital Insertion lwolmlelon lyete_ and
- lwo_e_t_ estahll|hed the current allocate_l vet_ht of 1700 pouagbl.
!
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t- _ Propulsion Module :
i Data frcl previous studies (L_P No. _8}) were used to determine
t prol_lslon requirements. These data, shown in figure 10, are conservative to
i
2 provide sufficient capability over a reasonable range of requirements.
j Utilizing these data to_ether wlth a desired useful orb'-tlng weight In
197_ of 5500 pounds (1700-pound spacecraft + _300-pound capsule), the weight
; of the propulsion module, both hardware and propellant, v_s calculated. This
1973 weight Is shown In figure ll and the off-loadln_ of propellant for the
better l_ and 1977 opportunities is Indicated. It should be pointed out
that the propulsion engine and tankage Is common for all three missions and Is
a
V based on the requlr_ents of the most demandlr_ mission. Therefore, the total
_i orbital Insertion propulsion weights are _000, 4790, and _TO0 pounds for 197_ _ :_
19T_, and 1977, respectively.
/ i
Launch Vehicle _
_ Nov that weights t'or the capsule (_OO pounds for 1_7_)_ the sp_ecrsft
{ (13_0 Toundat a_l the pro_atlslon module (_000 pounds) have bmm e|tablished_ 2
the launch vehicle can be selected which has the required c&l_bl_lty
"' (10_O0 pounds tO the planet). _:
The data shown in fl_re 12 are s compilation of booster capabilities as
t
Supplied by the Titan booster prl_e contractor - Nartln Nkrletta Corporation.
SIX e"_'bl_e, tlon_ of Titan III F, Yransts_e_ A_e_s, and Centaur ar_ shown In _*
_hls fli_re. After revlewtN_ Vm'tln's data, it was decide4 that the t
eal_bllltles, _hleh were optimised in several respects, were |lI_htl_
_tlslstle for the eo_se_v_tlve toes 04' this etude. Far thts l'esson the
_, blocked-In nm_bers, Its sho_ In the _/ei_ht To Planet" l£ne _ fllt_e 12_ _,
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were arbitrarilyreducedby iO percentto the more realisticvaluesas shown
°: In figure13. Only threeboostercombinationsare show_ in figure13 since
these reflect a cross-section of various Titan III F capabilities. All valueg _'
. ?
are based on 1973Type I trajectories.
Titan Ill F/Tr_ste_e cal3ability(column6) permil_ only a 525-pound
capsuleto be carriedin 1973; a wei@ht far below the 3000 - 4000 pounds
_ously defined.
Titan III F/Transt_e/A_ena(column3) permitsa total weight to the
planetof 7200 pounds. In this configurationthe Agena, _Ich itselfweighs
al_roximately1570 pounds,has been modifiedto serve as the s_cecraft by the
addAtlonof nearly13OO poundsof scienceand supportequi_ent. This vehicle
allowsa capsuleweight of i_55 pounds - stillbelow the weight necessary.
Titan IlI F/Centaur(colcmn5) however,permitsthe full lO,_g_Opounds,
u establishedearlier,to be sent to Mars. Thls configurationl_,ts
• 6_00 poundsin a I,O00 x 30,OOOkm orbit. This weight Includesa 8OO-pound
dry l_ro_isionmodule as weYl as the lTO0-poundspacecraftand a
, _O0-pound capsule vhich _re established as _ximum II.ssion require_nts.
The 'A_ltan III F/Centaur has been selected by this stud M as the 1Lunch
vehicle for the 1_7_ - 1_77 Mars missions. To demonstrate its capability In
the v_tous oi_ortunittes, the data in fl_re 1_ are presented. This rip,Are
that _htle usin_ a co_on propulsion module for the three mi|_lon8
_x_l"essivel_v heavier capsules _a_ be flown l_r each o_rtul_ity, With the _t
t_ IG|SlOnn I_sovl_ _i_bility _ell in excess of the Ig)OO*l_oundl_over _e_le
_ _eaerlbed _rller. _ne|e last two _Smtons are_ ho_ever_ ,b_ed on Ty_e lI
_ _eetoriu i_ittin_ _lw_ter _eight to be _at_d in _ orbit. .
/
9"
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S_rstems Inte_ration
Of the three capsule concepts shown in figure 3, the rover (3C) is by far
: the most sophisticated design and thus presents the greatest ehallen6e in the
areas of packa6in6 and Integrating. For this reason the rover conttsurStlon
ts selected here in order to illustrate the design approach as well as
tnte6rstlon into the flight ca_ule and, subsequently_ the sl_cecra_t and
launch vehicle. Figure 1_ Illustrates the basic size and shape of a FoYer
concept with _or coeuunicat!ons and science co_onents depicted in
• "black-box" manner. The RT3 l_wer system shcwn representQ capability for
• consldelqcble mobility as _11 as a lifetime of several months. Fi6ure 16
shows the roves-, with the lander_ packaged in a 1L-foot aeroshell and
',, encsi_ulated in a sterilization canister. Also shown in this f!_ure lure the
prolmlsion systes on the lander, attitude control system, pe_chute pack_e
I_d Irony electronic components. The lander, _tch delivers the rover to the
planet's s_rface, has been designed to land on a slope of 3k° or leas and
absorb l=lmet loads of 20 earth "6's" or less. The loads are absorbed by
attenuators located within the legs.
_ The en*.lre capsule Is illustrated In fitl_re 17 mated to the 1700-peund
spacecraft and its prolpulsion _odule. Solar panels are shown in a stowed
(folded up) posit_on and a louver design on the spaceclqlft provides thermal
control in or_Ler to ho_d temperatures Within the desired z_n_e. This entire
pl_net&ry vehicle is shown In figure 18 attached to the CentauZ snA enclosed
within a h_erhead shroud of 180-Inches titterer. The shroud is tied lnto
the TLte_ _o _revent the Ceatsar tankn4e f_m realizin_ any aero4yn_l_ local.
• _ weight of the _llmet4u_ v:hl¢le, hove_r, 1o borne by the C_tlu_r. This
_- c)OW_LIpJ_Lor, is Id_Vn in fll_ure 19 with the overall T_thn III _ steAk-up.
J
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COI_CUJSIO_ i
The conclusions drswn from this study are based on the premise that a
1973 _ mission _8t _ke a stl_ll_lcant contribution to the scientific
_nity at minimum cost while beinK the first ste_ in an Integrated progrmm.
• TheR conclusions art lleted below:
1. The Titan III F/Centauz provides performance cspabillty for mieolon
": _ and eomwnallty of baru'_are. !
_. _ae FLi_t Caimule dl_eter of 1_.0 feet provides volume fer e2l
m4sslone.
3. The Ca1_ule could be one of the followlng:
Ca_ule ,Sys. Wt.
• 6) Probe lission (Voy_er Entry Sclence) 23_#
b) Lander _tsslon (Voy_er Entry + SLS Science) 3310# _
c) Rover _lsslon (Voye_er Sclence + _0 Pounds)
_. _3_e follow']._ COHOrt eyste_ should be used For the three :
na,_o_ (1973,1975,_d 1977):
&) Blosh/eld
! b) Deorblt Prol_lelon Syste_
e) Aeroehell
_' t) Attitude Control _t_a
_ 8) T_ndlnllP_olpUlstonSyeteu :'
10
; iJ
• /
, e
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_' _. The probe _lnlon would peratt additionsl welpt to be put into
,;' the _aeeeratt In.riding a_k_ltto_l capability in IlUCh areal u orbital plane
i abanl_, lncreaaed co_ntcatiouj etc., eour_tLble _t_ Istambd l_ez-y
t ! ob_ecttTea.
• i
i
• I
4
t;
)
\
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THIS STUDY SHALL CONSIDER A Titre IU CLASS HISSION TO THE ,.o m
, L"I1 Ul
PLANET lIARS IX 1973. THE OBJECTIVE OF ,THIS.STUDY IS TO EVALUATE *'m m
AI, I.Amll Ill
¢1L 13 141Jl,THE BASELINEllISSION SUBI_ITTI_TO .tHE CONORESS,ASDF_INEDBELOV,- ._
_O_[THI[R VlTH ALL PROIlISINO ALTERNATIVES, TO P[RHIT A IIISSION DE_ IllIII
I'-'01_ 114
I*[_ll Ill
IrlNITION FOR THE 1973 OPPORTUNITY. THI EFFORT IN IrY 1968 IS _ma m
Z_mo_n'to_DV..CEt._ STAT_:or T.,"ARtorsuc.PO,TE.TIAL ._,_=_,,_IlZSm_itS mD WILL NOTBE DIRZC'I'EDAT A SPECIFICIrLISXT,PROJIOT
umzc.nuc.APROJECTIS A_o.zzz_ ev tm_A0,1.,IST.TO,.
nuc'n.x.+.issio. _'P' '_'_" .-
REPRODUCIBItlTY OF THI::ORI(.;IN.,\L PAGE IS POOR
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T.Ee.SELINE.ISSIO.ENCLAVES;.EFOLLOWI.G: _P74;'r'
|, TVO LAUNCH_SIN 1973.
•/Y,:/.r,,_
2, LAUNCHVEHICLE TO 8E EITHER A TITAN. III X (L2_5)/CE_TAUR _,_/.
OR A TITAN IZI C WITH HULTIBURNSPACECRAFTPROPULSION _.,_"
)'OR INTERPLANETARYINJECTION AS VELL AS ORBIT INSERTION, _l_._
EACHLAUNCHVEHICLE TO CARRYA HARINER7L CLASS ORBITER. _,_/
AND A ROUGH-LANDINGCAPSULE. THE CAPSULENAY EITKER C-_re
ERTERTHEHARSATHosP_DZRECTLYoRFRo.O,BZZ. "_'"
4* THE |97& NISSION IS CONSTRAINED; A. TOTAL PROGRAHCOS' ,_Pa,_/L
o_s:_,. INcLuDI,LAUNC.VERZCL_.T,ZSISe_LI_ED
TO BE COBSISZE.B7N.I_Jl THE USE OF A #INIRUII-IIODIFIED
IIARIRER 7| ORBITER AND .AN800 POUNDCLASSROUGHLANDER,
'Tile JPL CSAD DESIGN IS TO0 SHALL FOR THIS HISSION BUT, IS
A O00O EXAHPLEOF THIS TYP_r OF LANDER.
$. THE SCIENCE OBJECTIVESSHOULDINCLUDETHE FOLLOVlNSI
A." ORBITER8CARRYPAYLOADSIHILAR TO NARINER 71
; .ll?i'lr_'eY VEHICLE, NEASUREATNOSPHERZCTERPERATURE,
• PI_SSUREe CONPOSITIOt_, AND 8-AXIS ACCELERATION.
"C, .LMDI_! TRANSHIT LIliITED %HA_LI[RYANDNEASUU .
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ATHOSPHERIC TE]4PERATURE. PRESSURE, VIND, SOIL
: CONPOSITIOK, AND SUBSURFACE MOISTURE.
TI_SE ARE OBJECTIVES ONLY, SUBJECT TO _HE ABOVE CONSTRAINTS.
THE FINAL SELECTION.OF INSTRUHENT$ VILL NOT BE HADE UNTIL
_'_' AFTER THE SCHEDULED 1969 NARS FLYBY.
": ALTERNATE MISSION
r'_NSIDERATIOHS SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOVING ALTERNATES:
': 1. HARD LANDERS, VITH OR VITHOUT ORBITERS, DIRECT EKZJ_Y
_ OR OUT OF ORBIT ENTRY
2. SOFT LANDER, VITH OR VITHOUT ORBITERS, DIRECT ENTRY
OR OUT OF ORBIT ENTRY
H ANA6EHENT
• .,PROJECTNAr_AGKIIEWT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE I,IARS 73 NISSION
SHALL BE ASSUMED TO BE AT THE LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER. LRC SHOULD
$TIR)Y AND HAKE APPROPRIATE RECOflNENDATIOHS RELATIVE TO TKE
AT SYSTDI.LEVEL. POTENTIAL AREAS VHERK JPL CAN1 _ __ T
THE
C_TRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL EFFORT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THESE
i
CGII|IDERATIOI4S, THIS SHOULD INCLUDE SYSTEH 8ANAGgHEMT OF EITHER
THEMBITER OR LANDER, LRC AND JPL SHOULD DEVELOP A _%kN VHKREBY
*: JPL'IITUDIlli llUPPOliIU[D BY 'MUSk k/HIT ,PUN_I VZI.L ,BE IN Ili,IPlJl'_;_T OT _r.. ,
J
• t
, i
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CONSIDERAT|ON SHALL ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE SIGNIFICANT
INVOLVr._ENT OF T_E LUNAR AND PLANETARY _ISSIOHS BOARD IN THE P_O.E
:_ GRAIl DEFINITION ACTIVITYo INCLUDING THE RELATIVE HISSION EMPHASIS
i BETVF._N THE ORBITER AND LANDER.
: STUDY CONTRACTS
"-T IS REQUESTED THA_ THE HEADQUARTERSPLANETARY FROGRN4
+
+, OPFICE BE PURNIS)_ED VITH INPORNATION COPIES 07 CONTRACTUAL WORK+
STATEKENTS AT LEAST THREE WORKING DAYS PRIOR TO THEIR RELEASr. _0
POTENTIAL GOhTRACTORS. CONTRACTS SHOULD MEET THE GENERAL GROUND- _!
-+
RUL_ TEAT THEY BUST ADVANCE THE STATE OF THE ART OF PLANETARY ;
TECHNOLOGY_ RATHER THAN BE OF USE TO ONLY ONE SP.ECIFIC NISSION. _+
!
+ RESOURCES
PL_INXNG SHOULD 8E BASED ON HAVING ONLY THE APPLICABLE APflT
: RtSOURCES IN FY 68. FY 59 FUNDING OF $2e.e 14 HAS BEEN REQUESTED.
: T)(( TOTAL RUNOUT COST, INCLUDING LAUNCH VEHICLESI SHALL BE
APPROXIIIATELY $36_.0 H.
SCHEDULE AND REPORTING
A STUDY'SCHEDULE AND R'_:PORTING ARRANGEHENT CONSISTENT VITH
I_XISTING NASA RE(IUIREHENTS SHALL B_" DEVELOPED JOINTLY BETVEEN LRC
AND _ i_kJk_UARTERS PLANETARY PROBRAlt OFFIC£o
PAGE $ NASAKQ 148. UNCLAS
JOHN E NAUGLE ASSOCIATE A_It|N IrOIl
'+ +!$PAC| SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS
+: aT'
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With t_ ¢oucluslon ot t_ stud_ p_se for the ZTr3 )tszs J_se/on, it
st, mars tt:aLy for me to r_n_Iz_ FV3D'O et_ In t._L_ _ uad to
ImmBt _or _ur _tLo_ _ commt: z_r_.4 the 1_r3 nlssL_.
¢t_rts I and 2 su:mrt_ the 1_ e/_ ln-ho_e and su_rvts/ag
e_tmcta frua _ 196_ _be/lnnd_ stwUe,, _ u_o _:eeenL sdJa/_L
¢iart 3 Ltluat:ttes t_ :J_s_ o_tlcas req, lrl_ a sel_t/oa tot 17T3
1;h_t t._o eS,T_LSLOIs _ a _e: _lm sad no orbiter ocl_ce ls
zequlzed, the orbiter or fl_b_ ,_:c_ H_S na a lander "bus" sa4
6t_tloa. _a item _J_ an t_ _sslou o¢lectic_ m ecs_.
rl_X_ and ccmpsLtb_llt_ vtt_ _e_olo_ ds_lx_.
_,,_ Ij d_alls t_e c_e_ ;._t_olln_ user. Co_.s _z_ tskm rs'os A,._O
bport. October 2. 1'_. C_rt _ p_ a e_ed Lz_trlz
(_ atutm opttoas _._.'t_. that zd._st, costs _ex_ _0 z 10°
mx_-o_-o:bLt, Vh_ t_a _ _ has be_ _tandas4_ the _mr,_LbZo
ulas_cus can be _ tr_ tats chart,.
Za 11Jim:mmm. to the cost plet_Aru, the s'_lattmshAp o;r risk to ,,.4ssS._a
ac4a Is JJ_ud_t_4 _ Chart 6. In _ the direct made rep_smns
S _ rL -_ mslca boc_ th_s Aa mAaA_ _ for er_or Tehorm,8 J,E
t/l _axt-_-os'oit s_le _e can trta t_ _a_lt and _ a_tmet deodar
e_a4/tlons for _r_. _. In t_rn, alloes f_ a s_nllo_er entry _le_
m &ta_l_e Lk_T?_n_,Lud le_. d_sads _ the d_celmsto_ s_t_n.
sa_7 Ltlust_s _ -_lst_p _ ]_J_Lctte _ (D), mt=:r
N_h _.0 £o_ ttm c_t-cF-ozblt sad 41rect m_s. _ 3 6"eats7 ¢_r
the out-ot-o_lt _da I_ yell 4e_'la_! re=Lain _try 141e ou be
well vl_ _)o. _he _ _'entr_ corrldor toe t_ 41=eet m4e/_ mot, oo
d_ snd _s s,_b_ot_t to _ _tJ_K_tt_ _ao Ls _ the
4svelopLa_ toc_i _t_t_s to_ ma/ma _tW sa_a _ tr_
fl_o to _0_ --I above. C_ b_tlAo_e am_ea.o un_r ccusldemLtm
m _n 0.3 to 0.4 ma_. 2h, _tL_t; sh_s t_t, 1_w t_- n_r-oet4t ill_e, a } nl_ stall_lll m ida ]l,,, O.ls m mb,l_ &_"-. . i_O°m'_
m
REPRODUCIBILIIY Of THE ORI_._INAI_ PAGE IS POOR.
I
"1g74020203-5"18
f•-, .. _
R[PRODucI 111¥ OA _t-tt_ ORl(_l_t_,i PAGf I._ D0
--" OR
]974020203--5]9
2_ CHARTI
Missions Studied By FVSD (In-House)
• laths AT_O_I_ERICPROBEMISSIC_- LWP-328
(Atlas/Centaur, Mariner F1y_y, and _-Pound _p_ule - 1971 _sslon)
Presenl_.Q at 06SA in Washington, D.C., February 1966.
: ])EEV_ ARD D-'_-IGN CO.V_ARIS_;S _OR THE VOYAGER CAPSJLE - LW?-326
(Proposed, Ol%-Of-Orbi% Concept vlth Parachute and Retro Landim£) ,
Presented a_ Joln% OSSA, QA/_, and JPL meetln6 in Washln_, D.C.,
September 1966. +,
VO%KaER _ BUS STSTEM BASELI3E,AND MISSI_ MCDE _ESCRIFEION -
' 1973 )asszm m sazu_ v; LWP-_78
A _G_ API_N FORA COM_O_CAPSULE_S Sl_TEMFOR S_I_ V -
(R__ sys_m weight allocations for 1971Co=_tlblav_th
_ C_ Subsyetea Gro_h C_msideratlons).
A _31DD_ BLO_ AF_C_ TO M_S A_ _,"JSPIA_TA_ MISSZ_S IN T_E
19_O'e_ A X_ S_ACECK_FT- L_P-_3
(P_met_Ic Anal,ysu Usln 8 Titan IIX C - III F For Maltl-Mlu£_s
With Propulsion Changes on CommoaSt_ecrar_)
"+ T_tted %o 0SSAin November1967.
_ _ IIIF (C_'S CAPABIIXTYTO C_ OUTA "VOYA_T%PE"
_SSlm - U_-S&7
(l_vee/a_ C_tibtlity of LY with "Vo_6er" Cb_ectiwes X-alu_n_ A
_r. Ur_d S_t of Tltan/C_n_aur M_tin_ Zor_ Xtsslca
_Nm%ea at Joint Mse_ of X_'I Pt_ and Washlm&,_m B_presentatives
i
#
/
REPROt)(JCIBII_I_y Ol _ [HI ORI£_tN,\I pA(_t_ I_+ _:++ +
++
+ + + +<-)OR
+
1974020203-520
503
Cmtmcts I_itored By IN'SD
AVCO P_e/X_er S%_ T (De_egberl_k - _ I_)
&at._a I.B to Saturn V
_r,j fr_ Appz_eehand Orb£t
_ _ Iandea', Dueeu¢ TV.
AriaWDo,,,,elA_ S vo_r (Tel;nA,r_ 1967- _ _)
Satum v
_: _r_ fxmm OrbJ._
I_ 141ulcm Node 8_u4y (Apz_Al1968 - Oct,o_r _c_8)
fr_ _r_eh and OxbJ.t
_d% _ndtr
Q •
1974020203-522
f* i
i 505
/
_s_ _l ..
- z lo JIc;e_.c
I_. )b.rtmer Oz_t,_ - _LO0 10u_,(-too/)
• _ YehLelu
_Lz©/e_t,,,.r - x
|
1974020203-523
1974020203-524
50"/'
50_3
509 _
1974020203-527
T.
510
/
i 1_-,_sa ='A_/Cea_ur
• kst U_nr_o_ )tLss£_
, • f_ms.l.J.es't,RL,,._, Flexible In OpemtZon.o,3.
Se=ase -
L • LGwest g'8 for T_strum_ntDevel_nt
_" • Frovldes Platfo_a 1"o1"In,_trm:_nt
_ Depl_ment
• Less _:nndlng on D_eXemto_ System_
• Bas Groa_ Poes£blllties With Ssme
Technolotff
1974020203-528
!t
)il
CONCLUSIONS
There are no prtn,ary flight capsule concept differences re-
suiting from the selection of mission mode. Both the d_rect and
-" out-of-orbit modes are equally feasibly, although the direct mode
entry environmcuts are ahghtIy more severe. The main differences
be_een the modes are concentrated ia the flexiblhty and ton-
i" £idence in mission operations. The sp,.clfic conclusions are tab-
ulated below and on the following page.
Out-of-orbit mode rccoramended.
point designs studied, Conf.guratton IB (lO.5-ft aeroshell,Of the
= 0.35)is recommended.
/ %
Titan IllC/Centaur launch vehicle required for either mzssion mode
_en orbiter science capatility is desired.
- llulbous shroud required for dicect mode, and probably required for '_
out-of*orbit mode when using a Hach 2 parachute, VM atmopshere,
• fM)OO-ft terrain height, and 107 margins. :
! TargetS.rig capability is the same in either mission mode when con- {
i' aidering only flight profile constraints. However, superxmpos_n K
any time or orientation constraints oecreases the direct mode [and-
ing tire selection flexibility.
Accuracy of atmosphere structure determination not significantly
dlf[erent between mission model.
: Science, propulsion, telecommunications, power and pyrotechnics,
• and thermal control (autonomous capsule excepted) subsystems are
not affected by miss¢on mode choice.
:_ All subsystem components are eLther present state-of-the-art tech-
nolosy or can be developed for the 1973 launch opportunity.
Termln.aldescent and landing radar (TI)LK),altit,_demeasuring
radar (A_)antenna, inertial measurement unit (hUJ), engires,
isotope heaters, sterilizable batteries, stertlizable solar cell
: adhestvel, aerodeceleratora, and certain science components are
lona Iliad efforts which ,_ust start in Phase C.?
89 ::
- 0_?1(;IN,_i.,
?
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;
Out*of-orbit mode Direct mode
NOte in-flight mission flexibility Con use Dhrincr Mars '71 orbiter,
hut at sacrifice of targeting and
Site survey before separation ,,roital science objectives
Choose for science objectives Slightly larger launch vehicle per-
- Avoid poor capsule surface en- forraance margzn
vironment or adverse weather
patterns Note extensive development required
Tsrgetlng can be to different Higher entry environment
site alter launch
4, More severe base heating
;- Checkout with time for nullfunc-
*[ tion correction Increased aerodynamic sensi-
tivities to tolerances and
, Second lander can benefit from mtsalignments
first lander's data return
Larger aeroshell and canister
Can fit within lO-ft shroud; use Of
• Nach 2 parachute allows for no More comprehensive aerothermo-
margins. To provide margins, an dynamic test program
ll.$-ft shroud is required
Additional and more sophist{-
Can fit within 10-ft shroud and pro- cared equipment on orbiter for
vide margins by uszng a Kach 5 bal- approach guidance
lute
lequlree additional orbit insertion
propulsion added to Nariner Mars '71
orbiter
Requires'successful orbit insertion
maneuver for successful capsule mis-
sion
i
Y,
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1.O PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
1.1 General
l_e Viking Project is part of a program for the exploration
of 14ars with the use of _ed spacecraft. The Mariner IV initiated
this program by perforating scientl_lc investigations duxtng a flyby of
. the planet in mtd-l_5. Hariner '69, 14ariner '71, and Viking _rlll
continue thi._ exploration program. The Mariner '69 Project win conduct
two flyby mi._s_ons with Mars encounters occurring _n _id-l_9. The
Mariner '71 Project will conduct two orbital _ssions to be performed
in late 1971. 'the Vikin8 a_tssion _ILl 'utilize the 1973 opportuz_ty to
conduct scientific investigations from Mars orbit, during entry, end on
the surface. This will be the first opportunity in the Mars exploration
program to obtain direct measurements _rlthin the Mars ataosphere and on
the Nars surface.
1.2 Project Objectives
The general objective of the Viking Project is to obtain, usinE
Spacecraft consisting of a Lander and an Orbiter, scientlf_lc data vhich
will sianiftcantly increase our knovledEe of Mars _th particular e_sls
o_ providing information relevant to 14re on the p_anet.
The Lander _urf_c_ and ent_ science _easurements are of
priaary importance in satisf_J_ 8 the Project obJecttTes. The surface
_nsure_nts ere to visual3_y characterize the landi_ sites, search for
L organic compounds, search for the presence of liven8 orpnl_ and
: investigate the abi)dt¥ of the environment to support life. Entry
Imasurements will investigate atmospheric ccl_sttion and structure.
The Orbiter science measurements, vhl_h will be utilized in
• _n_er that will mxlltl_e the ussfulna|s of the landed |eience _easure-
_nta, will provide _ross area sur,,elllance of the landir_ area and vi 11
It_d_ th• dynamic characteristics of the planet and its atalOspbere
t_r_ orbit. In addition, the Orbiter v_1£ relay date _ro_ the Lander
to _rth.
_he detailed ob_ttves to 1_e acco_lshed in satlsf_ri_ the
_P_4n_ l_Ject objectives are specified in section _.0 of appendix 1.
k
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1.3 Project DescriDtion
Tvo Viking Spacecraft, each consisting of an Orbiter and a
Lander, will be used to accomplish the Viking Project objectives. The
Spacecraft will be separately launched by Titan/Centaur Launch Vehicles
from the Eastern Test Range during the 1973 Mars launch opportunity.
Each Spacecraft will be placed into orbit about Mars. The scie,ltific
instruments onboard the Orbiter will be used to obtain data to aid in
the ae._eetienof landing sites for the Lander. After the landing site
has been selected, the Lander will separate from the Orbiter and descend
to the designated landing area. The Lander will make scientific measure-
ments during entry and on the s_rface of Mars. The Orbiter will act as
a relay station between the Lande_ and Earth, obtain periodic coverage of
the Lander surroundings, and make scientific measurements. The Deep
8pace Instrumentation Facility and the Space Flight Operations Facility
rill he utilized for tracking, command, data reception, and control.
i._ ManaRement
Viking PrograB management is at NASA Headquarters, Office of
8pace Science and Applications, Office of Planetary Programs. The Langley
Research Center, Viking Project Office, has responsibility for the overall
V_king Project managenent, the Lander System, the Slmcecraft System, and
Launch and Flight Operations System. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory
It respoelsib_e for and will furnish the Orbiter System and the Tracking
emd Data System. The Levis Research Center is responsible for and will
t_a_ish the Launch Vehicle System. Figure 1 defines the management
_cture.
i._ Hardware Ter_Inoloay
The hardvare tea_tlnolo_ used in this Statement of Work is given
Illtable i and figures 2 and 3.
The Contracto_ 8ha3£ provide a2£ services, materials, FaoilAties, and
oq_pment, eu(eept those provided by the Oover_t, necessary to furnish a
Viking lander 8yltWl. He Shall 1110 prOYt_l a_ services, ulterial8.
,,u o
° REPRO_CIBItI1Y 01: lHg...... ORIL-dt,,l&t"- pAGl _ Ib POOR.
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i_leilities and equipmeatp except those provided by the Government,
required to intestate the Lander into the 8pacecreft and the spacecraft
into the Space Vehicle as defined herein. The Contractor shell provide
the mnaaement, overall planning, integration, control, and operations
necessary to successfully carry out all aspects of this Statement of Work.
3°0 _-lq_IISHED DATA, EQLPflq4EFP,FACILITIES, ANDSUPPORT
: The listed ite_ are to be considered Government-furnished for
pmrposea of acco_plishmnt of the tasks described in section _.0.
3.1 _unch Vehicle S_t;em
r 3.1.1 TWOTiten/Centeur Launch Vehicles with nose fairing and
i_pporting services (_6. h and _pandix 2).
_ 3.1.2 Titan/Centaur ITL facil/ties (Integration - Transfer -
LS_ch) at the Eastern Test Range (r.TR) (appendix 2).
3.1.3 Launch Vehicle lnJ.-ction errer analysis (appendix 2).
3.1.h Titan/Centaur estimated injected payload capability
(rts. _).
3.1.5 Spacecraf_ axes definition (fla.6).
3.1.6 Targeted launch trajectories and firing tables.
3.1.7 SupPorting services to launch the Titan/Centattr.
3.1.8 Launch Vehicle test items required for Spacecraft
if.terrace tests.
3.2 _rbiter Slfst_
3.2.1 Three ffltoht-qualii_ed Crbiters (appendix 3) including
the Spacecraft Launch Vehicle adapter (fig. 2).
3.2.2 Orbiter test models and AGE.
3.2.3 SupportinE services to operate the Orbiter durinE all
Spacecraft level tests.
3.3
3.3.1 F1/Iht-q_llfted Radioisotope The_oelectric Gonerator
3,k Launch and F12eht O_rsti_s System
3.k.l Lnnoh Operations i
3.k.l.1 Spacecraft facilities at KSC/ETR(appendix 5). ;
3.k.1.2 Range Facilities of _ and I_C (appendix 5).
3
,/
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3.& 1-3 Building a_ building-services at ETR to
hot_e and support Co_tractor-_trnished sterili-ati_ eq_i_eut.
3._.1._ Facility equipment which is dei_ne_ as all
equipment other than AG_, 0_, mechanics hand tools and/or office supplies
that are required by the Contractor to support operations.
3._.1._ Tne services and facilities to mate the
Spacecraft with the Launc_l Vehicle.
3.&.2 Flight Operations
3._.2.1 Facilities and eqtLip._ent of the Trackinc and
Data System and support services required to provide this system for
the Contractor's use (appendix _. A_, 0_, hand tools, and o_ice
: nqpplieaare excepted.
3._.2.2 Plans, estilatea of trajectory control
aapabilitT, procedures, .aof__are.pro_r_u, and Rersonnel in an integrated
rd_te_ to parlors the design and operati_al execution of the precision
naviga tion task of the Project ._roa Interplanetary injection to the
! establishment oI the orbit from which the Lander descent to the planet
%Ill be made. Thereafter, to perfor_ the sa_e _unction for the Orbiter.
! 3.h._.._ Plans, proced_re_, software pro_ra_ and
personnel in an integrated SMste_ to perform the design and operational
_tl_ _ t_m _asku required to analyze the perforeance of the Orbiter
fr_ launch to cc_leticn of the e_ls=ion.
3._.2._ Post-landing positic_ deter_nation of the
Lander for aissiov operations use.
3.5 __._.
_.5.1 Mars _4_ineering Model (appendix 7).
3._._ Navigation Capability Estimate (appendix 8).
The C_traetor sha_ _anage and control his effort in accordance
with plans specified in the tasks of this section. All such plans shall
b_ developed by the C_t_ae_r, updated as necessary, and s,_i%ted for
X_n_le_ _esearen Center ap_-_al or revle_, as required.
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_.1 _anaKeu_t sad Technical Inte_ratio_
The Contractor shall provide the management, overall planning,
luplementatton, and control necessary to successfully cart 7 out •11
agpecta of this Statement Of Work. Re shall sccouplish the overall
technical integration of the Viking Lander, Orbiter, Spacecraft, Launch
Vehicle, ••socl•ted UouBd 8upport equipment, 8oftw•r•, launch .and flIRht I
toperation•, and supportinqj services. HiS planning shall z_tcosnize otherGovernment and Contractor saree•ants. TMe task8 below •re by _ of
deseriptioQ and not limitation:
.1.1 )4_ement t
The Cont_•ctor shall manage and control his effort in
: accordance with •n approved hemggaent Plan which |hell include his
oz_ntzational concept and employment of resources (uanpc_er, facilities,
etc.), his plJn for providing •ffective control, the identification of
t_ 8_stamJ to be used in reporting t_ the Langley Research Center in
: o_ to implement this St•talent of Work. In developing and implementing
: the plan, the Contractor 8hall lnclude the requirements contained in
appendix 9-
_.1.].1 Master Schedule - The Contractor shall develop
• Master Schedule vhlch will includ_ all major el_.m_nt8of the Vi'-ing
l_oJeet. The approved Master Schedule. shall _p uaint_ine_ b_ _,_e Contractor.
JJ.l.2 Conflan_ration Control
The Contractor s,_e33 devel_ _n_ i_l_le_t s Configuration
(_1_1 _ _r am based on an appa.ove_ y_a_. The plan _hall describe the
o_l and repm_l_ effort •uoelated with the Lander 8Mute• end the
lnterfaees with e_hw vtkin8 8_J_uJ..
• L ] Planetary Quarantine
4.L3.1 Policy - 5_a Contrac_r shell ad½ere to •
Je_btt4t_y of ee_tamin_tien per 3£unch of less than 1 X 10 -6 for each
• ndim8 vehicle and 3 X 10 "_ for elA other flight hardware. The pe_od
_f' quJrutins Is _0 _Jar8 trine the First kn_m landing on the planet.
4.1.$.8 P_n_ qmrantine i_esra8- The Contractor
8h_ develop end l_t • Plan_l_ quarantlBe Fr¢_,'_ For the
uls_en i_ accordance with an Npp_wed p_an which is consistent
wit& eeetieu _.1. 3.1 and _la:Leb m_Le_Lee the raqu:trewn_8 and eens_sln_s
statedlaap_ 1_
)£_lllTy O_ THt ORl<)l_,\i ,, .
- " _A(,f 1_ ',
•-- _-(3( )k'
"- {
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_.1.k I_sslon Assurance
i _.1._.1 Project _tisston Assurance Program - The
_ _tractor shall develop and Implemen_ a Project F/Lsston Assurance
Plw_rem in accordance with an approved plan which is in cc_for:_ance
w/th apl_ldices ].1, ]2, and 13. The Con_raotor wi_l not be res}_onstble
/'or =_eStow assurance activities related to Goverrment-f_rnlshed
: i Fro_ect elHmnts. However, he shall utilize and incorporate in his snaly es end
_NKreN the alssdon assurance date provided by the 0overnment On those
elsmnts.
_ _.1._.2 La_ler System - The Contractor shall _cc_pllsh
the i'oLtowing Lander aission assurance activities _n accordance v_r,h
approved plans.
_.1.1,._.I Itellab_llty e_s_rsnee - The
C_tractca" shall develop and Smple_nt a La_,der Syate_ Relf_bil!ty
£a_hnce Pr_e_ in sccordan.e v_th appendix _ _'_ _d:._led by spadix 12.
k.1._.2.2 Q_21ty --_eurance - The COntractor
develop and to, leant s Lander $yste_ Q._altty Assurance Pro_ru in
ae_ordane_ _r_th a_ndtx 13.
k.l._ Revlevs
The COntractor sh_ p_n, centimo%, and participate in
t@_M_tt_l end _n_£Mme_t re_$e_s related .o his v_rk effort. T_
_troctc_ sbs_ l_rticl_te in but will not be responsible _or revt_s
: e_rln_ the desl_ _ Governl_nt-/'urnl_hed eqvA_ent (GFE). Roweverm he
": _ i_e in his r_ _ose in,efface l'actors _*h GFE affecttn_
Iit0 e/_t _der this State,he of Vcrk. The COntractor shall ub_t for
S_eo_l a revl_ plan end a_uda _r_eed_n_ each revt_. Bevteve
lll_Lude lit leeet o_m'sll _ect realism d_silln revt_s o_ fll_tt hst4-
_= ware a"_ ou_or'lM _ e_l_eat and related _ft_, sccept_e
: _, l_eh md t_.A_ht m_di_.ss m_lws, end _t fl_pt snsl_,sls
revtwe, Omw epe_l, fld M_lev reqdred 1,; • HAIIA mnNieme_t deM, Ip_
, _w at_ mo.,_ sf_ eeo_n_et _d vhielm eha_ eov_r a_l el_iote
_. I,.IA _ts Uuqmm_ )
_lm_ _ _ • _tts Ilass_sst I_a t_ snwml.
!
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the schedule "J_which they are needed, and their control and traceablZit'
The ecs_trolli,'_,Ccmtractor-prepered, Project document sh_l be the
_l_ '1_ MisSt® 8pecificati_c. _.e Contractor shall prepare a_l doc_ents
re_ltod to his _.tsks ax_ identify vhether they shall be suhnLttted for
approval, review, or lnforltton. An _pprovsl doc'_mt requi_ es forlla_
LsN_ey Research Center approval before i_lenontation. A review
&_unent permits lmplementatlc_ if Langley Research Center response is
m_t received within an a_reod-upon period of time. Infor_at'_on d_cu_ents
do no', reqtLire Langley Research Center response.
_.1.7 Logistics
The Comtractof sha_ plan end provide all logtltic_
ag_octin4 his tasks un_r this 8tateNnt of Work in accordance with an
8ppl'oved plan. }To is not respocsible for logistics of _overr, mont-furnishe ,4.
Stems uBttl they era delivered or otharv'Ise interface with his tasks.
_.1.8 Sparta
The Contractor shall provide spares for the' equlj_ent
IW /_arlltshee as _ecessar_ tc assure a ht_h probabllAty of mdssicn 8u:¢ess.
The 8pares Plan shell be stlb_ttod for review.
i _.1.9 8a.*ety
The come,actor mhall accomplish all effoa*t under this
|_ate55en_ of., Wor_ in aeem_kmco with an approved 8_fety P3&n which is in
em.4_snee _'lth ei_endlcss 1_ end l_. Re sbsl_ also coqpl_, with all
IIp_Ll,e_ble Federal, S_te, end local 1ewe, rea_l_ttoms, ol_lLInances, and
e_d_8 relatln_ to safety. The Contractor shall tuodiatol_ report to the
Ilsseerch Ca.lter any sea,done or incident res_ttl_ in a fatality,
i d!Mb_NE injury or property loss of _10,000 or w_'e or which Ca_HS Nr_(x_
delay e_kuq_rin( the metl_l of r_q,,_r_d launch @ares. _ka Centreetor
thorca_hly Investi_te ell sums eeeldents and Incld_t_ and furnish
+ the _ Ilesq_reh Comtor vith • veport of the lind.s and the proposed
U4/_ e_loted _'.lve actions to IP_ve_t _. TM Cmtn_ator
ass_ that h_s _tr_ctors e4_er_ to the ep_ron4 Vikln_ _fety
lqsn end o,be_ applacsb_e ssfe_ I_x_du_s.
?
t
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•1.10 Technical Integration
The Contractor shall accomplish all technical integration
_equired to achieve the Project objectives, such as: integration of the
Viking Lander Capsule and Viking Orbiter to produce the Viking Spacecraft;
integration of the Viking Spacecraft with the Launch Vehicle; integration
of the Viking Spacecraft with the Tracking and Data System, etc. This
1fork shall be acc,_plished in accordance with approved plans. All
planning and implementation affectin_ other Agencies and Contraetars
shall be accomp'_ished throulh the Langley Research Center.
_.2 SeierlceInte_ration
The Contractor shall i_tegrate all science requirements that
affect the ac:hievement of Lander bcience objectives. The Lander science
reqnirements will be provided by th_ Langley Research Center as a part of
the periodic ekission definition. Appendix 1 is the first such aluion
uef!nition. The schedule for subsequent definitions is given in
appendix 16. The Contractor shall incorporate this aission definition
schedule in his overall p]Ju_ning.
_.2.1 Requirements
_he _iniea_ scientific investigation, lifetiae, and
la_Lt_Ag site requirements shall he as defined in appendices 1 and 17.
The L'ontractor shall conauct perforlanee analyses to insure that these
can be met or exceeded. He shall define the quality and quantity of data
to be returned for each scientific investigation as a function of significant
Spacecratht, missian, and operations t_nettons. These analyses shall
include coverage, measttrement accuracy, measurennt range, etc. Each
_al_ls shall be submitted for review.
_. E. E Integration Plan
The Contractor shall develop and submit for approval a
Science Integration Plan which includes all requirements af_ecting Lander
sci_tnce objectives. The plan shall consider iteas such as schedules,
lwviws, sad the interface req_tre_nts between the Viking Pro_ect Office,
the Contractor, and the Scientists participating in the Vikin_ Project.
This integration plan shall utilize appac_Ltcea 1 and X6.
i
?
f
1
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_. _.2.3 Strategy
The Contractor shall develop and update as neees_ry
strategy for mite selection, the complementary use of the Lander
• and Orbiter, and the use of two Spacecraft. The strategy shall be consistent
with appendix 1. The strategy shall consider the Spacecraft, misaic_,
operation_ capatilities, stay time in orbit before Lander release, real
time data analysis, and other pertinent factors. This strategy shall be
dc_unented and submitted f_r approval. Recommended modifications to the
Orbiter and/or Orbiter science instruments relevant to strategy shall also
be submitted for approval. The Goverrsnent will ieq_leuent any approved
,_xli fications.
_.2._ Lander Constraints
The Contractor shall design a Lander to meet the
constraints defined in sections _.2.M.1, _.2._.2, J'.2._.3, and _.2._._
and others dictated by his specific design. The Contractor 8hall conduct,
where necessary, a test proKram to demonstrate that the constraints
have been met.
M.2._.l Radiation - The design shall be such that the
Lander science instruments be protected from onboard radiation. Protection
requireaents for the Government-defined instruments are given in
_ section _.5.8 of appendix 18. Protection from external radiation shallf
be provided if nece'asary to assure a high probability of proper
instrument per for_nce.
_.2.k.2 _M_le Acquisiti_n - The organic analysis,
biological, and bound water investigations require that multiple samples
of _artian soil be delivered to the science instruments. The Contractor
deliver s soil sample of at least _ cubic centimeters for each of _he
n_yses defined in appandl_ i.
The Lander Capsule design shall be such that
the soil uuplea used for the biological investigation consist of 80 per-
ee_t _ _--.e Mars coil that has bean heated to no _ora than 10"C above the
gaxieam surface temperatul"e at the landln_ 8_e for the day. of the a_alysi8.
: _8ideration shall be given to haa_ing by the terminal propulsion system,
N_le c_llecticn and delivery _foteu, and all other external sources.
9
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The Lander Capsule design shall be such that
soll Nmples used for the organic analysis and toLu_dwater investigations
are heated to no more than _O'C above the local surface temperature at
t the time of umple gathering during the sample collection and delivery
process.
The Lander Capsule design shall be such that
the soil _ples used for the organic analysis investigation contain less /
"_ than one _art per i0 milllon organic material released from the Lander
_ Cepeulea
: The Lander Capsu/e design shall be such that
soil samples used for the bound water lhvestlga_ion consist of leas than
one part per 10 million water released from or produced by the Lander
Capsule.
_.2._.3 Water - The Lander Capsule design shall be such
that the In_ldity and 1"tee water investigation environments consist of
leas than one part per 10 million water released £rom or produced by the
Lander Capsule.
M.2._,_ Entry Data Return - The Lander Capsule desiin
shall be such that all entry data are obtained independent of lending
: success. It is desirable that as much entry data as practical be stored
: onboard the X_nder for subsequent transmission in case uf relay link
laLeunction.
_.3 _sslon Analysis_ndDes_Kn
k.3.1 Missic_ Analysis and Design Plan
The CoQtractor shall prepare for approval a Viking Project
Ml|sion Analysis and Desi_ Plan describing _11 aspects of the Project
lission analysis and design activities from contract go-ahead through the
post-flight analyses of the mission. This plan shall be consistent with
the Viking Mission Deflation (appendix 1) and shall use the Government-
.S.ted capabilities and constraints for the Launch Vehicle, Orbiter, and
Tracking and Data 8ylte_ (appendices 2, 3, and 6).
10
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_..3.2 Parametric Mission Analyses
The Contractor shall perform and utilize all parametric
_asion studies required to establish design limits for Project hardware
and software. These studies shall be based on the environments described
iD appendix 7. The design limits shall be derived from parameter ranges
resulting from parametric studies of missions targeted to land anywhere
between 20°S latitude and 30QN latitude. The Contractor shall also
investigate parameter ranges and corresponding systems requirements
resulting from missions targeted to land between BOQN latitude and 79"N
latitude. In addition, he shall _erform parametric studies for alternate
aimmions corresponding to partial system failures. Baaed on the results
of these studies, the Contractor shall reco_nend suitable system design
requirements for all elements of the Project. These shall be included in
a Viking Missio_ Specificati_ Document. After the various hardvare and
sotq_are system designs have been established and approved 'by the Langley
Research Center, the Contractor shall analyze, define, and document the
capabilities of the various systems to perform nominal and alternate
aissions and update as required.
I_.3.3 41aslon Desi6n
_.3.3.1 Reference Mission Design - Based on the results
Of the parametric missio_ analyses zud the resulting Viking System
capabilities the Contractor shall analyze in detail a limited number of
nominal and alternate reference missions. These shall be developed in
accordance with the mission definitions indicated in appendix 16. The
reference miss!.,ls shall include the strategy for the use of two space-
craft and b, developed in sufficient detail to l_rmit analyses
which cannot '_e conducted on the basis of parametrics.
These analyses, vhlch the Contractor shall perform,, shall include preli:lnary
operations planning, development of specific sequences of events, development
of pa_uamer and co,and requirements, estieatea of the quality and
qtlantlty of the scientific data t_ be returned, and the requirements for
traJe@tory control.
11
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b.3.3.2 Operational Mission Design - In response to
Mission Definition No. _, appendix 16, the Contractor shall perform
and document the detail design of the operational missions. The coerall
operational mission _estgns shall cover (for nominal and alterne.te
sdssions) the entire aission from lift-off to cessation of dsSa return
fl'cm Mars, and shall include at least a definition of the launc_ arrival,
landAng and end-of-etssion periods, the sequences of events, spact_.aft
control parameters, the trajectories and traJectory-:'elated parameters,
the requirements for trajectory control, and an analysis of the science
data to be returned.
_./_ Orbiter S_stem
The Contractor shall rccoe_end to the Langley Research Center
for approval the interface requirements between the Viking Orbiter System
(V05) and other Viking systems. The Contrac'tor shall identify and control
through the Langley Research Center all technical and schedule interfaces
related to the VO8 as they affect his tasks under this Statement of Work.
: _._.1 Orbiter Baseline Description
A description of the Govern:ent-fu_nished Orbiter baseline
design is given in appendix 5. The Contractor shall participate in the
development of the final Orbiter design by defining Orbiter requirements
as part of his Spacecraft integration task. Orbiter requirements, as
approved by th_ _angley Research Cente _, will be implemented by the
GoverDmnt.
_.M.I.1 Orbiter-Mounted Lander Support Equipment - The
Contractor shall develop the requirements and performance specifications
for all Orbiter-mounted Lander support equipment.
_.&.l.2 Orbiter Baseline Modifications - The Contractor
shall identify any Orbiter baseline e_xtifications which wo_ld enhance the
achieveaant of the Project objectives.
_,_.2 Test Models and 8tmulators
M._.2.1 The Contractor shall furnish Lan_te_" +.eat models
and sisulators for Orbiter development and testing.
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_._.2.2 The Contractor shall identify and submit for
approval the requirements for Orbiter tes_ models and simulators for
Lander development and testing.
_.4. 3 Interface Identification and Control
The Contractor shall identify and control through the
Langley Research Center all technical, schedule, and other interfaces
between the Lander and Orbiter.
_-5 Lander System.
_.5.1 General Requirements
The Contractor shall accomplish ell activities such as
: design, development, fabrication, and assembly of the Viking Lander System.
The associated testing responsibility is identified in section _.7 of
this Statement of Work. Three flight-ready Lander capsules are to be
; provided and be mated with the Government-furnished Orbiters: two of
the resulting Vikln 6 Spacecraft shall be mated with and launched on
separate Launch Vehicles in the Mars 1973 launch opportunity; the third
will be a flight backup. Additional Lander c_pst_les as well as components,
subsystems, and systems shall be furnished by the Contractor to support
the development and testing activitiea.
M._.2 Performance Requirements
_.5.2.1 General - The Viking Lander Capsule consists of
components, subsystems, and systens which must function ia an overall
interrelated --nner to accomplish a soft landing and provide the required
entry and surface science measurements. Delineated belue are only those
_tew for which there are special requirements. Constraints, including
those given in section 4.2, shall be adhered to by the Contractor in
_sisnlng the Lander.
_.5.2.2 Science - The Contractor shall furnish all
required entz 7 and surface science in|trtments in accordance with
appendices 1, 16, 17 and 18.
! u
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_.5.2.3 Power - The Contractor shall provide a Lander
power system that utlllz,s Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (R_G's)
for power generation. A baseline design description of the RTG, which
will be Government-furnlshed, is given in appendix h. The Contractor
shall identify to the Langley Research Center for approval
any changes required to the baseline RTG design in order to satisfy Lander
power and integration needs. The Contractor shall prepare the Safety
Anal_Gis Report required to obtain approval for the launch of an RTG system.
h.5.2.h Communications - The Contractor shall furnish
a Lander co_unicatlon system capable of: (!) relaying Lander data via
the Orbiter, and (2) transmitting data directly to Earth and receiving
co1_ands directly from Earth. The co_unicatlon system shall inclt_de
the data handling and storage capability required to satisfy all data
requirements including those identified in section h.2.h.4 and
appendices 1 and 19.
The dlrect-to-Earth llnk shall have the
empablllty to provide: (I) range and range-rate data while simultaneously
transmitting Lander telemetry data other than imagery, and (2)
simultaneous transmission of imagery and telemetry. The criterion for
link design shall be that the performance margin is equal to or greater
than the linear sum of the adverse tolerances of all link parameters.
Relay llnk capability shall be such that
about 107 bits of surface data can be transferred from the Lander during
each co_unlcation session with the Orbiter; direct-link capability shall
be such that about 106 bits of surface data can be transferred each day
thro_h the 90th day after landing. The Lander shall be capable of
receiving co.ands from Earth at distances up to _00 X 106 kin. Adequate
command storage/progremer capability to ac_o_lish the planned milalon
_all be provided onboard the Lan_er,
The functional interface of %he relay c_ca-
tion lank with the C_eernme_t-furniahed Orbiter shall be at the RF path.
l&
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" The Contractor shall accomplish the overall design for the relay
co,nunication system including the development of the requirements and
performance specifications for all elements of the link and for implementing
those hardware elements which are Lander-mounted. Upon Langley Research
Center approval, the recommended Orbiter-mounted equipment will be
provided by the Government.
The relay coa_unication system shall be
de|igned so that any Orbiter can serve as a relay for any Lander.
_._.3 Lander-Orbiter Adapter
The adapter between the Lander Capsule and the Orbiter
(fig. 2) shall be furnished by the Contractor. The Government _rill
provide a suitable mounting face on the Orbiter to which the adapter can
be attached.
: _.6 _aunch Vehicle, Nose Fairin_1 and Titan/Centaur Launch Facilities
The Contractor shall recommend to she Langley Research Center
for approval the interface requirements between the Spacecraft and the
Launch Vehicle, nose fairing, associated ground equipment and the Titan/
Centaur launch facilities. The Contractor shall identify and control
through the Langley Research Center, all technical and schedule interfaces
related to his tasks under this Statement of Work.
_.6.1 Launch Vehicle
The Contractor shall utilize the Launch Vehicle data
given in figures _, _, and 6 and appendix 2 in accomplishing h'_s tasks.
b.6._ Nose Fairing
The Contractor shall use a Spacecraft dynamic envelope,
within the Government-furnished nose fairing, not to exceed 12-1/2 feet
in dia_:ter by 19 feet in length.
_,6.3 Titan/Centaur Launch Facilities
The Contractor shall utilize Government-furnished ETR Titan/
Centaur facilities to the maximum extent possible. He shall define and submit to
_he Langley Research Cancer as socm as practical his Titan/Centaur ETR
facility requireue_ta.
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h.6.1_ Required _4odif_cations
The Co_tractor shall identify and furnish his require-
ments for any _tlsslon-peculiar Launch V_hicle or nose fairing
modificatlonB. He shall also identify any mission-peculiar Spacecraft
or engineering measurements to be transmitted via the Launch Vehicle
telemtry system.
E.6.5 launch Vehicle Availability
The Contractor's plans shall recognize that only one
launch pad (No. MI) is available for the Viking Project and that the
time between the launch of the first vehicle and the availability of
the second Launch Vehicle on th@ pad, ready for mounting of the Space-
craft, will be approxim-tely IO days.
_.d.6 Spacecraft T_st Models and Simulators
The Contractor shall fu_'nlsh Spacecraft test models
and eimllators for Launch Vehicle development and testing.
_.6.7 Supporting Analyses and Data
The Contractor shall provide mAssion-related data and
mlyses necessary to support the development by the Gover_ent of
Launch Vehicle trajectory and firing tables, vehicle loads analysis, etc.
The Contractor shall _evelop and i_lement a test _rogram that
will provide a high level of confidence that all Project _ectives will
be achieved.
_.L1 Master Integrated Test Plan
The Contractor lha_l prQpare, submit for approval, and
periodically update a Master InteF _ed Test Plan. The plan shall define -
the test objectives, concepts, specizAcatior_,, requiremnts, location#,
e_figuratiens, facility and support requirements, flovs, sc_e4ttles, and
data repo_tin_ for el£ teats neeesNry during the development, qualAfiea-
tion testing, acceptance testing, proof testing, udssion slR_latlon and
other phases of the Project. The Ce_tr_ctor shall also submit fo_ approval
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1_emmendations for fllght acceptance and proof teat environmental levels.
_e Langley Research Center _rlll suppl_ data on Government-furnished items
aS required by the Contractor for the integrated test plan.
k.7.2 Lander Capsule Component Tests
Component tests shall be performed to verify comp14ance
_th lander Cal_Jule component level specifications prior to, durin8 if
applicable, and after exposure to Viking Lander Capsule component Flight
Acceptance Teat (FAT), and/or Proof Test (PT) environments representing all
phases of the mission, including sterilization.
k.7.3 Viking Lander Capsule Testa
Tests shall be performed to verify coup]dance with
Zfmbr 8peclficatl_a prior to, during if aGpL_ble, and after exposure
to FAT and/or PT environments, including sterilization. Lander
efmpatil;lltt¥ with the Trackln_ and Data $yste_ shall also be dem_strated
in accordance with the requiremmnts of appendix 19.
I*.7.1'VtkJ.ng Spacecraft Testa
_ Aa a miniumm, tests shall be performed to verify (1)
T_]der/Orbitar functional coupatibili*.y; (2) the ability to perform in
8pacification prior to, durin£ if applicable, and after expoem-e to FAT
_d/or PT environments; (3) Launch Vehicle and Tracktn K and Data 8_rstea
¢ompatibi]dt¥; (_) prelauneh testing at the apace vehicle
_rval sufficient to coemit to launch.
k.?._ Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)
The Contractor shall furutsh all AGE such as that
required to develop, assemble, test, sterilize, handle, transp(wt_ checkout
and service the Viking Lander Capsule and Viking Spacecraft, except for
the Government-furi_tshed equipment (section _.0). AGE t8 defined in
: table 1.
_.8 Laul_b a_d F]_ht ODerat_e System
k.8.1 General
C_t_raet(w 8hell plmn, deal£n, develop, luplemeat,
test, and participate In the operatlon of the Launch _ld F31Kht operations
8ystea requ£red to ac_348h the mission. Re shall integrate, throu4ih
11
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.e "r_ley Research Center, the OOvernment-furnlshed elements Int_
t_a_ system.
b.8._ Planning
The Contractor _hall prepare a Master Launch and Flight
Operations Yntegratton plan which outlines the overall system planning
approach. To implement that approved Master Plan, the Contractor shall
prepare a detailed plan for each major _absystem or element for
approval. Examples of such plans include: Launch Operations Plan, Flight
Operations Pla:_, Software Develcpment PIAn, Simulation and Training Plan,
Operations System Tea ,_ ._!an, and Operations System Design Plan.
&.8.3 Design and Development
The Contractor shall utilize the approved plans to
design and levelop the Launch and Flight Operations System, includLng
establishment of the requirements for _overnmert-furnished data,
equi_ent, facilitles, and support.
_.8._ Implementation
The Contractor shall furnish all facilities, equipment,
moftware, services, and materials required to implement the system design
with the exception of those items which are Government-furnished. He
shall prepare and maintain all required operations system schedules. All
|otters and equipment utilized in the Launch and Flight Operations System,
whether C_ractor or Government-furnished, shall be identified and
referred to as Operational @upport _quipment (OSE). It is an NASA policy
to exclude Contractor-furnished 0SE in those facilities which constitute
_e T1"eckingand Data System. Deviations from this policy require special
approval. The Contractor shall identify to the Langley Research C-nter for
approval any mIHion-dependent 0SE required in the Tracking and Data
8ysteL If such 0E is not presently identified as 5overnmnt-furnlshed,
it Id]£ be provided by the Government. _E is defIMd in table I.
_.8._) CcmpattbilAty Testing
The Contrae,or I)1111 cond@et tests to demonstrate
eeqatibtlity between the Launch and Plight Operations System and its
m_or interfacing Project elements in accordallce with an approved plan.
REPRODUCIBILITY'OF THE ORIGINA,L, PAGE. IS,.POOR.
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k.8.6 Training
T_ _ Contractor sha_ train Government and Contractor
persormel for the conduct of la_eh and flight operations in accordance
with an approved plan. Trsinin_ shall be conducted by the use of
classr_ sessions and mission simulation exercises.
_.8. ? Operations
The Contractor shall participate with the _cvernment
in the operation of the Launch and FllEht Operations System in accordlmce
with approved plans.
k.8.8 Mission Data
P_lsstcn data are defined as all data i_merste_ _. from _
launch throagh cessation of data return. _'
_.8.8.1 Mission Data P]an._ - The Contractor shal_ pre_re
plans and associated proc..dures for the collection, indexing, handling, _"
processing, reducticl_, delivery and reporting of all _.lssion data.
k.8.8.2 Date Collection IndexinE and Delivery ° The
Co_tractor shall collect, Index, and deliver all _ssion data except
for Launch Vehicle data and the _overnment-prepared easter data records
in accordance with approved p_n_. The Contractor shall package and
transport t_ese data from the p_int of orion to the Langley Research
Center end/or other locations to be specified by the C_vert_nt.
_.8o8. _ $upportint _nfor_ation o The Contractor shall
4_elop and pr_tde al_ necessary entry and Lander science support
lnft_mtion Includin_ m but not lie_ted to, instru_nt calibrations and
teagery support_n8 data such as photo orientation, location, sun angle, !
photo geometry scale, and resolution. _-
k.8.8._ Date _eduction and Re_rtin_ - Launch Vehicle,
Orbiter, and Trackln_ and _ta $¥st_ perf_nc_ data compilation and
a_alysis _ill be performed by the _over_nt. The Contractor ehall
utilize those data alq #Ith his Lander i_rfor_nce analysis to produce
_eral_ mission _rform_nca reports in accordance with approved pl_s.
19
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"_ g.8.8.5 Poltoglsai_ Data l_-ocesalng- _ C_tractor
, ahall _entl_y the requirements for post-_flsslcn data processlns.
Be ehsLl generate the software requtr_l, perfora the necessary operations,
and deliver the processed data to the Langley Reuarch Center.
_.0 _ P_TICIPATION
The NASAwill deteradn@ P_o_eet objectives, re_lremnts, and
policy during the fu_illmeut of the contract. Thro_hout the oou_N
Ct the co_trect the N_A will assess the perfo_e of the C_tl'a_oa"
_n his execution of' the contract and rill participate to the _rt_%
deemed necessary, vithin the te_s and cca_ditidns of this cGatraet_ to
assure satisl'actory mana4ement , _a_, integration, and imple_tation
: as required .o sucCesSfully achieve the Project obJectivts.
7
1974020203-553
536
VIKING PROJECT HARDWARE TERMINOLOG'f AND DEFINITIONS
YiKir,_ Lander System (VLS) - The Lander Capsule and all associated
_'O%U_ equipment,
Vlkln_ Lander Capsule [VLC) - All elements of the Lander Capsule
(bioshield, aeroshell, parachute, lander, etc.) transported to Mars b 7
the Orbiter.
Vikin_ _ar_er (VL} - Those elements which acccap].tsh the soft landir4
om the planet surface.
_ioshield Cap - The section of b4,_ehi_ld Jettisoned prior to lander
separation.
_i_shle_d _ase - The blo_le_ a_terbody which remains attached to
the Orbiter after the Lander mepmmtion.
Vikini lander Capsule Adspter * The intersttge structure which
Joins the Yikin_ Orbiter and the Vt_ Lander Capsule.
.ViktflK Orbiter SYstem _V06} - All O_btter f_.lJ,,_ head, re amd Croumd
eq_pment.
V]klnl Orbiter (VQ) - The fIA_ht article which transporta the
the release point in Mars orbit end makes orbital s_ lense owa_te.
yllrlnE 8mcecraft (V 8/C) * The VLC-VO eoMDinatlen exclnd/_ the
Launch Vehicle to V-8/C sdapt_r.
Launch Veh_ete (LV) o The Titan/Centaur as modified for t_¢ V%Idn_
_dealon.
yiktna f_asecreft AdsD_e T - The _lapter betw'on the Vlkin_ f_pacecr_f_.
and launch Veh:lcle inel_ln4 the i_lation £ta_.ra_
Launch Vehicle _et_ - The Titan/Centaur and ell Ls_eh Vehicle
J'J£sht ha_lv_.e (nose fairieS, etc.), leunch facilities and a_atad
_ eq_lpmnt.
%_b£_ |_¢e Vehicle - Yho entire vehicle thst le¢,v_o the _Ltth'8
mzrfac_.
_r_mace _ B_d_nt (A_) - All ,_t aid as_'_det_ so_t_
._pa/a'ed to develop, ee_e_b_t st_ilAse, ehe_out, test, handle, _neport,
_t service the VIE, VO, end V-8/C prior to eountd_n and leuneh.
"* _/'Imsre ,e_tr_l to _t the _iaAa_, _o_a_, _a_c_ and fl3_t
o_reti_.
_Un_l
m
1974020203-554
%• 1
•537
VIKIH_ PROJECT HARI_ARE _"_NOLOGY AND 'DEFINITIONS - TABLE 1 Continued
_auneh and Flight Opera "4 ons Ss__m - Equipment, sot_oware,
personnel and procedurel to conduct spacecraft prelaunch add launch
operations and the flight control of the spacecraft in accomplishing
i the mission o_j¢ctives.
• Tracktn K and Data 8_rstem - A selected col_ctio_ of FArth-based !
e_udpaen:, personnel, and procedures that acquires, transmit.-, and
processes tnfor_ationtfor the de_erminatio_ of a space vehie%e_s
- _ position, velocity, and performance.
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LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
ANNOUNCEMENT DATE
: February 19, 1969
SUBJECT: Establishment of Techr_;cal and Manage_.:entEvaluation Committees -
Viking Lander System and Project Integration - NASA Request for
_rooo,_ r.31LlO-qSo0
l, Two Evaulation Committees are hereby established to assist the Source Evaluation
Board in evaluating different area_ of the proposals covering subject requirement,
as co, mtained in RequeSt for Proposal L10-9800. which vJill be required to accomplish
the objectives of this prJcurement. Personnel are assigned as follows:
I. Technicdl Eva)uation Committee
1. Taback, Chalrma_, Viking Project Office, Langley
L. D. Guy, Structures Research Division, Langley
E. &. Brun_er, Viking Project Office, Langle_
W. J Boyer, Viking ProJect Office, Langley
N L. Crabill, Viking P_oject Office, Langley
E. B. Geer, Flieht Vehicles and Systems DivisLon, Langley
C. L. G_llis, Applied Materials ana Physics Division, Langley
J. M. Hallisey, Jr., Applied MateriaI_ and Phtsics Division, Langley
G. A _offen, Vikin 9 Project Office, Langley
J. E Stitt,'Flight Instrumentation Div!sion, Langley
A, T Young, Viking Project Office, Langley
F. E. Mershon, Viking ProJect Office, Langley
IS. Management Evaluation Committee
E. C. Kilgore, Chairman, Ensineering and _echnical Services, Langley
C, T. Brown, Flight Vehiclc_ and Systems Division, Langley
W, R. Glenny, Procurement Di.i_ion, Langley
A, luastaterro, Vlking ProJect Office, Langley
R. H. Sproull, Viking Project Office, Langley
D. G. StOne, Analysis and Computation Division, Langley
D. B. Ahearn, Procure.ment Division, Langley
2. The Technical Evaluation Committee will be assisted by panels Which will have
the following membership:
|. Science Panel
G. ¢. Broome, Chairman, Viking Project Office, Eangl_y
W. H. Michael, Jr., Aeronautical and Space Nechanl_$ Dlvllion, Ltngley
M. A. Mitz, NASA Headquarters
G. A. $offen, Viking ProJect Office, Langley
G. P. Wood, l,ero-Physics Division, Langley
A. T. Young, Viking ProJect Office, Langh_
S. T. Peterson, Instrument Research Division, Langley
........ -_.
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If. Mission Analysis .and Design Panel
N. L. Crabill, Chairman, Viking Project Office, Langley
J. F. Newcomb, Jr., Viking Project Office, Langley
C. H. Robins, Jr., Viking Project Office, Langley
R. H. Tolson, Viking Project Office, Langley
G. R. Young, Applied Materials and Physics Division, Ldngley
E. F. Harrison, Aero-Physics Division, Langley
Ill, Electronics Panel
E. A. Brun_er, Chairman, Viking ProJect Office, Langley
E. M. Bracalent_t Instrumentation Division, Langley
W. T. Bundick, Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
W. F. Cuddihy, Viking Project Office, Langley
R. P. Faust, Viking Pro ect Office, Langley '.
C. H. Green, Jr., Viking ProJect Office, Langley
R. F. Harrington, Viking"Project Office, Langley
IV. Po_Rr and Electrical Integration Panel
R 0. Sheath, Chairman, Viking Project Office. Langley
J. t Patterson, Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
R. C. Wells, Flight Vehicles and _ystems Division, Langley
V. PropuJsinn and Guidance and Control Panel
H. J. E Reid, Jr., Chairman, Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
T. B. Ballard, Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
O. J. Carter, Jr., Viking Project Oifice, Langley
H. K. Clark, Flight Vehicles and Systems Oivlsion, Langley
L. J. DeRyder0 Jr., Viking Project Office, Langley
C. 0. Engle, Viking Project Office, Langley
J. L. Jones, Jr., Vikin 9 Project Office, Langley
P. R. Kurzhals, Applied Materials and Physics Division, Langley
R. O. Staib, Analysis and Computation Division, Langley
V|. Engineerine Mechanics Panel
F. E. Mershon, Chairman, Viking ProJect Office, Langley
L. 0. Guy, Structures Research Division, Langley
P. J. Bobbitt, Oynamic Loads Division, Langley
T. W. E. Hankinson, Viking Project Office, Langley
J. C. McFall, Jr., ApplieO Materials and Physics Oiviston,.Laflgley
I. W. Ramsey, Viking Project Office, Langley
J. 0. Timmons, Viking Project Office, Langley
R. E. Turner, Applied Materials and Physics Division, Langley
W. C. Falk, F;;_,_ vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
REPRODUCIBILITYOF THE ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR. i
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VII. Sterilization and Planetary Quarantine Pa_l
L. P. Daspit, Chairman, Vikin 9 Project Office, Langley
O. S. Childre_s, Jr., Viking Project Office, Langley
O. G. Fox, NASA Headquarters
J. F. Zanks, Flight Instrumentatim, Oivtsion, Langley
VIII. Launch and Flight Operations F=ne/
W, J. Boyer, Chairmen, Viking Project Office, Langley
J. B. Graham, Jr., Viki_ 9 Project Office, Langley
U. M. Lovelace, Viking Project OFfice, Langley
O. H. Ward, Viking Project Office, Langley
O. D. Webb, Viking Project Office, Langley
IX. Testin9 Panel
W. |. Watson, Chcirman, Viking Project Office, Langley
R. L. Girouard, Viking Project Office, Langley
'_ N.A. Holmberg, Viking Project Office, Langley
M. L. Smith, J,., Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
X. Mission Assurance
E. H. Brits, Chairman, Office of Director, Langley
G. W. Brev,_r, viking Project Office, Langley
M. J. Pilny, Viking Project Office, Langley
H. H. Ricker, Jr., Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
M. B. Seyffert, Fabricatio,_ Division, Langley
W. L. _rvi, Jr., Viking Project Office, Langley
]. The Management Evaluation Z_:_ittee will be assisted by panels which will have
ti=e following membership:
I. Management Effectiveness Panel
O. O. Stone, Chairman, Analysis end Computation Division, Lingley
A. Ouastafer,o, Viking Project Office, Langley
C. T. Brown, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
A. Management Control and Procedures Subpanel
A Guastaterro, Chairman, Viking P_oject Office, Langley
T. N. Bartron, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
H. B. Bland, Resource_ Progrimming and Control, Langley
W. R. Glenny, Procurement Division, Langley
J. R. Hall, Space Vehicle Design Criteria Office, Langley
E. J. Janota, Procurement Division, Langley
H. T. Thornton, Jr,, Flight Vehicles and Systems DivisiOn, Langley
F. V. Moore, Procurement Oivision, Langley
?
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B. Sch_du)e and ]tnpl_mentation Subpane,I
C. T. Brown, Chairman, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
H. J, Curtman, Jr., Applied Materials and Physics Division, Langley
J E. Harris. Viking Pro _ct Office, Langley
F. E. J_nnin_s, Viking Pro oct Office, Langley
J F. M_Nulty, Flight Vehicles and Systems Oivision, Langley
J M. Mlch.,_l, Resources Programming and Control, Langley
Y: W. M. Moore, Flight |nstrumentation Oivision, Langley
J. O. Pride, Jr.. Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
H V. FullLr , Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
H. Qualification and Cost Panel
O. B. Ahearn, Chairm_n, Procuremen" Division, Langley
R. H Sproull, Vikin_ Project Office, Langley
W. R. Gl_nny, Procur_nlent DivisiOn, Langley
A. Capability and Capacity Su_papel
R. H. Sproull, Chairman Viking Project Office, Langley
V. W. Ander_nn, NASA H_ad_uartefs
W. E, Craig, Jr., Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
C. M Lord, Jr., Procurement Division, Langley
.; W. Mayo, F!i:,ht V_h_ies and Syste_,_ Osvislon, Langley
J L. Rapur, Applied Motcr=als and Physics Oivision, Langley
1. G. R_cant, V_king Projvct Office, Langley
C. Thiele, Fabricatson D=,ision, Langley
E. J Wolff, FliGht Vehi_l,,. and Systems Division, Langley
B. COSt, Fee _nd Incentives Subpanel
W. R. Clenny, Chairman, Procurement Division, Langley
O. B. Abeam, Procurement Division, Langley
C. T. Brown, Flight Vehiclvs and Systems Division, Langley
A. Guastaf_rro, Vikin 9 Project Ottl_c, Lan,jiey
A. J. Hansbrough, Resour_L.s Programming and Control, Langley
* _. M. MOOre, Flight Instrumentation Division, Langley
t F. V. Moore, Procurement Division, Langley
_. I. Njxon, Procurement Oivisson, Lanqley
N O. G. Stont', Analysis and Computation Division, Lar31ey
R. H. Sproull, Viking Pro_ect Office, Langley
* E. J. Wolff, Flight Vehicles and Systems Division, Langley
(_ Oual Capacity - Costing information to be received approximately
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4. it is anticipated that the Committee , Panels, and Subpanels cited above will
be augmented by Jet Propulsion laboratory, _oddard _pace Flight Center, Manned
Spacecraft Center, Kennudy Space Cent,'r, and Ames Research Cent(r personnel. Names of
these indlvlduaIs _Jll bo provided prior to the due date of proposals.
5. The duties of the C_rnmittecs, Pane)s, and _ubpanels will be to assist the
Source Evaluation 8o_rj in arrzving at its assessments of the proposals lr, the
manner to be prescribed by the Source Evaluation Board. %n this connection, an
Evaluation Plan _=11 be provided prior co receipt of proposals.
6. Attention of all Committee, Panel, and Subpanel members is directed to NASA
Procurement Regulation 3.804-k which prohibits the disclosure of information
regardin 9 this e_aluation to anyone _ho is not also participating in the simm
evaluation proceedings. The right to xnformation does not extend to the norn_ml
chain of supervision affecCin 9 any panel member.
,_,...['_,/3,_',.',"C. Oraley
Chitrma_, Source Evaluation 3oard
APPROVCD:
,. .....
Edgar H. Corcri_Et
D!rector
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¥1king ProJect Office
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All Research Division Chiefs
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